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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The documentary credit has for a long time served as a very reliable form of financial 
instrument in the trading of international goods.  The certainty of payment guaranteed under 
the documentary system is attributed to the autonomous nature of the credit contract, which is 
that it is independent of and unaffected by the contract of sale which it supports. So long as 
the documents which are presented strictly comply with the terms of the credit, the paying 
bank will be under an obligation to pay. However, documents which are non-compliant are 
also frequently presented in practice. The autonomous characteristic of the instrument also 
gives rise to problems because there are circumstances where, even though compliant 
documents are tendered, payment made under the credit would be unfair. 
 
This thesis attempts to investigate the various grounds which could provide a basis for 
withholding payment under a documentary credit. From the perspective of all the main 
parties involved in a documentary credit transaction, issues relating to payment are of utmost 
importance. Discrepant documents and fraud, which are well established as valid grounds, 
will be examined. The thesis will also explore other possible grounds to withhold payment 
such as illegality, nullity, unconscionability and breach of negative stipulations which exist in 
the underlying contract connected to the credit. The parameters of these grounds will be 
identified and where appropriate, recommendations will be made.  
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO DOCUMENTARY CREDITS
This chapter will begin by exploring the nature and function of the documentary credit (also 
known as letters of credit) and the relevant legal sources relating to the instrument. What will 
follow is an explanation of how documentary credit transactions work and the principles 
operative in such transactions. The writer will then examine the various types of credit, 
identifying their main features and the differences between them. Essentially, this chapter 
provides the background to understanding the analysis and ideas discussed in subsequent 
chapters of this thesis. 
1.1 Definition 
UCP 600 Article 2 defines credit as “any arrangement, however named or described, that is 
irrevocable and thereby constitutes a definite undertaking of the issuing bank to honour a 
complying presentation.” Another definition can be found in § 5-102(a)(10) of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC): 
“Letter of credit means a definite undertaking … by an issuer to a beneficiary at the request or for 
the account of an applicant or, in the case of a financial institution, to itself or for its own account, to 
honor a documentary presentation by payment or delivery of an item of value.”
Whichever definition is used, the documentary credit is simply a written instrument which 
provides a promise by a bank to pay a sum of money, within a specified time, to a stated party 
on behalf of its customer provided that the terms and conditions specified in the credit are 
satisfied. Essentially, the terms and conditions of the credit involve the presentation of 
documents which evidence the shipping of goods of a certain specification by the seller.
21.2 The role of the documentary credit
In international sale transactions, the parties involved operate their business in different 
countries and the goods are transported across national borders. Immediate payment in 
exchange for goods is practically impossible. Various factors such as currency exchange 
restrictions, political risks and the physical distance between the parties create a lack of trust 
and uncertainty for the parties involved. 
From a seller’s point of view, he will be reluctant to incur expenses for the shipment of the 
goods and more importantly to part with his goods without an assurance of payment from the 
seller. Once the goods are exported to another country, it will be very inconvenient and 
expensive for him to repossess the goods and recover any unpaid purchase price from the 
buyer since any legal issues are likely to be governed by the law of another jurisdiction. From 
the buyer’s point of view, he would certainly be unwilling to make payment before delivery 
without the assurance that goods will be delivered to him and that they will conform to the 
contract of sale. If the goods are not delivered to him, or the goods delivered do not conform 
to the contract of sale, he may face the difficulties and inconvenience of pursuing the seller in 
a foreign jurisdiction.  
Therefore, a sophisticated tool such as the documentary credit was invented to finance 
international trade. As early as the twelfth century the documentary credit was used by 
merchants to reduce the various risks involved in trade. 1 The documentary credit is able to 
address effectively both the seller’s and the buyer’s concerns because the bank steps in, 
substituting the buyer as the party who will make payment to the seller. The bank is a suitable 
intermediary because of its sufficient credit standing and the banking facilities it possesses 
abroad. With the documentary credit, a seller is provided with security of payment since the 
bank is under a legal obligation to pay him so long as he presents documents which conform 
                                                
1 For a discussion of the history of the letter of credit, see Holdsworth, “The Origins and Early History of 
Negotiable Instruments (II)” (1915) 31 LQR 173; B. Kozolchyk, Commercial Letters of Credit in the Americas-
A Comparative Study of Contemporary Commercial Transactions (Matthew Bende, New York 1966) 3. 
3to the conditions of the credit. As for the buyer, he can be assured that the goods which 
conform to their agreement are delivered before payment is made.
Despite the advantages offered, there remain some elements of risk in the use of the 
documentary credit for both the buyer and seller, as later chapters in this thesis will reveal. 
The security of payment provided to the seller is not absolute as documents are frequently 
rejected, whilst the buyer’s assurance of the goods may be affected by fraud. There is a chance 
that the parties may still need to resort to litigating their disputes in a foreign court. 
Nevertheless, the documentary credit remains one of the most indispensable instruments in the 
financing of international trade and has been described as “the life blood of international 
commerce”2.
1.3 The Uniform Customs and Practice
Due to the international operation of the documentary credit, it would benefit the commercial 
community tremendously if documentary credit transactions could be standardised by an 
adoption of an international code of practice. In 1933, the Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documentary Credits (the UCP) was introduced by the International Chamber of Commerce 
(the ICC) to provide a set of uniform rules on many aspects of the documentary credit. The 
UCP reflects accepted banking custom and practice around the world and would logically be 
updated periodically. It was revised in 19513, 19624, 19745, 19836 and 19937 and 20078. The 
sixth revision, known as the UCP 600 is the one currently in use and came into force on 1st
July 2007. The UCP 600 is also supplemented by the eUCP which sets out rules concerned 
with the presentation of electronic records, either alone or with paper-based records.
  
                                                
2 R.D.Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v. National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] Q.B 146, 155 per Kerr LJ.
3 UCP 222.
4 UCP 290.
5 UCP 400.
6 UCP 459.
7 UCP 500.
8 UCP 600.
4     It needs to be pointed out that the UCP is not a code having the force of law. It is an 
international agreement which will only apply if it is expressly incorporated into a credit 
contract. Article 1 UCP 600 provides the following: 
The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, 2007 Revision, ICC Publication no. 
600 ("UCP") are rules that apply to any documentary credit ("credit") (including, to the extent to 
which they may be applicable, any standby letter of credit) when the text of the credit expressly 
indicates that it is subject to these rules. They are binding on all parties thereto unless expressly 
modified or excluded by the credit.
Despite lacking the force of law, the UCP is undeniably of great importance in the practice of 
the documentary credit, as is evident by its incorporation into almost all documentary credits 
used in international trading. One commentator refers to it as “the most successful 
harmonizing measure in the history of international commerce, which has removed a plethora 
of technical problems that would have undermined the smooth operation of letter and credit.”9
    Containing 39 Articles, the UCP 600 does not cover every possible area of dispute which 
may arise - for example, the effect of fraud is not comprehensively provided by the UCP. It 
was deliberately created this way as it is thought that many matters are most suitably decided 
by national courts. 
1.4 Operation of the documentary credit
It is not the aim of this thesis to provide a detailed account of the mechanics of the 
documentary credit in practice.10 However, this section will go through the various stages in a 
documentary credit transaction to provide a general understanding of the way it works in 
international trading.
                                                
9 Xiang Gao, The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study (1st edn, Kluwer Law 
International, London, 2003) 18.
10
For a detailed account see R Jack, Documentary credits: the law and practice of documentary credits 
including standby credits and demand guarantees (4th edn Tottel, Haywards Heath 2009); Richard King, 
Gutteridge and Megrah's Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits (8th edn, London, New York, Europa 
Publications, 2001).
5The contract of sale
The documentary credit process begins with the buyer agreeing to purchase goods from the 
seller at an agreed price. The parties agree that the purchase price is to be paid by 
documentary credit. The sales agreement between the parties is commonly referred to as the 
underlying contract in documentary credit transactions. One leading expert cautions of 
ambiguity and recommends the underlying contract to set out in detail the description of the 
goods, quantity, unit price, the type of credit, the place where the credit is to be opened, 
advised or confirmed, the time by which it should opened, the duration it is to be available and 
the documents which are required for payment to be made.11
Application by buyer to his bank
To set up a documentary credit, the buyer (the applicant or account party) will apply to a bank 
in his country (the issuing bank) to issue a documentary credit in favour of the seller (the 
beneficiary). By issuing the credit, the issuing bank undertakes to make payment of a sum of 
money to the seller upon presentation of the specified documents. The buyer will need to 
provide precise instructions to his bank as to the type of credit he needs and the documents 
that the seller needs to submit in order to comply with the terms of the credit. Once the buyer’s 
application of the credit is accepted, a contract is formed between the buyer and the issuing 
bank. The issuing bank must act in accordance with the instructions of the buyer in order to 
receive its reimbursement from the buyer. 
Advising of the credit to the beneficiary
It is possible for an issuing bank to issue a documentary credit directly to the beneficiary. But, 
in international trading, this is almost never the case and the issuing bank will instruct a 
correspondent bank, which could be its branch or any other bank in the seller’s location, to 
advise the seller of the opening of the credit in his favour. The responsibility of the 
correspondent bank is to:
                                                
11 R Jack (n 10) 3.2.
6 inform the beneficiary of the opening of the credit and its terms and conditions.
 receive documents and check that the documents are compliant
 make payment
If the seller has requested the buyer to open a confirmed credit, the correspondent bank is also 
the confirming bank, adding its own undertaking to honour a compliant presentation. On the 
other hand, in an unconfirmed credit, the correspondent bank merely acts as an advising bank.
Presentation of documents and payment
Once the seller has been notified by the correspondent bank of the opening of the credit, the 
seller will review the terms of the credit. Where the seller is not able to comply with any of the 
credit terms, he needs to contact the buyer to request an amendment. If the seller is certain that 
the credit terms conform to the terms of the underlying sales contract, he will dispatch the 
goods (or anything else required) to obtain the necessary documents. When all the necessary 
documents are obtained, he must submit the documents to the nominated bank (usually the 
same correspondent bank which advised the seller). This bank will inspect the submitted 
documents to ensure that they comply strictly with the terms of the credit. If the submitted 
documents are in order, the nominated bank/confirming bank is obliged to make payment to 
the seller. 
Remittance of Documents
The documents relating to the goods will be remitted by the correspondent bank to the issuing 
bank, which will then examine the documents. Once satisfied that the documents are in order, 
the issuing bank will make payment to the correspondent bank.
7Release of Documents
Finally, the issuing bank releases the documents to the buyer, who will reimburse the bank in 
any way agreed between them. As soon as the goods arrive in the buyer’s country, the buyer 
can then obtain possession of the goods by presenting the bill of lading to the master of the 
ship.
Operation of the documentary credit
    From the above account, it can be seen that a documentary credit transaction typically 
involves several legal relationships. Firstly, there is the underlying contract of sale between 
the buyer and the seller. Secondly, a contract is formed between the applicant (buyer) and the 
issuing bank pertaining to the issuance of the credit - the issuing bank agrees to pay upon 
presentation of the specified documents whilst the applicant agrees to reimburse the issuing 
bank for the money paid. Thirdly, a contract between the issuing bank and the beneficiary 
(seller) is established where the former agrees to pay the seller against presentation of 
8complying documents. Fourthly, a contract exists between the the issuing bank and the 
correspondent bank whereby the correspondent bank agrees to act in accordance with the 
instructions of the issuing bank whilst the issuing bank agrees to pay the correspondent bank. 
In the case of a confirmed credit, a fifth contract exists between the confirming bank and the 
beneficiary. 
    However, it should be noted that although term contract is used to reflect the binding nature 
of the undertakings, the third contract does not fit in with the traditional concepts of contract 
law:
   
“First, a letters of credit is issued by the issuer to the beneficiary. It takes effect 
from the moment when it is issued, and therefore the theory of offer and 
acceptance of contract law does not apply. Second, the letter of credit is an 
undertaking by the issuer to substitute its financial strength for that of the 
applicant and it does not need consideration from the beneficiary to the issuer for 
the credit to be binding.” 12
The same can be said of the fifth contract. Many theories of formation of contract have
been advanced for the legal enforceability of the bank’s obligation but it is commonly  
regarded that the documentary credit is a sui generis (of its own kind). 13
                                                
12 Xiang Gao (n 9) 14. See also M Clarke, "Bankers' Commercial Credits Among the High Trees" [1974] CLJ 
260, 261
13
EP Ellinger, Documentary Letters of Credit (University of Singapore Press, Singapore 1970) Chapters III, IV 
and V; Mugasha, The Law of Letters of Credit and Bank Guarantees (The Federation Press, Sydney, 2003) 30; C 
Joseph, "Letters of Credit: The Developing Concepts and Financing Function" (1977) 94 Banking LJ 816 at 850.
9Legal relationships arising from a documentary credit transaction
1.5 Fundamental Principles of the Documentary Credit
1.5.1 Principle of Autonomy
The most important principle which governs documentary credits is the principle of autonomy. 
It posits that a documentary credit is separate and independent from the underlying contract of 
sale between the seller and the buyer. It is also independent of the contract between the buyer 
10
and the issuing bank. This principle has been judicially established for a long time.14 The UCP 
600 also specifically incorporates this principle:
Article 4   
Credits v. Contracts
a. A credit by its nature is a separate transaction from the sale or other contract on which it may be 
based. Banks are in no way concerned with or bound by such contract, even if any reference 
whatsoever to it is included in the credit. Consequently, the undertaking of a bank to honour, to 
negotiate or to fulfil any other obligation under the credit is not subject to claims or defences by the 
applicant resulting from its relationships with the issuing bank or the beneficiary.
A beneficiary can in no case avail itself of the contractual relationships existing between banks or 
between the applicant and the issuing bank.
Article 5
Documents v. Goods, Services or Performance
Banks deal with documents and not with goods, services or performance to which the documents 
may relate.
    
    The consequence of the independence principle is that the conditions for a bank’s obligation 
to pay are set out exclusively in the conditions of the credit. If the seller presents documents 
which strictly comply with the credit, the bank is under an obligation to pay the seller within 
the specified time limit, regardless of any disputes which may arise in the underlying contract 
of sale. If there is in fact a breach of the underlying contract of sale by the seller, the buyer’s 
only recourse is to bring an action for damages. Similarly, the paying bank cannot refuse 
payment to the seller on the basis that the buyer has not put it in funds or that it has claims for 
damages or rights of set-off against the buyer.15 It follows from this that courts will not 
generally grant injunctions to enjoin payment under a documentary credit on any of these 
grounds. 
                                                
14 United City Merchants Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168Tukan Timber Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc
[1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep 171; Themehelp Ltd v West [1996] QB 84; Bank of Nova Scotia v. Angelica-Whitewear Ltd. 
and Angelica Corp. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 59.
15 However, the paying bank may have a right to set off the amount that should be paid to the beneficiary against 
a claim it has against the beneficiary if this claim has arisen out of the same underlying contract which gave rise 
to the letter of credit -  Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v Kloeckner & AG [1990] 2 QB 514.
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    The autonomy principle was created and strictly adhered to in order to uphold the 
commercial utility of the documentary credit, ensuring that it functions as a fast and certain 
system of payment in international sales transaction. The principle provides a high degree of 
security and certainty for the seller. In any sale of goods transaction, there is always a 
possibility that the buyer will become insolvent or the possibility that he will attempt to avoid 
or delay payment or reduce the sale price, but the autonomy principle ensures that he will be 
paid regardless of any disputes which may arise under the underlying contract of sale. 
    However, the autonomy principle does create an element of risk for the buyer. For example, 
the seller may have perpetrated fraud but a strict adherence to the autonomy principle would 
mean that the seller would still have a right to be paid. Hence, over time, exceptions have been 
carved out from the autonomy principle, all of which will be discussed in subsequent chapters 
in this thesis. It suffices to mention here that the most recognised exception to the autonomy 
principle is in circumstances where a bank is alerted to fraud perpetrated by the seller. 
1.5.2 Principle of Strict Compliance
The principle of strict compliance follows from the principle of autonomy although both 
principles remain distinguishable concepts. The principle of strict compliance requires sellers 
wishing to receive payment to tender documents which on their face comply strictly with the 
requirements stated in the credit. If the documents strictly conform to the requirements of the 
credit, the bank is under an obligation to pay. Conversely, the bank is under an obligation to 
reject payment if the documents do not strictly conform - it will not consider whether the 
discrepancies in the documents are material or minor, whether the discrepancies affect the 
value or effect of the documents, or whether the relevant stipulations in the documentary 
credit have any real purpose. 
    Moreover, the principle applies to all the contractual relationships arising from a 
documentary credit transaction. The issuing bank can refuse to reimburse the correspondent 
bank if the correspondent bank has made payment to the seller on acceptance of documents 
which do not strictly comply with the credit. If the issuing bank pays the correspondent bank 
12
on acceptance of such documents, the buyer is under no obligation to reimburse the issuing 
bank.
    It needs to be emphasised that the concept of strict compliance refers to documentary 
compliance and does not refer to whether the factual reality behind the documents complies
strictly with the terms of the credit.  Banks “must examine a presentation to determine, on the 
basis of the documents alone, whether or not the documents appear on their face to constitute a 
complying presentation”16 [emphasis added]. Banks are under no duty to investigate the facts 
asserted by the documents.17 Banks are not experts in the diverse trade they finance and would 
not have knowledge of the practice and terminology of any particular trade. If their legal 
obligation was otherwise, banks would be diverted from the performance of their main 
function. There is also no doubt that banks would increase their fees to be commensurate with 
the burden of these additional responsibilities and risks. As a result, the documentary credit 
would not be an affordable system of payment. The unsatisfactory effect of imposing such a 
duty on bankers was also acknowledged by Mocatta J in United City Merchants v Royal Bank 
of Canada: 
“To hold to the contrary might greatly hold up the smooth running of international 
trade and might place on banks exceptionally onerous investigations, which they 
are ill fitted to perform.” 18
   
Schmitthoff provides another rationalisation behind the principle, one which is based on the 
law of agency: 
                                                
16 Article 14(a) UCP 600.
17
Article 34 UCP 600 : A bank assumes no liability or responsibility for the form, sufficiency, accuracy, 
genuineness, falsification or legal effect of any document…, or for the general or particular conditions stipulated 
in a document or superimposed thereon; nor does it assume any liability or responsibility for the description, 
quantity, weight, quality, condition, packing, delivery, value or existence of the goods, services or other 
performance represented by any document, or for the good faith or acts or omissions, solvency, performance or 
standing of the consignor, the carrier, the forwarder, the consignee or the insurer of the goods or any other 
person. 
18 [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 267, 278.
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“…the advising bank is a special agent of the issuing bank and the latter is a 
special agent of the buyer. If an agent with limited authority acts outside that 
authority (in banking terminology: his mandate) the principal is entitled to disown 
the act of the agent, who cannot recover from him and has to bear the commercial 
risk of the transaction.”19
In short, the strict compliance principle ensures that banks do not act beyond the limits 
delineated in the credit.
    Moreover, the principle offers protection to both sellers and buyers. A buyer can be assured 
that he will only be under an obligation to make payment if the seller has presented 
documentary proof that he has performed what was contractually required of him under the 
underlying contract. From the perspective of a seller, there is nothing unfair about the strict 
compliance principle because he has been given the conditions of the credit upfront and would 
have had opportunities to decide if the terms are consistent with the agreed arrangement and 
whether it would be possible for him to produce such documents. Moreover, even if his first 
presentation of documents is rejected, he may re-submit the documents again.20 Sometimes for 
various reasons, a buyer may wish to get out of his agreement with the seller, most commonly 
where the market price of the goods is falling, but sellers are protected by the principle 
because a buyer is obliged to take delivery of compliant documents and will not be able to get 
out of his payment obligation. 
   
    One question which inevitably arises is the degree of strictness which is imposed by the law 
in relation to documentary compliance. The UCP 600 does not contain any express provision 
on the principle of strict compliance, but many of the UCP 600 rules on documentary 
compliance incorporate this principle, whilst some of the rules represent a more liberal 
approach to the strict compliance principle. Chapter 2 will discuss these provisions in detail 
                                                
19 C Murray, D Holloway and D Timson-Hunt, Schmitthoff’s Export Trade-The Law and Practice of
International Trade, 11th edition Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007) 192.
20 Forbes, Forbes, Campbell & Co. v Pelling, Stanley & Co. (1921) 9 Ll.L.Rep. 202. This must be done before 
the expiry date and within the transport document time limit. 
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and examines the type of discrepancies which would allow rejection of the presented 
documents. 
1.6 Types of Documentary Credits
There are several types of credit, differing from each other in many respects such as the 
obligations of the bank, the method of payment, the manner in which the credit is issued or the 
existence of some other specific feature. It is important to be familiar with the types of credit 
because the varying rights and obligations in each category create different levels of risk for 
the parties involved.  
1.6.1 Revocable or Irrevocable Credits
UCP 500 made an express distinction between revocable and irrevocable credits, with Article 
8 UCP 500 stipulating that “a revocable Credit may be amended or cancelled by the Issuing 
Bank at any moment and without prior notice to the Beneficiary.” This means that, in a 
revocable credit, the issuing bank does not actually incur a legal commitment to the
beneficiary.21  UCP 600 no longer mentions the revocable credit. Under UCP 600, a credit is 
now defined as an irrevocable arrangement.22 Accordingly, UCP 600 Article 3 states that, “A 
credit is irrevocable even if there is no indication to that effect.”23 In contrast to a revocable 
credit, an irrevocable credit cannot be revoked or amended unilaterally. So long as the 
beneficiary tenders the correct documents, he will be guaranteed the correct amount of 
payment on time. The irrevocable credit being the default credit will further reduce the use of 
revocable credit, offering more assurance to sellers. Nevertheless, Article 1 of UCP 600 
                                                
21 There are serious risks involved when a seller accepts a revocable credit - see Cape Asbestos Co Ltd v Lloyds 
Bank Ltd [1921] WN 274, where it was held that a bank is under no legal duty to inform the beneficiary with 
reasonable notice about the revocation of the credit.
22 UCP 600Article 2:
Credit means any arrangement, however named or described, that is irrevocable and thereby constitutes a definite 
undertaking of the issuing bank to honour a complying presentation.
23 Where a contract of sale does not indicate whether a revocable or irrevocable credit is should be opened, an 
irrevocable credit will be implied at common law see; Giddens v Anglo-African Produce Ltd (1923) 14 Ll.L. Rep. 
230.
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allows for modification or exclusions of UCP terms. 24Parties should be aware that the use of 
revocable credit is still possible by the removal of some of the provisions that prevent 
revocation or are inconsistent with revocation. 
1.6.2 Unconfirmed Credits and Confirmed Credits
A revocable credit is always unconfirmed but an irrevocable credit can be either confirmed or 
unconfirmed. The distinction between the unconfirmed and confirmed credit is attributed to 
the role taken by the correspondent bank in the seller’s country.
    In an unconfirmed credit, the correspondent bank is instructed by the issuing bank only to 
advise or notify the credit to the beneficiary. The correspondent bank here acts solely as the 
advising bank to inform the beneficiary of the terms and conditions of the credit. It is an agent 
of the issuing bank but does not itself provide an undertaking to pay.25 It is only the issuing 
bank which undertakes to pay. Due to the lack of an undertaking by the advising bank, if the 
advising bank wrongfully rejects the documents presented, the beneficiary will have a legal 
remedy against the issuing bank but not the advising bank. This means that the seller will have 
to suffer the inconvenience of pursing a legal action in a foreign jurisdiction since the issuing 
bank is usually not located in the seller’s country of operation.
    In a confirmed credit, the issuing bank requests the correspondent bank in the seller’s 
country to add its own undertaking in addition to that of the issuing bank to pay against 
conforming documents.26 In such circumstances, the correspondent bank is known as the 
confirming bank. It follows from this that the issuing bank and confirming bank’s legal 
                                                
24
UCP 600 Article 1: 
The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, 2007 Revision, ICC Publication no. 600 ("UCP")
are rules that apply to any documentary credit ("credit") (including, to the extent to which they may be
applicable, any standby letter of credit) when the text of the credit expressly indicates that it is subject to
these rules. They are binding on all parties thereto unless expressly modified or excluded by the credit.
25UCP 600 Article 9(a) :
A credit and any amendment may be advised to a beneficiary through an advising bank. An advising bank
that is not a confirming bank advises the credit and any amendment without any undertaking to honour or
negotiate.
26 UCP 600 Article 2 provides that, “Confirmation means a definite undertaking of the confirming bank, in 
addition to that of the issuing bank, to honour or negotiate a complying presentation.
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obligations to pay are independent of each other. The advantage of this is that a beneficiary
will have a contractual remedy against both the issuing bank and the confirming bank if 
payment is wrongly refused. A confirming bank bears the risk of non-reimbursement from the 
issuing bank and should not confirm the credit until it has properly evaluated the country and 
credit standing of the issuing bank. 27
    Although more expensive, the irrevocable confirmed credit is more favourable to a seller 
since it offers the strongest level of security. Nevertheless, this extra cost may be unnecessary 
if the issuing bank is a credible multinational bank and is unlikely to default. 
1.6.3 Credits with different methods of payment
1.6.3.1 Sight Credits
This type of credit is most commonly used. It is payable as soon as the relevant documents are 
presented. The bank must examine the documents within five banking days. 28 If the 
documents comply with the terms and conditions of the credit, payment is initiated 
immediately to the beneficiary. 
1.6.3.2 Deferred Payment Credits
Under this type of credit, the issuing bank and any confirming bank undertakes to pay at a 
specified future date, known as the maturity date (for example, 90 days after the date of 
shipment) against submission of the prescribed documents within the expiry date of the credit. 
Deferred payment credit is commonly used where the buyer and seller are in a good business 
relationship. The seller grants the buyer a grace period to pay but is still guaranteed of 
payment by a certain date. Deferred payment credit not only offers cash flow benefits to the 
buyer but also provides certainty to him since, before parting with his funds, he is given 
                                                
27 The confirming bank may sue the issuing bank if the issuing bank defaults on payment but this may be futile in 
the case of an insolvent issuing bank. 
28 UCP 600 Article 14(b).
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enough time to ascertain whether the goods which arrived comply with the specification of the 
sales agreement.
    Unlike the acceptance credit, no drafts are involved in deferred payment credit, thus
avoiding fees and duties charged by some countries on drafts. Despite there being no draft 
involved, the seller still has the opportunity to obtain funds before the maturity date by 
discounting his right to payment. As security for the advance, the beneficiary seller would 
assign the proceeds of the credit to the discounter. 29
1.6.3.3 Acceptance Credits
Just like the deferred payment credit, the acceptance credit has a maturity date which is stated 
in the credit and allows the buyer a period of time to pay. Under this type of credit, the 
beneficiary seller draws a time draft upon the issuing bank, confirming bank or any other bank 
specified in the terms of the credit.   Upon presentation of the draft, and documents which 
comply with the credit terms, the bank will accept the draft. Payment will not be made 
immediately but instead will be made on the date of maturity. The accepted time draft is a 
very liquid instrument which allows the seller to discount it in the appropriate markets so that 
he can obtain payment before the maturity date. Where a “nominated bank does not accept a 
draft drawn on it or, having accepted a draft drawn on it, does not pay at maturity”, UCP 600 
imposes an obligation on the issuing bank or confirming bank to pay.30
1.6.3.4 Negotiation Credits
UCP 600 Article 2 provides the following:
Negotiation means the purchase by the nominated bank of drafts (drawn on a bank other than the 
nominated bank) and/or documents under a complying presentation, by advancing or agreeing to 
advance funds to the beneficiary on or before the banking day on which reimbursement is due to 
the nominated bank.
                                                
29 Xiang Gao (n 9) 151. See also Banco Santander SA v. Bayfern Limited (1999) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 239.
30 UCP 600 Article 7(a)(v); UCP 600 Article 8(a)(i)(d).
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A negotiation credit authorises a specific bank or any bank (in the case of a freely negotiable 
credit) to purchase drafts and/or documents under a credit. Therefore, the undertakings of the 
issuing bank (and the confirming bank if any) are extended to the negotiating bank. Typically, 
a negotiation credit contains a clause such as this:
“We hereby agree with drawers, endorsers and bona fide holders of Drafts/documents drawn under 
and in compliance with the terms of the Credit that such Drafts/documents shall be duly honoured 
on due presentation if (negotiated) or (presented at this office) on or before (the expiry date)”, or 
words of similar intent.31
    A negotiation credit may require a draft, in which case the credit would allow the 
beneficiary to draw on the issuing bank or any other drawee stated on the credit. The 
negotiating bank purchases the draft together with the required documents at a discount and 
later forwards these documents to the issuing bank to be reimbursed. Where a draft is not 
required, the negotiating bank negotiates the documents only.32
1.6.4 Transferable Credits
A middleman who obtains his goods from a supplier and sells them to his buyer will use a 
transferable credit to provide payment to his supplier. The advantage of this arrangement is 
that the buyer will not have knowledge of the supplier’s prices because of the lack of direct 
contact between the buyer and the seller’s supplier. This type of credit involves two 
beneficiaries and allows part or whole of the credit amount to be transferred from the first 
beneficiary to the second beneficiary. To open a transferable credit, the buyer of the goods 
will need to make a request with the issuing bank which will incorporate a provision in the 
credit terms allowing the transfer of a specified sum.33 The middlemen, as the first beneficiary 
                                                
31 Charles Del Busto,  ICC Guide to Documentary Credit Operations (ICC Publications No. 515, Paris 1994) 39.
32 It is possible for letters of credit to be negotiated without drafts. See James E. Byrne “Negotiation in Letter of 
Credit Practice and Law: The Evolution of the Doctrine” (2007) 42 Tex. Int'l L.J. 561, 571. This is recognised by 
UCP 600 in the definition of negotiation  in Article 2 – “purchase by the nominated bank of drafts (drawn on a 
bank other than the nominated bank) and/or documents”. [emphasis added]
33 UCP 600 Article 38 (b) provides that,“Transferable credit means a credit that specifically states it is 
‘transferable’.”
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will then instruct the advising bank to effect a transfer of the credit to his supplier. After the 
supplier ships the goods, he will submit conforming documents to the advising bank. The 
receipt of the supplier’s documents will be notified to the middleman, who will then present 
his documents. The advising bank replaces the supplier’s invoice and draft with that of the 
middleman. The amount the middleman receives is the credit amount less the amount paid to 
the supplier.
1.6.5 Back-to-back Credits
Like the transferable credit, a back-to-back credit is primarily used by a seller to finance the 
purchase of goods from his supplier. The arrangement revolves around two irrevocable credits
which are independent of each other. A buyer will firstly open a documentary credit in favour 
of the seller of the goods. Using this credit, the seller then requests his bank to issue a second 
credit in favour of his supplier. In essence, the first credit is security for the second credit. 
With the exception of the amount and the expiration date, the terms of the two documentary 
credits are mostly identical since they relate to the same shipment of goods. 
    The difference between back-to-back credit and transferable credit is that, in the latter, the 
rights under the existing credit are transferred. The back-to-back credit arrangement is also 
more flexible because the terms and conditions of the two credits can be varied. However, 
banks are reluctant to issue back-to-back credits because of the risk of loss in the event of a 
default under the first credit. 
1.6.6 Revolving Credits
The revolving credit is used by sellers and buyers in a continuous business relationship which 
involves a series of shipments of goods. It provides for the authorisation to draw regularly 
over a specified period but yet restricts the amount available and frequency of the shipments. 
This type of credit offers the convenience of not having to arrange for a new credit for every 
shipment in a long term contract. There are two types of revolving credits. In the case of a 
cumulative revolving credit, any unused amount of credit over one period can be carried over 
to the next period. In the case of a non
during a period ceases and can no longer be used. 
1.6.7 Red Clause Credits
Sometimes, a seller does not have the funds needed to produce or purchase items to fulfil an 
order. This is where a red clause c
advance needed prior to shipment
in the credit terms. This type of 
finance to the seller before the actual 
credits.  Once the buyer provide
authorise the correspondent bank to make advances to the seller
undertaking to submit the required documents in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
the credit.  When the goods are delivered, the seller presents the required documents to obtain 
the balance of the credit. The credit balance is calculated by deduc
and the accrued interest. This type of credit is named a
authorising the correspondent bank
traditionally typed or printed in red. This type of 
used in practice.34 If a fraudulent seller fails to deliver the goods, the correspondent bank still 
has a right of reimbursement from the issuing bank, which
reimbursement from the buyer.
1.6.8 Green Clause Credits
This type of credit works in similar way to the red clause 
on the credit before actual shipment of the goods. However, in addition to giving a
undertaking to present the required documents
that the goods have been warehoused in the name of the bank
                                                
34  An example of a case involving a red clause credit is 
Rep 171.
-cumulative revolving credit, the unu
redit is useful because it enables the seller to obtain the cash
. The advance amount agreed by the buyer will be stipulated 
credit can only be used if the buyer is willing to 
shipment of the goods and incur the risk for all advanced 
s the instructions to the issuing bank, the issuing bank will 
in return for t
ting the advanced amount 
red clause credit because the clause 
to advance a certain amount to the beneficiary
credit exposes the buyer to risk
in turn has a right to demand 
credit and allows the seller to draw 
, the seller needs to submit documentary proof 
advancing payment
Tukan Timber Ltd v Barclays Bank plc
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1.6.9 Standby Credits
The difference between the traditional documentary credit and a standby credit is that the 
latter performs an entirely different function. Under a standby credit, the issuing bank provides 
an undertaking to pay in the event that its client fails to perform its contractual obligation to 
the beneficiary. It is never used as a main method of payment, but only as a backup method of 
payment which is to be drawn on only when the applicant fails to perform his part of the 
underlying contract with the beneficiary. Essentially, it performs the same function as a bank 
guarantee. It was created in America at a time where the banks in America were prohibited by 
law from issuing bank guarantees to third parties.35
    Because of its flexible nature, the standby credit can be used in a wide range of transactions 
such as international trading, loan transactions, construction contracts and leasing agreements. 
In international sales transactions, it is usually used to guarantee payment by the buyer.  If the 
buyer pays in accordance within the specified time, the standby credit will not be drawn. If the 
buyer defaults in payment, the credit will be payable by presentation of a written demand or 
any other document specified in the terms of the credit. 
    The standby credit does share the same mechanism and structure as the documentary credit. 
Like the documentary credit, it is payable against presentation of documents specified in the 
terms of the standby credit, without requiring the bank to investigate the truth behind the 
documents i.e. the default in the underlying transaction.  However, the required documents in 
standby credits are never transportation documents and very often what is needed is only a 
written unilateral statement by the beneficiary that the applicant has failed to perform his 
contractual obligations. 36 Unlike the documentary credit, the documents required do not 
represent any security in goods for the bank. 
    Both the UCP37 and Article 5 UCC are applicable to standby credits. Because the UCP rules 
were primarily designed for documentary credits, a more usable regime was needed. The ICC 
                                                
35 Roeland Bertrams, Bank Guarantees in International Trade (3rd edn Paris; New York, ICC Publication  2004) 
6.
36 Ibid.
37 UCP 600 Article 1:
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published the Uniform Rules For Demand Guarantees (URDG) 38 which, although was 
specifically drafted for demand guarantees, is also applicable to standby credits.39 Unlike the 
UCP, the URDG did not gain wide acceptance. Moreover, it was felt that the URDG, drafted 
specifically for demand guarantees, does not fit in comfortably with the standby credit.40 The 
ICC later issued the International Standby Practices (ISP 9841), a new set of rules specifically 
created for standby credits which came into force on 1st January 1999. ISP 98 is only 
applicable to a standby credit if expressly incorporated into the contract. Alongside these ICC 
initiatives, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) also
developed the United Nations Convention on Standby Letters of Credit and Bank Guarantee 
Convention 1989 which came into force on 1st January 2000.  Its aim was to harmonise the 
law applicable to standby credits and bank guarantees but it has not been a huge success with 
only 8 nations so far having ratified it, none of which are the world’s major trading nations.42
ISP 98 was designed to be compatible with the UNCITRAL Convention on Independent 
Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit and today offers the most extensive legal framework 
for standby credits.
    Although the focus of this thesis is on documentary credits, the risk of unconscionable calls 
particularly associated with this type of credit and similar types of independent guarantees will 
be discussed in Chapter  6 .
                                                                                                                                                        
The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, 2007 Revision, ICC Publication no. 600 ("UCP")
are rules that apply to any documentary credit ("credit") (including, to the extent to which they may be
applicable, any standby letter of credit) when the text of the credit expressly indicates that it is subject to
these rules…
38ICC Publication No. 458. The URDG replaces the Uniform Rules for Contract Guarantees (URCG). It is 
currently under revisions <http://www.iccwbo.org/iccbdfie/index.html> accessed 16th November 2009.
39 This is because the definition of demand guarantees in Article 2 URDG is capable of including standby letters 
of credit.
40 JF Dolan, "Analyzing Bank Drafted Standby Letter of Credit Rules: The International Standby Practice 
(ISP98)" [2000] 45 Wayne L. Rev. 1865, 143-144.
41 ICC Publication 590.
42UNCITRAL, Status of 1995 United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of 
Credit”<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/payments/1995Convention_guarantees_status.html>ac
cessed  30th November 2009. See Dolan, “The UN Convention on International Independent Undertakings: Do 
States with Mature Letter of Credit Regimes Need It?” [1997] 13 Banking & Fin L.Rev.1.
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CHAPTER 2 
NON-CONFORMING DOCUMENTS1 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As was revealed in the Chapter 1, the principle of strict compliance plays a very important role in 
the operation of documentary credits. Despite being indispensable, the principle does present 
some practical difficulties, primarily because the high frequency of non-conforming documents 
slows down the flow of international trade and increases the cost of using the documentary credit. 
In 2003, SITPRO’s report revealed that numerous surveys which had been conducted suggested 
that 50-60% of documents presented to banks for payment are rejected on their first 
presentation.2 Therefore, in practice, documentary discrepancy is the most common ground for 
refusing payment. 
Chapter 1 explained the principle of strict compliance and the rationale behind its existence. 
The question of how strict is "strict compliance" is a contentious issue, hence the various 
standards of strict compliance will be explored. The writer will then evaluate the scope of the 
bank’s duty to examine documents. This will be followed by an analysis of the various types of 
discrepancies. The scope of discrepancy in letters of credits transaction is extremely wide and it 
is not within the scope of this study to examine every possible discrepancy which could arise in 
practice. The aim of this chapter is to examine the most common discrepancies and some of the 
problematic issues pertaining to non-conforming documents. The writer will also discuss 
circumstances where payment can still be made despite the existence of discrepancies in 
documents tendered.  
Throughout the chapter, the issues discussed will be examined in the light of the new UCP 
600. Whenever relevant, comparisons will be made with UCP 500 in order to analyse the changes 
brought about by the new UCP and the extent to which it succeeds in solving discrepancy 
                                                 
1 Some parts of this chapter have been published - Hang Yen Low, "UCP 600: the new rules on documentary 
compliance" [2010] 52 IJLM 193. 
2 SITPRO Ltd, Report on the Use of Export Letters of Credit 2001-2002 (SITPRO Ltd, London 2003) 2. 
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problems existing under the old UCP. In fact, one of the main foci of the revision process was to 
address the persistent discrepancy issues and to reduce the incidence of rejection of documents. It 
is important to analyse the new revision since there are changes which will affect businesses 
engaged in international trading and the way banks facilitate the financing of goods. From a 
seller’s perspective, understanding how documents will be compliant under the new UCP 600 is 
very important since rejection of documents can cause substantial monetary losses, delay in time 
and unwarranted litigation. It is also important for banks to study these changes, since the 
modifications will have an effect on their policies and credit operations and changes will have to 
be implemented accordingly.  
2.2 Standard of compliance 
Although the UCP does provide for the bank’s duties to examine the document, it does not prescribe the 
standard required for compliance of documents. Rather, the standard of compliance has been a matter 
developed by case law throughout the years. The principle  is well encapsulated by the words of Viscount 
Summer in Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd: 
 
“There is no room for documents which are almost the same, or which will do just as 
well . . . Business could not proceed securely on any other lines. The bank's branch 
abroad, which knows nothing officially of the details of the transactions financed cannot 
take upon itself to decide what will do well enough, and what will not. If it does as it is 
told it is safe; if it declines to do anything else, it is safe; if it departs from the conditions 
laid down, it acts at its own risk.”3 
A difficult question which arises is how strict is the standard of strict compliance. Case law 
demonstrates that different courts in different jurisdiction have in the past imposed different 
levels of strictness. The following discussion will discuss the two different standards which have 
been prevalent notwithstanding that there are other standards of compliance adopted by some 
judges in other common law systems. 
 
                                                 
3 (1927) 27 Lloyd’s Rep 49, 52.  
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2.2.1 Literal compliance/Precise Mirror Image 
Lord Summer’s formulation in Equitable Trust appears to suggest the highest degree of 
compliance, which is that documents are required to correspond word- by- word, letter-by-letter 
with the credit terms. In other words, documents tendered must be a mirror image of the credit 
terms and even the slightest deviation can result in non-payment. Requiring this degree of 
compliance from beneficiaries is problematic in practice. One commentator states that:  
 
“… any experienced banker knows, a word- by- word, letter-by-letter correspondence 
between the documents and the credit terms is a practical impossibility. Thus courts 
wedded to a mirror image version of strict compliance and reasonable care have failed 
to provide a functional standard of document verification.”4  
 
Particularly, difficult issues arise in relation to abbreviations and typographical errors, both of 
which will be discussed in more detail further on in this chapter. This is because discrepancies 
may be so technical and minor that it does not affect the value of the goods at all and is will not 
concern any of the parties involved. A bank’s customers will certainly not be happy and will be 
critical of its service if a bank rejects documents for a minor variation which is insignificant. 
Moreover, as Boris Kozolchyk points out “this standard is unhelpful when a credit requirement 
does not mean in the beneficiary's and confirming bank's place of business what it means in the 
customer's.”5 For example in Equitable Trust, the credit required a certificate of quality supplied 
by "experts" and signed by the Chamber of Commerce of Batavia. There was no Chamber of 
Commerce in Batavia although its equivalent was the Commercial Association of Batavia. 
Hence, the House of Lords accepted that the document conformed to the credit. It would certainly 
have been absurd if the House of Lords had still adhered to the standard of mirror image in such 
circumstances. There is also the possibility that banks or applicants will exploit the opportunity to 
reject documents based on minor irrelevant discrepancies.6 For example, this could happen where 
                                                 
4 Richard Morris, “Discrepancies: Has UCP 500 Wrought Any Improvement?” Hong Kong Lawyer (Dec 1998) at 62 
<http://sunzi1.lib.hku.hk/hkjo/view/15/1502320.pdf> accessed 11 June 2008. 
5 Boris Kozolchyk, “U.C.C. Article 5 Symposium Strict Compliance and the Reasonable Document Checker” 
Brook.L.Rev. (Spring, 1990) at 4 <http://www.natlaw.com/strictcompl.pdf>accessed 12 June 2008. 
6 Ibid, 5. 
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a bank fears the difficulty of getting its reimbursement from an insolvent customer or where an 
applicant is eager to get out of a bad bargain.   
 
2.2.2 Substantial Compliance 
 
Although the strict compliance principle is really the “cornerstone” of letters of credit, in certain 
circumstances it creates problems, raising questions about the justice of rigidly adhering to the 
principle. To avoid any inequitable result to the beneficiary, some courts developed the 
substantial compliance standard, which is a relaxation of the strict compliance principle. 
American courts apply the substantial compliance standard in a way such that documents will be 
accepted despite some deviation from the literal terms of the credit if compliance is apparent (i.e.  
the discrepancy does not create ambiguity) and the discrepancy does not mislead the document 
checker into thinking that there was compliance.7 The main disadvantage of this principle is that 
there is more subjectivity involved in the document checking process and offers less certainty to a 
buyer that the underlying contract has been performed as agreed. It seems to impose an additional 
obligation on banks as they may not be well-equipped to judge the impact of a minor deviation.  
 
The principle of substantial compliance has also been applied to bank guarantees/performance 
bonds, where arguably the principle is more easily justified.  This is because the type of 
documents which are required to be presented under such instruments are different from those 
required under a documentary credit; usually the documents required do not have any intrinsic 
value.8 Moreover, such documents presented under a bank guarantee/performance bond will not 
pass to third parties or be used in back-to back transactions, which is very often the case in 
documentary credit transactions.9 In I.E. Contractors Ltd. v Lloyds Bank Plc. and Rafidain Bank, 
Staughton LJ also took the view that there is less need for a doctrine of strict compliance in the 
case of performance bonds.10 
 
                                                 
7 Datapoint Corp. v. M & I Bank, 665 F. Supp. 722, 724 (W.D. Wis. 1987); First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta v. Wynne, 
149 Ga. App. 811, 817, 256 S.W.2d 383, 387 (1979); Flagship Cruises Ltd. v. New England Bank, 569 F.2d 699, 705 
(1st Cir. 1978). 
8 Roeland Bertrams, Bank Guarantees in International Trade (3rd edn Paris; New York, ICC Publication  2004) 143. 
9 Ibid . 
10 [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 496, 500. 
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2.3 Bank’s duty to examine 
 
Article 14 (a) of UCP 600 provides the following: 
 
A nominated bank acting on its nomination, a confirming bank, if any, and the issuing bank must 
examine a presentation to determine, on the basis of the documents alone, whether or not the 
documents appear on their face to constitute a complying presentation.  
 
The bank should only concern itself with the underlying contract; confining the bank’s 
examination to the documents means that the article remains consistent with the principle of 
autonomy. There was some debate as to whether the term “on their face” should be retained since 
it had been a cause for confusion leading to some banks examining only the front page of the 
document and not the reverse.11 However, the new article has retained this phrase. 
 
 There is no longer a reference to the phrase “reasonable care” as found in Article 13(a) UCP 
500, which was generally regarded as ambiguous.12 The omission of reasonable care is probably 
for the best since it was not doing much under the old UCP.  Under the old UCP, if documents 
did not strictly comply with the conditions of the credit but the bank failed to discover the 
discrepancy and made payment, the bank was not able to argue that it was still entitled to 
reimbursement on the ground that it had exercised reasonable care unless the terms of the credit 
were ambiguous, in which case the bank might argue that it had placed a reasonable 
interpretation upon the words used.  Therefore in normal circumstances the sole consideration 
was whether the documents complied or not. The reasonable care argument could only be of 
relevance if there was a dispute on an ambiguous term in the credit.13 Moreover, it is also 
arguable that the duty of the bank to examine with reasonable care was contradictory to the 
                                                 
11 C. Debattista , “Legislative techniques in international trade: madness or method?” [2002] J.B.L 626, 634-635. 
12 UCP 500 Article 13(a): Banks must examine all documents stipulated in the Credit with reasonable care to 
ascertain whether or not they appear on their face to be in compliance with the terms and conditions of the Credit. 
Compliance of the stipulated documents on their face with the terms and conditions of the Credit shall be determined 
by international standard banking practice as reflected in these Articles. Documents which appear on their face to be 
inconsistent with one another will be consider as not appearing on their face to be in complain with the terms and 
conditions of the Credit. 
13 Richard King, Gutteridge and Megrah's Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits (8th edn, Europa Publications, 
London  2001) 182. 
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reference to “on the face”, since exercising reasonable care means that the banks have a heavier 
responsibility in that they have to do more than ascertain whether documents appear on the face 
to comply with the credit. 
 
However, since the new article provides that banks are obliged to examine documents, it is 
still the case that they must perform this duty with reasonable care and not act negligently.  The 
reference to “on the face” merely means that the duty is not the more stringent duty which would 
require it to investigate the accuracy of the documents. Therefore, there is no need to refer to 
reasonable care. It is likely that this aspect of the new UCP will not change the number of 
documents rejected or the way banks perform their duties to examine documents. 
 
2.3.1 Time to examine documents 
 
The time taken to examine documents is an important matter for both sellers and buyers. All 
sellers hope for payment from banks as soon as possible for better business cash flow. Buyers 
also wish for the release of documents to claim the goods as soon as possible to avoid any extra 
cost such as storage charges.  The new UCP 600 Article 14(b) states that: 
 
“A nominated bank acting on its nomination, a confirming bank, if any, and the issuing bank shall 
each have a maximum of five banking days following the day of presentation to determine if a 
presentation is complying. This period is not curtailed or otherwise affected by the occurrence on or 
after the date of presentation of any expiry date or last day for presentation.” 
 
This article changes the rule relating to the time for determining the compliance of documents in 
several ways. Firstly, the expression “reasonable time” in UCP 500 Article 13(b) has been 
removed.14 Secondly, the maximum number of days allowed for banks to determine compliance 
had been reduced from seven banking days to five banking days.15 Thirdly, there is a new 
                                                 
14 UCP 500 Article 13(b): The Issuing Bank, the Confirming Bank, if any, or a Nominated Bank acting on their 
behalf, shall each have a reasonable time, not to exceed seven banking days following the day of receipt of the 
documents, to examine the documents and determine whether to take up or refuse the documents and to inform the 
party from which it received the documents accordingly. 
15Ibid.  
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addition in the second part of Article 14 which provides that the maximum period for determining 
compliance is not affected by the date of expiry or latest date for presentation 
 
“Reasonable time” in UCP 500 created much confusion and uncertainty since it is a concept 
which is inevitably flexible and open to different interpretations. Its removal was prompted 
because ICC national committees from around the world raised their dissatisfaction with the word 
“reasonable”. When the old UCP was in force, banks could not deliberately delay the 
examination of the documents till the seventh banking day since the old UCP provided that 
examination of documents must be completed within a “reasonable time”. If banks used the full 7 
banking days to examine documents, this would in some cases be seen as unreasonable which 
would not allow banks to reject the documents. One possible interpretation of the new article is 
that the five banking days are an automatic free inspection period. This interpretation gives rise to 
the concern that banks may take things slowly and insist on five banking days in all cases to 
accept or reject the documents. This would mean that the new provision does not actually reduce 
the period from seven to five banking but increases it from “a reasonable time” to five banking 
days. In practice, banks do not usually need more than two days to review the documents. 
Therefore, five days is considered generous in most cases. On the other hand, the new article is 
also open to a different interpretation, because the word “maximum” suggests that in some cases 
the time within which the bank is allowed to examine documents is less than 5 days.16  
 
If the second interpretation is adopted, it would mean reverting to the concept of reasonable 
time, making the deletion of reasonable time pointless. Considering that the removal of the 
phrase “reasonable time” stemmed from the drive to eliminate all ambiguities, the writer believes 
that the first interpretation is correct although it is not without its problem.  The difficulty 
involved in checking compliance differs between different letters of credit; some could require 
only few documents whereas others could require hundreds. Banks could take up to a maximum 
of five banking days even in straightforward cases, yet beneficiaries could not claim that banks 
had not examined the documents within reasonable time. This provision could potentially worsen 
the cash flow management of sellers.  
                                                 
16James E. Byrne, The Comparison of UCP600 & UCP500 (The Institute of International Banking Law & Practice, 
MD USA 2007) 133. 
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The rationale behind reducing seven banking days to five banking days was to speed up the 
average time taken by banks in clearing a letter of credit. Whilst the writer welcomes the deletion 
of the phrase “reasonable time”, the writer takes the view that the period of five banking days 
should be reduced to three banking days.  Note that banks are allowed five banking days from the 
date of presentation to give a notice of rejection.17  Since banks can now delay examination until 
the fifth day, this means that if a bank examines documents on the fifth day, makes a 
determination to reject and gives notice on the fifth day, less time will be left for the discrepancy 
to be rectified (particularly pressing where the expiry date of the credit is nearing). Three banking 
days is ideal since there is a drive for quick completions and delivery in the trading community. 
A longer period could mean extra storage costs or potential damage to perishable goods.  As it 
currently stands, if both the seller and buyer want to be sure of a shorter period for examination 
of documents, this can only be done by incorporating a term which provides for a shorter time for 
examination into the sale and credit agreements.  
 
Traders need to pay special attention to the second part of Article 14(b) as it has important 
implications on the operation of letters of credit. If the letter of credit is about to expire, Article 
14(b) allows the bank to examine documents in the usual manner and does not impose any 
obligation on them to expedite the process 18 It is over- simplified to say that all the beneficiary 
has to do is to make sure that he presents the documents at least 5 banking days before the expiry 
of the LC. There is always the possibility that the documents presented are discrepant. Therefore, 
a beneficiary should always try to ensure that presentation of documents is done early enough so 
that, if the documents are rejected, he has enough time to correct and re-present the documents.  
Since banks can take five days in all cases, the question also arises as to whether banks can refuse 
to examine documents if the beneficiary submits documents less than five days before the expiry 
date of the credit. Of course from a business point of view, this is a bad move as it could drive 
away prospective business for the bank. Beneficiaries should also take note of any holidays as the 
article states “five banking days”, which may have the effect of pushing the optimal date for 
presentation forward.  
                                                 
17 See 2.5.1. 
18Commentary on UCP 600-Article-by-Article Analysis by the UCP 600 Drafting Group (ICC, Paris  2007) 63. 
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 Article 2 UCP 600 complicates the issue further by defining a banking day as “a day on which 
a bank is regularly open at the place at which an act subject to these rules is to be performed.” 
This definition is weak since it is not clear what is the precise meaning of “the place”. It seems to 
refer to the country in which the bank operates. Different departments in a bank may have 
different operating hours. Some may be closed on Saturday whilst some may open half-day on 
Saturdays. The UCP should be more specific by providing that a banking day is, “a day on which 
the credit management department is regularly open in that country.” The current definition 
makes it difficult for banks to determine the last date in which they are allowed to examine the 
documents. Equally, a beneficiary will find it difficult to ascertain the optimum date for 
presentation of documents.  
 
2.4 Types of Discrepancies 
 
This section explores the different types of discrepancies which may be found in credit 
documents. 
 
2.4.1 Consistency 
 
Rejection of documents based on inconsistent data was a troubling issue during the lifetime of the 
UCP 500 because a large number of documents were rejected on this ground. Some 
representatives from Asia even admitted that banks took advantage of this rule because of the 
additional income coming in from the re-examination of documents.19  The second part of Article 
13(a) UCP 500 stated the following: 
 
…Documents which appear on their face to be inconsistent with one another will be considered as not 
appearing on their face to be in compliance with the terms and conditions of the Credit. 
 
Article 14 (d) UCP600 now stipulates that: 
                                                 
19Kreitman, R., “UCP 600: The End in Sight?” Mantissa Support (2005) 
<http://www.mantissa.co.uk/Support/nextucp3a.htm>accessed 21 September 2008. 
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Data in a document, when read in context with the credit, the document itself and international 
standard banking practice, need not be identical to, but must not conflict with, data in that document, 
any other stipulated document or the credit. 
 
Similarly, the successor of Article 37(c) UCP 500, Article 14(e) UCP 600 no longer uses the 
language of “inconsistent” but instead now stipulates that, “In documents other than the 
commercial invoice, the description of the goods, services or performance, if stated, may be in 
general terms not conflicting with their description in the credit.”  
 
The UCP does not explain the meaning of “not conflict/conflicting with” in more detail but the 
new provision re-establishes the position that documents do not have to be a mirror image of each 
other. It is highly likely that “not conflict with” means that documents are subjected to a less rigid 
standard than “inconsistent”, thereby having the effect of making it more difficult to find 
discrepancy on this ground. A discrepancy can only be found on this ground if the difference 
between the documents or data is one of substance and not merely a linguistic one.20  
  
The writer is not persuaded that the change in the wording brings significant improvement. 
The phrase “does not conflict” leaves room for subjectivity. So far, no guidance has been issued 
to clarify what kind of data would suffice as conflicting under the article so that documents could 
be rejected. In practice, non-identical data which conflict with each other could exist in varying 
degrees and therefore the position is not always straightforward. For example, does an invoice 
which states boxes and a bill of lading which states bags entitle banks to reject the documents?  If 
the invoice describes the goods as “yellow geometric print fabric” and the bill of lading shows 
the goods as “yellow patterned fabric”, would a discrepancy be called on the grounds that the 
documents conflict with each other? The writer takes the view that in the first example, the 
documents are discrepant since the information about the form of packaging of the goods are 
obviously conflicting. Moreover, the packaging is not an insignificant aspect of the goods. As for 
the second example, it is arguable that the information are not “conflicting”. In the absence of 
                                                 
20 AG Guest and others, Benjamin's Sale of Goods 7th ed: 1st supplement ( Sweet & Maxwell Ltd 2008) para 23-
236U. 
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ICC guidance, bankers and traders will have to use common sense and commercial knowledge to 
aid them in deciding whether the documents are indeed in conflict. Where highly 
technical/specialist data are involved, bankers themselves will not have the expertise to determine 
whether the data in fact conflict. 
 
Article 14(g) UCP 600 provides that, “A document presented but not required by the credit 
will be disregarded and may be returned to the presenter.” Hence, if a bank comes across data in 
a non-stipulated document which conflict with data in another stipulated document (perhaps 
because the non-stipulated document was inadvertently presented), it cannot reject the documents 
on the ground of inconsistency. The position is different for data which is not required but exist 
in a stipulated document. The UCP 500 provided that documents  must be consistent but Article 
14(d) UCP 600 provides that data must be consistent with other data in the same document. As 
Prof Byrne states, “No distinction is made in UCP 600 Article 14(d) between data required by the 
credit and extraneous data either, apparently, requiring all data be examined, a major change from 
recent ICC Banking Commission opinions.”21 This aspect of the change provides banks with a 
wider scope for rejecting inconsistent documents, which is perplexing since the thrust of the 
revision was to reduce the number of discrepant documents.  
 
One further issue which arises is how the new provision will be interpreted by the courts if 
data conflict with a non-documentary requirement, since under UCP 600 Article 14(h) banks are 
to disregard non-documentary requirements. C Debatista observes that there is some 
incompatibility between UCP 600 Article 14(d) and Article 14(h): 
 
“When the Article says, for example, that the banks must compare data in each 
document with data ‘in the credit’, this must be referring to data which is not in “any 
other stipulated document”, i.e. in a non-documentary requirement. However, if this 
is so, then does this mean that data in a document conflicting with a non-
documentary requirement in the credit would make the document discrepant? Or 
                                                 
21James E. Byrne, The Comparison of UCP600 & UCP500 (The Institute of International Banking Law & Practice, 
MD USA 2007) 135. 
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would Art.14(h), requiring the banks to disregard non-documentary requirements, 
avoid this result?”22  
 
It is hoped that the ICC will issue a clarification as to what data “in the credit” refers to. 
Considering the drive to the 2007 revision was to reduce discrepancy, it is almost likely that it 
was not the intent of the UCP Drafting Group that banks check for inconsistency in non-
documentary requirement. 
 
In theory, the overall effect of the re-drafted article should be a watering-down of the 
consistency test. However, it is a possibility that bankers may still adopt a rigorous examination 
of tendered documents in practice, since, as the discussion before shows, banks now have to 
check for inconsistencies between data within the same document. Only time will tell but it will 
be disappointing if the revised article does not alleviate rejection of discrepant documents.  If this 
is the case, then the article will need to be redrafted.  
 
2.4.2 Linkage 
 
Most writers treat consistency and linkage as the same issue but consistency and linkage are in 
fact capable of being differentiated. Linkage refers to the requirement that the documents 
tendered must relate the same batch of goods. In Banque de l'Indochine et de Suez S.A. v J. H. 
Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd, John Donaldson MR explained that, “There is, in my judgment, a 
real distinction between an identification of ‘the goods’, the subject matter of the transaction, and 
a description of those goods. The second sentence of art. 32 (c) [the equivalent of UCP 600 
Article 14(e)] gives latitude in description, but not in identification.”23 In this case, the bill of 
lading showed 40,000 polythene lined unmarked jute bags of white crystal sugar weighing 2018.6 
tonnes gross loaded on Markhor at Antwerp bound for Djibouti in transit for The Yemen. The 
combined weight of the two quality certificates was the same as that stated in the bill of lading 
and, by calculating the net weights represented the same number of bags. However, one referred 
                                                 
22 C Debattista, “The new UCP 600: changes to the tender of the seller's shipping documents under letters of credit. 
Journal of Business Law” [2007] 4 JBL 329, 341. 
23 [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 228, 233. 
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to the sugar having been loaded on the "m/v Markhor or substitute". As for the two certificates of 
origin, the quantities referred to are correct but one referred to consignment by "m/v Markhor or 
substitute", while the other to "Transports mixtes a destination Djibouti Port in Transit Yemen". 
The total quantities in the three EUR 1 certificates were correct, but one named Tate & Lyle for 
account their principals as consignees, another Rayners for account their principals and the third 
Rayners simpliciter. There is no indication of the method of transport in two of them, one says 
simply "Fer". One refers to preferential terms between France and Djibouti and the other to 
France and Yemen Nord.  John Donaldson stated that he did not consider that these documents 
were necessarily inconsistent with each other but decided that “Clearly these certificates could 
relate to the goods, but they do not necessarily do so. This will not do.”24 Therefore, the advising 
bank was entitled to be paid by the beneficiary for the amount paid under reserve. The decision 
imposes a very high standard for identification of goods, as it was emphasised by the learned 
judge that “the identification must… be unequivocal.”25  
 
Banque de l'Indochine was criticised for applying the requirement of identification too 
strictly.26 R Jack also suggested that, “Perhaps ‘necessarily’… should have been ‘with reasonable 
certainty’.”27 In Glencore International A. G. v Bank of China, Rix J stated that he was more 
inclined to think that the linkage or identification test is intended to be less demanding than the 
“unequivocal” standard as put forward in Banque de l'Indochine.28 Although he commented that 
it was unnecessary for him to decide this point29, he concluded that, “[T]he goods described in 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26C Murray, D Holloway and D Timson-Hunt, Schmitthoff's Export Trade: The Law and Practice of International 
Trade (11th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007) 207. 
27R Jack, Documentary credits: the law and practice of documentary credits including standby credits and demand 
guarantees (4th edn Tottel, Haywards Heath 2009) para 8.49. 
28 [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 135, 145. Rix J referred to No. 23 of Case Studies on Documentary Credits under UCP 500, 
where the packing list only indicated the quantity of the goods, the style number, and the invoice number 
corresponding with that of the commercial invoice but did not describe the goods shipped and invoiced.    The ICC 
committee of experts wrote:  
In this particular instance, a failure to give any description of the goods in the presented packing list cannot be 
construed as being a discrepancy. The reason being that there is a sufficient link between the data content in the 
commercial invoice and the packing list.     
29 This was because Bank of China did not include the issue of identification in its notice of refusal.  
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the packing list are to be unequivocally, albeit indirectly, identified with both the letter of credit 
goods and the goods shipped.”30 
 
It is the writer’s view that despite being capable of conceptual distinction, in practice, 
consistency and linkage are inter-related. It is true that consistency between, for example, a  
packing list and the other documents such as invoice and bill of lading, does not mean the goods 
indicated in the packing list are the same goods referred to in the other documents. Nevertheless, 
the more consistency in a set of documents, the more linkage between the documents and the 
more likely they are to refer to the same batch of goods. In other words, consistency between the 
documents may assist in the identification of goods.  
 
How does one reconcile the requirement of identification with UCP 600 Article 14(d) which 
provides for the requirement of consistency? R Jack suggests three possible approaches31: 
a) there is no requirement for the identification of goods, only a requirement of consistency as 
provided by Article 14(d). 
b) the  requirement of identification of goods is incorporated into Article 14(d). 
                                                 
30 [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 135, 146.   The learned judge supported his decision by these facts: 
“The packing list is headed "PT Indonesia Asahan Aluminium", which is of course the name of the shipper to be 
found in the bill of lading, as well as of the certifier of the certificate of weight/quantity. The packing list then gives, 
lot number by lot number, the bundle numbers which fall under each lot number, and the number of pieces which are 
in each bundle and the (net) weight of each bundle, as well as the total number of pieces and total net weight of the 
bundles within each lot number. At the end of the packing list are listed the final total number of bundles and pieces 
and the final total net weight of the parcel as a whole. Thus the packing list begins with lot number 84103: there are 
six bundles in lot number 84103; each bundle is made up of 44 pieces, and the individual weights of each bundle are 
given; the total number of pieces and total weight of the six bundles of lot number 84103 are then given as 264 and 
6,001 (i.e. 6.001 tonnes) respectively. These figures are identical with the figures on the certificate of 
weight/quantity. Thus the latter document refers to each of the 27 different lot numbers to be found in the packing 
list, and in respect of each lot number sets out the number of bundles, number of pieces and net weight relevant to 
that lot number. In the case of lot number 84103 there are six bundles, 264 pieces and a net weight of 6,001 - 
identical to the figures on the packing list. The process is repeated lot number by lot number, with the figures on the 
certificate of weight/quantity reproducing the figures of the packing list. At the very end of the packing list the final 
totals of 797 bundles, 35,068 pieces and a net weight of 800,022 are given. The final totals of the certificate of 
weight/quantity are identical. The packing list also gives the total gross weight of 801.616 tonnes, which is identical 
to the figure for gross weight given in the bill of lading. The total number of bundles and the total net and gross 
weights are also reproduced in numerous other documents within the tender, including the commercial invoice itself. 
The certificate of weight/quantity refers to the commodity as "aluminium ingot ", the name of vessel as Cheng Yun, 
and to the number of the commercial invoice itself. Both the packing list and the certificate of weight/quantity are 
dated June 20, 1995.”  
31R Jack (n 27) para 8.49. 
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c) the requirement of identification of goods is not covered by the UCP  but is one which has 
been established under common law.  
Even the Court of Appeal in Glencore struggled with this point and recognised that this is a 
difficult matter.32 As it currently stands under English law, c) is most likely to be the correct 
approach although a) is likely to be the position under the UCP, hence the absence of an express 
provision on the requirement of identification of goods in the UCP.  
 
2.4.3 Original Documents 
 
Pre UCP 600, in Glencore International AG v Bank of China33, the Court of Appeal held that a 
computer printout on non-headed paper which had been hand-signed but not marked as an 
original was not to be regarded as an original because Article 20(b) UCP 50034 required 
documents produced by reprographic means to be marked as “original”. Later in Kredietbank v 
Midland Bank35, the Court of Appeal took a less restrictive approach and held that an insurance 
policy which was not marked as an original but produced by a word processor and printed by a 
laser printer onto the insurance company's headed paper, with its logo is to be accepted as an 
original. The decision in Glencore was distinguished on the basis that it applied to documents 
which were obviously reprographic or carbon copies.36 As a result of these two decisions, there 
was uncertainty as to what constituted original documents under Article 20(b) UCP 500. 
                                                 
32 Rix J in Glencore International A. G. v Bank of China [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 135,145 stated:  
“The matter is not, however, without difficulty, because it can be argued on the one hand that Sir John Donaldson's 
doctrine of unequivocal and necessary identification is derived from the common law in the absence of contrary 
provisions in the UCP (see Banque de l'Indochine v. Rayner at p. 232, col. 2; p. 731E/H), that he considered that the 
1974 Revision did not touch on the question of identification which therefore remained as it did at common law, and 
that the altered language of what is now art. 21 of the 1993 Revision, unlike the more precise language of art. 23 of 
the 1983 Revision, once again leaves the question of identification entirely outside the provisions of the UCP Code; 
and on the other hand that the "legislative history" of art. 21 shows a clear intention that Sir John Donaldson's 
doctrine of identification in its full apparent rigour has been modified and relaxed.”  
33 [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 135. 
34 UCP 500 Article 20(b): 
Unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, banks will also accept as an original document(s), a document(s) 
produced or appearing to have been produced: 
 i.   by reprographic, automated or computerized systems; 
 ii.  as carbon copies;  
provided that it is marked as original and where necessary, appears to be signed. 
A document may be signed by handwriting, by facsimile signature, by perforated signature, by stamp, by 
symbol, or by any other mechanical or electronic method of authentication.  
35 [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 801. 
36 Ibid, 812. 
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Therefore, in July 1999, the ICC issued a policy statement to clarify this issue and this policy 
statement is now incorporated into Article 17 UCP 600. 37 Article 17 UCP 600 stipulates the 
following: 
 
a.   At least one original of each document stipulated in the credit must be presented. 
 
b.  A bank shall treat as an original any document bearing an apparently original signature, mark, 
stamp, or label of the issuer of the document, unless the document itself indicates that it is not 
original. 
  
c.   Unless a document indicates otherwise, a bank will also accept a document as original if it: 
  
    i. appears to be written, typed, perforated or stamped by the document issuer’s hand; or 
       
    ii. appears to be on the document issuer’s original stationery; or 
  
      iii. states that it is original, unless the statement appears not to apply to the document presented. 
  
d.  If a credit requires presentation of copies of documents, presentation of either originals or copies is 
permitted. 
  
e.   If a credit requires presentation of multiple documents by using terms such as “in duplicate”, “in 
two fold” or “in two copies”, this will be satisfied by the presentation of at least one original and the 
remaining number in copies, except when the document itself indicates otherwise.  
 
The position now is that the bank can no longer reject documents solely on the grounds that 
they were not marked as originals.  If a document is presented, it will have to be regarded as an 
original if its appearance bore any of the characteristics provided in Article 17(b) and Article 17 
(c) of UCP 600, unless the document itself indicates otherwise, for example if it was marked as a  
“copy”. Note that both clauses use the word “or” so that if for example, an invoice which is not 
signed by the issuer but is written on the issuer’s original stationery is presented, the bank will 
have to treat the invoice as an original.  However, some documents like the bill of lading or 
insurance documents are exceptions and the relevant provisions of the UCP 600 stipulate that 
they must be signed.38  
 
                                                 
37ICC Commission on Banking Technique and Practice, “The determination of an Original document in the context 
of UCP 500” sub-Article 20(b)” ICC Document” n° 470/871 Rev.  
<http://www.iccwbo.org/collection4/folder165/id415/printpage.html?newsxsl=&articlexsl=>accessed 21 May 2008. 
38 See UCP 600 Article 20 (a)(i) and Article 28(a). 
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Similarly, photocopies will not be treated as originals unless the photocopies accord with any 
of the characteristics stipulated in Article 17(b) and Article 17(c) of UCP 600. If a photocopy is 
just a photocopy of another document in its entirety, it will not be regarded as an original even if 
the document shows a signature, a stamp, has photocopied markings of the issuer’s stationery or 
has an “original” mark since any of these applies to the document which had been photocopied. 
However if, for example, a document is a photocopy of another document, but has evidently been 
photocopied onto original stationery or has been completed by hand marking, then the document 
is regarded as an original document under the UCP.39 In the instance where an original stamp is 
involved, this can be a dangerous rule which exposes the applicant and bank to fraud because a 
fraudulent party could create a document which appears to be a photocopied document,   buy an 
"original" stamp, stamp it on that document and claim that it is an original document. If the 
applicant does not wish to accept photocopies of any documents, it will be safe practice for the 
credit to expressly provide that photocopies are not allowed. 
 
Article 17(a) UCP 600 is a new clause, requiring a beneficiary to present at least one original 
of each required document. Unlike Article 20(c)(i) UCP 50040, Article 17(d) UCP 600 expressly 
provides that originals can be presented if the letter of credit calls for copies. It really did not 
make sense to insist on a copy if an original document was presented since copies are much 
easier to be fraudulently produced. There is no longer a reference to reprographic, automated or 
computerised systems and carbon copies. Where multiple copies are required, the wording of 
Article 17 UCP 600 differs slightly from the stipulation in Article 20(c)(ii) UCP 50041. Under 
UCP 500, at least one original must be presented with the remainder copies, whereas under the 
new UCP at least one original is required, with the remainder either copies or originals.  
 
                                                 
39See ICC Document n° 470/871 Rev., at Point 3. 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/collection4/folder165/id415/printpage.html?newsxsl=&articlexsl=>accessed 21st December 
2008. 
40UCP 500 Article 20(c)(i): Unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, banks will accept as copy(ies), a document(s), 
either labelled copy or not marked as an original –a copy(ies) need  not be signed.  
41UCP 500 Article 20(c)(ii): Credits that require multiple document(s) such as “duplicate”, “two fold”, two   copies” 
and the like, will be satisfied by the presentation of one original and the remaining number in copies except where 
the document itself indicates otherwise. 
40 
 
In comparison, the explanation of what constitute original documents under the UCP 600 is 
more detailed than the old UCP. The new rules on copies and multiple documents also accords 
with business sense and is more in line with banking practice.  
 
2.4.4 Bills of Lading  
  
Article 20 UCP 600 provides the following: 
 
a. A bill of lading, however named, must appear to: 
 
i. indicate the name of the carrier and be signed by: 
 
- the carrier or a named agent for or on behalf of the carrier, or 
- the master or a named agent for or on behalf of the master. 
 
Any signature by the carrier, master or agent must be identified as that of the carrier, master or agent. 
 
Any signature by an agent must indicate whether the agent has signed for or on behalf of the carrier or 
for or on behalf of the master. 
 
ii. indicate that the goods have been shipped on board a named vessel at the port of loading stated in 
the credit by:  
- pre-printed wording, or 
- an on board notation indicating the date on which the goods have been shipped on board 
 
The date of issuance of the bill of lading will be deemed to be the date of shipment unless the bill of 
lading contains an on board notation indicating the date of shipment, in which case the date stated in 
the on board notation will be deemed to be the date of shipment. 
 
If the bill of lading contains the indication "intended vessel" or similar qualification in relation to the 
name of the vessel, an on board notation indicating the date of shipment and the name of the actual 
vessel is required. 
 
iii. indicate shipment from the port of loading to the port of discharge stated in the credit.  
 
If the bill of lading does not indicate the port of loading stated in the credit as the port of loading, or if 
it contains the indication "intended" or similar qualification in relation to the port of loading, an on 
board notation indicating the port of loading as stated in the credit, the date of shipment and the name 
of the vessel is required. This provision applies even when loading on board or shipment on a named 
vessel is indicated by pre-printed wording on the bill of lading.  
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iv. be the sole original bill of lading or, if issued in more than one original, be the full set as indicated 
on the bill of lading. 
 
v. contain terms and conditions of carriage or make reference to another source containing the terms 
and conditions of carriage (short form or blank back bill of lading). Contents of terms and conditions 
of carriage will not be examined. 
 
vi. contain no indication that it is subject to a charter party. 
 
The predecessor of the above provision, Article 23 UCP 500, adopted the heading “marine/ocean 
bill of lading“, but the new provision replaces this with the term “bill of lading”. However, the 
new UCP continues to categorise the different types of bill and in separate articles makes 
provision, in most respects similar to those applicable to bills of lading, for multimodal bills, non-
negotiable sea waybills and charter party bills. This article will mainly discuss the traditional 
marine bill of lading but where the provisions of other bills are dissimilar on the same issue, the 
writer will highlight these differences. 
 
2.4.4.1 Signatures 
 
All bills of lading must be signed. Despite the removal of “or otherwise authenticated”, 
“authentication” and “authenticating” in all of the transport articles, there are no changes with 
respect to the way a bill of lading is to be signed.42 This is because Article 3 UCP 600 now 
                                                 
42 UCP 500 Article 23: 
a. If a credit calls for a bill of lading covering a port-to-port shipment, banks will, unless otherwise stipulated in the 
Credit, accept a document, however named which: 
i. appears on its face to indicate the name of the carrier and to have been signed or otherwise authenticated by: 
-the carrier or a named agent for or on behalf of the carrier, or 
-the master or a named agent for or on behalf of the master 
Any signature or authentication of the carrier or the master, as the case may be. An agent signing or authenticating 
for the carrier or master must also indicate the name and the capacity of the party, i.e. carrier master, on whose behalf 
that agent is acting. 
ii. indicates that the goods have been loaded on board, or shipped on a named vessel. 
Loading on board or shipment on a named vessel may be indicated by pre-printed wording on the bill of lading that 
the goods have been loaded on board a named vessel or shipped on a named vessel, in which case the date of 
issuance of the bill of lading will be deemed to be the date of loading on board and the date of shipment. 
In all other cases loading on board a named vessel must be evidenced by a notion on the bill of lading which gives 
the date on which the goods have been loaded on board, in which case the date of the board notation will be deemed 
to be the date of shipment. 
If the bill of lading contains the indication ”intended vessel” or similar qualification in relation to the vessel, loading 
on board a named vessel must be evidenced by an on board notation on the bill of lading which, in addition to the 
(footnote continues next page) 
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provides that “A document may be signed by handwriting, facsimile signature, perforated 
signature, stamp, symbol or any other mechanical or electronic method of authentication”. Article 
20(a)(i) UCP 600 maintains the position of its predecessor in the following matters: 
a) The name of the carrier must be indicated on the bill of lading. 
b)  A signature by the carrier or its agent or a signature by the master or its agent is required. 
c) A bill of lading with just a simple signature could be rejected since the article requires a 
signature to indicate the capacity of the signer. 
d) The words “named agent” means that the bill of lading must indicate the name of the 
agent. 
 
Although all the other transport document provisions follow the above position, there is no 
provision in Article 22 UCP 600 requiring charterparty bills to name the carrier. There are also 
some differences as to who may sign for charterparty bills with Article 22(a)(i) UCP 600 
providing that such bills must be signed by: 
a) the master or his agent; or 
b) the owner or his agent; or 
c) the charterer or his agent 
                                                                                                                                                              
date on which the goods have been loaded on board, also includes the name of the vessel on which the goods have 
been loaded, even if they have been loaded even if they have been loaded on vessel named as the “intended vessel”. 
If the bill of lading indicates a place of receipt or taking in charge different from the port of loading, the on board 
notation must also included the port of lading stipulated in the Credit and the name of the vessel on which the goods 
have been loaded, even if they have been loaded on the vessel named in the bill of lading. This provision also applies 
whenever loading on board the vessel is indicated by pre-printing wording on the bill of lading, and 
iii. indicates the port of loading and the port of discharge stipulated in the Credit, notwithstanding that it: 
a. Indicates a place of taking in charge different from the port of loading and /or a place of final destination different 
from the port of discharge, and /or 
b. contains the indication “intended” or similar qualification in relation to the port of loading and /or ports of 
discharge, as long as the document also states the ports of loading and /or discharge stipulated in the Credit, and 
iv. consists of a sole original bill of lading, or if issued in more that one original. A full set as so issued, and 
v. appears to contain all of the terms and conditions of carriage or some of such terms and conditions by reference to 
a source or document other that the bill of lading (short form/blank back bill of lading); banks will not examine the 
contents of such terms and conditions, and 
vi. contains no indication that it is subject to a charter party and /or or no indication that the carrying vessel is 
propelled by sail only, and 
vii. In all other respects meets the stipulations of the Credit. 
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This is a major change from UCP 500 where a charterer (could be the applicant or beneficiary 
depending on the terms shipment) was not allowed to sign a charterparty bill of lading. It is likely 
that in most circumstances, this option will not be utilised because an applicant would most likely 
not want to the beneficiary to sign and vice versa but would insist that a bill be signed by either 
the master or the owner. This is because it could have an impact on their legal interest in the 
event of damage to or loss of the cargo. Again, if the relevant parties do not wish for a charterer 
to sign, this needs to be expressly excluded in the credit.  
 2.4.4.2 Master’s name need not be indicated 
There is a fundamental change in all transport document articles in relation to the situation where 
an agent signs for or on behalf of a master. Unlike UCP 500, UCP 600 does not require an agent 
signing for or on behalf of the master to provide the name of the master.43  This is a welcomed 
change since, in practice, it is often the case that an agent who signs on behalf of a master 
receives instructions from a head office and has never met the master.  
 
 
2.4.4.3 Date of shipment 
 
The position regarding the date of shipment remains unchanged from the old UCP. UCP 600 
provides that the date of issuance of the bill of lading is the date of shipment. For multimodal 
bills, the date of issuance of the bill of lading is treated as “the date of dispatch, taking in charge 
or shipped on board and the date of shipment”44. If the bills contain a separate dated on-board 
notation, then the on-board date will be regarded as the date of shipment, regardless of whether 
the on-board date is before or after the issuance date of the bill of lading.45  
  
2.4.4.4 Port of loading and port of discharge 
As with UCP 500, all bills must show that the goods have been shipped from the port of loading 
to the port of discharge required by the credit or, where multimodal bills are concerned, it must 
                                                 
43 UCP 600 Article 19(a)(i), Article 20(a)(i), Article 21(a)(i), Article 22(a)(i). 
44 UCP 600 Article 19(a)(ii). 
45 UCP 600 Article 19(a)(ii), Article 20(a)(ii), Article 21(a)(ii), Article 22(a) (ii). 
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indicate the “place of dispatch, taking in charge or shipment and the place of final destination 
stated in the credit”. 46 The differences lies in the fact that, unlike a multimodal bill, a port-to-port 
bill of lading relates to loading on board the named vessel at the port of loading stated in the 
credit and not to any pre-carriage of the goods from a place of receipt to the port of loading. 
However, for charter party bills, if a credit gives a geographical area or range of ports of loading 
and/or discharge, the charter party bill of lading may show the geographical area or range of ports 
as the port of discharge, e.g “any Spanish port” but a named port of loading must still be 
indicated.47 For non-negotiable sea waybills and the traditional marine bills, if the bill does not 
indicate the port of loading to the port of discharge stated in the credit or if it indicates an 
“intended” port of loading or discharge, then an on board notation is required.48 The on-board 
notation must indicate the port of loading stated in the documentary credit, the name of the vessel 
and the date of the shipment.  The on-board notation should look like this: 
“SHIPPED ON BOARD ON 27 JANUARY 2007 
PORT OF LOADING: SINGAPORE 
VESSEL NAME: ILI” 
2.4.4.5 Vessel’s name 
Article 19 (a)(iii) UCP 600 allows multimodal bills to contain the indication “intended vessel” or 
similar qualification in relation to the vessel but all the other bills of lading must also indicate the 
name of the vessel on which goods have been loaded.49 There are no provisions in Article 22 
UCP 600 regarding “intended vessel” since the nature of charterparty bills would require it to 
name the vessel. 
    With the exception of multimodal bills and charterparty bills, if “intended vessel” or similar 
qualification in relation to the name of vessel is indicated on all other types of bills of lading, 
                                                 
46 UCP 600 Article 19(a)(iii), Article 20(a)(iii), Article 21(a)(iii), Article 22(a)(iii). 
47 UCP 600 Article 22(a)(iii). 
48 UCP 600 Article 20(a)(iii), Article 21(a)(iii). 
49 UCP 600 Article 20(a)(ii), Article 21(a)(ii), Article 22(a)(ii). 
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UCP 600 requires an “on board” notation indicating the date of shipment and the actual name of 
the vessel such as the following50: 
“SHIPPED ON BOARD ON 27 JANUARY 2007 
VESSEL NAME: ILI”  
2.4.4.6 Clean bills of ladings 
Article 27 UCP 600 is the new revised article of the Article 32 UCP 500. The text of Article 27 
UCP 600 is substantially shorter than the Article 32 UCP 500, but Article 27 UCP 600 does not 
change or create any new rules. It is still the case that banks will only accept clean transport 
documents. So long as a transport document bears “no clause or notation expressly declaring a 
defective condition of the goods or their packaging”51, document checkers will have to treat the 
document as a clean transport document.  Article 27 UCP 600 expressly states that, “The word 
“clean” need not appear on a transport document even if a credit has a requirement for the 
transport document to be “clean on board”.”  The need for amendment arose because Article 32 
UCP 500 was not clear on this point and document checkers rejected documents which did not 
bear the word “clean”.
  
What happens if a credit requires a document to be “marked clean”? Would it mean that the 
required document must be marked clean? Since Article 1 UCP 60052 allows modification of 
UCP rules by express wording in the credit, arguably, a requirement for a clean bill of lading is 
different from a requirement for a bill of lading to be marked clean.   
 
2.4.4.7 Transshipment  
 
Following the revision, Article 20 UCP 600 provides the following: 
 
                                                 
50 UCP600 Article 20(a)(ii), Article 21(a)(ii). 
51 UCP 600 Article 27. 
52 UCP 600 Article 1:The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, 2007 Revision, ICC Publication 
no. 600 ("UCP")  are rules that apply to any documentary credit ("credit") (including, to the extent to which they may 
be  applicable, any standby letter of credit) when the text of the credit expressly indicates that it is subject to  these 
rules. They are binding on all parties thereto unless expressly modified or excluded by the credit. 
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b. For the purpose of this article, transhipment means unloading from one vessel and reloading to 
another vessel during the carriage from the port of loading to the port of discharge stated in the credit. 
 
c. i. A bill of lading may indicate that the goods will or may be transhipped provided that the entire 
carriage is covered by one and the same bill of lading.  
 ii. A bill of lading indicating that transhipment will or may take place is acceptable, even if the credit 
prohibits transhipment, if the goods have been shipped in a container, trailer or LASH barge as 
evidenced by the bill of lading. 
 
d. Clauses in a bill of lading stating that the carrier reserves the right to tranship will be disregarded. 
 
Transshipment has been re-defined by replacing “during the course of ocean carriage” in Article 
23(b) UCP 50053 with “during the carriage”. Article 20(c)(i) UCP 600 provides that 
transshipment is allowed so long as one bill of lading covers the entire carriage. This probably 
means that separate bill of ladings for each leg of a voyage will allow the bank to reject the 
documents.   The writer interprets Article 20(c)(i) UCP 600 as reasserting for transshipment the 
rule in Article 20(a)(iii) UCP 600 that bills of lading must indicate shipment from the port of 
loading to the port of discharge stated in the credit. C Debattista raises the point that Article 
20(c)(i) UCP 600 could possibly mean that the carriage must be covered by one bill of lading  
which does not contain a clause disclaiming the carrier’s liability after transshipment.54 This, he 
argues, would be inconsistent with Article 20(a)(v) UCP 600, which provides that the contents of 
terms and conditions of carriage will not be examined. Although the position at common law is 
that the carrier must undertake responsibility for all journeys55, even those after transshipment, 
this is unlikely to be the intended effect of Article 20(c)(i) UCP 600 since it does not refer to the 
                                                 
53 UCP 500 Article 23: 
b. For the purpose of this Article, transhipment means unloading and reloading from one vessel to another 
vessel during the course of ocean carriage from the port of loading to the port of discharge stipulated in the 
Credit. 
c. Unless transshipment is prohibited by the terms of the Credit, banks will accept a bill of lading which 
indicates that the goods will be transshipped, provided that the entire ocean carriage is covered by one and 
the same bill of lading. 
d. Even if the Credit prohibits transshipment, banks will accept a bill of lading which: 
i. indicated that the transshipment will take place as long as the relevant cargo is shipped in Container(s), 
trailer(s) and/or “LASH” barge(s) as evidenced by the bill of lading, provided that the entire ocean carriage 
is covered by one and the same bill of lading, and/or 
ii. incorporates clauses stating that the carrier reserves the right to transship 
54C Debattista, “The new UCP 600: changes to the tender of the seller's shipping documents under letters of credit. 
Journal of Business Law” [2007] 4 JBL 329, 344. 
55 Hansson v Hamel and Horley Ltd [1922] 2 A.C. 36. 
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carrier’s liability. If this was the intended meaning, then Article 20(c)(i) UCP 600 is very poorly 
drafted.  
 
However, this means that the buyer is exposed to risks under the new UCP. It is possible that a 
bill of lading may be presented which satisfies Article 20(c)(i) UCP 600 (indicating shipment 
from the port of loading to the port of discharge), but yet at the same time also excludes the 
carrier’s liability after transshipment. Such a bill of lading weakens the utility of the documentary 
credit to the buyer since he will not be able to bring any claims against the carrier for cargo lost 
or damaged after the port of transhipment. The buyer should therefore protect himself by 
expressly excluding the right of the carrier to exclude liability after transshipment. 
 
Following Article 20(c)(ii) UCP 600, a prohibition of transshipment in the credit will not 
enable a bank to reject a bill of lading indicating transshipment if the bill of lading indicates that 
the goods  are shipped in a container, trailer or LASH barge. This corresponds with shipping 
practice since it is very common that transshipment may take place if goods are shipped by any of 
these methods. Article 20(d) UCP 600 states that clauses in a bill of lading giving the carrier a 
right to transship are to be disregarded, the effect of which is that banks cannot reject a bill of 
lading merely on the basis that such clauses exist. It is not entirely clear what is the position if a 
credit expressly prohibits transshipment but the bill of lading contains such a clause. At first 
sight, it does seem as if banks will have to accept the documents (provided Article 20(a)(iii) UCP 
600 is satisfied56) since banks will have to treat such clauses as if they are non-existent. However, 
the predecessor of Article 20(d) UCP 600, Article 23(d) UCP 500 included the words “even if the 
credit prohibits transshipment”57, as does Article 20(c)(ii) UCP 600.  The deliberate omission of 
these words in Article 20(d) UCP 600 could mean that the intention of the drafters was that in 
relation to goods not shipped in a container, trailer or LASH barge, where there is a clause in the 
bill of lading giving the carrier a right to transship, an express prohibition of transshipment in the 
credit will make the bill of lading non-complying.  This is a strict interpretation of Article 20(d) 
UCP 600 and would only be uncovered by a detailed analysis and comparison of both the new 
and old provisions. In the writer’s opinion, this is unlikely to be the intended effect of Article 
                                                 
56 See 2.4.4.4. 
57 UCP 500 Article 23 (n 53). 
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20(d) UCP 600 since meetings of the ICC Banking Commission revealed no underlying policy 
change regarding transshipment.  
 
The complexity of the relevant provisions relating to transshipment means that extra care must 
be taken in the drafting process so that the intentions of a buyer who does not wish his goods to 
be transshipped are given effect. UCP 600 does seem to allow transshipment in some 
circumstances even when the credit expressly excludes transshipment. Therefore, express 
exclusion of transshipment in the credit is futile. The credit will need expressly to exclude the 
application of the relevant articles and the sale contract should also expressly allow the exclusion 
of these articles. 
 
2.4.5 Insurance Documents 
 
The rules on the compliance of insurance documents are covered by Article 28 UCP 600.58 These 
provisions are rather straightforward and easy to follow, although one issue deserves to be 
                                                 
58 UCP 600 Article 28: 
a. An insurance document, such as an insurance policy, an insurance certificate or a declaration under an open cover, 
must appear to be issued and signed by an insurance company, an underwriter or their agents or their proxies.  
Any signature by an agent or proxy must indicate whether the agent or proxy has signed for or on behalf of the 
insurance company or underwriter.  
b. When the insurance document indicates that it has been issued in more than one original, all originals must be 
presented.  
c. Cover notes will not be accepted.  
d. An insurance policy is acceptable in lieu of an insurance certificate or a declaration under an open cover.  
e. The date of the insurance document must be no later than the date of shipment, unless it 
appears from the insurance document that the cover is effective from a date not later than the date of shipment.  
f. i. The insurance document must indicate the amount of insurance coverage and be in the same currency as the 
credit 
ii. A requirement in the credit for insurance coverage to be for a percentage of the value of the goods, of the invoice 
value or similar is deemed to be the minimum amount of coverage required.  
If there is no indication in the credit of the insurance coverage required, the amount of insurance coverage must be at 
least 110% of the CIF or CIP value of the goods. 
When the CIF or CIP value cannot be determined from the documents, the amount of insurance coverage must be 
calculated on the basis of the amount for which honour or negotiation is requested or the gross value of the goods as 
shown on the invoice, whichever is greater.  
iii. The insurance document must indicate that risks are covered at least between the place of taking in charge or 
shipment and the place of discharge or final destination as stated in the credit.  
g. A credit should state the type of insurance required and, if any, the additional risks to be covered. An insurance 
document will be accepted without regard to any risks that are not covered if the credit uses imprecise terms such as 
"usual risks" or "customary risks".  
(footnote continues next page) 
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highlighted here. As is the case under UCP 500, if a credit stipulates for insurance against “all 
risks”, an insurance document, even if it does not contain the heading “all risks” and excludes 
certain risks, will be accepted if it contains any “all risks” notation or clause.59 Following this, 
insurance against “all risks” does not mean that the goods are covered by insurance against every 
risk which may arise.60 One question which arises from this is the extent to which such a 
document may exclude risks. One writer argues that “…the existence of an ‘all risk’ notation or 
clause is all the bank needs to see. If the buyer wishes to ensure that the goods are covered to his 
satisfaction, he ought to then ensure that the credit contains the degree of specificity which would 
serve his purpose.”61 On the other hand, R Jack comments that “if the cover provided is so cut 
down by the exclusions that it would clearly fall short of the cover to be reasonably expected for 
the transaction in question, it should be rejected.”62 It is argued here that the first approach should 
be the correct one, since insurance clauses are often technical and banks may not have the 
required expertise to evaluate whether the exclusions in an insurance document are so extensive 
as to defeat the purpose of the insurance to the trading parties. In practice, if a document checker 
notices extensive exclusions of this nature, it would be good practice to inform the seller of this, 
although he should be under no duty to do so. Moreover, if the policy contains exclusions to the 
extent that it does not provide the protection which is reasonably expected by the buyer, the buyer 
will be able to bring an action against the seller for breach of its contractual obligation in the 
event of loss.  
Some of the new insurance provisions contain some changes, although they are not 
substantial. It is now expressly stated that an insurance document will include “an insurance 
policy, an insurance certificate or a declaration under an open cover”63. Under the new 
                                                                                                                                                              
h. When a credit requires insurance against "all risks" and an insurance document is presented containing any "all 
risks" notation or clause, whether or not bearing the heading "all risks", the insurance document will be accepted 
without regard to any risks stated to be excluded.  
i. An insurance document may contain reference to any exclusion clause.  
j. An insurance document may indicate that the cover is subject to a franchise or excess 
(deductible). 
59 UCP 600 Article 28(h). 
60 This is consistent with the position at common law. See Upjohn v. Hitchens [1918] 2 K.B. 48; British & Foreign 
Marine Insurance Co v Gaunt [1921] 2 AC 41; F.W. Berk & Co Ltd  v Style [1956] 1 Q.B. 180; Mayban General 
Assurance BHD v Alstom Power Plants Ltd [2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 609. 
61 Ellinger, P., and Neo, D., The Law And Practice Of Documentary Letters Of Credit (Hart, Oxford 2010) 272. 
62 Jack (n 27) 238. 
63 UCP 600 Article 28(a). 
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provisions, proxies are now allowed to sign insurance documents.64 This is probably not a 
significant change since proxies are generally agents.65 Moreover, an agent or proxy’s signature 
must indicate whether he has “signed for or on behalf of the insurance company or 
underwriter”66. One other change is that all cover notes are to be rejected under Article 28(c) 
UCP 600, since its predecessor only prohibited cover notes issued by brokers.67 The new UCP 
also expressly provides that the risks included under the insurance document must cover, at the 
minimum, carriage between the two places stated in the credit68, providing more assurance for 
buyers. There is also an additional provision, Article 28(i) UCP 600, which provides that 
reference to any exclusion clause in an insurance document is allowed. A seller should be wary of 
any term which excludes Article 28(i) UCP 600. The insurance industry revealed to the UCP 600 
Drafting Group that every insurance document in the future would contain clauses excluding acts 
of terrorism and other types of standard exclusions.69 An exclusion of this clause would make it 
impossible for the seller to supply complying documents70 and may even provide opportunities 
for dishonest buyers to obtain goods without paying. 
2.4.6 Non-Documentary Conditions 
  
Non-documentary conditions are conditions of payment specified in a letter of credit which do 
not require the tender of documents. Non-documentary conditions are problematic because they 
require banks to investigate true facts, thereby undermining the documentary nature of letters of 
credit. Article 13(c) UCP 500 provided that banks “will deem such conditions as not stated and 
will disregard them.” However, the position under the old UCP 500 was further complicated by 
ICC Commission on Banking Technique and Practice Position Paper (No. 3) which provided that 
banks could only disregard non-documentary conditions if there was no implicit connection 
between a non-documentary condition and a document to be tendered. This meant that under the 
                                                 
64 UCP 600 Article 28(a). 
65 However, a technical distinction is made by some insurers in some countries – Byrne (n 21) 215.  
66 UCP 600 Article 28(a. 
67 UCP 500 Article 34(c). 
68 UCP 600 Article 28(f)(iii). 
69 Commentary on UCP 600-Article-by-Article Analysis (n 18) 133. 
70 R Kreitmen, “UCP 600: One year on (nearly)” <http://www.mantissa.co.uk/support/OneYearOn.htm> accessed 4th 
January 2010. 
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UCP 500, banks could sometimes reject documents based on a non-documentary condition. The 
following example from Position Paper (No. 3) is a good explanation of the previous position: 
 
“For example, if a condition in the documentary credit states that the goods are to be 
of German origin and no Certificate of Origin is called for, the reference to 'German 
origin' would be deemed to be a non-documentary condition and disregarded in 
accordance with UCP 500 sub-Article 13(c). If, however, the same documentary 
credit stipulated a Certificate of Origin, then there would not be a non-documentary 
condition as the Certificate of Origin would have to evidence the German origin.”71 
Article 14(h) UCP 600 retains the position of discouraging non-documentary conditions: 
"If a credit contains a condition without stipulating the document to indicate compliance with the 
condition, banks will deem such condition as not stated and will disregard it."  
Since Position Papers issued under the old UCP will be ignored, the position now would be 
slightly different from that under the old regime, even though Article 14(h) UCP 600 is nearly 
the same as its predecessor72. Banks should disregard all non-documentary conditions even if 
there is a connection between a non-documentary condition and a document which is required 
by the credit.  Banks no longer have to check if a required document could be linked to the 
non-documentary condition.  
One example of a non-documentary condition is in Banque de l'Indochine et de Suez SA v JH 
Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd73 where the credit stipulated “Shipment to be effected on vessel 
belonging to shipping company, member of an International Shipping Conference” though no 
specific documentary proof was called for by the credit. The Court of Appeal held that the bank 
was entitled to ask for reasonable documentary evidence. Now, under UCP 600, the bank is to 
disregard this condition and should not ask for any documentary evidence. However, two 
Singaporean cases demonstrate that by resorting to ordinary rules of contractual construction, 
                                                 
71 ICC Commission on Banking Technique and Practice Position Paper (No. 3) 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/collection4/folder165/id357/printpage.html?newsxsl=&articlexsl=>accesed 19 June 2009. 
72 UCP 500 Article 13(c): If a Credit contains conditions without stating the document(s) to be presented in 
compliance therewith, banks will deem such conditions as not stated and will disregard them. 
73 [1983] Q.B. 711. 
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non-documentary conditions can still be enforced regardless of the provisions of the UCP.  In 
Kumagai-Zenecon Construction Pte Ltd v Arab Bank Plc74, a standby letter of credit was opened 
to secure any amount which the applicant was obliged to pay under judgment of the High Court 
as affirmed or varied by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal ruled that the obligation of the 
applicant was to pay for the price of all the shares which the beneficiary had purchased “at a fair 
price to be fixed by independent valuers or at cost, whichever is higher”. A day before the expiry 
of the credit, the beneficiary made a written demand for payment for $3,793,000, accompanied by 
copies of the High Court judgment and the Court of Appeal order but without any documents 
which supported the amount demanded. The bank refused to pay, on the ground that the sum 
demanded did not appear to be the sum payable under the applicant's obligations to the 
beneficiary following the judgments. The beneficiary sued for payment. The trial judge decided 
that the credit required the valuation report to be tendered as proof of the non-documentary 
condition and since this was not presented, the bank was entitled to reject the documents 
tendered.  Judith Prakash J explained the following: 
 
“It has to be remembered, however, that the provisions of UCP-500 were not 
expressly repeated in the credit. Instead they were incorporated by reference. It is a 
well known principle of construction of contracts that the express terms of [a] 
contract are capable of overriding terms incorporated by reference if inconsistent 
with such incorporated terms.”75 
 
The learned judge went on to say the following: 
 
“Whilst I recognize the desirability of upholding the provisions of UCP-500 in 
general, it appeared to me that in this instance the circumstances were such that the 
credit could only be operated if the non-documentary conditions ie the ascertainment 
of the fact and quantum of [the applicant's] obligation were satisfied. Otherwise the 
                                                 
74 [1997] 2 SLR 805; [1997] 3 S.L.R. 770. 
75 [1997] 2 SLR 805, [25].  
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credit did not make sense… I therefore found that in this case art 13c had been 
excluded by implication because of the express wording of cl 2 of the credit.”76 
 
The beneficiary appealed, arguing that the bank was not entitled to request the beneficiary to 
present the valuation report because UCP 500 Article 13(a) provides that extraneous documents 
"will not be examined" and that UCP 500 Art.13(c) provides that non-documentary conditions 
are to be ignored. Recognising the irreconcilable inconsistency between the operation of the 
credit and the UCP provisions, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s adoption of the 
ordinary principle of construction of contracts to give effect to the non-documentary term of the 
credit.   
 
In a later case, Korea Exchange Bank v Standard Chartered Bank77, a credit was opened to 
finance the purchase of gas oil. One of the terms of the credit was “The amount of this letter of 
credit shall automatically fluctuate to cover any increase/decrease according to the price clause 
without further amendment to this credit”. The price clause referred to the market price of gas oil. 
The amount provided in the credit was US$ 800,000. However, one clause in the credit provided 
for a tolerance of credit limit of plus or minus 10%. Standard Chartered (the negotiating Bank) 
paid upon presentation of tendered documents but Korea Exchange Bank (the issuing bank) 
refused to reimburse Standard Chartered, alleging various discrepancies. Standard Chartered 
obtained a summary judgment against Korea Exchange for dishonour and Korean Exchange 
appealed. On appeal, Korean Exchange argued only one discrepancy - the claim exceeded the 
upper limit of $ 880,000. Korean Bank submitted, inter alia that the price clause and the 
fluctuation clause, being non-documentary, was to be ignored under Art 13(c) UCP 500.  This 
was rejected by Andrew Ang J.  He observed that the purpose of Article 13.c was to protect a 
negotiating bank (or, perhaps, a beneficiary) against the issuing Bank. In seeking to invoke Art 
13(c) (the predecessor of Article 14(h) UCP 600), Korea Bank, as issuing bank, was “turning 
Article 13.c on its head”78. Furthermore, he stated that without the price clause and the automatic 
fluctuation clause, the credit would be unworkable as the price for gas oil is not fixed but 
                                                 
76 Ibid, [26]. 
77 [2006] 1 SLR 565. 
78 Ibid, [30]. 
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fluctuates with a benchmark.79 The learned judge applied the approach in Kumagai-Zenecon and 
held that the clause provision would override the relevant provisions of UCP 500. It was held that 
the conflict between the terms of the credit could be resolved by the words "without further 
amendment to the credit" in the credit term, which meant that the fluctuation and price clauses 
prevailed over the tolerance limit clause.80 Hence, the amount of payment claimed did not exceed 
the credit limit and the appeal was dismissed. 
  
Such an approach certainly does offer a number of advantages. It accords with the reasonable 
commercial expectation of the parties, giving priority to the intention of all the parties involved in 
the transaction. It is also likely that in most cases, the production of the required document is not 
very difficult on the part of the beneficiary. However, the principle in these two cases renders 
Article 14(h) UCP 600 to be rather pointless because it is not the case that all non-documentary 
conditions are to be disregarded.  It brings the position back to the one adopted by English courts 
in Banque de l’Indochine.81 The position under Article 14(h) UCP 600 is that an applicant who 
wishes to incorporate such conditions in the credit must expressly provide the document that is 
needed to be presented in order to satisfy the condition. For example, if the letter of credit states 
that goods  must be shipped on a dry cargo vessel, then  the letter of credit and the contract of 
sale should specify that “a vessel certification certificate indicating that the goods were shipped 
on a a dry cargo vessel” is be presented. Such express stipulation would safely convert a non-
documentary condition into a documentary condition. As C Debattista pointed out, “The degree 
of forethought by both parties is even more necessary under the UCP600 than it was under the 
UCP500.”82    
 
Adopting the principle adopted by the Singaporean courts means that the absolute prohibition 
of non-documentary conditions under Article 14(h) UCP 600 is very unlikely to succeed in 
                                                 
79 Ibid, [33]. 
80 Ibid, [23].  
81 See page 48 for discussion of this case. Ebenezer Adodo, “Non-documentary requirements in letters of credit 
transactions: what is the bank's obligation today?” [2008] 2 JBL 103, 112  noted this too but pointed out that Banque 
de l’Indochine is even more liberal because it would allow any reasonable document as opposed to a specific type of 
document. 
82C Debattista, “The new UCP 600: changes to the tender of the seller's shipping documents under letters of credit. 
Journal of Business Law” [2007] 4 JBL 329, 336. 
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eradicating the problems of non-documentary conditions. The writer agrees with R Jack that the 
most practical solution is for banks to “not accept instructions to issue or to confirm credits 
containing non-documentary conditions”83 but experience proves that mistakes can occur in 
practice. The position of non-documentary condition under UCP 600 is a positive change because 
it encourages all parties to deal only with documents, an attribute which strengthens the 
commercial efficacy of the letters of credit.  It is argued here that in the interest of the letter of 
credit community, the argument that Article 14(h) UCP 600 is to give way to the express terms of 
the contract whenever there is a conflict between the two should not be accepted. After all, if the 
parties really did intend for documentary proof of a condition, they really should be specifying 
the relevant documents in the credit for the sake of clarify to all parties. 
 
2.4.7 Addresses 
 
One other significant change is the addition of a new provision concerning addresses of 
beneficiary and applicants. There was no equivalent provision to deal with non-identical 
addresses under the old UCP but Article 14(j) UCP 600 now provides the following: 
 
When the addresses of the beneficiary and the applicant appear in any stipulated document, they need 
not be the same as those stated in the credit or in any other stipulated document, but must be within 
the same country as the respective addresses mentioned in the credit. Contact details (telefax, 
telephone, email and the like) stated as part of the beneficiary's and the applicant's address will be 
disregarded. However, when the address and contact details of the applicant appear as part of the 
consignee or notify party details on a transport document subject to articles 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 or 
25, they must be as stated in the credit 
 
With the exception of transport documents, the new provision provides that the addresses of the 
beneficiary and applicant can vary.  This is quite a divergence from the approach expounded by 
Viscount Summer in Equitable Trust.84 Typographical errors with addresses are common since 
international trading inevitably involve addresses in foreign languages or and will sometimes 
involve the addresses of regional subsidiaries of a beneficiary. This modification moves one step 
                                                 
83 R Jack (n 27) para 8.23. 
84See page 24. 
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towards the aim of reducing the rejection of documents based on trivial technical errors. 
However, the modification does increase the risk of fraud and money laundering. Since the article 
also provides for a document checker to disregard other contact details, there is no other means to 
help him decide if two different addresses are in fact the same place. Addresses in the same 
country which are similar but not identical could in reality be of two entirely different places in 
the same country. Nevertheless, given that the addresses of the consignee or notify party in 
transport documents subject to Articles 19 - Article 25  will need to “as stated” in the credit, 
Article 14(j) UCP 600 had achieved its best in striking a balance between the aim to reduce 
rejection and avoiding fraud.  
 
2.4.8 Description of Goods 
 
2.4.8.1 Description of Goods in Invoices  
 
Article 18(c) UCP 600 provides : 
 
The description of the goods, services or performance in a commercial invoice must correspond with 
that appearing in the credit. 
 
There are no changes from its predecessor. 85 The meaning of “correspond” is still uncertain. As 
one commentator, commenting on its predecessor rightfully puts it, “The question remains to 
what degree of correspondence?”86 Does it mean a) the description of the goods in the invoice 
must be a mirror image of the stipulations in the credit or b) that the description of the goods in 
the invoice must not contradict the stipulations in the credit? Luckily, the latest ISBP, which 
applies to credit subject to UCP 600, offers some clarification on this matter: 
       
         ISBP 
 
58) The description of the goods, services or performance in the invoice must correspond with the 
description in the credit. There is no requirement for a mirror image. For example, details of the goods 
                                                 
85 Article 37 (c) UCP 500. 
86 Richard Morris, “Discrepancies: Has UCP 500 Wrought Any Improvement?” Hong Kong Lawyer (Dec 1998) 
62,63  <http://sunzi1.lib.hku.hk/hkjo/view/15/1502320.pdf>accessed 30 June 2008. 
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may be stated in a number of areas within the invoice which, when collated together, represents a 
description of the goods corresponding to that in the credit. 
 
Nevertheless, UCP 600 and ISBP do not provide guidance for the many aspects of 
discrepancies which can arise in the description of the goods in invoices. For example, in practice 
a bank may be tendered an invoice with a description which differs in singular /plural terms from 
the stipulation of the credit. Clive M. Schmitthoff discussed an example of such a discrepancy 
which in his view should be disregarded - a credit which states “20 cm pipe-cutting machinery”  
and an invoice which states “ two 20 cm pipe-cutting machines.” 87  In his other example, where a 
credit stipulates “two machines” but the invoice specifies only “machinery,” he took the view that 
bank the documents should be rejected because “machinery” may cover only one machine.88 It is 
really difficult to set hard and fast rules in this regard. The determination of whether a non-
identical description in the invoice is a discrepancy is to be assisted by a combination of 
commercial judgment, common sense and the relevant case law. 
 
In Bank Melli Iran v Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial & Overseas)89 the credit provided 
for 60 “new Chevrolet trucks” but the invoices described the goods as ‘in new condition’. 
Barclays Bank accepted these documents but Bank Melli rejected the documents and refused to 
reimburse Barclays Bank, arguing that the documents were discrepant. It was held that there was 
a discrepancy because “in new condition” does not bear the same meaning as “new”. In Astro 
Exito Navegacion S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. (the Messiniaki Tolmi)90,  it was held that 
the expressions "ex Berger Pilot " and "previous name Berger Pilot" meant the same thing.  In 
Glencore International AG v Bank of China91 the credit stipulated for origin “Any Western 
Brand” but the invoice tendered stated “Any Western Brand-Indonesia (Inalum Brand)”. Sir 
Thomas Bingham M.R, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, cited the observation of 
Sir Thomas Browne that “the same country is sometimes East and sometimes West and Persia 
                                                 
87 Clive M. Schmitthoff, “Discrepancy of Documents in Letter of Credit Transactions” [1987] JBL 94, 97. 
88 Ibid. 
89 [1951] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 367. 
90  [1986] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 455. 
91 [1996] C.L.C. 95. 
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though East unto Greece, yet it is West unto China”92. It was held that in this respect, there was 
no discrepancy: 
“We cannot for our part accept that the additional words “Indonesia (Inalum brand)” 
were such as … to call for further inquiry or are such as to invite litigation. It seems 
to us quite plain on the face of the document that the additional words were to 
indicate the precise brand of the goods, it being implicit that that brand fell within the 
broad generic description which was all that was required. The additional words 
could not, on any possible reading of the documents, have been intended to indicate 
that the goods did not or might not fall within the description “any western brand.”93 
 
In comparison to English courts, some common law courts seem to have adopted a stricter 
interpretation of UCP 600 Article 18(c)’s predecessor. In Sunlight Distribution v Bank of 
Communications94, the credit stipulated for shipment of “MOTOROLA 8900X-2 (ETACS) 
PORTABLE RADIO TELEPHONE, 2600 UNITS.” The beneficiary presented the following two 
invoices: 
 
Invoice 1                                        Invoice 2  
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION QUANTITY DESCRIPTION 
v2160 UNITS S3410A  MOTOROLA 
8900X-2 (ETACS) 
PORTABLE RADIO 
TELEPHONE. 
440 UNITS S3410A MOTOROLA 
8900X-2 (ETACS) 
PORTABLE RADIO 
TELEPHONE 
2600 SNN4040A BATTERY 
BLACK HI-CAP 
2 SNN4216A 
PROGRAMMING 
BATTERY FOR 8900X-2 
52 S3410A MOTOROLA 
8900X-2 (ETACS) 
PORTABLE RADIO 
TELEPHONE. 
1 SNN4216A BATT TEST 
A/P SAM 
52 SNN4040A BATTERY 
BLACK HI-CAP 
  
 
                                                 
92Ibid, 119.  
93 Ibid. 
94 WL 46636 (S.D.N.Y.1995) 
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As can be seen from the above, both invoices provided full description of the goods in 
accordance with the terms of the credit. The problem was that they included additional terms 
which were not contained in the letter of credit (the terms bolded in the above invoices). The 
District Court of Southern District of New York held that the invoices were discrepant, adopting 
Professor Dolan’s the approach that “anything beyond the slightest, most unmistakable deviations 
is simply not acceptable”.95  
 
Dolan’s interpretation was also adopted in Rudy T. Oei and M.J.F.M. Kools, d/b/a Kools de 
Visser v. Citibank, N.A. 96 where a presented invoice, which was original, stated “LEVI 501-
0191,NEW, ORIGINALS, MADE IN USA LABELS” on one line, with the word “JEANS” 
typed right above the word “LEVI” while copies of the invoice did not include the word 
“JEANS”. It was held to be non-conforming because the credit provided for an original and four 
copies which indicate shipment of “LEVI JEANS 501-0191, NEW, ORIGINALS, MADE IN US 
LABELS”. It was held that there was wrongful honour of the credit. Although the result of the 
“mirror image” approach may be outlandish at times, it is submitted that this case was correctly 
decided since Levi produces other types of clothing and not merely jeans. Hence, “LEVI 501-
0191,NEW, ORIGINALS, MADE IN USA LABELS” does not obviously represent the delivery 
of jeans.  
 
The rigid “mirror image” approach adopted in some of the American cases discussed is not 
consistent with ISBP para 58. It is certainly true that there is a need to ensure shipment of the 
correct goods in documentary credit transaction and therefore one would normally assume that an 
exact description of the goods in the invoice can prevent fraud. But this idea is deceptive because 
in reality, the invoice is produced by the seller and he could always create an invoice detailing 
whatever he likes. Nevertheless, a seller should not be careless as it will avoid a lot of problems if 
the seller ensures that the invoice description matches the description which is provided in the 
credit.  If the applicants really wish for invoices and other documents to describe the goods in 
accordance the stipulations of the credit verbatim, then this should be expressly specified in the 
                                                 
95 J.F. Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit: Commercial and Standby Credits (2nd edn Warren, Gorham & Lamont 
Inc, Boston 1991) at 6.04[1]. 
96 957 F.Supp. 492, S.D.N.Y., 1997. 
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credit instructions. Equally important is that the credit instructions should provide short and 
concise descriptions of the goods. 
 
2.4.8.2 Description of Goods in Bills of Lading 
 
The term “not inconsistent” in Article 37(c) UCP 500 is replaced, with Article 14(e) UCP 600 
now providing as follows: 
 
In documents other than the commercial invoice, the description of the goods, services, or 
performance, if stated, may be in general terms not conflicting with their description in the credit.  
 
In  Soproma SpA v. Marine and Animal By-Products Corpn.97,  the credit described the goods as 
Chilean Fish Full meal but the bill of lading, bore the description "Fishmeal". It was held that this 
was a sufficiently general description to comply with Article 33 UCP 400 (the equivalent of 
Article 14(e) UCP 600). “Anyone in the trade seeing a bill of lading would not expect to see more 
specific a description than "Fishmeal" and could not reasonably object to such a description”.98 
The bill of lading was however non-confirming in other respects. In an earlier case, JH Rayner v 
Hambro's Bank99, the credit stipulated “coromandel groundnuts”, the invoice stated “coromandel 
groundnuts” while the bill of lading described “machine-shelled kernels with the margin 
containing the words, "O.T.C. C.R.S. Aarhus." The two terms were universally understood in the 
relevant trade as meaning the same thing and that "C.R.S." is short for "Coros" or "Coromandels 
but the court upheld the bank’s rejection of the documents on the basis that the bank is not in the 
groundnut business, and should not be expected to have knowledge of the terms of that trade. In 
this case, no provision equivalent to Article 14(e) UCP 600 was incorporated into the contract. In 
view of Article 14(e) UCP 600, would the decision still be decided in favour of the bank today? 
The writer does not think that Article 14(e) UCP 600 would assist the applicant’s case. Although 
it may be argued that the real meaning of the two terms do not conflict (in actual fact they are the 
same), it remains the case that this is knowledge which the bank did not have at that time.  R Jack 
also expressed the same view on the basis that “the two descriptions were inconsistent as a matter 
                                                 
97 [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 367. 
98 Ibid, 389 per McNair J. 
99 [1943] 1 K.B. 37. 
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of words and any special meaning in the trade was something which the bank was neither bound 
nor entitled to take into account.”100 
 
2.4.8.3 Reading together 
Documents presented to the bank can be read together, as if they were one document. If all the 
documents when read together, fully describe the goods and there are no inconsistencies, then 
there will be no discrepancy. In Midland Bank Ltd v Seymour101, the credit stipulated “Hong 
Kong duck feathers –85% clean; 12 bales each weighing about 190Ib; 5s per 1b.” but the bill of 
lading described the goods as “12 bales; Hong Kong duck feathers”. The invoice however, set out 
the full description of the goods as stated in the credit term. When all the documents tendered in 
the set were read together, they fully described the goods. The bank accepted the documents but 
the buyer then claimed, inter alia, that the bank should not have paid because the bill of lading 
did not fully describe the goods in accordance with the stipulations of the credit. It was held that 
it was unnecessary for each document to contain a full description of the goods. Devlin J gave the 
following reasons:  
“Having to choose between those two constructions, in my judgment the one that 
construes the letter of credit as requiring merely that the set should contain all the 
particulars is the preferable one and the right one, and I arrive at that conclusion 
mainly on two grounds. The first is that that is the construction which, in my 
judgment, best fits the language that is used in the letter of credit. The letter of credit 
quite plainly treats the documents as a set and not as an individual document...The 
second consideration is this…If each document contains all, it would produce a state 
of affairs that would be most unusual. For instance, I suppose rarely if ever does one 
find the price of the goods set out in the bill of lading”102 
Although Midland Bank was not decided under the UCP, the “reading together principle” 
applied in this case is consistent with Art 14(e) UCP 600. In Glencore International A. G. v Bank 
                                                 
100 R Jack (n 27) para 8.45. 
101 [1955] 2 Lloyd's Rep 147. 
102 Ibid, 152. 
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of China103, the defendant alleged inter alia that the packing lists failed to describe the goods. 
However the packing lists, certificates of weight and quantity, and bills of ladings together would 
provide a comprehensive description of the goods. The Court of Appeal applied Midland Bank 
and decided that the packing list was not to be read and considered in isolation from other 
documents tendered. This principle has also been adopted by American courts.104  
The writer wishes to highlight two issues arising from the principle in Midland Bank. To 
consider these issues, it is important to distinguish between two scenarios, one where documents 
other than the invoice are incomplete in description, and the other where the invoice itself is 
incomplete in description. Where documents other than the invoice provide incomplete 
description, does the “reading together” principle apply only if the goods are correctly described 
in the invoice? In Midland Bank, the courts seemed to have “read together” the bill of lading and 
the perfectly described invoice, whilst in Glencore, it was the packing lists, certificates of weight 
and quantity and bills of ladings which were read together.  It is submitted that documents can be 
read together only when the goods are correctly described in the invoice.  Although it was argued 
in Glencore that description of the goods in the invoice was non compliant, the Court of Appeal 
decided that the invoice description was compliant.  
 
Where an invoice is incomplete in its description, does the principle in Midland Bank apply so 
that if information is missing in the invoice, this can be supplemented by information in other 
documents? One may argue that since the invoice can be easily corrected by the seller, if the 
other documents produced by other parties demonstrate that the correct goods have been shipped, 
then it is more practical to accept the documents. In Courtaulds North America, Inc. v. North 
Carolina Nat. Bank105,  the presented invoice stated “Imported Acrylic Yarn” instead of “100% 
Acrylic Yarn” but the packing list which was stapled to the invoice indicated that the packages 
contained “cartons marked: -100% acrylic”. It was held that the invoice was not compliant with 
the terms of the credit because the invoice is not to be read as one with the packing list. The 
United States Court of Appeals (Fourth Circuit) based this decision on the distinction made in the 
                                                 
103 1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 135. 
104 Laudisi v American Exchange National Bank 239 NY 234 (1924); Exotic Traders Far East Buying Office v Exotic 
Trading USA, Inc 717 F. Supp. 14, 16(D. Mass. 1989). 
105 528 F.2d 802. 
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UCP between 'invoice' and the 'remaining documents', stipulating that in the latter the description 
may be in general terms whilst in the invoice the goods must be described to correspond with the 
credit letter.106 It is submitted that that the reasoning in this case is correct and still relevant under 
the current UCP since there has not been any substantive change in the relevant provisions. This 
perhaps explains why Article 18(c) UCP 600 and Article 14(e) UCP 600 are drafted in different 
language. One should not assume that “correspond” in Article 18(c) UCP 600 bears the same 
meaning as “not conflicting with” in Article 14(e) UCP 600.  
 
2.4.9 De minimis rule 
 
In Moralice (London) Ltd. v. E. D. & F. Man107,  the bill of lading showed 4,997 bags instead of 
5000  bags as stated in the credit term. Even though the shortage was only 0.06%, it was held that 
there was a discrepancy because the de minimis rule does not apply to the tender of documents 
under a credit. Subsequently, in Soproma S.P.A. v Marine & Animal by-Products Corporation108,   
a case concerning a credit which provided that the bills of lading should state that at the moment 
of loading the temperature of the fish meal does not exceed 37½° C but the presented bill of 
lading stated that the temperature did not exceed 100° F. The discrepancy in temperature was 
0.5° F but there were many other discrepancies in the documents presented. Mr. Justice McNair 
applied Moralice but it should be highlighted that he expressly stated that he “should be reluctant 
to do so if it [the objection about the difference of 0.5° F] stood alone.” 109  
 
Since then, this issue has been incorporated into the provisions of the UCP. Article 30(b) UCP 
600 provides that:  
A tolerance not to exceed 5% more or 5% less than the quantity of the goods is allowed, provided the 
credit does not state the quantity in terms of a stipulated number of packing units or individual items 
and the total amount of the drawings does not exceed the amount of the credit. 
For example, a credit incorporating the UCP 600 stipulates for 1000 tons of sand and the full 
amount of the credit as USD 5000. The documents indicate 1050 tons of sand, drawing an 
                                                 
106 528 F.2d 802, 806. 
107 [1954] 2Lloyd’s Rep.526. 
108 [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 367.  
109 Ibid, 390. 
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amount of USD 4950. This is not a discrepancy because it is within the allowed tolerance 
provided by the above article. If, in a different example, the credit stipulates for 1000 units of 
conventional oven, the allowed tolerance of ± 5% does not apply and no deviation in quantity is 
allowed under UCP 600. Also, if a credit specifically stipulates that the quantity of goods 
specified must not be exceeded or reduced, then any deviation in quantity will be a ground for 
rejection of the documents. Tolerance in quantity is to be distinguished from amount, for which a 
tolerance of -5% of the credit amount is allowed under UCP 600.110  It should also be noted that 
where the words “about” or “approximately” are used in connection with the amount of the credit 
or the quantity or unit price, a tolerance of  ±10%  is allowed.111  
 
2.4.10 Typographical errors 
 
The literal compliance principle, if applied would not allow any latitude, even for typographical 
error. In Bankers' Documentary Credits, Gutteridge and Megrah commented that Lord Summer’s 
statement in Equitable Trust “does not extend to the dotting of I's and the crossing of T's or to 
obvious typographical errors in the credit or the documents.” 112 However, it can be argued that 
sometimes, even though an error might appear trivial on the face, in actual fact there is a major 
difference between what it represents and what the credit requires. For example, one 
commentator referred to a case where The Federal Court of Justice of Germany 
(“Bundesgerichtshof”) had to decide the meaning of “a-d”  in a document since it could mean “a 
and d”, or “a up to d” ( a,b,c,d ).113  In situations where banks are confronted with typographical 
errors, it is best to request a waiver from the applicant although such a request is sometimes not 
possible in practice due to time constraints. The UCP does not provide any guidance on this issue 
but para 25 of ISBP provides some clarification: 
A misspelling or typing error that does not affect the meaning of a word or the sentence in which it 
occurs does not make a document discrepant. For example, a description of the merchandise as 
"mashine" instead of "machine", "fountan pen" instead of “pen" or "modle" instead of "model" would 
                                                 
110 UCP 600 Article 30(c). 
111 UCP 600 Article 30(a). 
112 Gutteridge and Megrah (n 13) 120. 
113 Andreas Karl, “Letters of Credit and The Doctrine of Strict Compliance” (Thesis, University of Uppsala 2004) at 
24 <http://www.juridicum.su.se/transport/forskning/Uppsatser/EssayKarl.pdf> assessed 1 February 2008. 
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not make the document discrepant. However, a description as "model 123" instead of "model 321" 
would not be regarded as a typing error and would constitute a discrepancy. 
 
    In Beyene v. Irving Trust Co.114, the beneficiary sued the bank for refusing to pay under the 
letter of credit. The bank refused to pay on the basis that the presented bill of lading showed the 
party to be notified as “Mohammed Soran” instead of Mohammed Sofan”. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision that this misspelling entitled the bank to refuse 
to honour the credit.  Circuit Judge Kearse gave two excellent reasonings for the decision: 
 
“First, this is not a case where the name intended is unmistakably clear despite what 
is obviously a typographical error, as might be the case if, for example, “Smith” were 
misspelled “Smithh.” Nor have appellants claimed that in the Middle East “Soran” 
would obviously be recognized as an inadvertent misspelling of the surname “Sofan.” 
Second, “Sofan” was not a name that was inconsequential to the document, for Sofan 
was the person to whom the shipper was to give notice of the arrival of the goods, 
and the misspelling of his name could well have resulted in his non receipt of the 
goods and his justifiable refusal to reimburse Irving for the credit.” 
 
In Bank of Cochin Ltd v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co115, the issuing bank brought an 
action against the confirming bank for wrongful honour of the letter of credit against a set of 
documents showing “St. Lucia Enterprises” instead of “St. Lucia Enterprises Ltd”, and insurance 
cover note number “4291” instead of “429711” as required under the credit. The documents 
turned out to be fraudulent with no shipment of goods and a seller which had disappeared. The 
Southern District Court of New York applied the second test and held that, although immaterial 
on its face, the incorrect insurance cover note number was not an inconsequential discrepancy 
because the mistake could have resulted in the insurer's justifiable refusal to honour the ultimate 
customer's insurance policy. In relation to the beneficiary’s name, it was held that, although there 
does not appear to be any difference between St. Lucia Enterprises” and “St. Lucia Enterprises 
Ltd, it is not clear that the “intended” party was paid since the difference in names could also 
                                                 
114 762 F.2d 4 (2nd Cir. 1985). 
115 612 F.Supp. 1533, D.C.N.Y.,1985, affirmed by Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 808 
F.2d 209, 3 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 1489 (2nd Cir.(N.Y.) Dec 24, 1986) (NO. 64, 85-7664). 
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possibly be an indicia of unreliability or forgery.116 Therefore, the confirming bank was held to 
have paid wrongfully.117 
 
In United Bank Ltd v Banque Nationale de Paris118, the High Court of Singapore upheld a 
bank’s decision to reject documents stating the beneficiary's name as “Pan Associated Pte Ltd” as 
opposed to “Pan Associated Ltd” as stipulated in the terms of the credit. This was despite the 
existence of evidence that the Registrar of Companies would not, except with the consent of the 
Minister, register two companies with these similar names. In Hanil Bank v. P.T. Bank Negara119 
the application form of the credit stated the beneficiary as Sung Jun Electronics Co.Ltd but the 
issuing bank mistakenly misspelled this resulting in the credit stipulating for Sung Jin Electronics 
Co.Ltd. The beneficiary did not request an amendment and subsequently sold the letter of credit 
to the plaintiff, Hanil Bank. Hanil Bank presented the documents to the issuing bank but the 
issuing bank refused to pay on the grounds that, inter alia, there was a discrepancy in the 
beneficiary’s name. It was held that this discrepancy allowed the issuing bank to reject the 
documents. The beneficiary has the responsibility of inspecting the letter of credit because “the 
beneficiary is in the best position to determine whether a letter of credit meets the needs of the 
underlying commercial transaction and to request any necessary changes....”120 Moreoever, it was 
not claimed that "Sung Jin" is an obvious misspelling in Korea of "Sung Jun”.121 Because the 
difference was only one incorrect letter and the fact that it was the issuing bank’s mistake which 
triggered this discrepancy, there was a general feeling at that time that this decision was 
unsatisfactory.122 The standard of compliance in United Bank and Hanil is rather rigid if 
compared to that adopted in Hing Yip Hing Fat Co Ltd v. The Daiwa Bank Ltd123,   where it was  
held that a bill of exchange stating the drawee as “Cheergoal Industrial Limited” which should 
                                                 
116 Ibid, 1541. 
117 However, it was held that issuing bank was precluded from asserting the confirming bank’s wrongful honor 
because it failed to comply with the timely notice provisions of the UCP. 
118 [1992] 2 SLR 64. 
119 2000 WL 254007. 
120 Ibid, 4-5, citing Mutual Export Corp. v.Westpac Banking Corp 983 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1993). 
121 Ibid, 4. 
122 See Kyle Roane, “Hanil Bank v. Pt. Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero): Continuing the Quandary of Documentary 
Compliance Under International Letters of Credit” 41 HOUS.L.Rev.1053 (2004). 
123 Hing Yip Hing Fat Co Ltd v The Daiwa Bank Ltd [1991] 2 H.K.L.R. 35 
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have been “Cheergoal Industries Limited” was not discrepant. Kaplan J gave the following 
reasons: 
 
“Firstly the error is minor and it is the sort of mistake that can easily occur in a society 
where English is not the first language of 98% of the population. Secondly Daiwa 
knew exactly whom to contact and Mr. Cheung [deputy manager of the advising 
bank] took out the Cheergoal Industries Limited's card which shows the same address 
and he phoned the number on that card. He spoke to the manager who said he would 
wait till he received a written advice. Thirdly Daiwa repeated this error in their advice 
of discrepancies.” 
 
These cases illustrate that different courts adopt different approaches and consider different 
factors in determining whether a typographical error constitutes a discrepancy. Some issues 
relating to typographical errors are covered by the UCP, for example, address and contact details 
are covered by Article 14(j) UCP 600. Where courts/banks are concerned with typographical 
errors not covered by the UCP, it is submitted that the determination of whether any 
typographical errors will justify a rejection of the document is to be determined by the two tests 
established in Beyene:  
 
a) Is the non-identical information obviously a typographical error? 
b) Is the error inconsequential to the document?  
 
It is only when both questions are answered in the affirmative that the error will not be treated as 
a discrepancy. It is not always self-evident to a document checker as to whether a typographical 
error is inconsequential. It is submitted that a bank’s determination of whether an error is 
inconsequential can be made objective if the courts consider factors such as the potential 
implication of the error, the importance of the document in question and the possibility of fraud. 
Linkage may also assist the document checker124- if all documents submitted in the set bear the 
same typographical error, then the error should be a discrepancy. Undoubtly, this imposes on 
                                                 
124 Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank Of China 167 F. Supp. 2d 940 (S.D. Tex. 2000); 288 F.3d 262 (5th Cir. 
2002). 
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banks the responsibility of accessing the materiality of a typographical error and is open to the 
criticism that this places a heavy burden on the bank which has many documents to check in a 
limited time. However, this argument is really exaggerated- since banks profit from the business 
of financing documentary credits, it is justifiable that they should carry certain responsibilities. 
 
2.4.11 Composite or multiple documents  
 
If a credit calls for a few different types of documents to be presented, what is the position if two 
documents are merged into one document, but this one document fulfills the role of the two 
documents and would certainly be compliant if it were two separate documents. In one American 
case, Richard v Royal Bank of Canada125, the conditions of the credit provided that drafts drawn 
must be accompanied by a few documents, amongst which was an invoice and a weight 
certificate. A weight certificate was not presented but the weight was given on the invoice 
presented and was approved by persons who were designated to approve the weight certificate. 
The Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s finding that the documents 
were sufficient.  
  
Whilst the UCP does not expressly provide for this issue, the ISBP provides that a composite 
document which contains a) certification, declaration or b) packing list and weight list is 
acceptable provided that the relevant conditions are met. 
 
    ISBP 
 
8) A certification, declaration or the like may either be a separate document or contained within another 
document as required by the credit. If the certification or declaration appears in another document 
which is signed and dated, any certification or declaration appearing on that document does not require 
a separate signature or date if the certification or declaration appears to have been given by the same 
entity that issued and signed the document. 
 
42) Documents listed in a credit should be presented as separate documents. If a credit requires a 
packing list and a weight list, such requirement will be satisfied by presentation of two separate 
                                                 
125 23 F.2d 430 (1928). 
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documents, or by presentation of two original copies of a combined packing and weight list, provided 
such document states both packing and weight details. 
 
Following the provisions of the ISBP, Richard v Royal Bank of Canada would certainly be 
decided in the same way. As yet, there are no English cases on this point. The approach in 
Richard v Royal Bank of Canada carries some risk and it is not recommend for it to be followed 
except where the conditions provided by para 8 and para 42 of ISBP are satisfied. The applicant 
may have good reasons for not wanting the documents to be composited. For example, he may 
wish the resell the goods and although it may still be possible to do so with the composite 
documents, it may make it more difficult for him. In the case where he is reselling the documents 
to multiple buyers and have several back-to-back credit to fulfill, the presentation of, for 
example, one certificate instead of two certificates as specified in the credit terms would be 
problematic.126 
 
    In the contrary situation where multiple documents are presented in lieu of a single document, 
the position is rather unclear. In Netherlands Trading Society v Wayne & Haylitt Co127, the 
Supreme Court of Hong Kong held that seven certificates (being combined jute mill and weight 
certificates) instead of a single original weight certificate, and a single original jute mills 
certificate were of compliance with the terms of the credit. The argument to reject multiple 
documents is much weaker than in the case of a composite document. For the sake of document 
checkers, the ICC should also clarify this point in the ISBP. 
  
2.5 After examination of documents 
 
Once a bank decides that the presented documents do not comply, it has a few courses of action 
available. This section will discuss the available options, some of which very usefully avoid the 
delays cause by rejection of the documents.  
 
 
                                                 
126 EP Ellinger, Documentary Letters of Credit – A Comparative Study  (University of Singapore Press, Singapore 
1970) 296. 
127 (1952) 36 HKLR 109. 
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2.5.1 Notice of rejection  
 
If a bank decides to reject the documents, it is under an obligation to give notice of rejection. 
Article 16 (c) UCP 600 provides the following: 
  
When a nominated bank acting on its nomination, a confirming bank, if any, or the issuing bank decides 
to refuse to honour or negotiate, it must give a single notice to that effect to the presenter. 
 
The notice must state: 
 
i.   that the bank is refusing to honour or negotiate; and  
ii.  each discrepancy in respect of which the bank refuses to honour or negotiate; and  
iii. a) that the bank is holding the documents pending further instructions from the presenter; or  
b) that the issuing bank is holding the documents until it receives a waiver from the applicant and 
agrees to accept it, or receives further instructions from the presenter prior to agreeing to accept a 
waiver; or 
c) that the bank is returning the documents; or  
d) that the bank is acting in accordance with instructions previously received from the presenter 
 
Note that the new Article now provides that only one notice of rejection can be given. A bank 
which issues a notice of rejection must state all discrepancies in the notice and will not be 
allowed to claim additional discrepancies later on. Although the language of the above article is 
drafted in terms of what should be contained in a notice or rejection, what the article also does is 
provide the rights and options available to a bank when it rejects documents.  
 
The major difference between the provisions of Article 14(d)(ii) UCP 500128 and the above 
article is the latter offers banks two additional option found in Article 16(c)(iii)(b) and  
16(c)(iii)(d). Under UCP 500, if the bank wants to seek for a waiver from the applicant, this 
                                                 
128 UCP 500 Article 14(d): 
.i. If the Issuing Bank and /or Confirming Bank, if any, or a Nominated Bank acting on their behalf, decides to refuse 
the documents, it must give notice to that effect by telecommunication or, it must give notice to that effect by 
telecommunications or, if that is not possible, by other expeditious means, without delay but no later than the close 
of the seventh banking day following the day of receipt of the documents. Such notice shall be given to the bank 
from which it received the documents, or to the Beneficiary, if it received the documents directly from him. 
ii. Such notice must state all discrepancies in respect of which the bank refuses the documents and must also state 
whether is holding the documents at the disposal of, or is returning them to, the presenter. 
71 
 
should be done before the notice of rejection is given.129 During this period, a bank is faced with 
the task of seeking a waiver but risk failing to give notice without delay within the seven days 
after presentation, as required by Article 14(d)(ii) UCP 500. After a decision to reject, banks must 
give notice of rejection, stating either a) it holds the documents at the disposal of the presenter or 
b) return the documents to the presenter. It is not allowed to seek for a waiver unless he obtain 
approval from the presenter in order to seek for an applicant’s waiver. As a result, some banks 
tried to delay giving notice whilst they seek for a waiver. Some banks attempted to give a 
qualified notice of rejection with a clause stating “Should the discrepancies be accepted by the 
Applicants, we shall release the documents to them without further notice to you unless your 
instructions to the contrary received prior to our payment” but this was ruled to be not 
enforceable as it is not in accordance with Article 14(d) UCP 500 and constitutes a threat of 
conversion of the pressenter’s documents.130 The previous position was less than ideal because 
practically, most banks would want to hold on to the documents whilst attempting to seek a 
waiver from the applicant since most of the time, applicants would be willing to waive. Now, 
under Article 16(c)(iii)(b) UCP 600, banks give notice of rejection  and choose to hold the 
documents pending the request for a waiver without having to seek for the presenter’s consent.  
This change is useful because it accelerates and simplifies the process for all the parties involved.  
 
Surprisingly, sometimes a beneficiary will not wish for the documents to be returned back, for 
example where the price of the goods had soared and the seller is able to sell the goods to another 
buyer for a much higher price. If such an event is a possibility, the beneficiary could utilise the 
Article 16(c)(iii) (d) option by providing instructions to the bank regarding how it should deal 
with rejected documents. This is an unwelcomed change since it allows a seller to take advantage 
of circumstances and avoid the transaction. The option is unnecessary and runs against the main 
benefits of the letter of credit, which provides certainty of payment to the seller and predictability 
of a transaction for the buyer.    
                                                 
129Ibid; UCP 500 Article 14(c):                                                                                                             
If the Issuing Bank determines that the documents appear on their face not be in compliance with the terms and 
conditions of the Credit, it may in its sole judgment approach the Applicant for a waiver of the discrepancy(ies). This 
does not, however, extend the period mentioned in sub-Article 13(b). 
130 Crédit Industriel et Commercial v China Merchants Bank [2002] C.L.C. 1263.It probably also constitutes a 
unilateral modification of the provisions of the UCP. See also Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China 288 
F.3d 262 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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Under UCP 500, notice must be given within seven banking days after presentation but this 
has now been replaced with five banking days. Under Article 14(d)(i) UCP 500, the giving of 
notice must be “without delay” but this requirement is now removed, and Article 16(d) UCP 600 
now only states that notice must be given “no later than the close of the fifth banking day 
following the day of presentation”. The modification emanated from the difficulties involved in 
determining whether a bank’s action is without delay. As with the removal of the reasonable time 
requirement for a banks’s examination of documents,131 this modification would not completely 
eliminate the difficulties in determining the time of which notice must be given by the bank.  Can 
banks give notice on the fifth banking day in all circumstances, thus allowing a bank to 
deliberately delay notice?132  It is most likely that the provisions will be interpreted as allowing 
banks five banking day in all circumstances. 
 
Despite these issues, the upshot of the revision is a clearer and easier to understand rule. There 
are fewer restrictions for a bank dealing with documents which do not comply. The rules are also 
more in line with the realities in the banking industry.  
  
2.5.2 Waiver 
 
Acceptance/approval of a discrepancy is referred to as a “waiver”. The purpose of obtaining a 
waiver from the applicant is to transfer the risk of paying against non-compliant documents from 
the bank to the applicant. Article 16 (b) UCP 600 provides that: 
  
When an issuing bank determines that a presentation does not comply, it may in its sole judgement 
approach the applicant for a waiver of the discrepancies. This does not, however, extend the period 
mentioned in sub-article 14 (b).  
 
Although the process of obtaining a waiver is codified in the UCP, there is surprisingly little 
detail provided in relation to its procedure except that a bank which seeks to obtain a waiver must 
                                                 
131 See 2.3.1. 
132James E. Byrne, The Comparison of UCP600 & UCP500 (The Institute of International Banking Law & Practice, 
MD USA 2007) 149. 
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still do so within the 5 banking days provided by Article 14(b) UCP 600. The ICC guidance 
“Discrepant Documents, Waiver and Notice” issued under UCP 500 provided clarification and 
should still be consulted because there are no substantive changes in the UCP 600 with respect to 
waivers.133 
 
According to the wording of Article 16(b) UCP 600, there is no obligation on the bank to 
request a waiver from the applicant - it is entirely at the bank’s discretion.  Nevertheless, there is 
evidence that it is widespread practice for banks to consult applicants as to whether it wishes to 
waive the discrepancies. 134 A request for waiver from the applicant should really only be made 
when the bank has identified all discrepancies. Banks should not abdicate its responsibility of 
checking for conformity by releasing documents to applicants for examination. In Bankers Trust 
Co v State Bank of India, Lloyd LJ stated that “…on no view should a bank be allowed time to 
enable the buyers to examine the documents for the purpose of discovering further 
discrepancies”135. On the other hand, Farquharson LJ took the view that sometimes this may be 
done where it is for “the purpose of seeking the applicant's opinion on the correct course to take 
in the light of discrepancies already found”136. If applicants are allowed to examine documents, 
they may not perform this task properly and consequently there may be discrepancies which are 
overlooked. One commentator pointed out that if the applicant was allowed to examine the 
documents, if he wished to get out of its credit obligation, “[It] is likely that he will dig into facts 
extraneous to the documents, and raise matters which a reasonable document checker could not 
have conceivably raised in the diligent performance of its task. And such an unenviable result 
would undermine the autonomy doctrine, which is the very heart of the letter of credit that there 
are good reasons for this.” 137 
 
If an issuing bank receives a waiver from the applicant and chooses to accept it, then payment 
will be made despite the existence of discrepancies in the document. However, it should be 
                                                 
133 ICC Commission on Banking Technique and Practice, “Examination of Documents, Waiver of Discrepancies and 
Notice under UCP 500” Document 470/952rev2, April 9, 2002. 
134 Bankers Trust Co v State Bank of India [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 443. 
135 Ibid, 452. 
136 Ibid, 455. 
137 Ebenezer Adodo “Conformity of Presentation Documents and a Rejection Notice in Letters of Credit Litigation: 
A Tale of Two Doctrines” 36 HKLJ 309, 327. 
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highlighted that even if an applicant’s waiver is obtained, the bank is still the sole authority on 
this matter and is under no obligation to take up the applicant’s decision.138  A bank’s waiver and 
the applicant’s waiver are usually seen as hand-in-hand but there are good reasons to distinguish 
the two. If the applicant does not provide a waiver, the bank itself can also choose to waive a 
discrepancy. It is rare for banks to do so because any prudent bank knows that it does so at the 
risk of jeopardising its reimbursement agreement with the applicant  
 
2.5.3 Ratification or estoppel 
 
Even if a waiver is not obtained, there may be circumstances where either the applicant or even 
issuing bank may be deemed to have accepted discrepant documents by conduct. There is no 
need for express words as ratification or estoppel139 can be inferred from the circumstances. 
Instances where the law may treat an applicant as having accepted discrepant documents are such 
as where an applicant negotiates the presented documents140 or where the applicant re-sells the 
goods to a sub-purchaser141. In Westminster Bank Ltd v. Banca National di Credito142, Roche J 
stated the following when considering the issue of ratification by an issuing bank : 
 
“If parties keep documents which are sent them, purporting to be sent them, or 
possibly sent them, in consequence of some mandate which they themselves have 
issued, and keep them for an unreasonable time, that may amount to a ratification of 
what has been done as being done within their mandate.”143 
 
In Bank Melli Iran v Barclay 's Bank144, after Bank Melli (the issuing bank) received the 
presented documents, Barclay’s Bank directed a request for a credit amount increase and Bank 
Melli authorised Barclay’s Bank to increase the amount. Barclay’s Bank subsequently made 
                                                 
138 Document 470/952rev2 (n 133). 
139 Although ratification and estoppel are not strictly the same,  they are  not distinguished in the context of 
documentary credits - A Mugasha, The Law of Letters of Credit and Bank Guarantees (The Federation Press, 
Sydney, 2003) 133. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Friedlander v. Bank of Australasia 8 CLR 85 (1909). 
142(1928) 32 Lloyd’s Rep. 306. 
143 Ibid, 312. 
144 [1951] 2 Lloyd' s Rep 367. 
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payment but Bank Melli brought an action, claiming that Barclay’s Bank were not entitled to 
debit Bank Melli with the sums paid because the documents presented were non-conforming. It 
was held that Barclays Bank paid against non-conforming documents but Bank Melli’s actions in 
authorising the increase in the amount did not indicate any intention to reject the documents. 
Bank Melli, as principal in the transaction, had ratified the action of Barclay’s Bank to pay 
against the documents tendered and was bound by it. 
 
In America, if a bank does not state all the discrepancies in the notice of refusal in accordance 
with Article 16 UCP 600, the bank will be precluded from objecting against the documents on 
other grounds not included in the notice on the basis that it has waived its rights under the credit. 
“By formally placing its refusal on one ground, the defendant must be held to have waived all 
others”145. UCC § 5-108 provides the following: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), an issuer is precluded from asserting as a basis for 
dishonor any discrepancy if timely notice is not given, or any discrepancy not stated in the notice if 
timely notice is given. 
 
On this issue there is a difference between English law and American law. In Skandinaviska 
Kreditaktie Bolaget v Barclays Bank146 and Kydon Compania Naviera S.A. v National 
Westminster Bank Ltd (The Lena)147, it was held that banks are allowed to raise additional 
grounds of discrepancies for rejection at a later time in addition to the discrepancies which it had 
already raised at an earlier time. It was pointed out by Clive M. Schmitthoff that these decisions 
are consistent with the general principle of contract law, where a new ground for the rejection of 
defective goods can be raised in addition to those initially raised.148 Overall, the position in these 
English cases offers more protection to banks as opposed to the American position which offers 
more protection to buyers. However, the English position has changed since Glencore 
International A. G. v Bank of China, where the Court of Appeal held that only those 
                                                 
145 Bank of Taiwan v. Union National Bank 1 F.2d 65, 66 (3rd Cir., 1924). See also Continental National Bank v. 
National City Bank 69 F.2d 312, 318-319 (9th Cir., 1934); Barclays Bank v Mercantile National Bank 481 F.2d 1224 
(5th Cir., 1973). 
146 (1925) 22 Ll.LR 523. 
147 [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 68.  
148 Clive M. Schmitthoff, “Discrepancy of Documents in Letter of Credit Transactions” [1987] JBL 94, 104. 
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discrepancies stated in the notice of rejection can be relied upon by the issuing bank which 
rejected the documents.149 The writer agrees that this is the correct approach. Firstly, this 
promotes certainty for beneficiaries. Also, as R Jack stated, “One object of a speedy notification 
with grounds of refusal is to enable the beneficiary to rectify the discrepancies within the time 
limit of the credit; it would be unfair if he were then to be faced with further discrepancies.”150 
Secondly, this would make the position in England in harmony with the provisions of the UCP. 
As discussed earlier, Article 16(c)(ii) UCP 600 imposes an obligation on the bank to specify 
every discrepancy. Article 16(f) UCP 600 further provides that “If an issuing bank or a 
confirming bank fails to act in accordance with the provisions of this article, it shall be precluded 
from claiming that the documents do not constitute a complying presentation.” 
 
2.5.4 Payment under reserve 
 
One other option available to a bank which is faced with discrepant documents is to make 
payment under reserve, whereby a bank makes payment to the beneficiary subject to an 
agreement that the beneficiary will repay the bank in the event that the bank is not reimbursed. 
Practically, this option should only be considered where a) the beneficiary is in good financial 
position and b) the discrepancy is one which is minor so that there is a high possibility that the 
buyer will accept the documents.151 Although this course of action was expressly recognised in 
Article 14(f) UCP 500, this was not retained by UCP 600. The difficulty with payment under 
reserve is that there is no definition of this option under the UCP.  Since it is not clear what are 
the exact circumstances which will entitle the bank to repayment, it is of utmost importance that 
parties put into writing the exact meaning of “under reserve”. 
In  Banque de l'Indochine et de Suez S.A. v J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd152, the Court of 
Appeal was confronted with the meaning of “payment under reserve” because the beneficiary, 
which received payment under reserve refused to repay the bank on the grounds that the 
                                                 
149 [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 135,149. 
150 R Jack (n 27) para 5.65. 
151 Schmitthoff's Export Trade: The Law and Practice of International Trade (11th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 
2007) 233. 
152 [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 228. 
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documents were complying.  The Court of Appeal had to consider which of these meaning 
“under reserve” was intended by the parties? 
1) Money is repayable if the issuing bank refuses to reimburse the confirming bank even 
where the documents were in fact compliant. 
2) Money is repayable only if the issuing bank refuses to reimburse the confirming bank and 
it is established that the documents were not compliant. 
In the High Court, Parker J decided that it was the second meaning but the Court of Appeal held 
that it was the first. The Court of Appeal decided that the second meaning is too legalistic:  
“The commercial reality of the situation is that, while holding opposing views, both 
the bank and the beneficiary hope that, whichever of them is right, the issuing bank 
and the buyer abroad will raise no objection to the documents. It is therefore with this 
hope uppermost in its mind that the confirming bank agrees to pay, but only "under 
reserve." However, in agreeing to do so, the bank cannot realistically be taken to have 
agreed to become involved in legal proceedings, if the documents are rejected, by 
having to sue the beneficiary to recover the money and establishing that the 
documents did not comply with the credit, or possibly by suing the issuing bank on 
the ground that they did, after all, comply with it.”153 
This interpretation does allow applicants to take advantage of a situation where there is payment 
under reserve - by rejecting the documents with the subsequent effect of the issuing bank not 
paying the confirming bank. When this happens, the beneficiary will have to repay the 
confirming bank under reserve and subsequently sue the confirming bank for non-payment. 
However, Article 14(f) UCP 500 stipulated the following: 
 
If the remitting bank draws the attention of the Issuing Bank and /or Confirming Bank, if any, to any 
discrepancy(ies) in the document(s) or advises such banks that it has paid,… under reserve or against 
an indemnity in respect of such discrepancy(ies), the Issuing Bank and/or Confirming Bank, if any, 
shall not be thereby relieved from any of their obligations under any provision of this article. Such 
                                                 
153 Ibid, 234 per Kerr LJ. 
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reserve or indemnity concerns only the relations between the remitting bank and the party towards 
whom the reserve was made, or from whom, or on whose behalf, the indemnity was obtained. 
Although this provision has been removed from UCP 600, it is nevertheless arguable that the 
issuing bank’s duty to pay remains the same regardless of a “payment under reserve” agreement 
between the other parties. However, if an applicant refuses to accept the documents by pointing 
out discrepancies, it is highly likely that an issuing bank will follow the instructions of the 
applicant.154 Of course, the applicant cannot manipulate the situation by refusing to pay even if 
the documents are compliant. Hence, the opportunities for buyers to take advantage do exist, but 
not to the full extent.   
Sometimes, banks obtain an indemnity from the beneficiary, rather than pay under reserve 
which really has the same effect as payment under reserve except that there are usually time 
limits with indemnity.155 Whichever is given, a beneficiary should be aware that, despite 
receiving payment, he could be liable to pay back the sum of money if the applicant rejects the 
documents. Hence, whether giving an indemnity or receiving payment under reserve, practically, 
the beneficiary should be in negotiation with the applicant to resolve any discrepancy issues.  
2.6 Conclusion 
 
There are many respects in which a document may not strictly comply with the conditions of the 
credit, allowing banks to refuse payment. Even though the principle of strict compliance is still 
regarded as the general standard for documentary compliance, the discussion so far illustrates that 
the standard of strict compliance does not apply to every type of discrepancies, and therefore 
banks can no longer apply a general standard in the documentary checking process. This is 
evidenced by the provisions of the UCP, ISBP and current banking practice. It is obvious that it is 
difficult in this area of law to delineate general rules in documentary compliance; there is always 
room for judgment where this issue is concerned. Certainly a literal compliance standard for 
every aspect of documents will not be the answer because it will defeat the feature of letter of 
credit as being as good as cash. The practical solution is for traders dealing with letters of credit 
                                                 
154 R Jack (n 27) para 5.82. 
155 SITPRO International Trade Guides, Letters of Credit - Checklist and Guide for Exporters, at 12. 
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to have organised planning and proper staff training so as to ensure that there are no 
discrepancies in the documents. Nevertheless, this chapter has discussed the circumstances 
where, even if documents are found to be non-conforming, payment can still be made. With 
respect to the obligations of banks, it has also been shown that it is important for banks always to 
act in strict accordance with their duties, particularly in the examination of documents within the 
time limits and the giving of notice of rejection since these could all have an effect on their duty 
to pay.  
 
UCP 500 has been substantially revised and some adaptation to the rules by the many parties 
involved in the documentary credit transaction will be needed. The revision does accomplish 
some of the objectives it set out to achieve. Overall, the new articles are simplified and provide a 
lot more clarification. The revised rules on transport documents are easier to understand and more 
in line with current shipping practice. The expanded explanation of what constitutes an original 
document eliminates the confusion existing under its predecessor as to what is an original 
document. The rules on multiple copies also accord with common sense. UCP 600 does provide 
sellers with more control and flexibility over the handling of their documents. The standard of 
documentary compliance has been lowered and the doctrine of strict compliance has been relaxed 
to reduce the number of discrepant documents. On the other hand, buyers are now exposed to 
some risks which previously did not exist. As for banks, their duties as document checkers are 
now less demanding as the requirement of consistency is watered down and rejection based on 
purely technical errors is restricted. However, banks will still have to be careful not too be lax in 
the documentary examination process as they could run the risk not being reimbursed.  
  
Although some of the uncertainty and ambiguity have been removed, it has been shown that 
there still exist aspects of UCP 600 which do not achieve the required certainty for traders and 
financiers. The new UCP still allows a lot of scope for different interpretation of whether a 
document is compliant or not. Undoubtly, some of the provisions will not be uniformly applied 
worldwide because national courts will interpret the rules differently. In comparison to UCP 500, 
the new rules are an improvement and provide solutions to some of the pressing issues which 
existed under the old UCP. There is still room for improvement but it is indeed very difficult to 
strike to balance the interest of banks, buyers and sellers respectively. If UCP 600 succeeds in 
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reducing rejection rate, it is highly possible for the letter of credit to survive as one of the most 
important method of payment in international trading.  
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CHAPTER 3
THE FRAUD EXCEPTION
3.1 Introduction
As was discussed in Chapter 1, the autonomy principle is regarded as the most sacrosanct concept 
in documentary credit transactions. Its function is to preserve the main function of the letter of 
credit – the guaranteeing of quick and reliable payment to the seller; but the certainty of quick 
payment carried with it the risk of fraudsters exploiting the letter of credit system in order to 
obtain monetary gains.  There are circumstances where it is obvious that the seller’s breach of 
contract is not one which could have occurred through mere negligence and in which a strict 
adherence to the autonomy principle would benefit fraudsters while denying justice to the other 
parties. Consequently, an exception to the autonomy principle, based upon the maxim ex turpi 
causa non oritur actio has been developed in order to deny payment under a letter of credit where 
fraud is proved. The basis of the fraud exception is that in cases of fraud the issuer of the letter of 
credit can refuse, or a court can restrain, payment under a letter of credit. However, it will be 
demonstrated that this departure from the autonomy principle remains minimal in order to 
maintain the commercial utility of letters of credit as an instrument for guaranteeing payment.   
Despite being the most well established exception to the autonomy principle and the only 
exception recognised by nearly every jurisdiction in the world, it has been referred to as “the 
most controversial and confused area”1. The overriding aim of this chapter is to provide a better 
understanding of the fraud rule and to identify any shortcomings in the application of the fraud 
rule to restrain payment. Where appropriate, suitable suggestions for reform of this area of law 
will be made.
The chapter will begin with a review of leading cases in common law jurisdictions on the 
fraud exception. The writer will then examine the scope of the fraud exception, which constitutes 
                                                
1 Note, "Fraud in the Transaction: Enjoining Letters of Credit During the Iranian Revolution” (1980) 93 Harv.L.Rev. 
992, 995.
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the main thrust of this chapter. Where relevant, contrasting judicial approaches in the application 
of the fraud exception will be highlighted. The section which follows will evaluate the changes 
brought about by the new UCP on the effect of fraud in relation to deferred payment credit. 
Lastly, the issue of fraud in electronic letters of credit will be explored.
3.2 Development of the Fraud Exception 
Although the UNCITRAL Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit 
does contain provisions on fraud, the UCP and ISP98 do not contain an express provision on the 
fraud rule. In fact, the ICC Banking Commission had a long time ago expressed the view that the 
legal rules relating to fraud should be left to domestic courts: 
“The ambit of this exception and the ensuing consequences for the beneficiary and/or the 
nominated bank may differ from one local jurisdiction to another. It is up to the Courts to 
fairly protect the interests of all bona fide parties concerned.” 2
Following this, the fraud exception has always been a matter developed by national courts in their 
respective jurisdictions. Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the scope of the fraud 
exception, it is important to gain some insights into some of the most important cases in common 
law jurisdictions which formed the foundations of this exception.3
3.2.1 America
It was in the United States where the foundations of the fraud exception were first enunciated in 
Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp.4 a leading case in this area of law. In Sztejn, before 
payment had occurred, the buyer applied for an injunction to prohibit the issuing bank from 
paying the beneficiary of the credit upon discovery that the hog bristles purchased were not 
                                                
2 Opinions 1980-1981 no 399, R76 at 27.
3 For a detailed account, see Xiang Gao, The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study (1st 
edn, Kluwer Law International, London, 2003).
4 31 NYS (2d) 631 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty 1941). 
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shipped. The buyer alleged that the seller had obtained the bill of lading by shipping cow hair and 
rubbish which did not in any way resemble the goods that were contracted for. The confirming 
bank filed a motion to dismiss claiming that its only concern was documentary compliance. 
The New York court assumed the allegations of fraud to be true (because this was a 
procedural matter which required it to do so) and there was also no objection by the sellers to the 
allegation that the goods delivered were not those purchased under the contract. The only issue 
before the court was whether fraudulent conduct on the part of the seller could be a basis for 
preventing payment on the credit. Shientag J emphasised the importance of the autonomy
principle but was of the opinion that the facts of the case presented before him was different:
“This is not a controversy between the buyer and seller concerning a mere breach of 
warranty regarding the quality of the merchandise; on the present motion, it must be 
assumed that the seller has intentionally failed to ship any goods ordered by the buyer. 
In such a situation, where the seller's fraud has been called to the bank's attention before 
the drafts and documents have been presented for payment, the principle of the 
independence of the bank's obligation under the letter of credit should not be extended 
to protect the unscrupulous seller.”5
This distinction led to his decision to grant an injunction to prohibit the issuing bank from 
paying. In considering whether the seller’s fraud was a ground to grant an injunction, he 
weighted the interest of the banks involved:
“No hardship will be caused by permitting the bank to refuse payment where fraud is 
claimed, where the merchandise is not merely inferior in quality but consists of 
worthless rubbish, where the draft and the accompanying documents are in the hands of 
one who stands in the same position as the fraudulent seller, where the bank has been 
given notice of the fraud before being presented with the drafts and documents for 
payment, and where the bank itself does not wish to pay pending an adjudication of the 
rights and obligations of the other parties. While the primary factor in the issuance of 
                                                
5 Ibid, 634.
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the letter of credit is the credit standing of the buyer, the security afforded by the 
merchandise is also taken into account. In fact, the letter of credit requires a bill of 
lading made out to the order of the bank and not the buyer. Although the bank is not 
interested in the exact detailed performance of the sales contract, it is vitally interested 
in assuring itself that there are some goods represented by the documents.”6
In relation to the confirming bank, he noted that:
“If it had appeared from the face of the complaint that the bank presenting the draft for 
payment was a holder in due course, its claim against the bank issuing the letter of credit 
would not be defeated even though the primary transaction was tainted with fraud.”7
On the basis of the pleadings, the confirming bank was not a holder in due course but was an 
agent for collection for the account of the seller charged with fraud. Therefore, the court rejected 
the confirming bank's motion to dismiss.
Since cases before Sztejn only considered disputes of fraud as a default under a contract8, it 
became a landmark decision which was considered by the courts of every common law 
jurisdiction in the development of the exception. The judgment was significant because it laid 
down the basic principles which formed the foundations of the fraud exception today. Mainly 
based on the Sztejn case, the fraud exception was later codified in the UCC. Article 5 UCC,
which deals with the issue of fraud, was substantially revised in 1995. 
Certainly there was a lot to be gained from the former provisions of Article 59 but the relevant 
sections on the fraud rule were not without flaws and did not deal with some questions left 
                                                
6Ibid, 635.
7 Ibid.
8 See Xiang Gao (n 3).
9 Before the major revision in 1995, § 5-114(2) of the UCC provided the following:
Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their face to comply with the terms of the credit but a required 
document does not in fact conform to the warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title (Section 
7-507) or of a certified security (Section 8-306) or is forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in the transaction:
(a) the issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if honor is demanded by a negotiating bank or other holder 
of the draft or demand which has taken the draft or demand under the credit and under circumstances which would 
make it a holder in due course (Section 3-302) and in an appropriate case would make it a person to whom a 
(footnote continues next page)
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unanswered by Sztejn. Over time, the following issues emerged to disturb the letter of credit 
community and the courts:
- In the absence of an injunction, was the issuer allowed to invoke the section to refuse 
payment? The use of the word “may” in the former §5-114(2)(b) suggested that the 
issuing bank is not obliged to refuse payment. Therefore, banks would normally pay and 
would be deemed to be in good faith despite notifications from their customers, but a 
customer could obtain an injunction from the courts to prevent the issuing bank from 
honouring the letter of credit. 
- It was not known with certainty what was the meaning of fraud under §5-144(2) since no 
explanation or definition of fraud was provided. In other words, it was not very clear what 
type of misconduct on the part of the beneficiary would attract the protection of the 
section. Sztejn offers no answer on this issue since the particular nature of the proceedings 
in Sztejn led the court to assume that the allegations of fraud were true. Later cases 
provide some insight on this issue but the varying interpretations by the different courts 
did not provide any conclusive guidance.
- There was a debate as to whether the reference to “fraud in the transaction” meant the 
letter of credit transaction between the issuer of the credit and the buyer or the underlying 
transaction between the buyer and the seller.  Article 5 and its official comments offered 
no explanation on this particular issue.
Forty years after the drafting of the first Article 5, a task force10 was appointed to identify the 
problems in this area. In 1995, the revised version of Article 5 was forwarded to state legislatures 
for enactment. The relevant provisions on fraud are now contained in §5-109, entitled “Fraud and 
Forgery”.11 The wording of §5-109(a)(2) now expressly provides that the issuer can  invoke the 
                                                                                                                                                             
document of title has been duly negotiated (Section 7-502 ) or a bona fide purchaser of a certificated security 
(Section 8-302); and
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good faith may honor the draft or demand for 
payment despite notification from the customer of fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the face of the 
documents but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honour.
10 ABA Task Force on the Study of UCC Article 5.
11 UCC §5-109 provides the following:
(footnote continues next page)
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section to voluntarily dishonour a presentation of documents. One of the most useful 
clarifications provided by the revised provision is the express mention that fraud must be found 
either in the documents, or must have been committed by the beneficiary on the issuer or the 
applicant. This is more specific than “fraud in transaction” as found in the former provision since 
it provides guidance as to where fraud needs to be identified. The revised provision also makes it 
clear that documents must be materially fraudulent or any fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer 
or the applicant must be "material”, raising the threshold for an applicant to obtain an injunction. 
In addition, it establishes additional barriers to granting injunctive relief. Firstly, there are some 
adjustments in §5-109(a)(1) to the categories of protected parties against whom the fraud 
exception cannot be used. Secondly, it states that the court must make the findings specified in 
§5-109(2)(1)-(4) before granting an injunction. The revised Article 5 was a success and played a 
big part in catalysing the more refined fraud exception today.
3.2.2 England
In England, the fraud exception derived from Sztejn and until today is not incorporated into any 
legislation. It can be said that English law caught up with the development rather slowly as the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) If a presentation is made that appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of 
credit, but a required document is forged or materially fraudulent, or honor of the presentation would facilitate a 
material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant:
(1) the issuer shall honor the presentation, if honor is demanded by: 
(i) a nominated person who has given value in good faith and without notice of forgery or material fraud, 
(ii) a confirmer who has honored its confirmation in good faith, 
(iii) a holder in due course of a draft drawn under the letter of credit which was taken after acceptance by the issuer 
or nominated person, or 
(iv) an assignee of the issuer's or nominated person's deferred obligation that was taken for value and without notice 
of forgery or material fraud after the obligation was incurred by the issuer or nominated person; and
(2) the issuer, acting in good faith, may honor or dishonor the presentation in any other case.
(b) If an applicant claims that a required document is forged or materially fraudulent or that honor of the 
presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant, a court of competent 
jurisdiction may temporarily or permanently enjoin the issuer from honoring a presentation or grant similar relief 
against the issuer or other persons only if the court finds that:
(1) the relief is not prohibited under the law applicable to an accepted draft or deferred obligation incurred by the 
issuer;
(2) a beneficiary, issuer, or nominated person who may be adversely affected is adequately protected against loss that 
it may suffer because the relief is granted;
(3) all of the conditions to entitle a person to the relief under the law of this State have been met; and
(4) on the basis of the information submitted to the court, the applicant is more likely than not to succeed under its 
claim of forgery or material fraud and the person demanding honor does not qualify for protection under subsection 
(a)(1).
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fraud exception was only considered quite many years after Szetjn, in Discount Records Ltd v 
Barclays Bank Ltd12. In this case, the plaintiffs purchased records and cassettes from a French 
company on the basis that payment was to be made by a confirmed irrevocable credit. Only a 
small proportion of the delivered goods complied with the terms of the contract while others were 
rubbish or were not as ordered. Therefore, the buyer applied for an injunction to restrain the 
conforming bank from paying on two grounds, one of which is based on the principle set out in 
Sztejn, that the sellers were guilty of fraud.13 The High Court distinguished Sztejn and refused to 
grant the injunction but accepted the fraud exception as applicable in English law. Megarry J held 
that although fraud was alleged, the evidence did not yet establish fraud, unlike in Sztejn where
the motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to disclose a cause of action required the court to 
assume the truth of the allegation of fraud.14 Another reason for refusing the injunction was the 
possibility that the draft might be in the hands of a holder in due course.15 He was of the opinion 
that an injunction would only be granted if there was a sufficiently grave cause and concluded 
that it was not shown in this case. 16
Discount Records set off the trend of English judges adopting a rigid style in their application 
of the fraud rule. The two cases which follow are regularly cited by counsels around the world to 
depict the traditional reluctance of English courts to interfere by way of an injunction, in the 
normal operation of the letter of credit. Although they dealt with performance guarantees, the 
same basic principles apply to documentary credits. In RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National 
Westminster Bank Ltd17, the plaintiffs had entered into contracts of sale with Egyptian buyers 
which required the plaintiffs to procure a guarantee covering 5% of the purchase price in favour 
of the buyers. The buyers demanded payment under the guarantees and the plaintiffs sought 
declarations and injunctions against each defendants (the buyers, the Egyptian bank and the 
English bank) to restrain payment on the basis that there was no justification for the demand. The 
                                                
12 [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 444.
13 The other ground was that there was a lack of correspondence between the documents and the goods which were 
delivered.
14 [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 444, 447.
15 Ibid.
16Ibid, 448.
17 [1977] 2 All ER 862.
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injunctions were granted ex parte but Kerr J discharged the injunctions on the inter partes 
hearing. He accepted the principle in Sztejn but asserted the following:
"Except possibly in clear cases of fraud of which the banks have notice, the courts will 
leave the merchants to settle their disputes under the contracts by litigation or arbitration 
as available to them or stipulated in the contracts. The courts are not concerned with their 
difficulties to enforce such claims; these are risks which the merchants take . . . The 
machinery and commitments of banks are on a different level. They must be allowed to be 
honoured, free from interference by courts. Otherwise, trust in international commerce
could be irreparably damaged."18
In Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd19, the English plaintiff 
contracted to erect greenhouses in Libya for Libyan customers. Pursuant to the contract, the 
plaintiff agreed to provide a performance guarantee. After the plaintiff had granted a counter 
guarantee to the defendant bank,  the latter, on their own responsibility and on the plaintiffs' 
behalf, gave a performance bond to the Libyan bank, in terms of which they confirmed that their 
guarantee was payable 'on demand without proof or conditions'. The Libyan bank then issued a 
corresponding guarantee bond in favour of the Libyan customers. The contract also provided for 
the Libyan customers to open an irrevocable letter of credit in favour of the plaintiff. When this 
did not transpire, the plaintiff informed the customers that the guarantee was in the circumstances 
ineffective, and treated the contract as repudiated. The customers then called on the bond but an 
injunction was sought by the plaintiff. An interim injunction was granted ex parte but was 
subsequently discharged. The plaintiff appealed but the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. 
Lord Denning MR, explained the position as follows:
“…the performance guarantee stands on a similar footing to a letter of credit. A bank 
which gives a performance guarantee must honour that guarantee according to its terms. It 
is not concerned in the least with the relations between the supplier and the customer; nor 
with the question whether the supplier has performed his contracted obligation or not; nor 
with the question whether the supplier is in default or not. The bank must pay according 
                                                
18 Ibid, 870.
19 [1978] 1 QB 159.
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to its guarantee, on demand, if so stipulated, without proof or conditions. The only 
exception is when there is a clear fraud of which the bank has notice. "20
    The most pivotal English case on this subject is United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v 
Royal Bank of Canada21. In this case, an employee of the loading brokers to the carriers 
fraudulently predated the bill of lading to 15 December when shipment had been made on 16 
December. On presentation of the documents, the confirming bank refused to pay because it 
became aware that the shipment had not been made as shown on the bill of lading. In the High 
Court, Mocatta J made the finding that the loading agents were not acting on behalf of the sellers, 
and neither the sellers nor its assignee were aware of the alteration. For this reason, he held that 
the bank was not entitled to reject the documents. The Court of Appeal later reversed the 
decision, holding that so long as the bank knew of the forged document, the bank is entitled to 
withhold payment regardless of the fact that the seller was unaware of the fraud.  On appeal to 
the House of Lords, Lord Diplock emphasised that a confirming bank deals with documents and 
not with goods but affirmed the fraud exception:
“To this general statement of principle [of independence] as to the contractual 
obligations of the confirming bank to the seller, there is one exception: that is, where the 
seller, for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently presents to the confirming 
bank documents that contain, expressly or by implication, material representations of 
fact that to his knowledge are untrue.”22
Following this, the application of the fraud exception is limited to cases where the beneficiary 
had knowledge of the fraud. Since the sellers in this case were not aware of the fraudulent 
alteration, Lord Diplock overruled the decision of the Court of Appeal and held that they should 
have been paid on presentation of the documents.
                                                
20 Ibid, 171.
21 [1983] AC 168.
22 Ibid, 183.
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3.2.3 Australia
As in England, the Sztejn principle is well accepted by the courts in Australia. Despite some 
difference in their approaches, Australian law is very similar to English law on this matter and 
English cases are cited habitually in Australian courts. The first case to recognise the fraud 
exception in Australia was Contronic Distributors Pty Ltd v Bank of New South Wales23. In this 
case, Contronic wished to purchase goods to the value of $2,508 from its supplier, GEC. 
However, GEC wanted some guarantee of payment for the goods which Contronic intended to 
buy and for goods delivered from previous transactions which had not been paid. Contronic 
opened a letter of credit for an amount of $8,596 in favour of GEC, covering both the 
indebtedness and the goods it wished to purchase. GEC was aware of that the documents which 
were to be presented would reflect goods to the value of $8,596 when in fact the value of the 
goods delivered were significantly less. The letter of credit was arranged by Balfour, Contronic’s 
financier which later discovers the true facts before the documents were presented and sought an 
injunction to restrain the bank from paying under the letter of credit and GEC from presenting the 
documents. Helsham J granted the injunction stating:
In my view the law is perhaps now settled, and in any event would establish that a seller can 
be restrained from presenting a letter of credit for payment or having payment made against it 
in the event that the documents which are needed to require payment to be made are false to 
the knowledge of the seller.24
This illustrates that the Australian courts, just like the English courts focuses on the state of mind 
of the beneficiary at the point of the presentation of the documents. 
                                                
23 [1984] 3 NSWLR 110.
24 Ibid, 116.
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3.2.4 Canada
Relying especially on the authority of Sztejn and Edward Owen, Canadian courts slowly 
recognised the fraud exception in letters of credit and performance guarantee cases.25 The pivotal 
case in Canada which considered many fundamental aspects of the fraud rule is Bank of Nova 
Scotia v Angelica-Whitewear26. In this case, Whitewear opened an irrevocable negotiation letter 
of credit with the Bank of Nova Scotia in favour of the beneficiary for the supply of men's 
industrial uniforms. There was a back-to-back credit arrangement, whereby, in order to finance 
the beneficiary’s purchase from its Taiwan supplier, the beneficiary obtained a letter of credit 
from the negotiating bank (Shanghai Commercial Bank) based upon Whitewear 's letter of credit. 
Two draws were made by the negotiating bank in this case. The first draw was honoured by the 
issuing bank and charged to Whitewear’s account although Whitewear informed the bank to 
withhold further payments on the basis that a signature on one of the documents had been forged. 
As for the second draw, Whitewear informed the issuing bank that the documents submitted 
showed improperly inflated prices and also contained certain discrepancies and should not be 
honoured. However, after repeated demands, the bank paid the negotiating bank for the second 
draft and sued Whitewear for the balance owed. Whitewear counterclaimed, contending fraud 
and non-compliance of the documents with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit. At the 
Quebec Superior Court, the issuing bank was successful in its action for both draws. Whitewear 
later appealed in respect of the second draw and the Quebec Court of Appeal ruled in favour of 
Whitewear. On further appeal, Le Dain J in the Supreme Court of Canada expressly affirmed the 
fraud exception as part of Canadian law but held that the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
allowing Whitewear's appeal cannot be supported on the ground of fraud.27 Even though the 
inflation of the prices constituted a sufficient fraud, it was found that there was no evidence to 
show that the particular fraud relating to the second payment had been brought to the bank's 
attention before payment, much less a finding that the fraud was sufficiently established to the 
                                                
25 Lumcorp Ltd. v. C.I.B.C., [1977] Que. S.C. 993; Planners Ltd. v. Commerce Masonry & Forming Ltd (1979) 25 
O.R. (2d) 167; C.D.N. Research & Devs. Ltd. v. Bank of N.S. (1980), 18 C.P.C. 62; Rosen v. Pullen (1981) 16 B.L.R. 
28.
26 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 59.
27 However, the appeal was dismissed because the documents tendered did not strictly comply to the terms of the 
credit. 
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knowledge of the bank before payment so as to be clear or obvious to it.28 In this case, the 
Supreme Court of Canada settled many important points of law relating to the fraud exception, 
many of which were not at issue. These issues will be dealt with in more detail within subsequent 
headings in this chapter. 
3.3 The scope of the exception
From the discussion so far, it is evident that it is not easy for the fraud exception to be 
successfully argued. This section will identify the scope of this exception by evaluating the 
requirements which are to be satisfied so that the fraud exception could apply to withhold 
payment.
3.3.1 The location of fraud
When applying the fraud exception, this issue will arise inevitably since a documentary credit 
transaction is a complex transaction involving a number inextricably linked contracts. In essence, 
this concerns the question of whether the fraud exception applies to fraud in the documents 
and/or fraud in the underlying transaction.
In Sztejn, there was documentary fraud but Sheintag J also considered the performance of the 
underlying transaction in reaching his decision to grant the injunction.  One is unable to state 
with certainty from the decision in Sztejn whether the fraud exception concerns fraud in 
documents or fraud in the underlying transaction but it is now settled that the fraud exception in 
America encompasses both. Official Comment 1 to UCC §5-109 states that, “The court must 
examine the underlying transaction when there is an allegation of material fraud, for only by 
examining that transaction can one determine whether a document is fraudulent or the beneficiary 
has committed fraud, and, if so, whether the fraud was material."
                                                
28 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 59, [31].
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In Australia, Young J observed in Inflatable Toy Co. v. State Bank of New S. Wales 29that Lord 
Diplock's statement of what constitutes fraud has been regarded as too narrow. Contending that 
the concept of fraud should not be narrowly constrained, he stated the following:
“It is not merely a mechanical exercise of seeing whether the words in the documents 
are completely true or completely untrue to the knowledge of the seller; the question is 
really one of considering whether in all the circumstances the uttering of the documents 
involves actual fraud.”30  
Similarly, in Canada, Le Dain J expressly stated in Angelica-Whitewear that, “[T]he fraud 
exception to the autonomy of documentary letters of credit should not be confined to cases of 
fraud in the tendered documents but should include fraud in the underlying transaction of such a 
character as to make the demand or payment under the credit a fraudulent one.”31
Under English law, this issue is more debatable than that of other common law jurisdictions. 
In United City Merchants, the House of Lords was only confronted with the issue of fraud in 
documents but a later case involving a performance guarantee suggests a broader scope of the 
fraud exception. In Themehelp Ltd v West32, the plaintiff contracted to buy shares in a company 
from the defendants. The purchase price was to be paid by installments, the third and last being 
the largest secured by a performance guarantee issued by a third party. The purchase was 
negotiated on the assumption that the demand for the relevant product from a major customer, 
Sony, would be continued in the future. Before the final installment, the plaintiff started 
proceedings for recission of the contract and damages. It was alleged that there was a fraudulent 
misrepresentation by the defendants, namely that the defendants knew that that Sony were in fact 
sourcing their products from a competitor at the time of contracting but concealed this fact from 
the plaintiff.  The defendants denied the misrepresentation, claiming that the plaintiff was in 
default and that they were therefore entitled to claim under the guarantee. The plaintiff then 
applied for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants from giving notice to the 
guarantor. An injunction was granted at first instance and later affirmed by the Court of Appeal.
                                                
29[1994] 34 NSWLR 243.
30 Ibid, 251.
31 [1987] 1 SCR59, 83.
32 [1996] Q.B. 84.
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Upon examination of the facts of Themehelp, it is obvious that the fraud exception have been 
applied to fraud in the underlying transaction, outside the scope of United Trading. There was no 
fraud in the documents because the representation was not a condition of the demand guarantee 
and was only related to the underlying transaction between the seller and the buyer.33 The 
dissenting judge, Evans LJ recognised the distinction, stating that only fraud in the calling down 
of the credit will justify an injunction.34 He based his decision primarily on an examination of 
the beneficiary’s right, emphasising that the contract was still binding even if the buyer's 
allegation regarding the fraudulent misrepresentation was sufficiently proved, since the buyers 
had taken no steps to rescind the contract or to restore the business to the sellers.35 Hence, he 
decided that the buyer cannot prevent the sellers from recovering payment of that sum without 
acting unlawfully and in breach of the agreement.36
Consistent with the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio, there is no reason why the 
beneficiary should be allowed to enforce payment just because the fraud is only found in the 
underlying transaction. In enforcing payment, there is still reliance on his own wrongdoing.37
Moreover, it is sometimes very difficult to distinguish between fraud in the documents from 
fraud in the underlying contract. As illustrated by Sztejn, in the usual sale of goods case, it is 
difficult to determine whether there is fraud in the document without inquiring into whether there 
is fraud in the underlying transaction. If the fraud exception was not extended to fraud in the 
underlying transaction, one problem arises in determining how close the connection must be 
between the fraud and the issue of the credit in order for the exception to apply.38 The only 
possible argument against allowing fraud in the underlying transaction is that it would widen the 
scope of the application of the fraud exception. It may be argued that the effect of which is the 
unnecessary interference with the international commercial transactions and lost of confidence in 
the letter of credit system. This argument is weak since there remain great difficulties in practice 
                                                
33 See Basil Coutsoudis, “Letters of credit and the Fraud Exception :A Comparative Analysis of the Laws of the 
United States of America, England and South Africa” [5.3.2] 
<http://www.lawonline.co.za/IntTradeLaw/letcredit.htm> accessed 1 August 2009.
34 [1996] Q.B. 84, 102.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Jack, Documentary credits: the law and practice of documentary credits including standby credits and demand 
guarantees (4th edn Tottel, Haywards Heath 2009) 9.26.
38 Ibid. 
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to successfully bring a case on the fraud exception. Even in common law jurisdictions which had 
extended the fraud exception to fraud in the underlying transaction, the number of successful 
cases remains very limited. 
As it currently stands, this issue remains unsettled under English law. However, in light of the 
arguments above and the position of other common law jurisdictions on this matter, if English 
courts are faced with this issue in future, it is very likely that the fraud exception would be 
applied to fraud in the underlying transaction.  
3.3.2 Standard of fraud
This is an issue central to understanding the limits of the fraud exception.  In other words, what is 
inquired is the degree of misfeasance on the part of the beneficiary which is required in order for 
the fraud exception to apply. There is however immense difficulties in setting the required 
standard because of the broad circumstances where fraud can arise and the aim to fairly balance 
the interests of the parties involved. It is useful to start by investigating the varying standards 
adopted by different jurisdictions. 39
3.3.2.1 America
On this point, the principles established by American courts vary and are difficult to reconcile. 
Reported cases before the revision of the UCC differed in their treatment of this issue. In some 
cases, the courts stated that only extreme misconduct would suffice, using the term “egregious” 
to describe the nature of the fraud.40 Some courts required an intention to misrepresent or an 
intention to defraud.41 Others adopted the opposite approach, requiring only “acts, omissions and 
concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly 
reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscious advantage is 
                                                
39 Research on this issue was conducted by searches on Westlaw and reference to Xiang Gao (n 3) 65-99.
40 Intraworld Industries Inc v. Girard Trust Bank 336 A.2d 316 (1975); N Y Life Insurance Co v. Hartford National 
Bank & Trust Co 378 A.2d 562 (1977); First Arlington Nat. Bank v. Stathis [1980] 90 Ill. App. 3d 802, 46 Ill Dec. 
175,413 NE 2d, 1288, 32 UCCRS 260; Stringer Construction Co. v. American Ins. Co. [1981] 102 Ill. App. 3d 919, 
58 Ill Dec. 59, 430, NE2d. 1, 32 UCCRS 1167, 25 ALR 4th. 230.
41 West Virginia Housing v Stroka Development Fund 415 F. Supp.1107 (W.D.Penn.1976); Roman Ceramics Corp v 
People’s National Bank 714 F.2d 1207 (3d.Cir 1983).
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taken”.42  Some cases adopted a “flexible standard” of fraud, setting a boundary of somewhere 
between “breach of warranty and outright fraudulent practice”.43
The revised Article 5 now provides that “material fraud” is required to dishonour a letter of 
credit. Official Comment 1 para 2 states that material fraud “requires that the fraudulent aspect of 
a document be material to a purchaser of that document or that the fraudulent act be significant to 
the participants in the underlying transaction”. Official Comment 1 para 3 states that “material 
fraud by the beneficiary occurs only when the beneficiary has no colorable right to expect honor
and where there is no basis in fact to support such a right to honor”. There is no express 
indication in the official comment that these two statements are to be read conjunctive or 
otherwise but Xiang Gao wrote that the former relates to letters of credit whereas the latter relates 
to standby letters of credit.44 He does not provide any reasons for this account but this is probably 
correct since paragraph 3 refers to standby letters of credit cases.45 Official Comment 1 para 4 
goes on to citing previous cases, providing that a court can only enjoin payment if the fraud was 
“so serious as to make it obviously pointless and unjust to permit the beneficiary to obtain the 
money”46, where the circumstances plainly show that the underlying contract forbids the 
beneficiary to call a letter of credit47, where they show that the contract deprives the beneficiary 
of even a colorable  right to do so48, where the contract and circumstances reveal that the 
beneficiary's demand for payment has "absolutely no basis in fact”49, where the beneficiary's 
conduct has "so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate purposes of the independence of 
the issuer's obligation would no longer be served”50. After the revision, not many cases have dealt 
with the issue of what constitutes material fraud but the limited cases which did so were standby 
                                                
42 Dynamics Corp of America v. Citizens & Southern National Bank 356 F. Supp. 991 (1973).
43 United Bank Ltd v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp 392 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976) 271.
44 Xiang Gao (n 3) 84.
45 Intraworld Indus. v. Girard Trust Bank, 336 A.2d 316 (Pa. 1975); Roman Ceramics Corp. v. People's Nat. Bank
(C.A. 3 1983) 714 F.2d 1207; Ground Air Transfer v. Westate's Airlines (1990) 899 F 2d 1269.
46 Itek Corp v First Nat. Bank of Boston 730 F.2d 19 (1st Cir.1984) 24-25.
47 Ibid, 24.
48 Ibid, 25.
49 Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & Southern National Bank  356 F. Supp 991 (N.D.Ga.1973), 999.
50 Itek Corp v First Nat. Bank of Boston  730 F.2d at 25 (quoting Roman Ceramics Corp. v. Peoples National Bank, 
714 F.2d 1207, 1212 n.12, 1215 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Intraworld Indus., 336 A.2d at 324-25))
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letters of credit cases. 51 Since the revision, American courts have consistently cited egregious 
fraud cases when applying the standard of material fraud. 52
3.3.2.2 England
In United City Merchants, Lord Diplock limited the fraud exception to “where the seller, for the 
purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently presents to the confirming bank documents that 
contain, expressly or by implication, material representations of fact that to his knowledge are 
untrue.”53 Following United City Merchants, English courts have generally avoided defining 
what constitutes fraud. Rather, when identifying fraud in letters of credit, the courts have always 
emphasised on the mens rea - the state of mind of the beneficiary. Hence, there is uncertainty as 
to what constitute “material representation”. R Jack offers one possible suggestion: 
“It is suggested that this must mean material to the bank’s duty to pay, so that if the 
document stated the truth the bank would be obliged and entitled to reject the 
documents. For example, if the bill of lading and the invoice in the Sztejn case had 
stated that the shipment consisted of cowhair and rubbish purporting to be bristles, 
they would not have conformed. And, in the United City Merchants case itself, if the 
bill of lading had had the correct date of shipment, it would have been outside the 
credit period.”54
A similar idea was rejected by Lord Diplock in United City Merchants:
                                                
51 Xiang Gao and Ross P Buckley,  “A Comparative Analysis of the Standard of Fraud Required Under the Fraud 
Rule in Letter of Credit Law 13 Duke J. of Comp. & Int'l L. 293, 319 explains that the limited cases testing the 
standard of fraud set out in s 5-109 as due to the fact that most of the cases tried until recently were still applying the 
previous UCC Article 5 because letters of credit involved in those cases were issued before Revised UCC Article 5 
was The authors, citing J G Barnes & J E Byrne, ‘Letters of Credit: 1995 Cases’, 51 Business L 1417, 1425 (1996) 
explains that another reason may be that “the number of reported cases involving fraud declined significantly” 
following the promulgation of Revised UCC Article 5.
52 Western Surety Co v. Bank of Southern Oregon 257 F.3d 933; New Orleans Brass v. Whitney National Bank and 
the Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District La. App. LEXIS 1764 (2002); Mid-America Tire v. PTZ Trading Ltd 
Import and Export Agents 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5402.
53 [1983] AC 168,183.
54 R Jack (n 37) 9.17.
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“It is conceded that to justify refusal the misstatement must be "material" but this 
invites the query: "material to what?" The suggested answer to this query was: a 
misstatement of a fact which if the true fact had been disclosed would have entitled 
the buyer to reject the goods; date of shipment (as in the instant case) or 
misdescription of the goods are examples. But this is to destroy the autonomy of the 
documentary credit which is its raison d'etre; it is to make the seller's right to 
payment by the confirming bank dependent upon the buyer's rights against the seller 
under the terms of the contract for the sale of goods, of which the confirming bank 
will have no knowledge.”55
R Jack’s suggestion is not the same as but not too different from the one rejected by Lord 
Diplock since any facts which would allow the buyer to reject goods would also allow the bank 
to reject the documents but the converse is not true. R Jack’s suggestion is certainly broader but 
it avoids Lord Diplock’s argument that the autonomy principle will be destroyed. Following this 
suggestion, the seller’s right to payment is still dependant on his right under the credit agreement 
with the bank and not on his right under the contract with the buyer. Later on in his judgment, 
Lord Diplock suggested the following:
“…[T]he answer to the question: "to what must the misstatement in the documents 
be material?" should be: "material to the price which the goods to which the 
documents relate would fetch on sale if, failing reimbursement by the buyer, the 
bank should be driven to realise its security."56
It may be difficult to determine whether a misrepresentation affects a bank’s security whereas 
the determination of whether a document is compliant is an exercise which banks and courts are 
familiar with. R Jack’s suggestion is much more viable than Lord Diplock’s suggestion and 
offers more certainty. It is submitted that his suggestion should be adopted by the courts. As it 
currently stands, there is a lack of focus on the issue of what is material. It is observed that 
                                                
55 [1983] AC 168, 185.
56 Ibid, 186.
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although “material misrepresentation” is the established standard of fraud in England, a more 
accurate terminology to indicate the position as it is now is “intentional fraud”. 
3.3.2.3 Australia
Granting an injunction in Contronic Distributors Pty. Ltd. v. Bank of New South Wales, Helsham 
J stated that, “a seller can be restrained from presenting a letter of credit for payment or having 
payment made against it in the event that the documents which are needed to require payment to 
be made are false to the knowledge of the seller.”57 Some cases suggest that Australian courts are 
content with a lower level of misfeasance, such as where the beneficiary lacks honest belief58 or 
was reckless and indifferent as to its truth59. In recent years, Australian courts appeared to be 
willing to extend the fraud exception to unconscionable conduct in cases involving standby 
letters of credit.60 This subject will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6. However, the focus on the 
mental state of mind remains the prevailing attitude in Australia.
3.3.2.4 Canada
In the past, Canadian courts when describing fraud have referred to “impropriety, dishonesty or 
deceit”, a demand that is “clearly untrue or false”, or “utterly without justification”, or where it is 
apparent there is “no right to payment”.61 "A legitimate dispute or disagreement over the 
interpretation of a contract, however one–sided that dispute may appear” 62 does not suffice as 
fraud, nor does " mistake or error in interpreting the terms of a contract"63. Although not at issue, 
in Bank of Nova Scotia v Angelica-Whitewear, LeDain J., for the unanimous court, agreed with 
United City Merchants and took up the view that the “fraud exception should be confined to 
                                                
57 [1984] 3 NSWLR 110,116.
58 Bush v National Australia Bank Ltd (1992) 35 NSWLR 390, 402 (SC).
59 Austal Ships Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd; unreported; SCt of WA (Templeman J); Library No 970037; 
13 February 1997).
60 Hortico (Australia) Pty Ltd v Energy Equipment Co (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 545 (N.S.W.S. Ct.); 
Inflatable Toy Co. v. State Bank of New S. Whales (1994) 34 NSWLR 243 (N.S.W.S. Ct.);Olex Focas v Skodaexport
(1996) 134 FLR 331 (V.S. Ct.).
61 Cineplex Odeon Corp v 100 Bloor West General Partner Inc [1993] O.J. No. 112 (Ont. Gen. Div.), [32].
62 Ibid, [31].
63 Washburn v. Wright (1913), 31 O.L.R. 138 (App. Div.), 147.
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fraud by the beneficiary of a credit and should not extend to fraud by a third party of which the 
beneficiary is innocent”.64
3.3.2.5 Commentary
The discussion so far shows two different approaches to finding fraud. American courts adopt the 
approach of looking at the factual circumstances of the case, in particular the effect of the 
wrongdoing and the severity of the wrongdoing.65 On the other hand, English courts focus on 
inquiring into the state of mind of the beneficiary in calling the letter of credit. Others like, 
Canada and Australia have in general, also required knowledge on the part of the beneficiary, 
although there are occasional suggestions of different notions of fraud. Overall, American courts 
adopt the least stringent concept of fraud. In United Trading Corporation S.A. and Murray 
Clayton Ltd. v Allied Arab Bank Ltd, Ackner LJ referred to some of the cases cited in the official 
comment to UCC §5-10966  and made the observation that the American conception of fraud is 
far wider than that in the English jurisdiction, to the extent of including ordinary breach of 
contract.67
One American writer argues that the English approach is better i.e. that for the purposes of 
injunctive relief, fraud should be found only where there is a dishonest intention on the part of the 
beneficiary.68 Whilst the focus on intention or knowledge of fraud is certainly an approach 
English courts have consistently adhered to, it is submitted that English law should not limit the 
scope of this exception to actual knowledge. This is because any investigation into the state of 
mind of the beneficiary is not likely to be easy and may require extensive investigation. Proof of 
actual intention on the part of the beneficiary is difficult to establish in a full trial, let alone in a 
preliminary hearing. The relevant evidence on the issue of intention may be just the words of the 
alleging party. Due to these difficulties, the writer feels that if the law is to require only actual 
knowledge, the allocation of risk is unfairly in favour of the beneficiaries.
                                                
64[1987] 1 S.C.R. 59, [18].
65 R.P. Buckley, “The 1993 Revision of the Uniform Customs and Practice for. Documentary Credits” (1995) 6 
JBFLP 77, 97.
66 Dynamics Corporation of America v. the Citizens and Southern National Bank. 356 F. Supp. 991 (1973); Harris 
Corporation v. Nirt , F. 2d 1344 (1982) and Itek Corporation v. F. N. Bank of Boston, 566 F. Supp. 1210 (1983).
67 [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 554, 561.
68 Symons EL, “Letters of Credit: Fraud, Good Faith and the Basis for Injunctive Relief” (1980) 54 T.L.R 338.
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It is suggested here that the question the courts should be concerned with is not just “did the 
beneficiary actually know?” but should also include the additional question of “ought he know?” 
The idea is that the relevant state of mind will be found objectively, by directing the inquiry into 
factual circumstances of the case. This is also supported by the writings of Professor Ellinger and 
R Jack who interpreted knowledge as similar to the tort of deceit.69 The tort of deceit contains 
the following elements: (1) knowing the representation to be false; (2) without belief in its truth; 
or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false70. “It may well be that where the party 
presenting the documents has some serious ground for suspicion of a document so that if he gave 
proper consideration to it he would realise that it most likely contained a false statement but 
shuts his eyes to that, this would be sufficient.” 71
In a recent American case, Levin v. Meagher, Margulies J stated this:
“What unifies the various standards formulated in the cases cited in the official code 
comment is their requirement that fraud be determined by an objective examination 
of the circumstances, rather than by reference to the subjective beliefs of the 
beneficiary.”72
The writer’s submission appears to be the same as the position adopted in America, albeit 
expressed in different terms. This means that if accepted, the fraud exception in England would 
be much more in line with the fraud exception in America. As explained by one American judge, 
an objective approach fits in comfortably with the fundamental principle which forms the 
mechanics of the letter of credit. 
“The adoption of an objective standard is consistent with the contractual nature of 
letters of credit. Under such contracts, a beneficiary has the right to draw on the letter 
                                                
69 R Jack (n 37) 9.18; E.P. Ellinger, “Documentary Credits and Fraudulent Documents” in C.M. Chinkin et al. (ed), 
Current Problems of International Trade Financing (Butterworths, Singapore 1983) 161. 
70 Derry v. Peek [1884] A.C. 337, 374. However, Jack recognises that there is a distinction between the reckless 
presentation of documents and the tort of deceit in that the bank did not enter into the contract based on 
misrepresentation but is merely refusing to perform it.
71 R Jack (n 37) 9.18.
72 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7060, 18.
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of credit only if certain conditions are met. If there is "no bona fide claim" that those 
conditions have been met-in other words, if it is clear that the beneficiary has no right 
to draw on the letter of credit-the beneficiary should not be permitted to draw on the 
line of credit merely because the beneficiary has formed a good faith but mistaken 
belief that conditions permitting a draw do exist.”73
One may argue that a beneficiary could have genuinely committed a mistake or was genuinely 
unaware of the misrepresentation but such an approach would have the result of unfairly 
punishing them. This concern is to a large extent unjustified since, as the discussion which 
follows will show, evidence has to satisfy a high evidential threshold. The evidence would need 
to show circumstances where it is hard to imagine that the beneficiary seller was not reckless and 
where there are strong reasons for him to be held responsible for his behavior.
3.3.3 Proof/evidence of Fraud  
In order to rely on the fraud exception to withhold payment, any allegation of fraud must be 
supported by sufficient evidence. This issue is of particular importance because evidential 
threshold is the primary device used to limit the application of the fraud rule. Due to the different 
stages of proceedings where the fraud exception may be argued, it is useful to discuss this issue 
by drawing a distinction between a pre-trial hearing and a full trial hearing.
3.3.3.1 Pre-trial 
3.3.3.1.1 Application for injunction
Since questions relating to the fraud exception are likely to arise primarily in applications for 
interim injunctions to restrain payment by the bank, where the evidence will be by affidavit or 
witness statement74 and the decision will have to be taken without a full hearing on the merits, the 
                                                
73 3Com Corp. v. Banco do Brasil, S.A. (2nd Cir. 1999) 171 F.3d 739, 747 per S. Sotomayor J.
74 An application for an interim injunction must be supported by evidence set out in either (1) a witness statement, or 
(2) a statement of case provided that it is accompanied by a statement of truth, or the application provided that it is 
verified by a statement of truth, unless the court, an Act, a rule or a practice direction requires evidence by affidavit. 
(CPR 25PD.3.2)
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approach to the standard of proof assumes particular importance.75 English courts generally 
require a high degree of proof for proceedings on this matter. It is difficult to see how the courts 
did not find established fraud in some of these cases even though the facts were very much in 
favour of the plaintiffs. For instance, in Discount Records, not only were the goods delivered 
later than the date stated in the invoice, there was evidence to show that 97% of the goods 
delivered were either not as ordered or rubbish. This evidence was in the form of the buyer’s 
inspection of the goods in the presence of the issuing bank. In addition, at the hearing, one of the 
boxes was presented showing that it had been tempered with.76 Despite all these facts, the High 
Court decided that the evidence had not satisfied the required standard. Megarry J also stated that 
it would be difficult to resolve an issue of fraud in any hearing to which the seller was not a party.77
In Harbottle78 and Edward Owen 79, the judges emphasised that the standard is that of “clearly 
established fraud” - in both case injunctions were refused because it was decided that fraud was 
alleged but not established. 
Moreover, these cases do not reflect a one-off approach. In Bolivinter Oil S.A. v Chase 
Manhattan Bank80, it was specifically stated that “...[T]he evidence must be clear, both as to the 
fact of fraud and as to the bank’s knowledge”.81 In United Trading Corpn SA v Allied Arab 
Bank82, Ackner LJ provided further explanation on this issue:
“We would expect the Court to require strong corroborative evidence of the allegation, 
usually in the form of contemporary documents, particularly those emanating from the 
buyer. In general, for the evidence of fraud to be clear, we would also expect the buyer to 
have been given an opportunity to answer the allegation and to have failed to provide any, 
or any adequate answer in circumstances where one could properly be expected. If the 
                                                
75 But the effect of granting an interim injunction will merely be to delay payment to the beneficiary if at trial his 
claim for payment is found to be justified.
76 The numbers indicating the serial number of the records inside which appeared on the outside of the box had been 
pasted over with some semi- transparent material and different numbers had been put on the outside, the outside 
numbers corresponding with the order and the covered-up numbers not corresponding with the order.
77 1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 444, 448.
78 [1977] 2 All ER 862.
79 [1978] 1 QB 159.
80 [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 251.
81Ibid, 257 per Sir John Donaldson MR.
82 [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554.
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Court considers that on the material before it the only realistic inference to draw is that of 
fraud, then the seller would have made out a sufficient case of fraud.”83
However, he warned of a too restrictive approach to evidence which will make the fraud 
exception meaningless and established this test: “Have the plaintiffs established that it is 
seriously arguable that, on the material available, the only realistic inference is that [the 
beneficiary] could not honestly have believed in the validity of its demands on the performance 
bonds?”84. This has since been the test adopted in English cases where pre-trial injunctions are 
sought. One may question whether “the only realistic inference” standard set out in this case is a 
slightly lower threshold than the test of clear or established fraud. In Turkiye Is Bankasi AS v 
Bank of China85, Waller J. took the view that there is no material difference between the two and 
it is argued here that this is correct. 
English courts later appeared to have deviated from the traditional strict approach in 
Themehelp Ltd. v. West & Others86, the facts of which have already been discussed.87 The 
plaintiff in this case applied for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants from giving 
notice to the guarantor, on the grounds that there was fraudulent misrepresentation.  The plaintiff 
had to prove that in the course of negotiating the purchase of the shares, the defendants 
fraudulently concealed the fact that Sony would no longer be a major customer of the company. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s finding that the plaintiff had satisfied the onus of 
proof, which is the establishment of a seriously arguable prospect at trial that the only realistic 
inference to draw is that the defendant were fraudulent 88 This is the same test set out in United 
Trading Corpn but the Court of Appeal in Themehelp was much more lenient in their approach 
and even accepted some of the hearsay evidence involved. In fact, the dissenting judge, Evans LJ 
decided that any finding of the alleged misrepresentation is unrealistic. 89
                                                
83 Ibid, 561.
84 Ibid.
85 [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 611, 616.
86 Themehelp ( n 32).
87 See page 93 for facts of this case.
88 Counsel for the buyers did not sought to argue in this appeal that the judge adopted the wrong test. Therefore the 
Court Of Appeal assumed that the correct test was adopted.
89 Themehelp ( n 32) 104. Evans LJ gave the following reasons:
(footnote continues next page)
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In Canada, earlier cases took up the strict English approach of requiring clearly established 
fraud90 but subsequently, in CDN Research & Development Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia J 
Galligan established the test of a strong prima facie case of fraud91. This approach, which is less 
onerous than the English standard of proof, is also adopted by Australian courts.92 American 
courts have not formulated any test in relation to establishing proof of fraud. The reason behind 
this may be because preliminary proceedings in American fraud cases sometimes involve 
extensive and multiple hearings with delays. 93  Perhaps, this could also be partly due to 
American courts focusing more on the rules of procedural law governing the issuance of 
preliminary injunctive relief.
3.3.3.1.2 Summary judgment
When a bank refuses to pay on grounds of fraud, a beneficiary will often try to obtain a summary 
judgment against the bank to obtain quick payment. In Solo Industries UK v Canara Bank 94 a 
beneficiary made an application for summary judgment against a bank which refused to pay 
under a performance bond. The Court of Appeal had to consider the standard of proof which is to 
be applied in a summary judgment hearing where a bank is defending an application by the 
beneficiary for a summary judgment. Mance LJ drew a distinction between two types of cases:
                                                                                                                                                             
“The plaintiffs purchased the defendants' shareholdings in the Shinecrest group of companies on terms negotiated 
over several months and set out in the share sale agreement dated 29 May 1992…Both parties were represented by 
experienced solicitors and each had access to financial advisers (Price Waterhouse for the defendants). The plaintiffs 
were acting in conjunction with their two bankers, 3i and Midland Montagu, and Mr Daniel of 3i accompanied Mr 
Adrian Evans, of the plaintiffs, to all meetings with the defendants except apparently a visit which Mr Evans made to 
the defendants on 27 April 1992 at which the allegedly fraudulent misrepresentation was made. Moreover, in January 
the plaintiffs … received Price Waterhouse's update which included trading and financial forecasts on the express 
assumption that the Sony UK business would decline almost to zero. I find it difficult to accept that the plaintiffs, 
their bankers and advisers relied ultimately, even in part, on an oral assurance given by the second defendant to Mr 
Evans alone on 1 April, or that Mr Evans and Mr Daniel, of 3i, who visited Sony's offices at Staines in order to 
establish the company's trading prospects with Sony, failed to discover either what the prospects were or that Mr 
Rose, the senior executive to whom they spoke, was not the appropriate person within the Sony organisation for 
them to see (if such was the case), without realising that they had not done so.”
90 Lumcorp Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, [1977] Que. S.C. 993, and Aspen Planners Ltd. v. 
Commerce Masonry & Forming Ltd. et al. (1979), 100 D.L.R. (3d) 546, 25 O.R. (2d) 167, 7 B.L.R. 102 (H.C.).
91 (1980) 18 CPC 62.
92 Hortico (Aust) Pty Ltd v Energy' Equipment Co (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 545; Inflatable Toy Co. v. State 
Bank of New S. Whales (1994) 34 NSWLR 243, 251; Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, 13 February 
1997, 2221/1996.
93 Roeland Bertrams, Bank Guarantees in International Trade (3rd edn Paris; New York, ICC Publication  2004)
359.
94 [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 578.
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a) Cases where it is alleged that the bond's issue had been obtained by fraud or 
misrepresentation
Where the validity of a bond is challenged, the Court of Appeal in Solo held that the applicable 
test was the lower civil test - whether the bank had a “real prospect of successfully defending the 
claim”.95 Mance LJ gave the following reason:
“The cash principle means that (short of established fraud) any claim that a bank 
may acquire against a beneficiary making a fraudulent demand must be pursued 
separately and subsequent to payment, and cannot normally be used as a defence or 
set-off to avoid payment. All that is clear. But such risks all arise out of and on the 
basis of the instruments issued. They assume the “integrity” of the instrument that 
the bank has issued. It does not follow that banks accept the risk that the instrument 
itself has been induced by conspiracy between, or misrepresentation by, their 
customers and the beneficiaries. The mere appearance of a valid instrument cannot 
commit a bank.” 96
Solo Industries fell within this category. Based on the evidence, the Court of Appeal held that the 
bank passed the test and refused summary judgment to the beneficiary.
b) Cases where it is alleged that a fraudulent demand was made on the bond
In such circumstances, it was held that the applicable standard is that of established fraud, or 
establishing that on the material available the only realistic inference is that the beneficiary could 
not honestly have believed in the validity of its demands on the performance bonds. The Civil 
Procedure Rules Part 24 test for summary judgment was rejected:
“If instruments such as letters of credit and performance bonds are to be treated as 
cash, they must be paid as cash by banks to beneficiaries. The courts in the 
                                                
95 Civil Procedure Rules 1998/3132, 24.2(a).
96 [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 578, 587.
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Harbottle and Edward Owen cases emphasised this, and, in my view, set a higher 
standard than “a real prospect of success” in relation to all these situations.”97
In a later case, Banque Saudi Fransi v Lear Siegler Services Inc98, the Court of Appeal followed
Solo Industries and held that the test of standard of proof at summary judgment on this matter 
was higher than that laid down by Civil Procedure Rules Part 24.99
Very recently, in Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v Banca Popolare Dell'alto Adige SPA100, where 
banks which issued the guarantees sought to resist summary judgment on the basis that there was 
a fraudulent demand for payment, these cases were reviewed in the High Court and Teare J took 
the view that the test on a summary judgment application “is not entirely clear”. 101 Rather than 
following Solo and Banque Saudi Fransi, Teare J established that the test to be applied is 
“whether there is a real prospect that the Banks will establish at trial that the only realistic 
inference is that the fraud exception applies”.102 He distinguished Solo and Banque Saudi Fransi
on the basis that the courts in both cases were not considering a claim against a bank where the 
defence was that there was a fraudulent demand under a guarantee - the comment in Solo is 
obiter dicta whilst Banque Saudi Fransi concerned a claim against a person who has given a 
bank a counter indemnity under a performance bond. Although the test which was applied in 
Enka  without doubt sets a lower standard than that established in Solo and Banque Saudi Fransi, 
it remains the case that this standard is still quite high, as evidenced by the banks’ failure to meet 
up to this standard in Enka.
                                                
97 Ibid, 586.
98 [2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 47.
99 Ibid, [16]. Interestingly, it was stated that the applicable test is different in a case which involved a claim against a 
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3.3.3.2 Full trial
In civil cases, the level of proof required to convince the court that a proposition is true is to 
prove it “on the balance of probabilities”. Professor Goode writes that this is the standard to be 
applied even at the trial of letters of credit cases, whilst emphasising however that “in fraud 
cases, this is at the high end of the scale”103. This may be correct, since in Themehelp Ltd v West
Waite L.J referred to the balance of probabilities standard as  “weighing the evidence with due 
regard to the gravity of the particular allegation”104. Xiang Gao, however, submits that due to the 
very small number of cases, it is too early to conclude that the balance of probabilities is to be 
applied in trials considering the fraud exception.105 He points out that such a distinction is not 
drawn in the United States.106 One English case which considered the fraud exception in a full
trial is Turkiye Is Bankasi AS v Bank of China107, where the Court of Appeal applied the “only 
realistic inference is that of fraud” test, with no reference to the “balance of probabilities” test. 
Interestingly, in the Canadian case Bank of Nova Scotia v Angelica-Whitewear108, Le Dain J
adjusted the test from CDN Research, by distinguishing the proof of fraud required in an 
application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain payment on the ground of fraud from that of 
a case determining whether a draft was improperly paid by the issuing bank after notice of 
alleged fraud by the beneficiary:
“A strong prima facie case of fraud would appear to be a sufficient test on an 
application for an interlocutory injunction. Where, however, no such application was 
made and the issuing bank has had to exercise its own judgment as to whether or not 
to honour a draft, the test in my opinion should be the one laid down in Edward 
Owen Engineering, whether fraud was so established to the knowledge of the issuing 
                                                
103 R Goode, Commercial law (3rd edn Lexis Nexis, London 2004) 993.
104[1996] Q.B. 84, 99. 
105 Xiang Gao (n 3).
106 He cites as support Official Comment 5 on UCC §5-109 which provides the following:
Although the statute deals principally with injunctions against honor, it also cautions against granting ‘similar relief’ 
and the same principles apply when the applicant or issuer attempts to achieve the same legal outcome by injunction 
against presentation…interpleader, declaratory judgment, or attachment.
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bank before payment of the draft as to make the fraud clear or obvious to the 
bank.”109
He justifies this distinction by explaining the difficulty faced by the issuing bank at that point in 
comparison to that of a court in an application for an interlocutory injunction:
“In view of the strict obligation of the issuing bank to honour a draft that is 
accompanied by apparently conforming documents, the fact that the decision as to 
whether or not to pay must as a general rule be made fairly promptly, and the 
difficulty in many cases of forming an opinion, on which one would hazard a 
lawsuit, as to whether there has been fraud by the beneficiary of the credit, it would 
in my view be unfair and unreasonable to require anything less of the customer in the 
way of demonstration of an alleged fraud.”110
This approach of adopting a higher standard of proof of fraud at full trials was also adopted in 
Australia.111
From the analysis so far, the logical conclusion to reach on this issue is that a higher standard
of proof of fraud is applied in a full trial. This has been the English, Canadian and Australian 
position for some time although it may be argued that the exact standard of proof of fraud for 
applications for injunctions in these jurisdictions slightly differs. It is submitted here that there is 
no reason for a lower standard of proof to apply at trial. At trial, when considering the fraud 
exception, the courts will be looking retrospectively to the time when payment has been made or 
should have been made. In view of the difficulties faced by banks in making a quick decision at 
that point in time, the writer agrees with the reasoning of Le Dain J that there is a need for a 
higher standard of proof at a full trial. There is support for this in the judgment of Rix J in 
Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc. v Standard Bank London Ltd where the learned judge 
stated that “the claimant gets the benefit of a lower standard of proof for the purposes of a pre-
trial hearing”112. Despite this, English judges are close to being too rigid in the application of the 
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110
high standard of proof in pre-trial hearings and should be cautious in this regard. Otherwise, the 
fraud exception may not be able to serve its purpose, which is to prevent fraudulent parties from 
improperly receiving payment.
3.3.4 Relevant time of bank’s knowledge of fraud 
It has already been shown that for the fraud exception to be successfully invoked, it must be 
proven to a high standard that the bank has knowledge. It should be highlighted that the question 
of what is sufficient to constitute knowledge of fraud is different from the question of which 
point in time the bank is required to have knowledge. The former relates to the issue of standard 
of proof, an issue already discussed in the previous heading. In relation to establishing a 
beneficiary’s knowledge of fraud, it is the time of presentation which is critical. However, in 
relation to establishing the bank’s knowledge of fraud, the required timing is different. For the 
purpose of facilitating this discussion, a distinction is made between three different scenarios in 
which this issue may arise. 
3.3.4.1 Where payment has been made
After payment, the bank’s knowledge of fraud becomes relevant only because the applicant or 
another bank disputes its obligation to reimburse.  If a bank had acquired evidence of fraud
between the time of presentation and the date of payment but had gone ahead to make payment, it 
is only fair that the applicant or another bank should not be obliged to reimburse the bank for the 
amount paid. Similarly, if the evidence of fraud arises after payment, the bank should be entitled 
to reimbursement of the amount paid. In United Trading Corporation SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd, 
Ackner LJ stated the following:
“It seems to us clear that, where payment has in fact been made, the bank's knowledge 
that the demand made by the beneficiary on the performance bond was fraudulent must 
exist prior to the actual payment to the beneficiary and that its knowledge at that date 
must be proved. Accordingly, if all a plaintiff can establish is such knowledge after
111
payment, then he has failed to establish his cause of action. The bank would not have 
been in breach of any duty in making the payment without the requisite knowledge…”113
If this was not the case, then banks could potentially suffer huge losses because of the 
fraudulent act of another party of which they were unaware at the time of payment. The argument 
that banks should have conducted an investigation is extremely weak because the commercial 
reality of the banking world means that banks cannot be expected to carry out an extensive 
investigation every time documents are presented to them. In Turkiye Is Bankasi v. Bank of 
China114, Waller J affirmed that a bank is under no obligation to investigate:
“It is simply not for a bank to make enquiries about the allegations that are being made
one side against the other. If one side wishes to establish that a demand is fraudulent it 
must put the irrefutable evidence in front of the bank.” 115
3.3.4.2 Where payment has not yet been made 
If all the other requirements of the fraud exception are fulfilled and a bank has knowledge of 
fraud at the time of payment, it must not pay. If it does pay in such circumstances, it would be in 
breach of its mandate with its customer, hence exposing itself to non-reimbursement by the 
applicant. 
Banks and applicants do not necessarily agree on whether payment should be made, 
understandably so since they have different underlying interests to protect. An applicant may 
need to seek an injunction to restrain payment if the paying bank takes the view that payment 
should be made. In Bolivinter Oil v Chase Manhattan Bank116, where the plaintiff appealed 
against the discharge of ex parte injunctions which had been previously granted, Sir John 
Donaldson M.R. stated that the following:
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“… if…, the principle is that "fraud unravels all" and if the issue is whether payment 
should now be made, it is nothing to the point that at an earlier stage the fraud was 
unknown to the payer and so could not begin its unravelling, if fraud is now known 
to him and has now unravelled his obligations.”117
Similarly, in United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd, Ackner LJ decided that fresh 
evidence which emerged by the time the appeal is heard was to be taken into account even 
though such evidence were not available previously.118
3.3.4.3 Where payment has been refused
A more complicated situation exists where a bank refuses payment but it is subsequently 
proven that there was no clear evidence of fraud at the time when payment was due. In such a 
situation, a beneficiary will often try to obtain a summary judgment against the bank to obtain 
quick payment. If the bank obtains evidence of clear fraud after the date of expected payment, 
can the bank raise evidence which was not available at the time of refusing payment to resist 
summary judgment? In Balfour Beatty Civil Engineering Ltd. v. Technical & General 
Guarantee, a surety appealed against a summary judgment granted in favour of the beneficiary 
of the performance bond. Waller LJ stated that, “If the evidence is now clear, then no judgment 
will be given in favour of the beneficiary because of the fact that the surety would be entitled to 
a judgment for the equivalent sum.”119 By this Waller LJ was referring to the surety’s 
counterclaim since it would have its own remedy against the beneficiary. In Safa Ltd. v Banque 
Du Caire120, it was also held that the bank is able to rely on clear evidence of fraud which 
becomes available at the time of hearing but the Court of Appeal’s refusal to grant summary 
judgment in Safa was based on the surety’s right to set off rather than a counterclaim.121In 
Mahonia Ltd. v JP Morgan Chase Bank, Colman J approached the matter differently:
                                                
117 Ibid, 256.
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“…[I]t is, in my view, unnecessary to confine the surety’s position to one founded 
on a counterclaim for damages or circuity or potential circuity of action. As long as 
there is before the court evidence which establishes fraud by the beneficiary there is 
evidence sufficient to establish a straight defence based on ex turpi causa. For this 
purpose, I agree with Lord Justice Waller that the strength of the fraud case has to 
be tested on the evidence available at the hearing of the summary judgment 
application, as distinct from the time of demand.”122
Professor Goode points out that, “It would be absurd if the court were to be compelled to 
give summary judgment to the beneficiary in the face of clear evidence of fraud merely 
because the evidence was not available at the time of demand”123 This is very true, and for this 
reason alone Colman J was correct to have not considered the right to counterclaim or set-off. 
R Jack suggests another reason - the general rule in contractual disputes allows the bank to 
justify non-payment using any reasons known at trial. 124 He pointed out that a bank could 
potentially abuse this precedent by refusing payment in a borderline fraud case. Nevertheless, 
he suggests that this is quite unlikely as the bank would be risking its reputation in making the 
decision  not to pay. 
3.3.5 Third Party Fraud
The following discussion explores the contentious issue of whether the scope of the fraud 
exception encompasses fraudulent conduct which is not perpetrated by the beneficiary. Although 
Lord Diplock famously stated that “fraud unravels all” in United City Merchants, in actual fact 
fraud does not unravel the legal position of all parties under English law. In United City 
Merchants, the House of Lords ruled that a bank was obliged to pay even though it had 
knowledge of the fraud because the beneficiary did not have knowledge of the fraud. The effect 
of United City Merchants is that the identity of the party who perpetrated the fraud is crucial – a 
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document forged by a third party without the involvement of a beneficiary will not provide a 
ground to refuse payment under the fraud exception. This position is followed in other common 
law jurisdictions such as Canada125 and Australia126. § 5-109 UCC does not provide that the 
beneficiary’s knowledge of the fraud is required in order for the fraud exception to intervene 
payment. So far there is no direct authority in American cases specifying that the fraud exception 
is limited to fraud of the beneficiary. Moreover, in demand guarantee cases, it has been expressly 
stated in American courts that there is no need to establish that the beneficiary acted “deceitfully 
or with malicious intent”.127 Therefore, American courts appear to differ in this respect from 
other common law jurisdictions.
There are many reasons why English law retains the requirement of beneficiary’s knowledge 
in the fraud exception. The main justification is that it is in the interest of international trade to 
maintain the efficacy of the documentary credit as a system of payment. Beneficiaries choose the 
use of documentary credits because of the certainty of payment offered and should be able to rely 
on it. There is also the argument that it is rather unfair to refuse payment to an innocent 
beneficiary on the basis that a third party has forged a document. Moreover, forgery and fraud are 
certainly different kinds of wrongdoing, hence a good justification for each to be treated 
differently in the eyes of law. Arguably, the allocation of risk in the event of third party fraud 
should fall on the applicant because this is the risk that any applicant consents to by agreeing to 
pay by letter of credit. 
3.3.5.1 The drawbacks of United City Merchants
The disadvantage of the judgment in United City Merchants is that it creates a rather absurd 
situation - a bank who obtains strong evidence before payment that a document is forged by a 
third party is still obliged to make payment, despite knowing that the documents are in fact 
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United City Merchants and took up the view that the “fraud exception should be confined to fraud by the beneficiary 
of a credit and should not extend to fraud by a third party of which the beneficiary is innocent”.
126 Contronic Distributors Pty. Ltd. v. Bank of New South Wales [1984] 3 NSWLR 110. See page 90 for a detailed 
discussion of this case.
127 Rockwell International Systems Inc v Citibank NA 719 F.2d 583 (1983); Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio 
and Television, 691 F.2d 1344 (1982); Dynamics Corp of America v. Citizens & Southern National Bank 356 F. 
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forged. Ultimately, the burden falls on the applicant who is to reimburse the bank. Such a rule 
could make this payment instrument a breeding ground for fraudsters.  One commentator referred 
to letters of credit as a Crooks Charter.128 Although circumstances where a beneficiary conspires 
with a third party would fall within the scope of the fraud rule, the evidential difficulties of 
proving the beneficiary’s involvement in practice means that opportunities are created for 
beneficiaries to defraud banks. The act of fraud remains fraud and its effect on international 
trading is detrimental regardless of whoever perpetrates the fraud. The effect of fraud on the right 
to payment should have no correlation to the identity of the perpetrator. 
Many commentators advocate that the requirement of beneficiary’s fraud should be 
abolished.129The primary argument is that, despite being compliant on its face, a document forged 
by a third party is not genuinely conforming. As Professor Goode correctly states, “A 
fraudulently completed bill of lading does not become a conforming document merely because 
the fraud is that of a third party.”130  Take for example the bill of lading in United City 
Merchants. It is difficult to see how a bill of lading which had been deliberately modified to 
record the wrong shipping date is conforming when even minor errors in documents could 
provide a ground for rejection under the strict compliance rule. International trading often 
involves goods with volatile market value. Since the price of the goods could vary significantly 
from one day to another, an incorrect shipping date should not be seen as trivial.  Furthermore, in 
M. Golodetz & Co. Inc. v Czarnikow-Rionda Co. Inc, Donaldson J stated that, “A tender of 
documents which, properly read and understood, call for further inquiry or are such as to invite 
litigation is clearly a bad tender.”131
In his writings, Xiang Gao highlighted the importance of the maintaining a fair balance of the 
competing interests amongst the many parties involved in the letter of credit transaction: 
                                                
128 Ademun-Odeke, “Double Invoicing in International Trade; The Fraud and Nullity exceptions in Letters of Credit 
– Are the America Accord and the UCP 500 Crooks Charters?” (2006) 18 Denning L.J. 115.
129  Ibid ; R Goode “Abstract payment undertakings” in P. Cane and J. Stapleton (eds), Essays for Patrick Atiyah
(Clarendon, Oxford 1991) ;  Xiang Gao ( n 3) Chapter 5.
130 R Goode, "Reflections on Letters of Credit -1" [1980] JBL 291, 294.
131 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 495, 510. 
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“The normal operation of the letter of credit not only provides the beneficiary with 
safe and rapid access to the purchase price or a sum of money when the applicant 
defaults, but also provides the applicant with credit and/or other commercial benefits 
and protects the applicant against improper calls on the credit by requiring the 
beneficiary to present genuine documents indicating that it has properly performed its 
obligations under the underlying transaction. If forged or fraudulent documents are 
allowed to trigger payment, the balance assumed in the letter of credit scheme will be 
undermined”132.
Also, the argument that it is unfair for an innocent beneficiary to be refused payment because of 
the fraud of a third party cannot always be sustained. Take for instance the example of a master 
who observes that the condition of the goods is not as it should be and inserts remarks into his 
mate’s receipt. The charterer is keen to have a clean bill of lading since a claused bill of lading is 
no good for the shipper. Therefore, the charterer provides a letter of indemnity to the master to 
cover him in the event of cargo claims in return for which the master issues a clean bill of lading. 
Meanwhile, the beneficiary of the credit (the shipper) is not aware of this. In this example, 
although the beneficiary was not the person perpetrating the fraud, it is hardly unfair to refuse 
payment to the beneficiary since the goods shipped were not in acceptable condition.  
The UCP and other international regulations do not expressly deal with the issue of third party 
fraud. However, it is worthwhile to note here that Article 8 of the Provisions of the Supreme 
People’s Courts on Some Issues Concerning the Trial of Cases of Disputes over Letters of Credit 
(which took effect on 1st of January 2006) provides the following: 
        
The letter of credit fraud shall be determined as constituted under any of the following circumstances:
(i) The beneficiary has forged documents or presented documents containing fraudulent information;
(ii) The beneficiary has intentionally failed to deliver goods or delivered goods with no value;
                                                
132 Xiang Gao, Ross P Buckley, “A Comparative Analysis of the Standard of Fraud Required Under the Fraud Rule 
in Letter of Credit Law” (2003 Oxford University Comparative Law Forum) <http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/gao-
buckley.shtml#fn1> accessed 2 September 2008.
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(iii) The beneficiary has conspired with the applicant or a third party and presented fraudulent 
documents whereas there is no actual underlying transaction; or
(iv) Other circumstances of letter of credit fraud.
Whilst subsection (i)-(iii) focus on beneficiary’s fraud, subsection (iv) appears to be a catch all 
clause with no reference to the beneficiary’s involvement at all. This means that subsection (iv) 
may encompass circumstances where a beneficiary is innocent but a third party is fraudulent. It is 
likely that subsection (iv) would include such circumstances although Xiang Gao expresses his
uncertainty as to the effect of this subsection133
Upon review of the arguments presented for and against the extension of the fraud exception 
to third party fraud, it is submitted here that third party fraud should be included within the limits 
of the fraud rule. Nevertheless, as one commentator rightly points out, the principle in United 
City Merchants is influential and well entrenched even in other common law jurisdictions and a 
consideration of whether the fraud exception should be extended to third party fraud is likely to 
be futile.134 It is hoped that English courts will review this issue. Otherwise the autonomy 
principle will continue to protect unscrupulous fraudsters, allowing them to obtain monetary 
gains out of the letter of credit system. Some of the arguments discussed in this section will be 
revisited in more detail in the discussion of null documents (Chapter 3). 
3.3.6 Holders in due course
Following Sztejn and United City Merchants, it is clear that the fraud exception cannot be used 
against holders in due course. In England, holders in due course of a bill of exchange are 
protected from allegations of fraud by Section 38 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882. Section 
29(1) of the Act defines a holder in due course as follows:
A holder in due course is a holder who has taken a bill, complete and regular on the face of it, under the 
following conditions; namely,
                                                
133 Xiang Gao, “The Fraud Rule in Law of Letters of Credit in the P.R.C” (2007) 41 Int'l Law 1067, 1080.
134Dora Neo, “A Nullity Exception” [2004] Sing. J.L.S. 46, 69.
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(a) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously 
dishonoured, if such was the fact:
(b) That he took the bill in good faith and for value, and that at the time the bill was negotiated to him 
he had no notice of any defect in the title of the person who negotiated it.
Article 2 UCP 600 provides that:
Negotiation means the purchase by the nominated bank of drafts (drawn on a bank other than the 
nominated bank) and/or documents under a complying presentation, by advancing or agreeing to 
advance funds to the beneficiary on or before the banking day on which reimbursement is due to the 
nominated bank.
A negotiating bank becomes a holder in due course who is protected from the fraud of a 
beneficiary if he negotiates a negotiable instrument and is authorised to do so. Under a straight 
credit, an issuing bank’s undertaking is only to a named beneficiary. On the other hand in a 
negotiation credit, the issuing bank’s undertaking extends to another party who obtains the 
beneficiary's draft and documents through negotiation or purchase. Although straight letters of 
credit are frequently discounted in practice, the third party purchaser is not granted greater rights 
than a beneficiary by the issuer of the credit and hence would only be regarded as an assignee of 
proceeds to the credit. 135 Even with a negotiation credit, not all parties who negotiate are granted 
protected status.136 In the case of a freely negotiable credit, any bank willing to negotiate can do 
so and will be eligible for protected status. But in the case of a restricted negotiation credit, the 
negotiation is restricted to a nominated bank, with protected status only available to the 
nominated bank.
Where a straight credit is involved, a bank should be careful about negotiation since it is not 
generally authorised to negotiate and does so on its own account. The risk thereby carried is 
particularly alarming in the discounting of deferred payment credit137 since fraud could be 
discovered during the period between the purchase of the credit and the maturity date. In Banco
                                                
135 Xiang Gao (n 3) 140; D Pawlowic “Letters of Credit: a Framework for Analysis of Transfer, Assignment, 
Negotiation and Transfer by Operation of Law” (1992) 39 Wayne L. Rev 1, 25.
136 See James E. Byrne, “Negotiation in Letter of Credit Practice and Law: The Evolution of the. Doctrine” (2007) 42 
Tex. Int'l lj 561, 579-593.
137 For an explanation of deferred payment credits, see section 1.6.3.2.
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Santander SA v Bayfern Ltd138, English courts were confronted with the difficult question of 
whether a negotiating bank is entitled to reimbursement by the issuer if fraud is established 
during this period. UCP 600 now clearly provides on this issue. Before examining the new UCP 
provisions, it is useful to study the background behind these new provisions. 
3.3.6.1 Banco Santander SA v Bayfern Ltd139
In this case, Paribas issued a deferred payment letter of credit (subjected to UCP 500) in relation 
to the sale of oil in favour of Bayfern which was payable at 180 days from bills of lading date. 
The confirming bank, Santander, accepted the documents upon presentation by Bayfern, thereby 
agreeing to pay on the maturity date, 27th November 1998. Subsequently, before this date, 
Santander (without any knowledge of fraud at this point) made a discounted payment to Bayfern 
in consideration of which Bayfern wrote a letter assigning its rights under the letter of credit to 
Santander. After the documents were forwarded to Paribas, it informed Santander that documents 
accepted by Santander included forged documents and refused to reimburse Santander. Santander 
then sought summary judgment against Paribas. The Court of Appeal assumed for the purpose of 
the preliminary issues that Bayfern had been guilty of fraud and that the fraud was discovered by 
Paribas and Santander prior to 27 November 1998. In the Court of Appeal, the following issues 
were considered:
1) Was Santander making a claim as assignee of Bayfern? If so, is there any reason why 
Paribas should not have the fraud defence to that claim as they would have had against 
Bayfern?
2) Does Santander have a right to reimbursement under the UCP? 
It was held that Santander was an assignee and that the fraud defence could be used against the 
assignee. Waller LJ drew a distinction between an acceptance credit and deferred payment credit. 
The former is a negotiable instrument which could be discounted or sold in the forfait market to 
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which s. 38 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 applies, providing that a holder in due course 
holds the bill free from any defect of title of prior parties.
“Thus holders in due course can sue on the drafts even if fraud is discovered prior to 
the maturity date of the draft. Furthermore, if a confirming bank who has accepted a 
bill becomes the holder and holds the bill at maturity, the bill is discharged by virtue 
of s. 61 of the Bills of Exchange Act ….since that discharge is by law automatic, the 
fraud would not provide an answer, and that thus the confirming bank is in as good a 
position as a holder in due course, even if it purchases drafts accepted by it.”140
He concluded that “if parties agree for whatever reason that they will not provide a negotiable 
instrument, and do not provide by terms of the trade or even by the express terms of the 
instrument itself the protection for assignees that a negotiable instrument would provide, they 
must live with the consequences.”141
As to the issue of reimbursement under UCP 500, Waller LJ asked the question of “what 
precisely the issuing bank has requested the confirming bank to do, and what the issuing bank 
has promised to do if the confirming bank does what is requested of it”.142 He decided that the 
request was for Santander to confirm that it would pay on 27th November 1998 and that Paribas 
promised to reimburse Santander for this payment. “There is no request from Paribas that 
Santander should discount or give any value for the documents prior to [maturity], and albeit it 
may not be a breach of mandate for Santander to do so, it is up to Santander whether it does so or 
not.”143 If Santander had obtained Paribas's authority to discount and obtained confirmation of 
reimbursement if it did discount, the fraud exception would be inapplicable.144
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The decision caused a stir amongst the banking community because it was common practice
before this case for banks to discount deferred payment letters of credit145 but the decision means 
that by doing so they assume the risk of fraud on the part of beneficiary which is discovered 
before the maturity date of the credit. As a result, it was necessary for banks to review their 
practice of discounting this type of credit. Some common law courts adopt the same position146
but the position of the law on this matter is different in America. After the revision, §5-109(a)(1) 
UCC stipulated that that the following parties are protected from the fraud exception:
(i) a nominated person who has given value in good faith and without notice of forgery or material 
fraud, 
(ii) a confirmer who has honored its confirmation in good faith, 
(iii) a holder in due course of a draft drawn under the letter of credit which was taken after acceptance 
by the issuer or nominated person, or 
(iv) an assignee of the issuer’s or nominated person’s deferred obligation that was taken for value and 
without notice of forgery or material fraud after the obligation was incurred by the issuer or nominated 
person
Accordingly, under the UCC, a case like Banco Santander, which fell into either (i) or (iv) would 
have been decided in favour of the confirming bank. 
In response to the criticisms following Banco Santander, UCP 600 now contains the following 
articles, attempting to reverse the ruling in Banco Santander:
7 (c) An issuing bank undertakes to reimburse a nominated bank that has honoured or negotiated a 
complying presentation and forwarded the documents to the issuing bank. Reimbursement for the 
amount of a complying presentation under a credit available by acceptance or deferred payment is due 
at maturity, whether or not the nominated bank prepaid or purchased before maturity. An issuing 
bank's undertaking to reimburse a nominated bank is independent of the issuing bank’s undertaking to 
the beneficiary.
                                                
145 Expert banking witness in Banco Santander SA v Bayfern Ltd [1999] C.L.C. 1321 testified that it was common 
market practice in London to discount deferred payment letters of credit.
146 Credit Agricole Indosuez v Banque Nationale de Paris [2001] 2. S.L.R. 1; Vereins-und Westbank AG v Veren 
Investments 2000 (4) S.A. 238.
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12(b) By nominating a bank to accept a draft or incur a deferred payment undertaking, an issuing 
bank authorizes that nominated bank to prepay or purchase a draft accepted or a deferred payment 
undertaking incurred by that nominated bank.
Following Article 12 UCP 600, nomination of a bank to incur a deferred payment undertaking 
automatically provides the nominated bank with authorisation to purchase the deferred payment, 
the authorisation which was absent in Banco Santander. Article 7 UCP 600 merely reinforces the 
consequence of Article 12, which is that the issuing bank is to reimburse the nominated bank 
even if it had discounted before the maturity date.  In relation to deferred payment credit, the risk 
of fraud now falls on:  
a) The applicant (who is under an obligation to reimburse the issuing bank) or 
b) The issuing bank (in the event that it is not able to recover its reimbursement from the 
applicant).
Some commentators welcome this change147 whilst some retained their reservations as to the 
benefit of these provisions.148 The writer takes the view that these changes are not ideal for 
various reasons. There is no longer a straightforward option for parties to choose between either 
the negotiation credit or the deferred payment credit in accordance with their desired allocation 
of risk. Following the new provisions, the risk of fraud with respect to both types of credit falls 
on the issuing bank or the applicant. There exists the option of expressly excluding these 
provisions but there may be difficulties in getting the beneficiary to agree to such exclusions.149
Although some expert evidence suggests the this allocation of risk was not the prevailing 
practice before Banco Santander, it is arguable that over time, Banco Santander and the cases 
following its ruling, together with the many commentaries which followed, would probably have 
raised the required awareness and created a new market practice in line with these decisions.150
In the words of K Takahashi, “It[Article 12] has produced the undesirable result of effectively 
removing a useful option of risk apportionment.”151Issuing banks may also become reluctant to 
                                                
147 Ebenezer Adodo, ‘‘The Legal Effect ofNomination under the New UCP 600’’ [2008] J.I.B.L.R. 231.
148 Janet Ulph, “The UCP 600: Documentary Credits in the 21st Century” [2007] J.B.L. 355, 374; K Takahashi, "The 
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issue deferred payment credits using nominated banks due to the extra cost of fraud in the event 
of non-reimbursement from the applicant.152 This means that buyers will not be able to make use 
of the deferred payment credit which has the main advantage of allowing it a period of time to 
verify that there is no fraud before making payment.153 The only advantage of these new 
provisions is that there is more harmonisation on this matter with the UCC.154
Moreover, these new provisions are themselves problematic.  It is not clear whether Banco 
Santander is effectively reversed since, unlike the UCC, UCP 600 does not expressly provide 
an assignee to be in the category of protected persons, but only provides for the authorisation 
issue in Banco Santander.155 The case itself was decided on the assignment point whilst the 
authorisation point was considered as only a secondary argument. There is uncertainty as to 
who is to bear the risk of fraud which transpires before the date of maturity in the case of a 
nominated bank which is an assignee of the proceeds of the beneficiary. This uncertainty is 
well explained by D Horowitz :
… [A]s explained by the Court of Appeal in Banco Santander, assignment and 
prepayment are mutually exclusive possibilities. A confirming bank can either take 
an assignment of the proceeds under Art.39 of the UCP, and present for payment as 
assignee; or it can discharge its undertaking to the beneficiary (at a discount or in 
full) and present for reimbursement in its own right. Articles 7 and 12 arguably 
only cover the latter situation.156
Hence, it may be that the new provisions do not fully protect the legal position of confirming 
banks which purchase deferred payment credits.
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3.4 Additional Hurdles for Injunctions
The circumstances where the fraud exception may arise are such as the following:
(a) An applicant seeking an injunction against the beneficiary from calling the credit on grounds 
of fraud.
(b) An applicant seeking an injunction against the paying bank from making payment on 
grounds of fraud.
(c) Where payment has been made and recovery is sought but either the beneficiary or the 
issuing bank disputes their obligation to reimburse on the grounds of fraud.
In relation to a) and b), there is a further hurdle which an applicant has to overcome - the balance 
of convenience test propounded in American Cyanamid v Ethicon Ltd157, according to which the
court has to determine whether one party risks being prejudiced should an injunction be granted. 
In this case, Lord Diplock said that “ It would be unwise to attempt even to list all the various 
matters which may need to be taken into consideration in deciding where the balance lies, let 
alone to suggest the relative weight to be attached to them. These will vary from case to 
case.” 158If there is no imbalance, the courts should preserve the status quo, which is the state of 
affairs before the defendant embarked on the conduct sought to be restrained, provided the 
plaintiff did not delay his application for relief.
The American Cyanamid principles are also firmly adhered to in other common law 
jurisdictions. In relation to applications for injunctions involving letters of credit, it is often said 
that the test provides an extra benefit to banks because the balance of convenience is usually 
weighted against the applicant and that only in exceptional cases would the test be overcome. The 
test requires a consideration of whether damages would be an adequate remedy for the applicant. 
“If there is no breach of contract by the bank, there is no case for an injunction; if there is a 
breach of contract, the applicant will have a good claim for damages against the bank, so there is 
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no need for an injunction”.159 Because of these reasons, in Harbottle Ltd. v. The National 
Westminster Bank, Kerr J expressed the view that an applicant seeking an injunction would face 
an “insuperable difficulty” and that the balance of convenience is “hopelessly weighted against 
the plaintiffs”.160
Moreover, it seems that in determining the balance of convenience in the context of 
documentary credit, the courts will always have to consider the position of the bank if payment 
was restrained.  Most of the time, an injunction would expose the bank to multiple suits and the 
consequential costs involved in defending them. In Czarnikow v Standard Bank London Ltd161, 
Rix J asserted that if a claimant could obtain a Mareva injunction against a beneficiary, the 
overriding interest to protect a bank’s reputation and the autonomy of banking commitments 
would always tip the balance against granting an injunction:
“Ex hypothesi, the bank would be entitled, in the absence of an injunction, to pay the 
beneficiary and would not be in breach of contract to the claimant in doing so. Why, 
therefore, should the interests of the claimant overtop the public and general interests in 
the maintenance of banking commitments and in the autonomy of such commitments? 
The preference of concern about the private loss of the defrauded claimant to the general 
weal might arguably in a particular case fall in favour of the former, if the claimant could 
be in no other way protected. But it seems to me that the presence of the Mareva 
injunction or freezing order, which the Courts can grant in a case of fraud even on a 
worldwide basis and even as merely ancillary relief to litigation abroad, militates very 
strongly against that argument.”162
He noted that there were only two cases where an injunction had been upheld on an inter partes
basis and there were problems with both.163  One may question whether the consideration of 
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reputation of the bank is relevant where the injunction sought is one against the beneficiary. Rix J 
emphasised in this case that there was no difference between seeking an injunction against a bank 
and a beneficiary, approving the words of Staughton LJ in Group Josi Re Co SA v Walbrook 
Insurance Co Ltd that, “The effect on the life blood of commerce will be precisely the same 
whether the bank is restrained from paying or the beneficiary is restrained from asking for 
payment.”164
In America, equitable rules require an applicant seeking a preliminary injunction to show:
(1) irreparable injury and either 
(2) (a) probable success on the merits  or 
     (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation    
and  a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the preliminary relief.165  
Following § 5-109 (b)(3) UCC166, these requirements are to also apply to the fraud exception. 
Generally, financial losses will not be regarded by the court as irreparable harm since this loss 
can be compensated if the applicant brings an action against the beneficiary under the underlying 
contract.167  In 1979, the Iranian revolution resulted in the non-performance of many contracts by 
American parties in Iran, most of which were secured by standby letters of credit. Fearing and 
anticipating that the Iranian government would make calls on the standby credits, some American 
applicants sought injunctions to restrain the American banks from paying. The applicants based 
their claim on the argument that the financial loss they would suffer would be irreparable since 
there would be no real remedy for them in the Iranian courts. 
In KMW International v. Chase Manhattan Bank168 and American Bell v. Islamic Republic169, 
the American courts rejected this argument on the basis that the claimants had assumed the 
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business risks of international transactions which included the possibility that, if a dispute arose 
and international litigation ensued, their funds would be paid out under the irrevocable letter of 
credit and held in foreign hands. In American Bell, the district judge even admitted that resorting 
to Iranian courts would be futile but decided that the claimant would be able to receive an 
adequate remedy in American courts. In both cases, it was held that the balance of hardship did 
not tip in favour of the claimants because the defendant banks would suffer loss of credibility in 
the international banking community, a factor also taken into great account by English courts in 
the balance of convenience test. However, in many cases with similar circumstances heard after 
the Iran hostage crisis170, the courts held that Iranian courts were an unsuitable forum for 
obtaining any appropriate remedy because of Iran’s hostility towards Americans.171 Therefore, in 
these cases, the risk of foreign litigation was enough to show irreparable harm. The inconsistency 
between the decisions in earlier and later cases may be justified by the differing circumstances 
before and after the taking of the hostages. 
It seems that American and English courts take into account very similar considerations when 
deciding whether to grant an injunction to stop payment. The extreme difficulties in seeking an 
interim (interlocutory) injunction, caused by the application of these conventional requirements 
leads one to question whether it is appropriate for English courts to apply the American 
Cyanamid test in the context of the fraud exception. In Brody, White & Co Inc v Chemet172, the 
Singaporean Court of Appeal held that the balance of convenience test should be displaced in 
cases involving irrevocable letters of credit. In Bocatra Construction Pte Ltd v Attorney General 
(No 2)173, the application of this test was also rejected in relation to performance bonds:
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…If the appellants’ arguments are accepted174, this would mean that the court has to 
deal with both the equitable principle as well as the balance of convenience. To 
require such a ‘double-barrelled’ test would be dichotomous and illogical. In our 
opinion, whether there is fraud or unconscionability is the sole consideration in 
applications for injunctions restraining payment or calls on bonds to be granted. Once 
this can be established, there is no necessity to expend energies in addressing the 
superfluous question of ‘balance of convenience’. It does not lie in the mouth of the 
defendant to claim that damages would still somehow be an adequate remedy.175
This study has already highlighted the high standard of proof of fraud required in proceedings 
for interlocutory injunctions to interrupt payment in England. Given that this high standard is in 
place to curb the potential injustice caused to other parties in a documentary credit transaction, it 
is contended that the application of the American Cyanamid test is unnecessary. The stringency 
of this standard was clearly recognised by Karthigesu JA in Bocatra (No 2) :
“… [D]ispensing with consideration of the balance of convenience does not make an 
injunction any easier to obtain. Indeed, a higher degree of strictness applies, as the 
applicant will be required to establish a clear case of fraud or unconscionability in 
interlocutory proceedings. It is clear that mere allegations are insufficient.”176
It is argued here that the Singaporean courts were right to reject the American Cyanamid test. 
In fact, the disposal of the American Cyanamid test should not be limited to cases involving
irrevocable credits and performance bonds. The consideration of the bank’s reputation in the 
balance of convenience test has the unfair effect of resulting in dismissal of applications
involving all types of credit. The focus of the test is the balancing of the interests of the applicant 
against the interests of other parties involved. Consistent with the ex turpi causa non oritur actio 
maxim, if an applicant is able to prove to a high standard a clear case of fraud in these 
proceedings, surely this overrides the potential inconvenience caused to any of the parties 
                                                
174 The appellants argued that, on the balance of convenience, declaratory relief should have been granted since the 
appellants might suffer irreparable damage to their reputation as a consequence of a call for payment under the 
guarantee.
175 Bocatra (n 173), [44-45].
176 Ibid, [47].
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involved. If an injunction is not to be granted even in the event of the applicant proving a clear 
case of fraud, this defeats the purpose of the existence of the fraud exception. To impose the 
American Cyanamid requirements is to make the fraud exception practically defunct. Arguably, if 
an applicant is able to show a clear case of fraud, then the balance of convenience is tipped in his 
favour. Ironically, the balance of convenience test is commonly referred to as the “balance of risk 
of injustice”177 - isn’t there a greater risk of injustice if upon proving a clear case of fraud, the 
injunction is still refused because of failure to satisfy this test? Also, more uncertainty persists as
a result of the application of the American Cyanamid principles since judges have unfettered 
discretion in determining the relevant factors used to decide the balance of convenience. English 
law has already established that there are exceptions to the American Cyanamid principles in 
certain circumstances where there are other overriding interests.178 In view of these arguments, 
the balance of convenience test should be abandoned in any application for an injunction to 
restrain payment on grounds of fraud.  
3.5 Fraud in electronic letters of credit
Since banks deal with documents and not with goods, the documentary credit transaction is 
suitable to be operated electronically. Whilst the UCP has successfully governed documentary
credit for some time, when the growth of the internet triggered the use of electronic documents,
it became obvious that there was a need to update the rules to accommodate this development 
since the UCP was initially designed for paper documentary credits. Instead of revising the 
UCP, the ICC Banking Commission supplemented the UCP with another set of rules, known as 
the eUCP (Supplement to the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits for 
Electronic Presentation). The eUCP 1.1 is the latest version, updated to be consistent with the 
provisions of UCP 600. The eUCP came into force on 1st of April, 2002 and provided a 
framework of rules for the presentation of electronic documents in documentary credit 
transactions. In order for the eUCP to apply, the credit must expressly stipulate that the eUCP 
                                                
177 Cayne v Global Natural Resources plc [1984] 1 All ER 225, 237; Films Rover International Ltd v Cannon Film 
Sales Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 672, 680.
178 For example, defamation, covenants in restraint of trade, passing off cases etc. See Craig Osborne, Civil 
Litigation (OUP, Oxford 2006) .
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is incorporated.179  There is no need to expressly incorporate the UCP as all credits which are 
subjected to the eUCP are also subjected to the UCP.180
The problem of fraud remains a major concern as the popularity of electronic credits
continues to grow. One important question arises - does the presentation of documents 
electronically increase the risk of fraud? The main risk with paper documents is that important 
information like signatures, description of goods or any other contents of a document could be 
easily amendable by a fraudulent party, or that documents could even be destroyed. The time 
frame for completion of transactions involving paper documents is also longer, providing more 
opportunities for fraudulent acts. The inherent delays in the presentation of documents also 
mean that banks have very limited time to investigate even if they have suspected fraud.
There is a common fear amongst traders and banks that electronic credits will be subject to
the same level of fraud and security breaches found in other systems of electronic financing, 
e.g credit cards and internet banking.  This is partially justified, since electronic and computer 
systems can be quickly tampered with by those with specialist knowledge of computer systems. 
However, the eUCP provides some safeguard against fraud by requiring that an electronic 
record must be "capable of being authenticated as to the apparent identity of a sender and the 
apparent source of the data contained in it, and as to whether it has remained complete and 
unaltered”.181 There is no definition of authentication in the eUCP and no explanation is 
offered as to how documents will be authenticated. However, many technical systems which 
securely create, store and authenticate documents are available to banks. These technological 
advances mean that an electronic letter of credit could be as safe, or even safer, than the 
traditional letter of credit.182 One such system is the Bolero183 (Bill of Lading Electronic 
Registry Organization) internet world trade system, which is compliant with all the articles of 
the eUCP. It essentially provides a hosted and centralised electronic processing of letters of 
                                                
179 eUCP  1.1 Article e1b.
180 eUCP  1.1 Article e2a.
181 eUCP 1.1 Article e3(b)(i).
182  See James E. Byrne, Dan Taylor, ICC Guide to the eUCP, ICC Publication No. 639 (2002), 18.
183 Bolero was created in 1998 as a joint venture with SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication) and the Through Transport Club (an association specializing in transportation risk).
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credit and documentation. It incorporates advanced encryption and claims to provide extensive 
safeguards against fraud in storing and transmitting any trade document in electronic form. 
Bolero also has a Title Registry which manages the creation and transfer of rights of Bolero 
bills of lading184. 
Since electronic credits cannot be signed in the usual way, one aspect of electronic credits
which reduces the risk of fraud is the use of digital signatures. A digital signature has two major 
advantages: 1) it can effectively identify the signer of the document 2) it helps the receiver verify 
that the original contents of the document are unamended by persons other than the sender since 
it was created. It offers these security features because it was created using cryptography, the 
process of transforming ordinary information into unintelligible forms. There are two forms of 
cryptography, public key cryptography and symmetric-key cryptography. Digital signatures use 
the former which employs two algorithms using two different but mathematically linked "keys" 
which match to a combination.185 One key, the private key, is kept secret by the sender (signer) 
and used to create the signature whilst the other corresponding key (the public key) is publicly 
available to decrypt and verify the signature. Nevertheless, the eUCP does not prescribe the 
technology method for digital signatures - “electronic signature means a data process attached to 
or logically associated with an electronic record and executed or adopted by a person in order to 
identify that person and to indicate that person's authentication of the electronic record”.186 This 
demonstrates that the drafters of the eUCP recognised the frequent changes and advancement of 
technology in this modern world. 
A handwritten signature has safety problems because it is only manually added to a document 
and could be imitated by anyone easily. The details in the document could be altered with the 
handwritten signature still looking the same. On the other hand, a digital signature is intrinsically 
connected with the transmitted document and the signature will be affected if there are any 
alterations to the original document.  Another added advantage of a digital signature is that if 
                                                
184 This was named as Bolero bill of lading because it does not fit the legal definition of a bill of lading. However, it  
performs the same function and has the same legal effect because all users on Bolero must become a member of the 
‘Bolero User Association’ and contractually agree to adopts the Bolero Rulebook.
185 Marianne M. Jennings, Business: Its Legal, Ethical And Global Environment  (7th edn Thomson, USA 2005).
186 eUCP 1.1 Article e3(b)(ii).
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circumstances have changed and the signed document is now of no benefit to the signor, it is very 
difficult for him to deny that he had signed the document in order to escape his responsibility. 
Despite the role of the internet in revolutionising many banking transactions, the use of 
electronic credits is not as prevalent as one would expect. This could be due to the fact that it is 
difficult to implement the relevant infrastructure to support electronic documents at all levels, 
from banks to every organisation in the logistic chain. There may also be difficulties in 
implementing the relevant infrastructure at the international level, which is essential since the 
operation of the letter of credit often transcend borders. In view of the prevailing problems of 
fraud and the many advantages offered by electronic documents in preventing fraud, the writer 
urges the ICC to be more proactive in promoting the use of electronic letters of credit in
international trading. Moreover, if electronic credits are successfully integrated as a vital part of 
financing payment for international trading, receiving payment would most certainly be faster 
and the cost of using the letter of credit may even be cheaper in the long run.
3.6 Conclusion
It has been demonstrated that the documentary credit is surrounded by problems of fraud. Where 
the requirements of the fraud exception are met, a bank can refuse to make payment or an 
applicant (or another bank) can seek an injunction to restrain the paying bank from making 
payment. However, despite being the most established ground to refuse payment, the analysis of 
the relevant case law clearly shows that only in very few instances would the fraud exception be 
invoked successfully to refuse payment. 
It is concluded that the fraud exception should not be limited to documentary fraud but should 
also encompass fraud in the underlying transaction. Not to do so would be to confine the 
application of the fraud exception narrowly and to defeat the objective of combating the 
proliferation of fraud. It is observed that, with the exception of America, most common law 
jurisdiction do not regard mere breaches of contract as sufficient to attract the fraud exception; an 
element of dishonesty and  material fraud are required. Nevertheless, the issue of what constitutes 
material fraud remains to an extent difficult to clarify and will, in practice, be decided on a case-
by-case basis. 
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From the analysis of the relevant case law, it is clear that the standard of proof in applications 
for injunctions is high. It is submitted that there is no reason for a lower standard of proof to be 
applied at a full trial.  Further, the bank’s knowledge of this strong evidence must be timely. It 
has also been argued that the balance of convenience test from American Cyanamid is 
unnecessary in the context of the fraud exception since there are other mechanisms in place 
which considerably restrict the scope of the fraud exception. 
It has also been shown that the restriction in United City Merchants on the identity of the 
fraudulent party is not without its problems and can put banks in a very difficult position. Hence, 
the writer urges English courts to review United City Merchants so that third party fraud could 
fall within the ambit of the fraud exception. It is recognised that there is a need to not intervene 
with payment arrangements entered into in international trading, but this should also be balanced 
against the importance of effectively deterring fraud. 
This chapter has also highlighted the new provisions in UCP 600 which reverse the effect of 
Banco Santander. As a consequence of these new provisions, a useful method of allocation of 
risk is removed. Furthermore, it is unclear if the new provisions will protect a confirming bank 
which takes on an assignment from the risk of any beneficiary fraud discovered between the date 
of early payment and the maturity date of the credit. 
Finally, it has also been highlighted that electronic documentary credits are a useful solution to 
controlling the problem of fraud in international trading. There is a need to expand the use of 
electronic credits but practical challenges of implementing world wide use of paperless 
documents make the process a rather slow one. The law is now prepared to facilitate the use of 
electronic credits, although if electronic credits become a staple part of international trading, 
more legal problems may arise with the need to update the law.
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CHAPTER 4
NULLITY
4.1 Introduction
Some cases have considered the question of whether “nullity” can be a ground for refusing 
payment under a documentary credit, although it is not clear what this word means. The 
precise meaning of nullity will be discussed later, but for present purposes we may take it to 
mean either some defect in a document presented by the beneficiary sufficiently serious to 
make it legally ineffective, or some defect in the underlying transaction sufficient to make it 
void rather than merely voidable. It follows from this that there is a distinction between a null 
document and a contract which is null. An underlying contract connected to a documentary 
credit may be null because of illegality1 or mistake2 but the discussion in this chapter focuses 
on the question of whether documentary nullity constitutes a ground for refusing payment. It 
will be argued that payment should be refused where null documents are presented under a 
credit but it will be demonstrated that this does not constitute an exception to the autonomy 
principle. 
Documents which are null are not what they appear to be yet no version of the UCP 
provides for the effects of such documents. To understand the position of the law, this chapter 
begins with an analysis of the relevant cases which have considered this issue. Following this, 
the writer evaluates the arguments for recognising the tender of null documents as a ground 
for withholding payment. Finally, an attempt will also be made to analyse the circumstances 
which render a document to be null.  
                                               
1 The effect of illegality in the underlying transaction  will be discussed in Chapter 5.
2 There is no scope for a “mistake exception” to the autonomy principle since, if there was mistake in the 
underlying contract but documents which strictly comply with the conditions of the credit were presented under 
the credit, the facts would very likely fall under the fraud  exception (see Chapter 3) or the unconscionability 
exception (see Chapter 6).
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4.2 Documentary Nullity
So far, the effect of documentary nullity in the context of documentary credit has only been 
properly considered by English and Singaporean courts. The discussion in this section will 
begin with an analysis of the relevant English cases, followed by Singaporean cases. 
4.2.1 England
In United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada3, Lord Diplock 
expressly stated that he would leave open the question of the rights of a beneficiary against 
the confirming bank when a document presented by him is a nullity because unknown to him 
it was forged by some third party. 4  The House of Lords did not have to decide on this point 
because, although the bill of lading was wrongly dated, it was a “valid transferable receipt for 
the goods giving the holder a right to claim them at their destination… and was evidence of 
the terms of the contract under which they were being carried.”5
Subsequently, in Montrod Ltd v Grundkötter Fleischvertriebs GmbH6, English courts were
confronted with the issue of whether null documents would allow non-payment. This case 
concerned the sale of frozen pork which was financed by a documentary credit. The issuing 
bank, Standard Chartered, was acting on the instructions of another bank, Fibi Bank, which 
was instructed by Montrod. The credit provided for the presentation of a “certificate of 
inspection issued and signed by the credit applicant at his discretion on the goods quality and 
quantity in good order before shipment”. The underlying contract of sale of frozen pork was 
between the defendant seller and a Russian company, but the applicant was Montrod, a 
company which provided documentary credits for international trading transactions. This 
stipulation in the credit relating to the certificate of inspection was inserted so that Montrod 
could delay payment until it was put in funds to cover its liability under the credit. The 
beneficiary (the defendant seller) was informed by the buyers that that it could sign the 
inspection certificate on behalf of Montrod. After presentation of the documents, it was 
revealed that Montrod did not authorise the beneficiary to sign on its behalf and that the 
buyers were not entitled to speak for Montrod. The issuing bank made payment despite 
                                               
3 [1983] 1 A.C. 168.
4 Ibid, 188.
5 Ibid, 188.
6 [2002] 3 All ER 697.
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Montrod alleging that the documents were fraudulently created. Eventually, the buyers did not 
pay for the delivered goods. Montrod brought an action disputing its obligation to reimburse, 
advancing these arguments:
1) The beneficiary had acted fraudulently and hence the fraud exception should be applied.
2) The inspection certificate was a nullity, which worked in the same way as the fraud 
exception. 
At first instance, HHJ Raymond Jack QC held that the fraud exception could not be relied 
upon to refuse payment because the beneficiary acted in good faith on the honest belief that it 
had authority to sign the certificates. He took the view that the UCP articles does not support
a nullity exception -  to interpret the provisions this way would be to go against the 
fundamental principle that banks consider the documents alone and should not take into 
account other matters such as the disputes between applicant and beneficiary.7 The learned 
judge concluded that there was also no nullity exception under English law:
“[I]t is unsupported by authority. It provides a further complication where 
simplicity and clarity are needed. There are problems in defining when a document 
is a nullity. The exception could have unfortunate consequences in relation to the 
rights of third parties.”8
Therefore, it was held that the seller was entitled to payment and that Standard Chartered 
should be reimbursed by the Fifi Bank, which in turn is entitled to reimbursement by 
Montrod. Montrod appealed on the nullity argument. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial 
judge’s decision and held that nullity of documents was not a defence to payment. Potter LJ
decided that there were sound policy reasons for rejecting the nullity argument: 
“The creation of a general nullity exception, the formulation of which does not 
seem to me susceptible of precision, involves making undesirable inroads into the 
principles of autonomy and negotiability universally recognised in relation to letter 
of credit transactions. In the context of the fraud exception, the courts have made 
clear how difficult it is to invoke the exception and have been at pains to point out 
that banks deal in documents and questions of apparent conformity. In that context 
                                               
7 [2001] C.L.C. 466, 477.
8 Ibid.
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they have made clear that it is not for a bank to make its own inquiries about 
allegations of fraud brought to its notice; if a party wishes to establish that a 
demand is fraudulent it must place before the bank evidence of clear and obvious 
fraud... If a general nullity exception were to be introduced as part of English law 
it would place banks in a further dilemma as to the necessity to investigate facts, 
which they are not competent to do and from which UCP 500 is plainly concerned 
to exempt them. Further, such an exception would be likely to act unfairly upon 
beneficiaries participating in a chain of contracts in cases where their good faith is 
not in question. Such a development would thus undermine the system of 
financing international trade by means of documentary credits.”9
Surely the argument about placing banks in a dilemma to investigate the facts is 
unsustainable. Just like the fraud exception, recognition of null documents as a ground to 
refuse payment would only oblige a bank to refuse payment if, before the time of payment, it 
is established to the bank to a high degree of proof that a document is null. This was also the 
submission put forward by Montrod: “If, by the time of payment (or the time when a bank 
irrevocably commits itself to a third party who has taken in good faith, if earlier) the only 
reasonable inference is that one (or more) of the documents presented under the credit is not 
what it appears on its face to be, but is a nullity, then the bank is not obliged to make payment 
under the credit.”10 Even if nullity is accepted as a ground for refusing payment, a bank is still 
under no obligation to check for documentary nullity. Its obligation remains the same, which 
is to check for compliance on the face of the documents.
In Montrod, the Court of Appeal considered the claimant’s argument to refuse payment on 
the grounds of nullity as an extension of the fraud exception. This is itself problematic 
because the restrictions imposed by United City Merchants that a beneficiary must have 
knowledge for the fraud exception leaves nearly no room for the success of any nullity
argument. As one commentator recognises, “The United City Merchants fraud exception 
creates difficulties for the development of a conceptually coherent nullity exception.”11
Further, as shall be demonstrated in the analysis of what constitute null documents, null 
                                               
9 [2002] 3 All ER 697, 713.
10 [2001] C.L.C. 466, 475.
11 K Donnelly, “Nothing for  nothing: A nullity exception in letters of credit?” [2008] JBL 316, 324. See also M 
Bridge, “Documents and contractual congruence in international trade” in S Worthington (ed), Commercial Law
and Commercial Practice (Hart Publishing, London 2003) 236.
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documents and forged documents are conceptually different. Hence, there are strong reasons 
to consider nullity as distinct ground to refuse payment. 
4.2.2 Singapore
In the following two cases, the Singaporean courts did not have to decide the cases on the 
basis of nullity of documents although both judgments appeared to welcome the possibility of 
refusing payment on such grounds. In Mees Pierson NV v Bay Pacific (S) Pte Ltd12, the seller 
tendered a health certificate which  showed that it was issued by the Municipal Corporation of 
Greater Bombay but was in fact not issued by this institution. When the confirming bank 
sought to recover payment made to the seller under the credit, the bank’s claim was dismissed
on the basis that it had accepted the documents, made payment and had not given notice of 
rejection to the sellers within the period required under the UCP.  However, Rajendran J 
stated obiter that if the bank knew of the actual fact regarding the certificate, it would be 
under no obligation to make payment. 13 In Lambias (Importers & Exporters) Co Pte Ltd v 
Hongkong14, the quality and weight inspection certificate showed that it was issued and 
signed by the applicant, when in fact it was issued by the beneficiary.  The certificate was to 
be countersigned by Mr Yau but was in fact signed by an imposter. The claim was dismissed 
by Goh JC mainly on the basis of discrepancies but he also made reference to the fact that the 
documents were null in his judgment.  
    It was not until Beam Technology (Manufacturing) Pte Ltd v Standard Chartered Bank 15
that a Singaporean court made a determinative ruling on this issue. In this case, the underlying 
contract of sale of electronic component was financed by a letter of credit which stipulated for
a full set of clean air waybills. The buyer notified the seller that the air waybill would be 
issued by their freight forwarders, "Link Express (S) Pte Ltd". Upon presentation of the air 
waybill, the confirming bank rejected it on the ground that it was a forgery because Link 
Express(S) Pte Ltd was a non-existing entity. The beneficiary bought an action against the 
bank for non-payment under the letter of credit but the Singapore High Court held that the 
bank was entitled to refuse payment. On Appeal, the court had to consider the issue of 
                                               
12 [2000] 4 SLR 393.
13 Ibid, [42].
14 [1993] 2 SLR 751.
15 [2003] 1 SLR 597.
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whether forged or null documents can be relied on to refuse payment. For this application, it 
was assumed that the sellers did not carry out the forgery. The Court of Appeal considered all 
the English cases discussed above and came to the conclusion that there was no definite 
authority on “a nullity exception”.16 This was a rather surprising move, considering that the 
English Court of Appeal in Montrod was quite explicit in rejecting the argument that null 
documents provide a ground to refuse payment. The Singaporean Court of Appeal explained 
that Montrod was different from the facts in Beam Technology because the certificate of 
inspection required in Montrod was not “an essential document but one touching on the 
question as to the quality of the goods sold.” 17 Persuaded by the views of the Court of Appeal 
in United City Merchants, Singaporean Court of Appeal held that the confirming bank was 
not obliged to pay if the air waybill is null.
“While the underlying principle is that the negotiating/confirming bank need not 
investigate the documents tendered, it is altogether a different proposition to say 
that the bank should ignore what is clearly a null and void document and proceed 
nevertheless to pay. Implicit in the requirement of a conforming document is the 
assumption that the document is true and genuine although under the UCP 500 and 
common law, and in the interest of international trade, the bank is not required to 
look beyond what appears on the surface of the documents. But to say that a bank, 
in the face of a forged null and void document (even though the beneficiary is not 
privy to that forgery), must still pay on the credit, defies reason and good sense. It 
amounts to saying that the scheme of things under the UCP 500 is only concerned 
with commas and full stops or some misdescriptions, and that the question as to 
the genuineness or otherwise of a material document, which was the cause for the 
issue of the LC, is of no consequence.”18
This argument is supported by Professor Goode‘s writings where he wrote that, “A 
fraudulently completed bill of lading does not become a conforming document merely 
because the fraud is that of a third party.”
Further, Chao JA, went on to say that, “It is our opinion that the negotiating/confirming 
bank is not obliged to pay if it has established within the seven-day period that a material 
                                               
16 Ibid, 609.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
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document required under the credit is forged and null and void and notice of it is given within 
that period.”19 Following Article 14(b) UCP 600, the maximum time period for determining 
compliance of a document is no longer seven days, but is now five days. It should be 
highlighted that that, as with all the other grounds which allows refusal of payment,  the time 
period is of utmost importance as it will determine the success of any claims. However, it is 
submitted here that this five day period should not be the critical time period. The relevant 
time period should be anytime before payment. If it is established to the bank anytime prior to 
payment that the documents are null, the bank should not be obliged to make payment. The 
arguments in favour of not paying against a null document remain with equal force even if the
fact that the document is null is established to the bank after the five day time period (but 
before the time of payment). If however, this fact is only established to the knowledge of the 
bank after the time of payment, the bank should be entitled to reimbursement for the payment 
made.  
4.3 Documentary nullity - not an exception to the autonomy principle
Commentators who have written on this subject discussed a nullity exception to the autonomy 
principle by reference to the cases analysed so far.20 This is understandable since the term 
“nullity exception” was frequently referred to in the judgment of most of these cases, 
including the leading case Beam Technology. However, it is submitted here that conceptually, 
refusing payment on the grounds of documentary nullity does not constitute an exception to 
the autonomy principle. A null document provides a ground to refuse payment because, as 
referred to by Ackner LJ in Court of Appeal in United City, it is a “waste paper”21, it is invalid 
and would mean that a beneficiary have failed to submit one of the documents required by the 
credit terms.  
    Chao JA in Beam Technology, Ackner and Griffiths L.JJ. in the Court of Appeal in United 
City considered the issue of refusing payment in relation to null documents from the 
perspective of their conformity with the credit. It has already been argued in the previous 
chapter that payment should be refused where forged documents are presented by innocent 
beneficiaries on the basis of non-conformity. However, in relation to null documents, the 
                                               
19 Ibid, 610.
20 K Donnelly (n 11); Chin and Wong, “Autonomy- A nullity Exception at Last?” [2004] LMCLQ 14; Dora Neo, 
“A Nullity Exception”  [2004] Sing. J.L.S 46.
21 [1982] Q.B. 208, 246.
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arguments are even stronger. The argument is best encapsulated by the obiter comment of 
Rajendran J in Mees Pierson: 
“… if the document tendered by the seller is a nullity, that document would have 
no legal effect. There would therefore be a failure by the seller to tender a
document (in this case the Health Certificate) called for under the credit. That 
being so, the tender would be an incomplete tender.” 22
This, the writer submits is the correct analysis. Hence, as with any case of incomplete tender, 
refusing payment on the basis of a null document does not infringe the sacrosanct principle of 
autonomy. Payment is refused because the tendered documents do not comply with the 
conditions of the credit.
4.4 Documentary nullity as a ground of withholding payment: the rationale
4.4.1 Non-compliance
The discussion so far shows that, in essence, refusing payment on grounds of documentary 
nullity is based on the idea that null documents are not conforming documents, drawing no 
distinction between actual compliance and apparent compliance. This distinction is only 
drawn in terms of the bank’s duties to examine the documents. Banks are only obliged to 
check for apparent compliance because it is to the benefit of all parties involved in 
international trading that banks are able to deal with the documents as quickly as possible.  
However, if a bank has knowledge of a null document but the law forces a bank to pay against 
this document presented by an innocent beneficiary merely because the document conforms 
on the face of it, Professor Goode argues that this “has the effect of extending to beneficiaries 
the benefit of a rule designed exclusively to safeguard the banks.”23
    D Neo also raises another related but different argument - since a bank is to make payment 
to the beneficiary upon presentation of conforming documents, if a bank pays against 
documents which it knows are not genuine, it breaches its mandate and is exposed to the risk 
                                               
22 [2000] 4 SLR 393, [42].
23 R Goode, Commercial Law (3rd edn, LexisNexis, London, 2004) 996. 
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of not being able to claim reimbursement.24 If it does not pay, it could be sued by the 
beneficiary, with the consequence of risking its reputation with other customers. Hence, it is 
only logical that null documents be recognised as a ground for refusing payment, so as to 
relieve the banks of this dilemma. Additionally, it can be argued that if payment is to be made 
against documents which are not genuine, this is an unreasonable result which is not one 
which could have been intended by the parties to the contract.25 If specific documents are 
required by the terms of the credit, it must be an implied term of the contract that payment 
should only be made against presentation of genuine documents.
4.4.2 A beneficiary does not share the status of a holder in due course
Although in United Trading, Lord Diplock did not have to decide whether documentary 
nullity could be a defence to payment, he gave the following explanation as to why it is more 
likely that he would not have supported this proposition: 
I would not wish to be taken as accepting that the premiss as to forged documents 
is correct, even where the fact that the document is forged deprives it of all legal 
effect and makes it a nullity, and so worthless to the confirming bank as security 
for its advances to the buyer. This is certainly not so under the Uniform 
Commercial Code as against a person who has taken a draft drawn under the credit 
in circumstances that would make him a holder in due course, and I see no reason 
why, and there is nothing in the Uniform Commercial Code to suggest that, a 
seller/beneficiary who is ignorant of the forgery should be in any worse position 
because he has not negotiated the draft before presentation.26
Subsequently, these reasons were also cited by Potter LJ in Montrod in rejecting the nullity 
argument advanced by the applicant in the case.
Professor Goode took the opposite view, arguing that “[I]t is trite law… that a holder in 
due course is in a favoured position and is insulated from defences not available even to other 
holders of the bill, let alone a seller whose documents and draft have been rejected”27. In 
another article, he affirmed that, “The beneficiary under a credit is not like a holder in due 
                                               
24 Dora Neo, “A Nullity Exception”  [2004] Sing. J.L.S 46, 64.
25 Ibid, 65.
26 [1983] 1 A.C. 168, 187.
27 R Goode ( n 23) 996. 
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course of a bill of exchange; he is only entitled to be paid if the documents are in order.”28 In
Lambias, Goh JC explained that a beneficiary who has not negotiated a draft should not be 
treated as being in the same position as a bona fide holder in due course because “…as a party 
to the underlying contract, he has an additional recourse against the buyer which is not open 
to a holder in due course.”29  
Although both Lord Diplock and R Jack submit that the beneficiary should not be in a 
worse position than the holder in due course, both do not support this submission with any 
reasons. On the contrary, Professor Goode and Goh JC both offer convincing reasons, which 
are based on the mechanics of the letter of credit in practice. The writer is not able to think of 
any reason why the beneficiary should be afforded the same status as a holder in due course.  
It is submitted here that Lord Diplock’s statement in United Trading should not be taken as 
good authority. 
4.4.3 Protection of Banks
One advantage of recognising nullity as a defence to payment is the protection of the financial 
position of banks.  The position of banks may be affected by null documents, as recognised by 
Ackner LJ in the Court of Appeal in United City Merchants:    
“A banker …ought not to be under an obligation to accept or pay against 
documents which he knows to be waste paper. To hold otherwise would be to 
deprive the banker of that security for his advances, which is a cardinal feature of 
the process of financing carried out by means of the credit”30: 
Griffiths LJ expressed the same concern: “The bank takes the documents as its security for
payment. It is not obliged to take worthless documents.”31
On the contrary, Dolan commented that “It may be misleading to suggest that bank issuers 
are always concerned about their security interest in the goods. It is probably fair to say that 
                                               
28 R Goode, "Reflections on Letters of Credit - I" [1980] JBL 291, 294.
29[1993] 2 SLR 751, 763.
30 [1982] Q.B. 208, 246.
31 Ibid, 254.
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they do mind having the security interest but are more concerned about the applicant’s ability 
to reimburse the issuer when it pays the beneficiary.”32 K Donnelly also wrote that banks 
usually have a lien on the applicant's bank account or other additional security from the 
applicant.33 The writer disagrees with these arguments because a lot of times additional 
security is not asked from the applicant, and even if it is required the additional security does 
not usually cover the total amount of the applicant’s liability. Further, very often applicants 
would resist reimbursing banks where it is known that the documents are null, as in Montrod
and Beam Technology. Hence, the documents still represent important security to bank.  This 
issue of documentary security will be returned to later as it plays a vital role in the 
determination what constitutes a null document.
4.4.4 Fraud Prevention
For a long time, the problem of fraud in letters of credit transaction has been highlighted by 
many. 
"There are many means that are available to criminal syndicates to launder their 
illegal gains. Letters of credit transactions, in my view, are an ideal vehicle for 
laundering illicit funds and have so far attracted little attention from the regulatory 
authorities. While in every other service provided by banks, under the anti-money 
laundering statutes, bankers are required by the law to comply with 'know your 
customer' regulations, bankers in documentary credits department remain 
consistent with the documentary and independent principle."'34
If payment could not be refused on the basis of null documents, fraudsters will be encouraged 
to continue with their illegal activities, at the expense of other innocent parties. At worst, the 
beneficiary could be an accomplice of such fraudsters, but because of the high standard of 
proof of fraud in applying the fraud exception, and the evidential difficulties of proving a 
beneficiary’s involvement, the beneficiary will still be regarded as an innocent party by the 
courts. In the grand scheme of things, controlling the problem of fraud in international trading 
                                               
32 JF Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit. Commercial and Standby Credits (Revised ed Warren Gorham & 
Lamont Inc, Boston 1996) 8-23.
33 K Donnelly (n 11) 337.
34 Anonymous Author, "Money laundering and documentary credit transactions" (2002) 5 JMLC 192, 217 cited 
in Ademun-Odeke, “Double Invoicing in International Trade; The Fraud and Nullity exceptions in Letters of 
Credit – Are the America Accord and the UCP 500 Crooks Charters?” (2006) 18 Denning L.J. 115, 120. 
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should be given the most priority. It is important to control the extent and severity of these 
fraudulent activities so that parties do not lose confidence on the system and the use of letters 
of credit does not decline. If banks are not allowed to withhold payment when they have 
knowledge that a document is null, the autonomy principle may inadvertently be providing 
opportunities for fraudsters to manipulate the system. Even though null documents are not 
necessarily forged, there are opportunities for fraudsters to manipulate other innocent parties 
to create documents which are null.  
4.4.5 Fairness 
Ultimately, there is a question to be answered as to whether it is fairer for the bank/applicant 
or the beneficiary to bear the risk.  From a lay person’s point of view, it may appear unfair if a 
beneficiary seller who has actually delivered the goods does not receive payment. However, 
there are strong reasons to support the argument that the beneficiary should be the one to bear 
the risk. Firstly, the operation of the documentary credit is based on the duties of the 
beneficiary to present documents which comply with the conditions of the credit. If he fails to 
do this, why should the law not hold him responsible by bearing the risk of non-payment? In 
the Court of Appeal in United City Merchants, Stephenson LJ expressed this view: 
“Banks trust beneficiaries to present honest documents; if beneficiaries go to 
others (as they have to) for the documents they present, it is important to all 
concerned that those documents should accord, not merely with the requirements 
of the credit but with the facts; and if they do not because of the intention of 
anyone concerned with them to deceive, I see good reason for the choice between 
two innocent parties putting the loss upon the beneficiary, not the bank or its 
customer.”35  
It really is unfair for the law to impose an obligation on a bank to pay, in the words of
Rajendran J, “on terms less favourable to the bank than that envisaged under the credit 
arrangement”36 merely because a beneficiary fails to perform his duty of submitting the right 
documents. Secondly, one has to go back to the point already mentioned about fraud 
prevention. If the law says that beneficiaries are to bear the risk in the event of presentation of 
null documents, beneficiaries will be more vigilant in verifying the authenticity of the 
                                               
35 [1982] Q.B. 208, 234. 
36 Mees Pierson NV v Bay Pacific (S) Pte Ltd [2000] 4 SLR 393, [40]. 
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documents they tender.37 In fact, amongst the many parties involved in a documentary credit 
transaction, there is no other party more apt to ensure the genuineness of the documents prior 
to presentation.
4.5 Meaning of Nullity
In Montrod, one of the criticisms Potter LJ directed towards a nullity exception was that it is a 
concept which is not “susceptible of precision”38. Potter LJ was right to question this, because 
the issue of what constitutes nullity is in need of clarification. It is submitted that, despite it 
being a difficult concept, it is inherently more technical and more objective than the concept 
of unconscionability.39 Some guidance can be obtained from Stephenson LJ’s judgment in 
United City Merchants:
“A document may tell a lie about itself, e.g., about the person who made it, or 
the time or place of making. If it tells a lie about the maker, it is a forgery; if it 
tells a lie about the time or place of making "where either is material," it is a 
forgery: Forgery Act 1913, section 1 (2). In the former case it may be a nullity, 
in the latter not40.Or the document may tell a lie about its contents. Then it is no 
forgery, but the maker or utterer of it may commit a criminal offence of some 
kind of fraud. Or a document may be untrue in the sense of inaccurate by 
mistake and without any intention to deceive by its maker or anyone who puts it 
forward.”41
This statement shows that forgery, nullity and fraud are capable of conceptual distinction but 
may sometimes overlap e.g a document with a forged signature is both a forgery and a nullity. 
Using Stephenson LJ’s judgment to form the basis of his analysis, Professor Bridge illustrates 
the difference between forgery and nullity by referring to a falsely dated bill of lading, which 
would be a forgery but not a nullity and a bill of lading representing a phantom cargo, which 
                                               
37 K Donnelly (n 11) 339.
38 [2002] 3 All ER 697, 713.
39 See Chapter  6.
40 Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders and Shippers Ltd.[1954] 2 Q.B. 459 , 476; Gian Singh & Co. Ltd. v. 
Banque de l'Indochine[1974] 1 W.L.R. 1234 , 1238-1239.
41 [1982] Q.B. 208, 231.
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would be a nullity but not a forgery?42 He argues in relation to a falsely dated bill of 
lading,e.g., one which is dated 31st July when in fact the goods were shipped on 1st August, 
that it is still a stipulated document since it bears the required date provided by the credit;43
whereas for the bill of lading representing a phantom cargo, he argues that it cannot be a 
stipulated document, citing Hindley & Co Ltd v East Indian Produce Co Ltd44, where Kerr J 
stated that bills of lading representing goods which had not been shipped at all is of an a 
fortiori nature in comparison to other documentary misstatements.45 Firstly, the writer 
disagrees with Professor Bridges’s view that a bill of lading representing a phantom cargo is a 
nullity but not a forgery. It is difficult to imagine how a bill of lading which represents a 
phantom cargo can exist without forgery being involved. Secondly, these examples, despite 
being helpful, do not really provide a principled distinction as to how to determine 
documentary nullity. How then does one determine nullity outside the obvious case of a bill 
of lading indicating a phantom shipment?
One alternative is to adopt the ordinary meaning of null documents - documents which are 
invalid or without legal force. This approach is attractive and, in the writer’s view, should be 
the starting point in determining whether a document is null.  In Beam Technology, Chao JA 
interpreted the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Montrod as having decided that the certificate 
issued by the seller in Montrod in honest belief that he had authority could not be a nullity.46
With due respect, the Court of Appeal in Montrod held that there was no nullity exception but 
did not make the finding that the document in question was not null. Moreover, most lawyers 
would regard a document which is signed by someone who does not have authority as without 
legal force. One should also note that Potter LJ stated the following in Montrod:
“While he [referring to Lord Diplock in United City Merchants] left open the 
position in relation to a forged document where the effect of the forgery was to 
render the document a 'nullity', there is nothing to suggest that he would have 
recognised any nullity exception as extending to a document which was not forged 
                                               
42 M Bridge, “Documents and contractual congruence in international trade” in S Worthington (ed), Commercial 
Law and Commercial Practice (Hart Publishing, London 2003) 234.
43 Ibid.  
44 [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 515.
45 M Bridge (n 42) 234.
46 2003 1 SLR 597, [31].
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(ie fraudulently produced) but was signed by the creator in honest error as to his 
authority; nor do I consider that such an exception should be recognised.” 47
This statement indicates that he regarded forgery as a prerequisite to refusing payment on the 
grounds of nullity. But a document may be devoid of legal effect if it was created by an 
innocent party who creates a document with the honest belief that he had the authority to do 
so, when in fact he does not. The decision only goes to show that judges do not consistently 
adhere to the ordinary meaning of nullity. The writer agrees with the views of other 
commentators that it should not matter whether the null document is caused by forgery or 
not.48 This is consistent with the writer’s argument that null documents are to be rejected 
because they are an incomplete tender - whether caused by forgery or not, the tender is still 
incomplete.
However, even with the “ordinary meaning” approach, no clear dividing line can to be 
drawn and further guidance is needed to determine whether a document has legal force or not.
One commentator also suggested that the extent and nature of falsity in a document should be 
considered in deciding whether a document has no legal effect.49 This point is perhaps best 
demonstrated by Lambias (Importers and Exporters) Co PTE Ltd v Hong Kong & Shanghai 
Banking Corpn50, where Goh JC took into account the following considerations in concluding 
that the quality and weight inspection certificate was a nullity:
“First, it was issued by the beneficiary instead of the applicant as required by the 
letter of credit. Secondly, it failed to state the necessary particulars to relate it to 
the goods which were the subject of the letter of credit. Thirdly, it failed to contain 
the necessary statement as to the quality or weight of the goods ostensibly
inspected, and most important of all, it had been counter-signed by an imposter 
and not by Yau Tin Sang. All these elements taken together make the QWI 
certificate a nullity ab initio.”51[emphasis added]
    In Beam Technology, Chao JA stated that the certificate in Montrod was not a nullity on the 
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49 Ibid.
50 [1993] 2 SLR 751.
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grounds that it was not an essential document (the learned judge also uses the phrase “material 
document”).52 This introduces an entirely new approach to the meaning of nullity, one which 
is not consistent with the approach of Lord Diplock in United City Merchants where he 
treated a bill of lading with the wrong date of loading as not a nullity - no document can be 
more essential and material than the bill of lading in a documentary credit transaction. D Neo 
suggests that a stricter interpretation of essential/material document has the attraction of 
reducing the application of a nullity defence to payment, hence preserving the autonomy 
principle as much as possible. However, it is submitted that the “essential document” 
approach should be rejected. The main reason for this is the same point made in the previous 
paragraph - a tender is incomplete if any of the presented document (whether an essential 
document or not) is without legal effect. In the normal operation of documentary credits, the 
absence of any document, regardless of its importance will allow the bank to refuse 
payment.53 Moreover, it may not be easy to draw a distinction between an essential document 
and a non-essential document in such transactions. 
One possible approach to determine whether a document is null is to assess whether the 
bank’s security is affected by the document in question. In Montrod, Potter LJ described a 
null document as “a document which is worthless in the sense that it is not genuine and has no 
commercial value, whether as a security for the goods or otherwise”.54 The question then 
arises as to how one evaluates whether the bank’s security is affected? Once again, reference 
should be made to Lord Diplock’s statement in United City Merchants, where he stated the 
following in relation to material misstatements:
“… the answer to the question: "to what must the misstatement in the documents 
be material?" should be: "material to the price which the goods to which the 
documents relate would fetch on sale if, failing reimbursement by the buyer, the   
bank should be driven to realise its security."55   
In United City Merchants, a distinction was drawn between a document which is a nullity and 
that which contained material misstatements. This distinction is correct since not all material 
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53 D Neo (n 24) 72.
54 [2002] 3 All ER 697, 709.
55 [1983] 1 A.C 168, 186.
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misstatements in a document make it a nullity. However, null documents will often contain 
material misstatements. Hence, the above statement would surely provide some guidance in 
the determination of whether a document is null but should not be treated as conclusive. As 
was pointed out in Mees Pierson, documents may be null without affecting the security of the 
bank. Rajendran J treated the Health Certificate in Mees Pierson as null despite stating that 
“such a certificate is not a document of title and it cannot be so readily concluded that a 
forged Health Certificate would affect the bank's security interest”.56
The circumstances where the issue of null documents may arise is really wider than one 
would normally expect. For example, in Beam Technology, the Singaporean Court of Appeal 
was confronted with an air waybill issued by Link Express (S) Pte Ltd, a non-existing freight 
forwarder but one which the buyer had specifically notified the seller to use. The Singapore 
Court of Appeal did not decide whether the document was null, stating that “the questions 
whether the air waybill constituted forgery and is null and void and whether it amounted to 
non-compliance with the credit terms, warrant, in the circumstances of the present case, 
further exploration.” 57  D Neo took this view:
“If the document that is presented is exactly what is required under the credit, it 
is arguable that the beneficiary is entitled to payment even if this document is a 
nullity and without legal effect. In other words, if what is stipulated under the 
credit can be none other than a null document (for instance because the company 
that is supposed to issue the document does not exist), there should be no 
exception to the autonomy principle.”58
It is contended that this argument should be rejected. In accordance with the ordinary meaning 
of “null”, a document which has been issued by a non-existent entity is likely to be null. Many 
of the arguments advanced in favour of a nullity defence to payment also apply with equal 
force to such a document. Nevertheless, in these circumstances, it is likely that there is 
forgery. How can a document be produced by a company which does not exist except for 
someone forging the document?  In such circumstances, if the fraud exception is extended to
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third party fraud59, payment may also be refused under the fraud exception although proving 
fraud may be a difficulty.  
The discussion in this section shows that different courts have so far adopted different 
analyses of what constitutes a null document and that commentators may not always take the 
same view on this issue. However, the writer agrees with the following words of Chao JA in 
Beam Technology:
“While we recognise that there could be difficulties in determining under what 
circumstances a document would be considered material or a nullity, such a 
question can only be answered on the facts of each case. One cannot generalise. It 
is not possible to define when is a document a nullity. But it is really not that much 
more difficult to answer such questions than to determine what is reasonable, an 
exercise which the courts are all too familiar with.”60
4.6 Conclusion
The cases discussed show that at present English law does not recognise documentary nullity 
as a defence to payment. This chapter has shown that there are strong arguments, based on 
theoretical and practical justifications, for recognising the presentation of null documents as a 
ground for withholding payment. It has been argued that a null document does not actually 
comply with the terms and conditions of a credit. It follows from this that refusing payment 
on the grounds of null documents is not a breach of the principle of autonomy, a principle 
governing the operation of the documentary credit which is regarded to be of utmost 
importance in ensuring certainty of payment of the instrument. Even if one takes the view that 
refusing payment on the grounds of null documents constitutes an exception to the autonomy 
principle, it should be recognised that it is necessary to maintain a balance in the enforcement 
of the autonomy principle. The principle of autonomy should be preserved but it should not be 
enforced to the extent of ignoring notions of justice and leaving a detrimental effect on the 
relevant parties involved in international trading. 
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This chapter has demonstrated that the main difficulty in recognising null documents as a 
ground to refuse payment is the determination of what constitutes a null document.  Since
nullity is a concept where it is difficult to formulate clear-cut principles, this presents an 
element of ambiguity, a drawback which is a small price to pay in view of the improvements 
it would bring to the documentary credit system. When the next opportunity presents itself, it 
is urged that English courts follow the bold move of Singaporean courts in recognising 
documentary nullity as a ground for refusing payment under a documentary credit. English 
courts should not be concerned that such a development would affect the smooth functioning 
of the documentary credit since, if a nullity defence is rejected, the lack of trust in the 
documentary credit system may continue and affect its future. Moreover, English courts have 
the ability to delineate the boundaries of a nullity defence to payment. Over time, when 
documentary nullity is well established as a ground to refuse payment, clearer guidance and 
principles will emerge.
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CHAPTER 5
ILLEGALITY
5.1 Introduction
At common law, it is a well-established principle that contracts which are illegal or contrary to 
public policy are unenforceable.1 The two maxims forming the basis of the courts’ refusal to 
enforce such contracts are ex turpi causa non oritur actio (no court will lend its aid to a man who 
founds his action upon an inmoral or an illegal act) and in pari delicto, potior est conditio
defendentis (where both parties are equally wrongful the position of the defendant is the 
stronger). However, this branch of the law is not straightforward and until today, remains as 
complex as ever. This chapter aims to investigate one aspect of the subject - the position of the 
law when a documentary credit is tainted by illegality in the contract which it supports.
This chapter will begin by demonstrating that there are two ways illegality may arise in a 
documentary credit transaction; illegality in the credit or illegality in the underlying contract. The 
chapter will deal with the former briefly but its main focus is to investigate whether the latter is 
or should constitute an exception to the autonomy principle so that payment could be refused. 
This will be followed by an examination of the relevant judicial decisions on this matter. It will 
be argued that illegality should be established as ground for refusing payment, separate and 
distinct from fraud. In order for an illegality exception to be workable and of benefit the 
international trading community, it is necessary to confine the parameters of this exception. It 
will be contended that there are a few requirements which should be fulfilled in order for 
illegality to be successfully applied as an exception to the autonomy principle. 
Because of the international nature of the documentary credit, the issue of applicable law will 
inevitably arise alongside a consideration of whether the illegality can be successfully invoked as 
a ground to withhold payment. At the end of the chapter, the writer investigates which country’s 
                                                
1 There is much debate as to whether an illegal contract is void or unenforceable. See  N Enonchong, Illegal 
Transactions ( Lloyd’s of London Press, London 1998) 29-31.
154
law is material for determining whether a contract is illegal.   On this matter, the state of the law 
is complex but an attempt will be made to suggest a viable principle which is both simple and 
consistent with the approach of English cases. 
5.2 What constitutes illegality?
A chapter on illegality would be incomplete without a discussion of what constitutes illegality but 
the inherent nature of the concept of illegality makes this task an extremely difficult one. In fact, 
this branch of the law is in such a confusing state that the law reform bodies of several 
Commonwealth jurisdictions such as England, New Zealand, Australia, Canada and British 
Columbia have conducted extensive reviews in the hope of systematically reforming the law 
relating to illegal transactions. It is also apparent that in discussing illegal transactions, different 
law reform bodies and writers of leading textbooks differ widely in their approach and scope. 
Although illegality can have an effect on trusts, this study is confined to those circumstances 
which may affect the legal enforcement of contracts.
At common law, it is generally agreed that that the law adopts a wide view as to what amounts 
to an illegal contract.2 It is not within the scope of this study to provide a detailed analysis of the 
relevant case law and the factual circumstances in which the courts have treated a transaction as 
illegal.3 However, it should be mentioned here that contracts may become illegal in a number of 
ways, involving either the commission of a crime or civil wrong, or a broad range of conduct 
which is regarded as contrary to public policy.4  Where the illegal element in the transaction 
involves the commission of a crime or civil wrong the illegality may be based upon the 
contravention of a statute or the common law. In such cases the contract is illegal in the strict 
sense that the contract is prohibited by positive law or the performance of the contract inevitably 
                                                
2 J. Beatson, Anson Anson's Law of Contract (28th ed OUP, Oxford 2002) 348;  G. H. Treitel and E. Peel, Treitel on 
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the mere breach of the transaction in question) or conduct which is otherwise contrary to public policy” – see The  
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involves the doing of an act forbidden by the law. By contrast, in cases where the contract is 
alleged to be contrary to public policy, the performance of the contract involves conduct of which 
the law disapproves as being against public policy, even though that conduct is not strictly 
unlawful. The terms “illegality” or “illegal” is used in this chapter in a broad sense, 
encompassing all of these situations.
It is fair to say that it is public policy which has primarily contributed to making this area of the law so 
notoriously complex. The difficulty with public policy is that it offers very little certainty since the 
range of transactions contravening public policy which will be treated as “illegal” is potentially 
very wide. Burroughs J once described public policy as “a very unruly horse, and when once you 
get astride it you never know where it will carry you”.5 Also, the social, moral and economic 
values of a society can differ in different places and can change over time, thereby rendering it a 
concept which is constantly evolving. 
“Rules which rest on the foundation of public policy, not being rules which belong to 
the fixed customary law, are capable, on proper occasion, of expansion or 
modification. Circumstances may change and make a commercial practice expedient 
which formerly was mischievous to commerce.”6
In the writer’s opinion, a descriptive definition of illegal contracts does not at all shed light on 
this matter. Since transactions which may be illegal are very wide ranging, it is submitted that 
with regard to the issue of what constitutes illegality, it is important to maintain some flexibility 
and not set hard and fast rules. Nevertheless, it is contended in this chapter that the doctrine of 
public policy can be applied in a way which provides a measure of legal certainty.  It follows 
from this that, in the context of letters of credit, it is possible to shape the parameters of an 
illegality exception so that it promotes predictability.  As Lord Denning M.R. said, “With a good 
man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control. It can jump over obstacles. It can leap 
the fences put up by fictions and come down on the side of justice.”7.
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Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 229 at 252; 130 ER 294, 303.
6
Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co v Nordenfelt [1893] 1 Ch. 630, 661, per Bowen LJ.
7
Enderby Town Football Club Ltd v. The Football Association Ltd [1971] Ch 591, 606.
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5.3 Two categories of illegality in documentary credit transactions
As explained in Chapter 1, a documentary credit transaction typically involves a number of
contracts. 8 Essentially, a distinction is made between the following two categories in accordance 
with the locus of the illegal element. Although other contracts are involved, the diagram shows 
only three contracts, because typically the illegal element is likely to exist in any of these three 
contracts.
                         
5.3.1 Illegality in the documentary credit itself
There many ways in which a letter of credit may be illegal. First, the issuing of the credit may be 
illegal. The issuing bank may have breached lending limits when issuing the credit. At times of 
war or diplomatic crisis, a government might put a ban on banks to prevent them from issuing 
letters of credit in favour of nationals of certain countries. If an issuing bank does not comply 
with national law in issuing the letter of credit, then the issuance of the letter of credit is illegal. 
Second, a situation may also arise where, although the issuance of the letter of credit does not 
violate the law, by the time of payment, the circumstances had changed, rendering payment to the 
beneficiary to be illegal under the applicable law. 9 This could be due to the government placing a 
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prohibition on the issuing bank from making payment to beneficiaries of some payment 
instruments. For example, after Iranian militants took over the American embassy on Nov 4, 
1979, the American government imposed harsh economic sanctions against Iran, freezing 
approximately $12 billion of Iranian assets. Payment to Iran was prohibited and issuing banks 
were ordered to pay into blocked accounts.   
In both of the above circumstances, the effect of the illegality is straightforward. Since the 
illegality affects the credit itself (contract B or C), performance of the credit contract cannot be 
enforced. This is nothing new but a mere application of the existing principle at common law that 
a legal right can be denied on grounds of illegality. No question arises as to whether an exception 
should be made to the autonomy principle.
5.3.2 Illegality in the underlying transaction
This refers to cases where the underlying contract (contract A) perpetrates an illegal scheme or 
contravenes public policy. Here, the documentary credit is not intrinsically illegal. Rather, the 
credit, because of its connection with a transaction having an illegal purpose, is infected by that 
purpose. In such circumstances, there are good reasons to not pay the beneficiary but the 
autonomy principle will protect the beneficiary. As discussed in Chapter 1, the autonomy 
principle posits that any defence or claims under the underlying contract will have no effect on 
the paying bank’s obligation to pay. This means that if no exception is made, the beneficiary will 
be paid under the terms of the credit regardless of the illegality in the underlying contract. 
The question therefore arises as to whether illegality in the underlying transaction should be 
recognised as an exception to the principle of autonomy so that payment under the credit can be 
refused. The ensuing discussion in this chapter will concern circumstances of this type. There has 
been some recognition of illegality as an exception to the autonomy principle in a few 
jurisdictions, but existing cases on this point are very limited.
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5.4 Illegality as an exception to the autonomy principle
5.4.1 English law
In England, the courts have for a long time refused to enforce a collateral contract which was 
itself legal, but which is founded upon another illegal contract.10 Similarly, there is some judicial 
indication that a documentary credit which is founded upon an illegal contract may be 
unenforceable. One of the earliest cases dealing with documentary credits which were affected by 
illegality is United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada11, a case already discussed in 
Chapter 3. As the analysis of the case unfolds, it will seen that it is debatable as to whether it is 
good authority for the proposition that illegality is an exception to the autonomy principle.  
In this case, an English company selling manufacturing equipment to a Peruvian company
agreed to invoice the buyer at double the actual sale price and to remit within 10 days one half of 
the amount drawn under the letter of credit  for each of the three instalments to the buyer’s dollar 
account in Miami, Florida. This enabled the buyer to exchange Peruvian currency for the excess 
amount in breach of Peruvian exchange control regulations. The seller sued the confirming bank 
when it refused to pay upon presentation of documents. Two issues arose in this case, one was a 
defence based upon fraud, and the other was the effect of the illegality on the enforceability of 
the letter of credit. At first instance, Mocatta J held that the entire agreement between the buyer 
and the seller was a “monetary transaction in disguise” and was therefore unenforceable under 
the Bretton Woods Agreements Order in Council 1946 which gave the force of law in England to 
Article VIII section 2 (b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement. On appeal, the Court of Appeal had 
to consider whether the letter of credit was an exchange contract because it was the contract that 
was sued upon. Stephenson L.J held that, when considered in isolation, the letter of credit 
contract was not an exchange contract, but the Bretton Woods Agreements Order in Council, and 
public policy based on international comity, required the courts to consider all the circumstances 
of the contract embodied in the letter of credit:
“But it [the letter of credit] has come into existence to pay the dollars required by the 
                                                
10 Fisher v Bridges (1854) 3 El. & Bl. 642; Geere v Charles Mare (1863) 2 H & C 339; Bigos v Bousted [1951] 1 All 
E.R. 92; Spector v Ageda [1971] 3 WLR 498 and Mansouri v Singh [1986] 1WLR 1393.
11 [1983] 1 AC 168.
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underlying contract of sale. It is a necessary step on the way towards an ultimate 
exchange of United States dollars for Peruvian soles. It is part and parcel of a scheme 
to defeat the Peruvian exchange control regulations”12
Hence, the letter of credit was held to be a monetary transaction in disguise and was 
unenforceable, but the Court of Appeal was of the view that the claimants should be allowed to 
recover that part of the transaction which did not breach exchange control regulations. The 
House of Lords, although reversing the Court of Appeal’s decision on the fraud issue13, affirmed 
this part of the decision on the basis that there was no difficulty in identifying the monetary 
transaction that was concealed by the credit and the underlying contract of sale. In the House of 
Lords, Lord Diplock emphasised that an exchange contract which breached the exchange control 
regulations of a member state is not strictly illegal under English law but that the effect of 
breaching Peruvian exchange control regulations was the same as that of an illegal contract, 
which is that it is unenforceable by the courts.14
Although, following United City Merchants, payment under a credit is likely to be refused in 
cases where the underlying contract contravenes currency exchange regulations, the decision 
itself is not authority for the proposition that illegality in the underlying contract constitutes an 
exception to the autonomy principle. As explained in a later case, the letter of credit in United 
City Merchants was “part of the whole transaction so that the prohibition directly attacked the 
enforceability of the letter of credit”.15 Hence, both the underlying contract and the letter of 
credit were illegal, the result of which was that there was no need to infringe the autonomy 
principle to refuse payment in United City Merchants.16 Moreover, nowhere in the judgment 
contained an explicit recognition of an illegality exception to the autonomy principle. 
Another English case which hinted at a possibility of an illegality exception in English law is 
                                                
12 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1982] Q.B. 208, 220.
13 See Chapter 3. 
14[1983] 1 A.C. 168,189.
15 Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co. Ltd [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 345, 353 per Staughton LJ.
16 N Enonchong, “The Autonomy Principle of Letters of Credit: An Illegality Exception?” [2006] LMCLQ 404, 407.
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Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co. Ltd17. In this case the plaintiff was a reinsurer who
entered into numerous reinsurance contracts with the defendant, a company which underwrote 
original risks on behalf of a number of other companies and also arranged reinsurance for them. 
The plaintiff opened a letter of credit in favour of the defendant whereby the defendant had to 
present debit notes to draw on the credit. The plaintiff later applied for an injunction to prevent 
the defendant from presenting the debit notes for payment under credit, alleging, amongst other 
things, that the reinsurance contracts were illegal as it was prohibited by statute from carrying on 
insurance business in Great Britain. At first instance, the application was rejected. In the Court of 
Appeal, Staughton LJ stated this:
“… established fraud is not necessarily the only exception. It seems to me that there 
must be cases when illegality can affect a letter of credit… Turning to the present 
case, if the reinsurance contracts are illegal, and if the letters of credit are being used 
as a means of paying sums due under those contracts, and if all that is clearly 
established, would the Court restrain the bank from making payment or the 
beneficiary from demanding it? In my judgment the Court would do so.18
However, it was held by the Court of Appeal that s. 132(6) of the Financial Services Act 1986
provided that the effect of contravening s. 2 of the Insurance Companies Acts 1982 Act was to 
make a contract of insurance illegal, void and unenforceable on the part of the insurer only, but 
the insured could still enforce the contract against the insurer.19 Since performance of the contract 
of reinsurance by the reinsurer was not illegal, the appeal was dismissed.
In another English case, Mahonia Ltd v. West LB AG20, JP Morgan, Enron and Chase entered 
into swap transactions. Pursuant to these transations, Enron  agreed to pay JP Morgan the sum of 
approximately $356 million after six months, part of which ($165 million) was secured by a letter 
of credit issued by West LB in favour of Mahonia. Subsequently Enron filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection, an event of default under the credit and Mahonia then made a demand 
under the credit. West LB refused to make payment, claiming that the credit was tainted with 
illegality because a number of the swap transactions constituted a loan which should have been 
                                                
17 [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 345.
18Ibid, 362. 
19 Ibid, 364.
20 [2004] EWHC 1938.
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accounted for as such, and that the existence of the three limbs of the composite transaction and 
its nature as a loan should have been disclosed prior to its issue of the credit. It was alleged that 
this was a breach of US General Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) and the US 
Securities Exchange Act 1934. Initially, an application for summary judgment was made by 
Mahonia to strike out West LB’s defence regarding its refusal to honour the credit based on 
illegality, but the court dismissed the application, holding that there was a strong arguable case 
for West LB. 
When the case went to full trial, Cooke J held that the accounting of these transactions did not 
contravene US GAAP and US securities law. He also did not find any conspiracy between Enron, 
Mahonia and Chase to devise the transactions to enable Enron to account wrongfully, nor that 
there was an unlawful purpose behind the three swaps or the letter of credit. He also could not 
find evidence of misrepresentation to West as to the nature of the underlying transaction or the 
true purpose of the letter of credit. Therefore, the illegality defence was not available to the bank. 
Interestingly, despite the ruling, Cooke J went on to assert in the closing paragraphs of the 
decision that he was willing to recognise illegality as a ground for withholding payment in letters 
of credit:
“…If the L/C had played a part in an overall scheme of the magnitude alleged, to 
deliberately mislead by wrongful accounting, contrary to section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act 1934, and Chase and Mahonia had been complicit therein, public 
policy would, in my view have required the court not to lend its aid to the 
enforcement of the L/C … " 21
It is observed that whilst there is an indication of a willingness to accept illegality in the 
underlying contract as a ground to refuse payment, English courts have not used this ground to 
refuse payment in any of these cases. This shows that it is certainly not easy for payment to be 
refused if the illegal element exists in the underlying contract. Moreover, clearer judicial 
guidelines are needed since the scope of the illegality exception is still vague.
                                                
21 Ibid, [432].
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At this point, it is also appropriate to refer to the very recent high profile case, Stone Rolls Ltd 
v Moore Stephenson22. The case did not involve illegality as a ground to refuse payment under a 
letter of credit but should be noted because it demonstrates a strong willingness on the part of 
English judges to allow the doctrine of illegality to defeat legal claims. In this case, the sole 
director of Stone & Rolls Ltd, Mr Stojevic, had used the company to perform several letters of 
credit frauds against banks. One of the main victims, Komercni Bank SA obtained judgments 
against the company and Mr Stojevic for deceit, but the company could not pay and became 
insolvent. The liquidators of the company sued their auditors, alleging negligence for failing to 
detect and prevent the director’s fraudulent activities. The auditors applied to strike out the 
claim, relying upon the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio. Although the company and Mr 
Stojevic are separate legal entities, the House of Lords, by a 3:2 majority, upheld the Court of 
Appeal’s decision that the case be struck out. They made the finding that Stone & Rolls Ltd was 
not merely vicariously but also primarily liable for the director’s fraud. Because it was 
exclusively managed and owned by the director, awareness of the fraudulent activities was 
imputed to the company. This is a landmark case which illustrates the operation of the ex turpi 
causa defence in negligence claims against auditors. Nevertheless, the decision does not 
significantly broaden the illegality defence for auditors, since it is limited to circumstances 
involving fraud perpetrated in a “one man company”. 
5.4.2 America
The UCC is silent on this matter but some American courts have examined the effects of 
illegality on payment under a letter of credit. These cases primarily concerned preferential 
transfers or penalty clauses which violate common law.
5.4.2.1 Preferential transfers
In American Bank of Martin County v Leasing Service Corporation (In re Air Conditioning, Inc. 
of Stuart)23, the beneficiary of the letter of credit was a creditor who leased a computer system to 
the applicant, its debtor. Initially, to secure its performance under the lease, the debtor granted the 
                                                
22 [2009] 1 AC 1391.
23 845 F2d 293 (11th Cir 1988).
163
creditor a security interest in everything it owned. When the debtor defaulted on payment, the 
parties came to another arrangement whereby the debtor opened a $20,000 letter of credit at the 
American Bank in favour of the creditor. The debtor gave a promissory note with a security 
interest in a $20,000 certificate of deposit to the American Bank. However, only a month later, 
the debtor petitioned for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. The bankruptcy court found that the 
transfer of the certificate of deposit to the bank as collateral for the credit was “to or for the 
benefit” of the creditor (the beneficiary of the credit) and therefore constituted a voidable 
preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C.S. § 547(b).  Since the  certificate of deposit and the letter of 
credit both form a single contemporaneous transaction,  American Bank  effectively had a 
security interest in the certificate of deposit which was immune from preference attack under 
U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1982). Therefore, the bankruptcy court nullified the letter of credit and 
ordered American Bank to surrender the certificate of deposit to the trustee.
On subsequent appeals, both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the finding of 
a preference in favour of the creditor but decided that the letter of credit should not have been  
nullified. Instead, they ruled that Sec. 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code allowed the trustee to 
recover from the creditor the certificate of deposit. It expressly provides that a trustee can recover 
the value of the preferential transfer from "the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for 
whose benefit such transfer was made....".By utilising Sec.550(a)(1), the letter of credit was able 
to operate as normal, thereby upholding the independence principle and the sanctity of letters of 
credit as vital instruments of commerce whilst preventing the creditor from obtaining the 
preferential transfer of the debtor’s assets. 
Two important points arises from the examination of the above case. Firstly, what would be 
decided if a case with similar facts was heard in a jurisdiction which did not have the equivalent
of Sec. 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code? The law of restitution may be the solution to 
achieving the same outcome, whilst still maintaining the independence of the letter of credit.  
However, for similar reasons to those which make an illegal contract unenforceable, the maxim
in pari delicto, potior est conditio defendentis (where the parties are in equal fault, the 
defendant’s position is stronger) operates so that restitution of benefits conferred under illegal 
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contracts is generally denied. Some exceptions to this general rule apply24, but in the context of a 
letter of credit transaction, the exception which is of most relevance is a withdrawal from the 
illegal contract (the doctrine of locus poenitentiae). The applicant may be able to recover the 
money paid under the credit if he withdraws from underlying contract before the illegal contract 
is executed. This has been interpreted quite liberally in the past and it seems that restitution will 
be allowed so long as the illegal purpose had not yet been effected. In Tribe v Tribe, Nourse LJ 
stated that “In a property transfer case the exception applies if the illegal purpose has not been 
carried into effect in any way”.25 Following this, it is probably the case that in circumstances 
where a letter of credit has been used to effect a preferential transfer, an applicant would have to 
withdraw from the underlying contract before payment is made to the beneficiary. Once payment 
is made, a preferential transfer has been made, and the illegal purpose would have been carried 
out.26
Secondly, it is important to note that the letter of credit in this case had a collateral, pledged by
the debtor as security for the credit, and was found to constitute property of the  debtor’s estate.  
In this case, the Circuit Judge expressly stated that the letter of credit and its proceeds are not 
property of the estate.27 This means that in a factually similar case without a collateral, the court 
would not have been able to find a preferential transfer of the “property of the estate”, with the 
result that a creditor would be able to escape a preference attack in respect of a letter of credit 
which was issued during the preference period. This is an opportunity for a creditor to avoid 
bankruptcy laws since it is possible for a creditor to request the applicant that it does not provide 
a collateral in consideration for the issuance of the letter of credit. Although any bank would be 
hesitant to issue a credit without security, in practice letters of credit are often issued without 
security for the full amount for long term customers of the bank.  In such circumstances, an 
illegality exception to the autonomy principle would avoid the unfair result but whether 
American courts would be willing to create a new exception is in doubt. 
                                                
24 The exceptions are :a) Withdrawal from the illegal contract b) where the parties are not equally guilty c) where the 
claimant can establish his proprietary claim without relying on the illegal contract.
25 [1966] Ch 107, 121.
26 The same conclusion would be reached under the law of restitution in America - see Gerald T. McLaughlin, 
“Letters of Credit and Illegal Contracts: The Limits of the Independence Principle” (1989) 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1197, 
1227.
27 American Bank of Martin County (n 23), [18].
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5.4.2.2 Penalty Clauses
In New York Life Insurance Company v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Company28, the
applicant entered into a mortgage loan commitment with the plaintiff (the beneficiary) which 
required that $180,000 in cash be deposited with the plaintiff to satisfy a liquidated damages 
provision of the agreement. In lieu of the cash sum, the plaintiff agreed to accept an irrevocable 
letter of credit which the applicant opened in the plaintiff’s favour at the defendant bank. When 
the applicant failed to tender the cash sum before the commitment expired, the plaintiff presented 
the defendant with a draft on the credit but the defendant dishonoured the draft.  The beneficiary 
brought an action for wrongful dishonour and the defendant raised several defences, one of which 
was that the liquidated damages clause of the mortgage loan commitment between beneficiary
and the applicant was an unenforceable and illegal penalty. The Superior Court of Connecticut
granted an interlocutory summary judgment to the beneficiary as to the liability of the defendant 
bank for wrongful dishonour of the demand for payment, stating that even if the defence was 
proven, it would not excuse the defendant bank from its duty to honour the demand for payment. 
However, the beneficiary was only awarded nominal damages. On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut affirmed the summary judgment but reversed the award of damages, holding that the 
beneficiary was entitled to the whole amount of the dishonoured draft. Speziale, Associate Justice
ruled that only in rare situations of egregious fraud can the bank go behind confirming documents
and went on to assert the following:
“ …the question of whether this commitment’s liquidated damages clause was a 
penalty were claims relating to the mortgage loan commitment contract between 
TVC [the applicant] and New York Life which, as discussed previously, was entirely 
separate and independent from the letter of credit arrangement involving Hartford 
National and New York Life. In the present case, these allegations were not proper 
defenses to the issuer's obligation to honor the draft pursuant to the letter of credit.”29
                                                
28 173 Conn. 492 (1977).
29 Ibid, 502.
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Similarly in Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Marquette National Bank30, the plaintiff
made a loan to the applicant, whereby they agreed on a loan commitment agreement. The 
applicant opened a standby letter of credit in favour of the plaintiff at the defendant bank, which 
is to serve as the loan commitment standby fee as required by the loan commitment agreement. 
Subsequently, the applicant failed to take out the loan and the plaintiff presented a draft for 
payment. The defendant bank refused to honour the draft, arguing that the commitment standby 
fee as required by the underlying contract was an illegal penalty provision.  The plaintiff filed a 
motion for summary judgment and the District Court of Minnesota granted summary judgment in 
favour of the plaintiff. Donald D.Alsop J upheld the autonomy principle, emphasising that "the 
contract of McGlynn-Garmaker Company [the applicant] with plaintiff is independent of the 
obligations of defendant as issuer of the letter of credit and that the alleged illegality of the 
commitment standby fee is not a defense which may be asserted by defendant in this action.”31
It appears from these cases that, in America, illegality in the underlying contract will not have 
any effect on payment under a letter of credit. If the two cases discussed in this section were
heard in England, it is highly likely that English judges would reach the same decision, especially 
since penalty clauses are unenforceable under English law only due to the intervention of equity, 
not on the basis of the maxim ex turpi causa.
5.4.3 Canada
Although Canadian courts have never directly considered the issue of an illegality exception, the 
conventional position seems to be that illegality in the underlying contract will not allow the 
withdrawal of payment. Mr. Justice Riddell’s following explanation of fraud in Washburn v. 
Wright32, which specifically differentiated fraud from illegality, is well cited in Canadian cases: 
“Fraud is not mistake, error in interpreting a contract; fraud is "something dishonest 
and morally wrong, and much mischief is...done, as well as much unnecessary pain 
                                                
30 419 F. Supp. 734 (D. Minn. 1976).
31 Ibid, 735.
32 (1913) 31 O.L.R. 138 (App. Div).
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inflicted, by its use where 'illegality' and 'illegal' are the really appropriate 
expressions:" 33
The closest a Canadian court came to considering illegality as a ground to stop payment was in 
the case of Morguard Bank of Canada v. Reigate Resources (Canada) Ltd34. In this case, Reigate 
has arranged with Morguard bank for the issuance of a letter of credit in favour of The Canada 
Trust Company, who was trustee for holders of the Series A Tender Shares. Security was granted 
for the letter of credit which was for an amount equal to the aggregate dividend requirement 
during the first five years that the shares were outstanding. Reigate agreed to provide the trustee
with directors' resolutions authorising the payment of the fixed cash dividends when due and to 
provide cheques made payable to the holders of the shares. If Reigate failed to do this, then the 
trustee would make a call under the letter of credit. Reigate did pay the dividends to shareholders 
but Morguard sought an order determining whether the agreement was legal and what would be 
the result if no declaration of dividend was made by the directors and a call was made by the 
trustee on the credit.
Power J held that the agreement to pay shareholders of Series A tender shares with funds 
received under the credit would not contravene s. 40 of the Business Corporations Act  and 
therefore the application by Morguard being premature, was dismissed. Power J stated this: “The 
letter of credit is a separate and distinct agreement and is not tainted with illegality in this 
circumstance [emphasis added].”35 It is difficult to ascertain whether he would have been willing 
to recognise illegality as a ground to prevent payment. On the one hand, there is a sense from the 
judgment that he was not against an illegality exception, since he may have been referring to the 
circumstances of the particular case. Further, he made the finding that “It is not possible to 
determine whether the agreement will be performed in a manner contrary to the Act at this 
time.”36 On the other hand, he stated that, “The historical use of the letter of credit as a 
commercial document is such that its character stands above the undercurrent of equities that may 
                                                
33 Ibid, 147.
34 (1985) 40 Alta. L.R. (2d) 77.
35 Ibid, [19].
36 Ibid, [21].
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exist between Morguard and Reigate.”37 Nevertheless, his obiter statement has been interpreted 
as a rejection of an illegality exception.38
5.4.4 UNCITRAL Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit
Although the UCP does not deal with the issue of the effect of illegality in the underlying 
contract, the UNCITRAL Convention took the initiative to make provisions on this issue in 
relation to independent guarantees. The UNCITRAL Convention provides for an illegality 
exception only to the extent that  injunctions to withhold payment39  or Mareva injunctions40 may 
be granted  where  “the underlying obligation of the principal/applicant has been declared invalid 
by a court or arbitral tribunal, unless the undertaking indicates that such contingency falls within 
the risk to be covered by the undertaking”41.  The writer does not advocate  this approach because 
the inherent delays involved in waiting for a declaration by a court or arbitral tribunal would 
significantly reduce the objective of an illegality exception. As with the fraud exception, a bank 
which is in possession of very strong evidence that the underlying contract is illegal should be 
able to invoke the illegality exception to refuse payment at the time of payment. Similarly, a bank 
should also be able to apply for an injunction before a full trial which determines the illegality of 
the underlying contract is held.  The effort to incorporate this issue by itself is commendable but 
the relevant provisions of the UNCITRAL Convention are lacking in depth and fail adequately to 
deal with many aspects of the exception.42
5.5 Arguments for and against an illegality exception
One of the objectives of the law is to deter and punish unlawful conduct.  If the law enforced the 
right to be paid under a documentary credit which assists an illegality, this would have the 
opposite effect, providing opportunities for parties to use the documentary credit to benefit from 
an illegal transaction. Professor Atiyah argues that the threat of unenforceability can sometimes 
                                                
37 Ibid, [19].
38 Morguard Trust Co v Royal Bank of Canada (1988) ACWS (3d) 416; N Enonchong (n 16) 409.
39 Article 20(1)(a) of UNCITRAL Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit.
40 Article 20(1)(b) of UNCITRAL Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit.
41 Article 19(2)(b) of UNCITRAL Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit.
42 For a critical analysis of the provisions, see Michelle Kelly-Louw, “Selective legal aspects of bank demand 
guarantees" (PhD thesis, University of South Africa 2008).
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have a more deterrent effect than criminal law.43 This argument is particularly appropriate where 
a documentary credit has been utilised to guarantee payment for a transaction which is not strictly 
illegal, but is contrary to public policy. In such circumstances, there is no other deterrence apart 
from the deterrence provided by the risk of the courts refusing to enforce payment. The 
consequence of having his right to payment refused by the court can also be seen as a form a 
punishment for a beneficiary’s participation in the illegal transaction.
Moreover, since the purpose of law is to promote justice, the court’s dignity is only upheld if it 
is not seen as giving effect to a contract which has been tainted by an illegal element. This can 
only be achieved if the courts maintain a balance, since there are other underlying policy 
considerations which mean that courts should not refuse to enforce payment under a documentary 
credit merely because of some minor technical breaches of the law (this point will be returned to 
in the subsequent discussion). This is best captured by the words of Taylor J in the Canadian case 
Mack v Enns, when referring to the ex turpi causa maxim:
“The purpose of the rule today must be to defend the integrity of the legal system, and 
the repute in which the courts ought to be held by law-abiding members of the 
community. It is properly applied in those circumstances in which it would be 
manifestly unacceptable to fair-minded, or right-thinking, people that a court should 
lend assistance to a plaintiff who has defied the law.” 44
In comparison to the fraud exception, there are a lot of similarities between an illegality 
exception and the fraud exception. The fraud exception and the illegality exception are both 
derived from the same maxim. In terms of moral blameworthiness, a fraudulent act could be on 
the same level as an illegal act. Since the fraud exception has achieved worldwide recognition as 
an exception to the autonomy principle, there is no reason why illegality should be treated 
differently by the law. The scope of this exception can be laid out clearly and applied analogously 
to the fraud exception, hence the exception will not involve more difficulties than the fraud 
exception as one might expect.45 Just as with the fraud exception, the bank is under no duty to 
                                                
43 P S Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract (6th ed OUP ,Oxford 2006) 342.
44 (1981) 30 B.C.L.R. 337, 345.
45 The same approach has been argued by N Enonchong (n 16).
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look for illegality in the transaction. Its responsibilities are confined to the examination of the 
presented documents. 46
The only difference between an illegality defence and the fraud exception is, as the American 
lawyer, J Barnes states, “…the public policies to be applied are much more varied and unrelated 
to the purpose of the L/C.”47 The direct of result of this is that there will be uncertainty as to 
when an illegality exception can be invoked. In the general law of contract, the same uncertainty 
has plagued the doctrine of illegality yet this has not deterred English courts from developing the 
doctrine. He recognises the same problem with the fraud exception, stating that, “Even those who 
recognize that the fraud/abuse defence is peculiar to L/C law and are experienced in applying the 
fraud exception sometimes disagree on whether a particular drawing crosses the line.”48
However, as with the fraud exception, the interest of justice and fairness means that this is an 
inevitable disadvantage of an illegality exception which one needs to overlook.  
J Barnes further highlights that “LCs supporting obligations to pay for an investment security, 
to pay executive compensation on termination, to pay liquidated damages, to pay for a covenant 
not to compete, etc., would appear to be more vulnerable to defences based on illegality than on 
L/C fraud”.49 Whilst this is true, the extent maybe inflated because these obligations are likely to 
exist in standby letters of credit - the use of standby letters of credit is not as commonplace in 
England as in America. Furthermore, despite these types of transaction being more vulnerable, 
the scope is limited by the many requirements proposed in this chapter, amongst which is the 
requirement of a serious offence. Accordingly, the number of cases where illegality may be 
successfully argued to refuse payment is limited and should not be a lot more than cases where 
fraud is successfully argued. The risk of an illegality exception, on its own, undermining the 
importance of the letter of credit as an international method of payment is  minimal.50
                                                
46 N Enonchong (n 16)  412.
47J Barnes, “The UCP in court "Illegality" as excusing dishonour of L/C obligations”  
<http://www.iccbooks.com/Home/UCPCourtIllegality.aspx> accessed 11 June 2009.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 N Enonchong (n 16) 412.
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5.6 Scope of the exception
In their first report on illegal transactions, the English Law Commission recommended that the 
courts be given a statutory discretion to decide whether the claimant’s involvement in some form 
of illegality should act as a defence to a claim, and in exercising this discretion the courts should 
take into account a list of factors.51 In their subsequent report, they moved away from 
recommending legislative reform for the law of illegality as it applied to contract, but 
recommended that what judges need to do is to base their decisions on the policy factors which 
lie behind the illegality defence and explain their reasoning accordingly.52 Whilst the Law 
Commission’s recommendation might be plausible for general application to illegal contracts, it 
is the writer’s opinion that they are not suitable in the context of a documentary credit 
transaction. Because the main advantage offered by a letter of credit is that it offers certainty of 
transaction and security, any exception created to the autonomy principle has to be well-
structured so as to provide certainty. Therefore, the writer proposes some requirements which 
should be established for the illegality exception to be successfully invoked before payment to 
the beneficiary can be refused.53 It is emphasised here that this idea is not the same as the 
approach recommended by the Law Commission in their first report because these are hurdles 
rather than mere factors which should be taken into consideration. With these requirements in 
place, the courts will be able to maintain a balance between two competing interest - achieving 
justice by preventing one party from gaining a benefit from their own illegal conduct and 
enforcing the normal legal rights arising under contracts which have been freely entered into.
5.6.1 Knowledge of the beneficiary
The issue of the beneficiary’s knowledge, despite its importance, has so far received little 
analysis in the judgments of cases where illegality has been considered as an exception to the 
autonomy principle. In Group Josi, counsel for both the plaintiff and defendant contested on the 
type of knowledge which was required. The defendant’s counsel contended that “the principle 
applies only where, to the knowledge of both parties, the collateral transaction is entered into 
                                                
51 The Law Commision (n 4).
52 The Law Commission Consultation Paper No 189, “The Illegality Defence” (2009).
53 These requirements were also advocated by Nelson Enonchong to limit the scope of the exception.       
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with the common purpose of performing an illegal contract”, whilst the plaintiff’s counsel 
submitted that “it is sufficient if the parties are aware of the facts which give rise to the 
illegality.”54 Staughton LJ expressed the difficulty involved since the relevant cases do not 
discuss this point but concluded that it was unnecessary in this case to decide the knowledge 
required in order for the illegality of the underlying contract to taint the collateral contract.55
In Mahonia, Cooke J held that one of the reasons why the illegality defence failed was 
“because Mahonia was not privy to any unlawful purpose, having no knowledge of any element 
of wrongful accounting”56. There is no direct judicial authority on this point but in Spector v 
Ageda57, Megarry J referred to the following passage from an old edition of Cheshire and Fifoot's 
Law of Contract 58:  
If, for example, A and B borrow £500 from C in order to pay a loss that they have 
suffered on an illegal transaction, C cannot recover the loan if he was aware of the 
purpose upon which it was to be expended, but presumably he will succeed if he 
proves his ignorance of that purpose order to discharge an existing loan that was 
wholly or partly illegal was itself tainted with illegality. 59
In this case, Megarry J did not decide the issue of whether the plaintiff needed to demonstrate
knowledge. Nevertheless, it is contended here that in relation to this issue, there is a distinction to 
be made between two different types of illegal contracts. This follows from the position in the 
general law of contract where the relevance of the state of mind of a party depends upon which 
category of illegal contract is in question. Essentially, the distinction concerns the time at which 
the contract becomes illegal. 
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5.6.1.1 Contracts which are illegal at the time of formation
Contracts which are illegal at the time of formation are illegal per se and given the strictest 
treatment by the courts. The contract will be unenforceable by either party regardless of whether 
one or both of the parties were not aware of the fact that the contract is against the law. Where the 
contract is illegal per se, knowledge will be imputed even if it was not actual. In such 
circumstances, neither party has any rights or remedies. The contract is void ab initio. For 
example, in Re Mahmoud and Ispahani60, a contract for the sale of linseed oil was concluded 
without a licence at a time when both the selling and buying of linseed oil otherwise than under 
licence were prohibited by statute. The seller had a licence whilst the buyer had misrepresented 
that he had a licence. The seller had acted honestly and had thought that the buyer had a licence, 
but the Court of Appeal held that the seller was not allowed to recover damages for the buyer’s 
non-acceptance. 
Applying this principle by analogy to a documentary credit transaction it is submitted that, if 
the underlying transaction is illegal in its formation, there is no requirement that the beneficiary 
must have actual knowledge of the illegality of the underlying transaction since knowledge will 
be imputed. The transaction will be void in any event. For example, a seller contracts with a 
buyer to supply pharmaceutical products, to be paid for by a documentary credit opened in 
favour of the seller. A statute prohibits the selling of these goods except by an authorised 
manufacturer - the seller therefore lacks the necessary authority to sell the products. In such 
circumstances, a bank does not need to prove that the plaintiff seller had knowledge of the illegal 
act in order successfully to invoke the illegality exception to refuse payment. However, the bank 
will still need to establish the other requirements, as submitted in the remaining discussion.
5.6.1.2 Contracts which are illegal as performed or which achieve an illegal purpose
A contract in this category is not illegal on its face, but becomes illegal because it was made with 
the intention of achieving an illegal purpose or because it falls to be performed in an illegal 
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manner. In such circumstances, the enforceability of the contract is dependent on the intention 
and knowledge of the parties. If both parties intended and knew about the illegal purpose or 
illegal performance, then it is unenforceable by both parties.  If one party entered into a contract 
with an intention of achieving an illegal purpose, or performs it in an illegal manner, and the 
other party was unaware of his intention to this effect, the innocent party is able to enforce the 
contract but the guilty party is not able to do so. 61
Marles v. Philip Trant & Sons62 is a good example of a case where the contract was tainted 
with illegality because it was performed in an illegal manner. In this case, the contract of sale 
between the claimant and defendant was for spring wheat. The seller delivered winter wheat, 
which breached the agreement but the contract was still lawful as formed. However, the seller 
failed to deliver an invoice together with the goods, which was required by statute63, and this 
constituted an illegal performance of the contract. The buyer was allowed to recover damages for 
breach of the contract because of his innocence. 64 Following this, it is submitted that in a 
documentary credit transaction where the underlying contract is illegal because it furthers an 
illegal purpose, or is performed in an illegal manner, the beneficiary’s knowledge of the illegality 
needs to be established in order for the illegality exception to deny the beneficiary’s right to be 
paid under the credit.65 Otherwise, the illegality exception would fail. 
5.6.2 Character/seriousness of the offence
Not all illegal acts are of the same gravity. For example, in terms of moral culpability, there is a 
significant difference between a contract of sale of illegal drugs and a contract of sale which 
involves goods which do not meet the requirements of import regulations. This issue is not 
always straightforward and, as discussed earlier, public policy can differ in different countries. 
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What might be considered as sufficiently serious in one country may not be regarded as so by 
another jurisdiction.
In the majority of English cases where the courts have had to decide the issue of whether an 
illegality could defeat a contractual claim, the judiciary did not openly recognise the need to 
consider the gravity of the illegality involved. In fact, this aspect of the law was criticised by the 
English Law Commission which recommended that judges should always take into account the 
seriousness of the illegal conduct when deciding such issues.66 But it was not always the case that 
English courts disregarded this factor. In St John Shipping Corporation v Joseph Rank Ltd67, Devlin J
showed that he was reluctant to invalidate a contract for an illegality which is minor in nature: “It may be 
questionable also whether public policy is well served by driving from the seat of judgment 
everyone who has been guilty of a minor transgression.”68 There was also a subtle expression of 
this in Mahonia where Cooke J stated the following:
“...[T]he Court ought not and will not lend its aid to enforce a contract, a security or 
something akin to a security for a contract, where the underlying purpose of that 
contract is contrary to the law of a friendly foreign state where performance is to 
occur and the gravity of that unlawfulness is such as to engage public policy 
considerations.” 69 [emphasis added]
The same notion has also been expressed in American law:
“However, courts in recent years have moved away from applying such formal tests 
(the Armstrong test) to decide whether to enforce a contract tainted with illegality. 
Instead, they look directly at the extent and seriousness of the illegal conduct and its 
relationship to the contract at issue.”70
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Ordinary notions of justice presume that a sanction or penalty should be proportionate to an 
illegal act.  Withholding payment to the beneficiary is not a trivial decision and has significant 
commercial consequences on all parties involved in a documentary credit transaction. This 
argument, together with the general disposition of the courts in restricting the success of the fraud 
exception leads to the writer’s proposition that not all prohibited conduct, but only seriously 
illegal conduct, will fall within the scope of an illegality exception. Otherwise, the commercial 
utility of the documentary credit will be severely affected. The inevitable question arising from 
this proposition is: how would the courts distinguish between different categories of illegal 
conduct? This is a very difficult question to answer for two reasons. Firstly, there is limited 
guidance on this point because of the small number of cases where illegality has been raised as a 
defence to a claim for payment under a letter of credit. Secondly, the range of illegal conduct 
which could affect a documentary credit transaction is extremely wide-ranging.  
Where the underlying contract is truly criminal or morally repugnant, the position is rather 
straightforward.  A good example of this is the hypothetical contract referred to by Staughton LJ 
in Group Josi:
“Take for example a contract for the sale of arms to Iraq, at a time when such a sale 
is illegal. The contract provides for the opening of a letter of credit, to operate on 
presentation of a bill of lading for 1000 kalashnikov rifles to be carried to the port of 
Basra.”71
In a case such as this, the illegality is obviously grave and there is no reason why the courts 
should still enforce payment. There are few difficulties in identifying contracts like this. The 
determination of whether the illegal element in a contract is serious enough to attract the 
illegality exception becomes a lot more complex where it involves statutory illegality of a 
technical nature. In the general law of contract, this has also proven to be difficult, and it is likely 
that the same problems would arise in the application of the illegality exception to documentary 
credits. How should the courts classify a contract as involving a trivial/technical breach so that it 
does not attract the illegality exception?  Different approaches have been adopted so far. 
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In St John Shipping, Devlin J considered the proportionality of the offence in relation to the 
commercial inconvenience which would result.72 Devlin J also approached the case by construing 
the statute to determine whether the intention of parliament was to prohibit such contracts or to 
impose fines upon those who breached its provisions and concluded that the objective of the 
statute was the latter.73 In Mahonia, Cooke J distinguished breaches of section 13 (a) or 13 (b) 
from section 10 (b) and 20 (e) of the US Securities Exchange Act 1934 on the basis that breaches 
of the former will not give rise to unenforceability because it does not involve an element of 
deceit or intentional wrongdoing, whereas breaches of the latter involves planned deliberate large 
scale mis-accounting which will provide a defence to payment.74 Here, it seems that the test he 
establishes is one which focuses on the extent of the participation of the beneficiary. Although 
the writer appreciates the learned judge’s effort in highlighting that not all breaches of statutory 
provisions will constitute a ground for refusing payment, this test really does not provide any 
more clarification as to what types of illegality are sufficiently serious so as to deprive a claimant 
of his rights. It is argued here that the issue of a beneficiary’s knowledge of the illegality should 
be distinguished from the issue of the seriousness of the illegality. A beneficiary’s knowledge is a 
pre-requisite to attract an illegality exception, but even if this requirement is satisfied, it does not 
necessary follow that the illegality is serious enough to justify the refusal of payment under a 
credit. 
To ensure utmost consistency and certainty, the courts could, rather than engaging on a 
random moral judgment, adopt a systematic methodology to lay down a clear set of identifiable 
categories which would be sufficiently serious to invoke the illegality exception. One possibility 
is to restrict the illegality defence only to crimes or indictable offences.75 One other alternative 
method is to categorise minor and major transgressions according to the penalties which can be
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imposed upon violation of the law.76 So for example, breaches of statutes which involve fines 
above a specified amount may attract the illegality exception whilst those below the specified 
amount will not.  Both of these methods would enable a very clear dividing line to be drawn. The 
first suggestion to restrict the scope of an illegality exception to crimes or indictable offences is 
probably not suitable because it is too restrictive and there may well be other offences such as 
statutory offences or conduct contravening public policy where there are strong arguments for 
refusing payment despite them not being a crime or indictable offence. The latter method, despite 
being systematic, is inflexible with the potential of creating injustice in its application since it 
would also exclude many illegal acts. One solution to this is to maintain that exceptions can be 
made to these categories and that there is a rebuttable presumption so as to allow some element of 
moral judgment. However, the writer does not advocate that any of these approaches be adopted 
because the many circumstances which may violate public policy mean that it is crucial to retain 
flexibility. Moreover, if any of these methodologies were adopted, it would be difficult to provide 
a rational account of why public policy is excluded from the scope of the illegality exception. 
Nevertheless, it is suggested that the criminal element of an offence and the level of punishment 
imposed by the law are factors which should be considered in the determination of whether an 
illegality is serious enough to fall within the scope of the illegality exception.
It should be noted that where contravention of statues are concerned, a separate issue which 
may confront the courts is the extent to which the contract contravenes the statute. This is related 
to, but not exactly the same as, the issue just discussed. To illustrate this point, reference must be 
made to St John Shipping, where Devlin J recognises what would be a startling result if "a 
shipowner who accidentally overloads by a fraction of an inch will not be able to recover from 
any of the shippers or consignees a penny of the freight”77. In this regard, the courts should 
determine the issue with a common sense approach. Common sense would dictate that where the 
degree of transgression is so minor, this should not result in the refusal of payment to the 
beneficiary. 
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5.6.3 Close relationship between a documentary credit and the illegality
When confronted with an illegality defence, common law judges have in the past discussed the 
relationship between the contract and the illegal conduct. In St John Shipping, Devlin J 
distinguished between “a contract which has as its object the doing of the very act forbidden by 
the statute, and a contract whose performance involves an illegality only incidentally”78.
“The rights which cannot be enforced must be those "directly resulting" from the 
crime. That means, I think, that for a right to money or to property to be 
unenforceable the property or money must be identifiable as something to which, but 
for the crime, the plaintiff would have had no right or title.”79
Clearly, he felt that it was necessary to establish the connection between the contract and the 
illegality. 
Where the courts are dealing with a linked contract which is by itself strictly legal, but may be 
tainted by illegality of another contract, this issue becomes more acute. In Fisher v. Bridges80, a  
case concerning a deed which promised payment for the sale of a land for an illegal purpose, 
Jervis CJ refused to enforce the deed and stated the following:
“It is clear that the covenant was given for payment of the purchase money. It 
springs from, and is a creature of, the illegal agreement; and, as the law would not 
enforce the original illegal contract, so neither will it allow the parties to enforce a 
security for the purchase money, which by the original bargain was tainted with 
illegality.”81[emphasis added]
It is contended that a documentary credit would have to be sufficiently linked to the illegality in 
the underlying contract if it is to be tainted so as to attract the illegality exception. It is of course 
important to restrict the tainting concept, particularly where it concerns a financial instrument of 
                                                
78Ibid, 291.
79 Ibid, 292.
80 (1854) 3 El. & Bl. 642.
81 Ibid, 649.
180
commercial importance. It is impossible to draw a clear line between those which are sufficiently 
linked and those which are not.  Nevertheless, guidance can be sought from some cases.
In Group Josi Staughton LJ stated obiter that if the reinsurance contracts were illegal, he was 
willing to restrain payment “because they were being used to carry out an illegal transaction”.82
This leads to one commentator arguing that, “…[I]t is only in very rare situations that the letter of 
credit would not be found to play an integral part in the underlying transaction. Payment is, after 
all, virtually always an integral part of commercial or financial transactions.”83 In the writer’s 
view, this is not true because payment may not necessarily be integral to the illegal element. For 
example, in a case where the terms of the underlying sale contract involves a covenant which 
breaches a statutory provision, payment under the credit may not be sufficiently connected to the 
illegality in the underlying contract to justify non-payment under the credit.
In Mahonia, Colman J suggested that a letter of credit would be tainted if “it plays from the 
outset an integral part in the illegal transaction”.84 When the case went to full trial, Cooke J also 
adopted a very similar approach and considered the following (some of which overlap):
- Whether the letter of credit was brought into existence for the very purpose of being part 
of what was an unlawful scheme.85  
- whether the letters of credit was part of the overall arrangements and shared the same 
common purpose”86
- whether the letter of credit was opened in consideration of obligations contained in the 
ENAC/Mahonia Swap87  
- whether the letter of credit played a part in an overall scheme of the magnitude.88
In addition, Cooke J introduced a slightly different element. He asked whether, without the 
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letter of credit, the transaction would not have gone ahead.89 On the hypothesis that there was 
deliberate false accounting, he concluded that it would not since the letter of credit in the case 
was akin to a form of security for the performance of the ENAC/Mahonia Swap. One leading 
commentator, N Enonchong has strongly criticised this test: “The mere fact that the parties to the 
illegal venture decided to carry it out using a letter of credit when they could still have gone 
ahead with the venture without the letter of credit is not a sound basis for holding that therefore 
the letter of credit is not sufficiently connected to the illegality.”90 The writer agrees with his 
criticism to a certain extent, since even if the illegal transaction could have been performed in 
another manner and could go ahead without the letter of credit (perhaps through the use of 
another payment instrument), the fact remains that the letter of credit in Mahonia was still used to 
carry out the illegal purpose. Despite this criticism, it is certainly true that if the illegal purpose 
could not be carried out by any other means (if it would not have gone ahead without the letter of 
credit), then the letter of credit is without doubt closely connected to the illegality. There is 
therefore something of value to be taken from Cooke J’s test. It is proposed here that this test 
should be refined: A letter of credit is sufficiently connected to the illegality if, without the letter 
of credit, the illegality in the underlying transaction could not be executed. However, in the 
converse situation, where the illegal venture could still go ahead without the letter of credit, it 
does not necessarily follow that a letter of credit is not closely linked to the illegality. 
N Enonchong further suggests the there is no need for a separate test to establish the closeness 
of the illegality and a letter of credit:
“If the beneficiary was aware of the illegal purpose of the underlying contract, then 
that should be enough to establish a sufficient connection between the illegality and 
the letter of credit issued in respect of the transaction. And vice versa.”91
However, such an approach is very much based on the idea of moral punishment, placing 
emphasis on the state of mind of the beneficiary. The writer disagrees with this, primarily 
because the very essence of an illegality exception is based on the idea that the documentary 
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credit contract, despite being a separate contract in itself, is tainted by the illegality of the 
underlying contract because it is linked to the underlying contract. 
It is argued here that this suggestion would reduce the level of uncertainty but some 
uncertainty would still linger because of the evidential difficulties in establishing the 
beneficiary’s state of mind. Not every concept should be abandoned at the expense of certainty, 
especially since there are good reasons to retain the requirement of close linkage. It is also 
possible to limit the uncertain effects of this requirement. Despite the differences in the language 
adopted, the approach adopted by the courts in Group Josi and Mahonia are the same. All the 
different formulations used to determine whether a letter of credit was sufficiently connected so 
as to be tainted have focused on  identifying what function the letter of credit had in relation to 
the alleged illegality. This includes Cooke J’s consideration of whether the transaction would 
have gone ahead without the letter of credit, which might at first sight appear to be radical. As the 
writer sees it, such an approach denotes common sense. Since the courts will not enforce illegal 
contracts, the courts certainly should not enforce a credit which has an important role in any 
illegal transaction, in circumstances where it is very difficult to separate the good from the bad.
5.6.3.1 Non-reliance rule
The long established rule from Bowmakers Ltd v Barnet Instruments Ltd92 posits that a party can 
enforce his legal or equitable right if he does not have to “plead or prove” an illegal act in order 
to establish the cause of action. In this case, the defendant, Barnet, hire-purchased machine tools 
from Bowmaker under three separate hire purchase agreements. Barnet made some but not all of 
the agreed payments. Barnet also sold two of the machines and refused to deliver up the 
remaining machine to the plaintiff on demand. The hire-purchase agreements contravened
wartime maximum price rules and licence regulations. Barnet argued that the hire purchase 
agreement was an illegal contract which should not be enforced by the courts. The Court of 
Appeal held that the plaintiff could claim damages in the tort of conversion in respect of all three 
machine tools on the basis that they could rely on their basic right of ownership and did not have 
to rely on the illegal contract. The wrongful sale by Barnet terminated its right to retain 
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possession as enjoyed by a hirer of goods and allowed the plaintiff to regain their right to 
immediate possession.    
The Bowmaker rule was subsequently affirmed by the House of Lords in Tinsley v Milligan93, 
where two women purchased a house with joint funds, intending to share the ownership of the 
house. They registered the legal title to the house only in Tinsley’s name so that Milligan could 
make fraudulent claims for housing benefit from the DSS. When the relationship ended, the 
House of Lords had to decide whether the illegality should affect Milligan’s claim that Tinsley 
held the house on trust for the benefit of both of them. The majority of the House of Lords 
adopted the Bowmaker rule and allowed Milligan’s claim for equitable title of the house because 
she did not have to rely on the illegality. She could prove title by proving a contributory payment 
and a common intention upon which both of them acted. 
The non-reliance rule has been the subject of debate and controversy.94 It is deceptively simple 
and its application can often be difficult and produce varying results. For example, if the couple 
in Tinsley had been husband and wife and the house had been purchased in the wife's name only, 
the application of the rule would bring a different result. The husband would not have been 
allowed to enforce his interest in the property because he would have been required to rebut the 
presumption of advancement. He would have needed to submit evidence rebutting the 
presumption of gift, and in doing so, would have needed to rely on evidence of the illegality in 
order to rebut this.95 Despite this, the rule seems to have been universally applied in all common 
law jurisdictions in the law of contract and trusts. In fact, its application has also been extended to 
letter of credit cases where the courts have had to consider whether illegality was an exception to 
the autonomy principle. In Group Josi, at first instance, Clarke J rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the rule was inapplicable. On appeal, Staughton LJ affirmed this and applied the 
Bowmaker rule to the facts presented to him. He concluded that the defendants would need to 
base their case on the illegal contract because, to draw down on the credit, they must present a 
debit note to the bank, which covered the liability for outstanding loss reserves under the
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umbrella quota share facilities. 96 The non-reliance test is likely to retain its significance in the 
illegality doctrine especially since it found support in the recent decision of the House of Lords in 
Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephenson.97   
N Enonchong submits that the Bowmaker rule should have no relevance in establishing the 
closeness between the letter of credit and the illegality of the underlying contract.98 He bases his 
argument on two grounds. The first ground is the uncertainty of the ambit of the test - does the 
rule prevent the claimant from relying on his own illegality, or from relying on the illegal 
transaction?99 The second ground is that the application of this rule would effectively make the 
illegality exception pointless because the exception would have no effect in practice.100 It is N 
Enonchong’s second ground which the writer feels forms a strong basis for abandonment of this 
test for the illegality exception.  The paradigm case of a documentary credit transaction involves 
an underlying contract which is a contract of sale of goods. In sale of goods cases, the application 
of the rule would always allow the beneficiary to enforce his right to be paid. Applying the 
Bowmaker rule would bring the undesirable result that a beneficiary, regardless of any illegality, 
would always have a claim to payment if he has delivered the goods and provided the necessary 
documents.101 Although it was decided in Group Josi that the beneficiary had to rely on the 
illegality in order to make its claim, the facts of Group Josi, as N Enonchong rightly points out, 
“were exceptional”.102
5.6.4 Proof/evidence of illegality 
By analogous application, the required evidence to support any allegation of illegality should be 
the same as that required under the fraud exception. It is unnecessary to embark on a repetitive 
discussion since Chapter 3 has already discussed the relevant standard of proof in a pre-trial and 
full trial hearing.103  It suffices to say here that the standard of proof is very high. 
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5.6.5 Relevant time of bank’s knowledge of illegality
Just like the fraud exception, in order for the illegality exception to be successfully argued, the 
bank has to have evidence of the illegality at the correct time. 104 Mahonia is the only case so far 
which has considered this issue in relation to the illegality exception. Cooke J stated in Mahonia
that the defendant bank was “entitled to resist enforcement at this stage [full trial] of the 
proceedings without knowing of any basis for resisting the demand under the L/C at the time 
when it refused to pay.”105 This follows closely the position of the fraud exception as discussed in
Chapter 3.106
5.7 Illegality and conflicts of laws
In order to refuse payment on the grounds of illegality (either because the underlying contract is 
illegal or because the documentary credit itself is illegal), it is necessary to establish that there is 
an illegal element in the transaction in question. This inevitably leads to the question of which 
country’s law is material in establishing illegality. When a documentary credit is used in a sale of 
goods transaction on the home market, it is unlikely that issues of conflicts of laws will arise 
because the legal system applicable to the contract of sale or the documentary credit is unlikely to 
be that of a foreign system. However, when it is used in international trading, the documentary 
credit will transcend national borders and involve various parties in different countries. This 
partly explains the many efforts which have been made to achieve international uniformity. 
Despite the widespread adoption of the UCP, conflict of laws issues will inevitably arise. Issues 
of conflict of laws are often difficult, but an already difficult subject is made even more complex 
by the many autonomous, yet linked, contractual relationships arising from a documentary credit 
transaction. The two main aspects to a conflict of law case are a) jurisdiction and b) applicable 
law. The former is not within the scope of this study, but “the plaintiff, in the absence of a 
choice-of-court agreement, may have a multiple choice as to the court where he may bring the 
action”107. 
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At common law, the law to be applied to a contract is referred to as the proper law. The Rome 
Convention and Rome 1 adopt the term applicable law or governing law but this is merely a 
difference in terminology. The widespread incorporation of the UCP does in fact alleviate 
conflict of laws issues but the UCP does not cover all matters since some matters are inherently 
national in character and would require national laws to be applied.  UCP 600 does not contain 
any clauses concerning governing law or jurisdiction. Where a matter is not covered by the UCP, 
the proper law is the one expressly incorporated by the parties into the letter of credit.108 With 
respect to a documentary credit transaction, M.Kurkela correctly observes the following:
“The choice of law made by the parties in one of these relationships does not as such 
extend to the other contractual relationships which may in turn be governed by 
another substantive law chosen by the parties thereto or determined by applicable 
conflict rules. Parts of one facility may thus be governed by different law 
endangering at least in theory the consistency and uniformity of the decisions in case 
of disagreement or dispute.”109
Therefore, in order to discuss issues of applicable law in relation to documentary credits, it is 
necessary to discuss this according to the various contractual relationships arising from a 
documentary credit transaction. The ensuing discussion will only focus on three of these 
contractual relationships which are of most relevance since the existence of any illegality in these 
contracts may have an effect on payment.
5.7.1 Underlying contract of sale between the buyer and the seller
Since this chapter is based on the submission that illegality in the underlying contract can 
constitute an exception to the autonomy principle, the contract between the buyer and the seller is 
of much relevance. For this contractual relationship, the rules that will apply are the general 
conflict of law rules for contracts.
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It is good practice for the buyer and seller to include in their agreement a clause specifying 
their choice of law. The position is a lot more complicated if the contract does not contain an 
express choice of law. Where there is no express choice of law in the underlying contract, the 
issue of the governing law for this relationship will have to be resolved by a jurisdiction’s normal 
rules of conflict of law for contractual relationships. In the UK, the rules of the Rome Convention 
1980 are to apply to issues of choice of law for contracts entered into after April 1, 1991. 
Contracts entered into before this date will be governed by the common law. The 1980 Rome 
Convention is replaced by a European legislative instrument, the European Regulation No 
593/2008 (Rome 1) dated 17 June 2008, which is to apply to all contracts entered into after 17 
December 2009.  Just like the common law, the Convention provides the freedom for parties to a 
contract to choose the applicable law. They can do so by express words or their choice may be 
implied by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the particular case. 
At common law, in the absence of an express or implied choice of law, the courts will apply 
the system of law which it has its closest and most real connection to the transaction. A range of 
factors are taken into account, including place of performance, place of contracting, and 
residence of the parties even though generally, in sale of goods cases, there is a tendency to apply 
the law of the country of shipment.110  Under the Rome Convention 1980, the presumption in 
Article 4 (2)111 is that the contract of sale will be governed  by the law of the country where the 
seller is situated and the same presumption remains under Article 4 (1) of Rome 1.112
                                                
110 See AG Guest and others, Benjamin's Sale of Goods (7th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008) Chapter 25, 
Section 2.
111 Article 4 (2) Rome Convention 1980:
Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article, it shall be presumed that the contract is most closely 
connected with the country where the party who is to effect the performance which is characteristic of the contract 
has, at the time of conclusion of the contract, his habitual residence, or, in the case of a body corporate or 
unincorporate, its central administration. However, if the contract is entered into in the course of that party's trade or 
profession, that country shall be the country in which the principal place of business is situated or, where under the 
terms of the contract the performance is to be effected through a place of business other than the principal place of 
business, the country in which that other place of business is situated.
112 Article 4 (1) Rome 1:
To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in accordance with Article 3 and without 
prejudice to Articles 5 to 8, the law governing the contract shall be
determined as follows:
(a) a contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by the law of the country where the seller has his habitual 
residence;…
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Unlike English law, for commercial transactions governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, 
the power of the parties to choose a law is restricted by the requirement that the choice of law 
should have a reasonable relationship to the transaction. § 1-105(1) UCC provides the following:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state 
and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other 
state or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Act applies to 
transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
113
At first sight, the difference between English law and American law may be striking in respect of 
their treatment of party autonomy. However, in Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. 
Ltd114, Lord Wright qualified the parties’ freedom to choose a law under English law to a choice 
of law which is “bona fide and legal” and where there is “no reason for avoiding the choice on 
ground of public policy”.115
5.7.1.1 Foreign illegality
Courts may be confronted with a situation where a documentary credit is opened to guarantee 
payment for a contract of sale which is governed by English law, but the performance of this 
underlying contract of sale contravenes the laws of another country. Would this constitute 
illegality under English law so that, if all the requirements of the illegality exception are 
established, payment can be refused under the credit? There is authority that the courts will not 
enforce a contract which is valid by its proper law if the contract violates the law of a friendly 
state.116 In Foster v Driscoll117, the parties agreed in a contract to import whisky into America 
which contravened the prohibition laws of America. However, the contract concerned was 
governed by English law. Subsequently, actions were brought in relation to various disputes 
                                                
113 Section 187(2) Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws (1971) also provides that the expressly chosen law of a 
contract will apply unless:
“(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable 
basis for the parties' choice, or 
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a 
materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule 
of s 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties”.
114 [1939] A.C. 277.
115 Ibid, 290.
116 See N Enonchong (n 1) 63.
117 [1929] 1 KB 470.
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arising out of the contract. The contract was held to be void “as a matter of public policy based 
on international comity”118. Sankey LJ said:
“To sum up, in my view an English contract should and will be held invalid on 
account of illegality if the real object and intention of the parties necessitates them 
joining in an endeavour to perform in a foreign and friendly country some act which is 
illegal by the law of such country notwithstanding the fact that there may be, in 
certain event, alternative modes or places of performing, which permit the contract to 
be performed legally.”119
This principle was also applied in Regazzoni v K.C. Sethia Ltd120, where the defendant seller 
agreed to sell and deliver half a million jute bags from India to Genoa. The parties to the contract 
contemplated that these bags “would be shipped from India and be made available in Genoa so 
that the plaintiff might make or fulfil a bargain of resale to a South African buying agency”. As 
both parties knew, at that time, an Indian ordinance prohibited the export of goods (directly or 
indirectly) to South Africa. When the seller did not deliver, the buyer brought an action for 
damages for breach of contract. The House of Lords applied the principle in Foster v Driscoll, 
basing its decision on public policy and international comity. The contract was unenforceable
since its performance would involve doing an act in a foreign and friendly State which violates 
the law of that State.121
Article 21 of Rome 1 (which is very much the same as Article 16 of the Rome convention 
1980) provides that:
The application of a provision of the law of any country specified by this Regulation may be refused 
only if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of the forum.
                                                
118 Ibid, 496.
119 Ibid, 521.
120 [1957] 3 W.L.R. 752.
121 See also Ralli Brothers v Compania Naviera[1920] 2 KB 287 but it is debatable as to whether this case is based 
on public policy or English domestic law of frustration.
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Therefore, the implementation of the Rome Convention does not bring any changes to the 
common law position. It is important to note that principle established from these cases only 
applies where there is illegality under the law of the country of performance. 122
5.7.2 Contract between the issuing bank and the beneficiary
The issue of applicable law is likely to arise in this contractual relationship if the documentary 
credit in question is an unconfirmed credit or one where only one bank is involved (with no 
correspondent bank) since in these circumstances, payment is demanded directly from the issuing 
bank. This explains why the two cases which are about to be discussed both concerned credits 
which were unconfirmed.
In Offshore International SA v Banco Central SA123, a Spanish contractor (second defendant) 
opened a standby letter of credit in favour of the plaintiff, which was incorporated in Panama. 
The credit served as a guarantee for the repayment of the advance payment made by the plaintiff 
to the Spanish contractor. The first defendant, a Spanish bank issued the credit and a New York 
bank advised but did not confirm the credit. There was no express provision as to the choice of 
law. Subsequently a dispute arose and at the hearing of the action, the court had to decide as a 
preliminary point whether the governing law was the law of New York or Spain. It was held that 
the governing law was the law of New York since this is where transaction had the closest and 
most real connection. Even though the letter of credit was opened by the Spanish bank, the credit 
was opened through a New York bank, payment was to be made in United States dollars and was 
only to be made against documents presented in New York. Ackner J stated the following:
“…very great inconvenience would arise, if the law of the issuing bank were to be 
considered as the proper law. The advising bank would have constantly to be seeking 
to apply a whole variety of foreign laws.124
This decision was applied in Power Curber International Ltd v National Bank of Kuwait
SAK125 which concerned an irrevocable letter of credit opened by a buyer in Kuwait in favour of 
                                                
122 See N Enonchong (n 1) 64.
123 [1976] 3 All E.R. 749.
124 Ibid,752.
125 [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 394.
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the seller in America (the plaintiff) for the sale of machinery. The letter of credit was issued by 
the defendant bank who instructed the Bank of America in Florida, which acted through the 
North Carolina National Bank in North Carolina. Subsequently, the buyer filed a dispute in 
Kuwait against the seller regarding a claim for commission - a court order was obtained which 
prevented the issuing bank from making any further payment under the credit. The seller then 
issued proceedings in England against the issuing bank for the amount due under the credit. All 
three judges in the Court of Appeal applied Offshore International and came to the conclusion 
that the proper law was that of North Carolina since it was the place where payment was to be 
made against the presentation of documents. Lord Denning and Griffiths LJ found that the lex 
situs of a letter of credit is the place where it is payable against documents, rejecting the 
submission that payment would be unlawful because Kuwait was the lex situs of the debt. 126
When considering the applicable law in the contract between the issuing bank and the 
beneficiary, it is important to draw a distinction between credits where a correspondent bank is 
involved (such as in Offshore and Power Curber) and credits where the issuing bank is the only 
bank involved. If the issuing bank is the only bank involved, it is the issuing bank which will be 
accepting documents and making payment directly to the beneficiary. Therefore, in cases where 
the issuing bank is the only bank involved, the applicable law in this contractual relationship is 
that of the country of the issuing bank. Hence, the determination of the applicable law in this 
contractual relationship is dependent on whether a correspondent bank is involved in the 
transaction.
It is necessary at this stage to determine whether Rome 1 would also lead to the same 
conclusion.  The only case which considered the Rome Convention 1980 is Bank of Baroda v
Vysya Bank Limited127. In this case, an Indian buyer agreed to purchase a consignment of Latvian 
steel through the seller’s London office. A letter of credit was issued by Vysha Bank in India in 
favour of the seller, Granada. The credit was confirmed by the Bank of Baroda's London office 
since the seller had a London office. Bank of Baroda paid the beneficiary seller on presentation of 
                                                
126 However, Waterhouse J dissented on the point about the lex situs and stated the following at 401: “In the absence 
of any previous binding authority, I have not been persuaded that this debt due under an unconfirmed letter of credit 
can be regarded as situate in North Carolina merely because there was provision for payment at a branch of a bank 
used by the sellers in Charlotte…”
127 [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep 87.
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documents but Vysha Bank later refused to reimburse them. Bank of Baroda then brought an 
action in England against Vysha Bank to seek for reimbursement. The High Court was 
confronted with issue of the law applicable to the relationship between the confirming bank and 
the issuing bank (this point will be discussed in the next section) but Mance J also considered,
obiter, the relationship between a beneficiary and an issuing bank: 
“As between the beneficiary and Vysya, the position under Art. 4(2) is that there is a 
presumption that Indian law applies. This presumption applies, although the 
performance which is characteristic of the contract is the issue of the letter of credit 
in London which was to be and was effected in London through National 
Westminster, initially at least as advising bank, with Bank of Baroda later adding its 
confirmation. Although such performance was to take place in London, art. 4(2) 
refers one back, prima facie, to India as the place of Vysya's central 
administration…In the present case the application of art. 4(2) would lead to an 
irregular and subjective position where the governing law of a letter of credit would 
vary according to whether one was looking at the position of the confirming or the 
issuing bank. It is of great importance to both beneficiaries and banks concerned in 
the issue and operation of international letters of credit that there should be clarity 
and simplicity in such matters. Article 4(5) provides the answer.”128                                                                                                                             
The learned judge concluded that Article 4(5)129 will be invoked to rebut the presumption in Art. 
4(2) and concluded that English law applied to the contract between Vysya and the beneficiary. 
The position remains the same under Rome 1 since Article 4(3) of Rome 1130 retains the power of 
the courts to override the presumption in Article 4(1) and Article 4(2) if it is 'manifestly more
closely connected' to another country.
                                                
128Ibid, 93.  
129 Article 4(5) Rome Convention:
Paragraph 2 shall not apply if the characteristic performance cannot be determined, and the presumptions in 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 shall be disregarded if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more 
closely connected with another country.
130 Article 4(3) Rome 1:
Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely connected with a 
country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply.
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5.7.3 Contract between the confirming bank and the beneficiary
Like the relationship between the issuing bank and the beneficiary, it is assumed that a contract 
arises between the confirming bank and the beneficiary despite the lack of some of the important 
features which make up a contract.131 Following Offshore and Power Curber, this contract has its 
closest and most real connection with the country where the branch of the bank at which the 
payment was to be made to the beneficiary.132 Therefore, the applicable law in this contract will 
be the law of the country of the confirming bank. The position is the same under the Rome 
Convention 1980 133 and Rome 1134.
5.7.4 Contract between the issuing bank and the correspondent bank
Disputes in this contract are likely to arise because of issues of reimbursement or indemnity. 
Though this is not strictly within the scope of this chapter, it deserves to be mentioned because 
such disputes are often triggered by divergent views on the compliance of documents. The system 
of law which has the closest and most real connection is the law of the country where payment is 
to be made.135 This means that it will be the law of the either the advising bank or the confirming 
bank. 
In Bank of Baroda v Vysya Bank Limited136, the facts of which have already been discussed137, 
the High Court was confronted with the issue of the law applicable to the relationship between 
Bank of Baroda (the confirming bank) and Vysha (the issuing bank). On the application of the 
Article 4(2) of the Rome Convention, Mance J had to consider what performance is characteristic 
of the contract between the two parties. He reached the conclusion that the presumption in Article 
4(2) would lead to the applicable law being that of English law, the law of the place of the 
confirming bank (Bank of Baroda):
                                                
131 See section 1.4. 
132 Dicey and Morris, Conflict of Laws, 33-312. See also European Asian Bank v. Punjab and Sind Bank [1982] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 356; Mannesman Handel AG v Kaunlaran Shipping Corporation [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 89.
133 Bank of Baroda v Vysha Bank [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 87, 92; Marconi Communications International Ltd v Pt Pan 
Indonesia Bank Ltd TBK [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 72, 84; Bank of Credit & Commerce Hong Kong Ltd v Sonali Bank
[1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 227, 237. 
134 Article 4(1) Rome 1.
135Dicey and Morris (n 132) 33-312; Habib Bank Ltd v Central Bank of Sudan [2006] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 412, [44]. 
136 [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 87.
137 See page 191.
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“…under a contract between an issuing bank and a confirming bank the
performance which is characteristic of the contract is the adding of its confirmation 
by the latter and its honouring of the obligations accepted thereby in relation to the 
beneficiary. The liability on the part of the issuing bank to reimburse or indemnify 
the confirming bank is consequential on the character of the contract; it does not 
itself characterize the contract.”138
In addition, he based his decision on the fact that the relationship between issuing bank and 
conforming bank is one of agency, referring to the following example in the Giuliano-Lagarde
Report:
“… in an agency contract concluded in France between a Belgian commercial agent 
and a French company, the characteristic performance being that of the agent, the 
contract will be governed by Belgian law if the agent has his place of business in 
Belgium.”139
  Where there is no confirming bank but an advising bank, the law of the country of the 
advising bank would apply since the characteristic performance is the advising of the credit and 
the handling of the documents140 or one can reach this conclusion based on the view that the 
characteristic performance is that of the agent.141 The same conclusions would be reached under 
Rome 1 since the concept of “characteristic performance” is retained under Article 4(2) Rome 1.
5.7.5 Commentary
It is proposed that only one criterion, which is the place of payment, should be applied to 
determine the applicable law in the absence of an express choice of law. This would mean that a 
universal principle will apply to each of the different contractual relationship arising in a 
documentary credit transaction. This approach would also be consistent with the decision of 
English courts so far and the writings of authors on the issue of applicable law in relation to the 
                                                
138 [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 87, 91.
139 Journal officiel n° C 282 du 31/10/1980 p. 0001 – 0050.
140 R Jack, Documentary credits: the law and practice of documentary credits including standby credits and demand 
guarantees (4th edn Tottel, Haywards Heath 2009) 406.
141 Dicey and Morris (n 132) 33-311.
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various contracts under Australian142 and American143 law. Nevertheless, there is contradictory
American authority which decided that in the case of an unconfirmed credit, the place of 
performance is the place of issuance, resulting in the finding that applicable law is that of the 
country of place of issuance.144
  It may be true that sometimes, as in the case of an unconfirmed credit, the paying bank is not 
the bank that assumes the primary obligation towards the parties and that the primary obligation 
in a documentary credit transaction is completed when the issuing bank reimburses the advising 
bank. However, the primary function of a documentary credit is to pay the beneficiary upon 
presentation of the documents specified in the conditions of the credit. It is at the advising bank’s 
site that inspection of the documents and payment takes place and therefore the place of payment 
should be treated as the place of performance. One other argument in favour of the proposition 
that the applicable law is that of the country of the place of payment is that this would prevent a 
situation arising where the applicable law of the contract between the beneficiary and the issuing 
bank is different from that of the contract between the beneficiary and the confirming bank. But 
this argument is weakened by the fact that the parties may stipulate different applicable laws for 
the various contractual relationships. R Jack advocates the same approach in relation to contracts 
between banks (issuing banks/confirming banks) and beneficiaries, arguing that it has the 
advantage that the banks which are examining the documents are able to apply their own law. 145
The only difference between his submission and the writer’s is that the writer argues that this 
principle should be extended to all contractual relationships arising from a documentary credit 
transaction. 
                                                
142 RN Purvis and R Darvas, The law and practice of commercial letters of credit, shipping documents and 
termination of disputes in international trade (Butterworths, Sydney 1975) 152.
143 A N Oelofse, The Law of Documentary Letters of Credit in Comparative Perspective (Interlegal, Pretoria 1997) 
526.
144 Sabolyk v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, No. 84 Civ. 3179, 1984 WL 1275 (S.D.N.Y.1984) 
(unpublished decision); RSB Manufacturing Corp. v. Bank of Baroda, 15 B.R. 650 (S.D.N.Y.1981); Chuidian v. 
Philippine Nat. Bank 976 F.2d 561.
145 R Jack, Documentary credits: the law and practice of documentary credits including standby credits and demand 
guarantees (4th edn Tottel, Haywards Heath 2009) 399.
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5.8 Conclusion
It is obvious from the preceding discussion that the subject of illegality is riddled with uncertainty 
and confusion. This chapter has only attempted to examine this subject from one angle which is 
how the concept of illegality could operate in the context of documentary credit so as to refuse 
payment.
This chapter has demonstrated the distinction between a scenario where a documentary credit 
itself is illegal and one where the underlying contract is illegal so as possibly to taint the 
documentary credit. In the former, it is not open to doubt that payment may be refused without 
infringing the autonomy principle. In the later, there are strong arguments for the adoption of an 
illegality exception to the autonomy principle although, it is apparent from the analysis of the 
relevant decisions that that English courts will apply the illegality defence with much caution, 
just as with the fraud exception. 
There is certainly a need to develop the illegality exception with more defined principles. 
When considering the illegality exception, the courts should apply the many requirements 
suggested and considered in great length in this chapter. These suggestions would procure some 
coherence and confine the scope of the exception. Undeniably, some uncertainty will persist due 
to the wide ranging circumstances which may face the courts and the need to maintain some 
flexibility of the law in this area.
     It is not uncommon for issues of applicable law to arise in documentary credit transactions. 
Banks should incorporate a choice of law provision in the credit terms since, as the relevant cases 
show, the determination of the applicable law in the absence of a choice of law clause is far from 
simple. In the absence of an express choice of law, it has been contended that in all of the legal 
relationships arising from a documentary credit transaction, the applicable law is the law of the 
country of the place of payment. This submission, if accepted, will result in clarity and less 
confusion.
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CHAPTER 6
AN UNCONSCIONABILITY EXCEPTION?1
6.1 Introduction   
Instruments which share similar characteristics to the documentary credit are the performance 
bond, demand bond, demand guarantee or performance guarantee. These instruments will be 
referred to in this study as “independent guarantees”, a term adopted by the UNICITRAL
Convention of Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters. The characteristic of these 
instruments will be explained following this introduction, but it should be mentioned here that 
despite the similarities to the documentary credit, they perform an entirely different function, one 
which is the same as that served by the standby letter of credit, a subject which has been 
introduced in Chapter 1.2 These instruments, just like the documentary credit, can dangerously 
expose an applicant to unfair calls. The UNCITRAL Convention contains stipulations to deal 
with this issue but the convention itself has not been ratified by many countries.3
In recent years, a few common law legal systems have adopted the concept of 
unconscionability as a ground for withholding payment in independent guarantees. It is important 
to observe any promising trends in the law of other jurisdictions since useful recommendations 
and guidance could be obtained from such an insight. This chapter has two objectives: to trace the 
development of the concept of unconscionability in independent guarantees and to examine 
whether unconscionability should be an additional and distinct ground for which payment under a 
documentary credit can be withheld.  
                                                
1
A version of this chapter has been published – Hang Yen Low, “Unconscionability as a Ground for Withholding 
Payment in Demand Guarantees: Should the exception be Extended to Letters of Credit” [2008] M.L.J.Supp. clxxxiii.
2 See 1.6.9.
3 Only Belarus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Kuwait, Liberia, Panama, Tunisia has ratified the convention – “Status 
of 1995 United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit”
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/payments/1995Convention_guarantees_status.html>accessed  
30th November 2009.
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     The chapter will begin with a brief explanation of independent guarantess. Following that, the 
analysis will begin with a detailed examination of how various common law jurisdictions have 
used the concept of unconscionability to restrain payment in independent guarantees. This will be 
followed by a discussion of any similar development in English common law.  Next the writer 
will consider the advantages and disadvantages of applying the unconscionability concept to 
documentary credits. Finally, the writer investigates to what extent the documentary credit 
resembles the independent guarantee for this purpose.
6.2 Independent Guarantees
An independent guarantee is an undertaking given by a bank to pay a sum of money to a 
beneficiary in the event that the applicant fails to perform as promised.4 It is not within the scope 
of this study to provide a detailed account of the operation of the instrument and the various types 
of independent guarantees. 5 However, independent guarantees can be categorised into two main 
types. This is best explained by one prominent writer on this subject:
“The first type secures financial obligations and guarantees such as those of the 
buyer in respect of the purchase price arising from a contract of sale, or those of the 
employer for the payment of installments in connection with a construction contract, 
or those of the borrower for payment of principal sum and interest arising from credit 
facilities…The second type of guarantees provides security for non-financial 
                                                
4 Article 2(1) UNCITRAL Convention of Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters provides a more detailed 
explanation:
“For the purposes of this Convention, an undertaking is an independent commitment, known in international 
practice as an independent guarantee or as a stand-by letter of credit, given by a bank or other institution or 
person ("guarantor/issuer") to pay to the beneficiary a certain or determinable amount upon simple demand 
or upon demand accompanied by other documents, in conformity with the terms and any documentary 
conditions of the undertaking, indicating, or from which it is to be inferred, that payment is due because of a 
default in the performance of an obligation, or because of another contingency, or for money borrowed or 
advanced, or on account of any mature indebtedness undertaken by the principal/applicant or another 
person.”
5 For a detailed account, see Roeland Bertrams, Bank Guarantees in International Trade (3rd edn Paris; New York, 
ICC Publication  2004).
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obligations such as those of the seller for the delivery of goods, or those of the 
construction firm for the completion of the project.”6
In the event that the applicant defaults on performance, the beneficiary will need to 
present the documents specified in the guarantee to obtain payment. However, these 
instruments are often payable on presentation of only a written demand, without the need 
for additional documents proving default. There is nearly no difference between an 
independent guarantee and the standby letter of credit in terms of the applicable legal rules 
and the purpose they serve.
6.3 Recent Developments in Common law Systems
The courts in Singapore, Malaysia and Australia had all adopted an unconscionability exception 
in relation to independent guarantees and standby letters of credit. It is important to examine the 
approach of these courts before making any recommendations.
6.3.1 Singapore
In Singapore, a line of cases involving performance bonds establishes the position that fraud is 
not the sole ground for restraining payment. In Royal Design Studio Pte Ltd v Chang 
Development7, the plaintiff agreed to construct nine units of three- storey terrace houses for the 
defendant. Under the agreement the plaintiff would provide a performance bond of $165,000 to 
the defendant, but subsequently this amount was reduced to $120,000.  A dispute arose between 
the parties and the plaintiff then obtained an injunction restraining the defendant from calling on 
the performance bond. An application for discharging the injunction was refused. In arriving at 
his decision, the judge considered various matters:  
a. The plaintiff had carried out a substantial part of the construction of the nine units of the 
terrace houses but could not proceed with the construction of the houses because the 
                                                
6 Ibid, 37.
7 [1991] 2 MLJ 229.
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defendant refused to make interim payments and the defendant’s architect did not issue 
any further interim certificate. 
b. Under the agreement the plaintiff, on completion of the construction and issue of the 
temporary occupation licence, would be entitled to the 3½ units of the houses, and these 
3½ units had been sold for a total amount of $1.575m. The sales were made by the 
defendant and were yet to be completed, and the legal ownership of these units was still 
vested in the defendant. The defendant had paid to the plaintiff only $948,021.21 and a 
considerable sum of money was still in the hands of the defendant, which, if upon 
resolution of the dispute, the plaintiff was found liable to pay damages to the defendant 
for breach of contract, could be applied by the defendant to set off such damages payable. 
c. Pursuant to the agreement, the director of the plaintiff had issued a personal guarantee to 
the defendant in the sum of $1m and there was no suggestion that this guarantee was 
worthless. 
There was no allegation or finding of fraud in this case. The decision departs from the English 
position where an injunction can only be granted in circumstances where fraud is established.
    In Kvaerner Singapore Pte Ltd v UDL Shipbuilding (Singapore) Pte Ltd8 , the defendant 
purchased a pumping and valve control system for $1,000,000 from the plaintiff. Pursuant to the 
contract, the defendant paid a deposit of $300,000 but subsequently did not open a letter of credit 
for the remainder of the purchase price as required under the contract. The plaintiff delivered to 
the defendant a performance bond for 30% of the price. The defendant subsequently demanded 
payment under the performance bond. The plaintiff applied for and obtained, ex parte, an 
injunction restraining the defendant from receiving payment under the performance bond. Selvam 
JC stated that: “The credit was also a condition precedent to the right to call on the performance 
bond. And it failed to fulfill the condition precedent. Accordingly it was eminently just and 
convenient to restrain a party from taking advantage of his own wrong.”9 Approving of Eveleigh 
LJ’s obiter dictum in Potten Homes v Coleman Contractors Ltd10, he was of the opinion that the 
fraud exception is “not an immutable principle of universal application” and “has no application 
                                                
8 [1993] 3 SLR 350.
9 Ibid, 353.
10 (1984) 28 Build LR 19.
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where the injunction is sought against a party to the underlying contract who seeks to take 
advantage of the performance guarantee where by his own violation he fails to perform a 
condition precedent.”11
    The door to a major breakthrough was really only opened in Bocatra Construction  Pte  Ltd v 
Attorney General (No 2). 12 The appellant in this case was appointed by the Public Works 
Department (PWD) as contractor for certain works. They provided a performance guarantee but 
did not complete the works in time. Disputes arose and the parties subsequently referred them to 
arbitration. The PWD notified the bank and the appellant of their intention to call on the 
guarantee. The appellant obtained an interim order from the arbitrator but this was later set aside 
by the High Court. The appellant further appealed to the Court of Appeal seeking, inter alia, a 
declaration that the defendant was not entitled to call on the performance guarantee until the 
disputes were resolved by arbitration.13 In the Court of Appeal, Karthigesu JA  rejected the 
approach in Potten Homes and Royal Design which suggested that “...the courts in exercising its 
equitable jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining a call or payment on performance bonds, 
should not be precluded from adopting a broad approach, if the facts warrant it, to examine 
disputes relating to the underlying transaction.”14  Rejecting the appellants’ submissions, he 
asserted that, “...there is no distinction between the principles to be applied in cases dealing with 
attempts to restrain banks from making payment or those dealing with restraint of calls from 
calling for payment.” 15 He further went on to emphasise that, “Whether there is fraud or 
unconscionability is the sole consideration in applications for injunctions restraining payment or 
calls on bonds to be granted.”16   However, the appellant did not allege that the government had 
acted without honest belief in its entitlement to make a call and therefore the appeal was 
dismissed.
                                                
11 [1993] 3 SLR 350, 353.
12 [1995] 2 SLR 733.
13 Under s 27(1)(b) Government Proceedings Act (Cap 121, 1985 Rev Ed), the appellant could only seek a 
declaration as to the rights of the parties but could not seek an injunction against the government.
14 Bocatra (n 12) 743.
15 Bocatra (n 12) 744.
16 Bocatra (n 12) 746.
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There are two possible ways to interpret this decision:
1) Due to the express reference to unconscionability throughout the judgment, it could be that the 
court attempted to introduce unconscionability as an additional ground for restraining a call or 
payment on a bond. Although unconscionability was not accorded a full discussion in this case, 
one may assume that this was because the facts did not require it.
2) It could be that the court never intended to introduce unconscionability as a new ground. A 
detailed analysis of the judgment reveals that Karthigesu JA used the term “unconscionability” 
interchangeably with fraud. The parameters of the notion of unconscionability were not discussed 
at any point and no reasons were given as to why unconscionability should be an additional 
ground for injunctive relief. In fact, the approach adopted by the court in this case was not to 
investigate the facts relating to the underlying transaction. As observed by Adrian SP Wong, 
“The judgment was specifically tailored to dispel the notion that fraud was not the sole ground 
for an interim injunction.”17 Therefore, following this interpretation, Bocatra does not depart 
from the English position.
    In Raymond Construction Pte Ltd v Low Yang Tong and AGF Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd18, 
the plaintiff undertook to build a house for the first defendant. Pursuant to the contract, the 
plaintiff procured for the first defendant a performance guarantee. There was a dispute 
subsequently and the first defendant called on the performance guarantee. The plaintiff obtained 
an injunction restraining the second defendant (the guarantor) from paying and the first defendant 
from receiving the sum. The first defendant subsequently applied to discharge the injunction. 
There was no evidence of fraud but Lai J was of the opinion that the plaintiff had provided 
considerable evidence that the first defendant acted unconscionably. He granted the interim 
injunction solely on the ground of unconscionability and very much influenced by the following 
facts:
a. There was strong evidence that the first defendant would postpone meeting his financial 
commitments by employing various tactics, including the frequent drawing of defective 
                                                
17Adrian SP Wong, ‘Restraining a Call on a Performance Bond: Should Fraud or Unconscionability be the New 
Orthodoxy?’ (2000) 12 SAcL.J 132.
18 High Court Suit No. 1715 of 1995, 11 July 1996, unreported.
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cheques and delays in his payments. There were also several bankruptcy notices issued 
against him and some outstanding amount for the architect’s fees for the project which 
were not settled.
b. An interim claim by the plaintiff which amounted to 30% of the contract price was not 
paid.
c. The first defendant had requested the architect to withdraw a previous certificate of 
interim payment which was validly issued by the architect. The architect had no choice 
but to terminate his services.
d. The first defendant had obstructed the plaintiff’s work. He did not choose the marble, 
repeatedly changed his mind with respect to the marble newel post, kept changing the 
curvatures of the cornices, delayed his responsibility of the construction of the culvert to 
the house (which consequentially delayed the plaintiff’s work) and prevented the plaintiff 
from installing the extra water tank by alleging trespass. 
e. The claims for damages were disproportionately high.
The High Court of Singapore seems to have adopted the first interpretation of Bocatra in this 
case since it cited Bocatra as the authority for the proposition that unconscionability can be a 
ground on which payment under a performance guarantee can be stopped. 
    In New Civilbuild Pte Ltd v Guobena Sdn Bhd & Another19, the law took a U-turn when 
unconscionability was expressly rejected by Lee JC as a separate ground for preventing the 
enforcement of a performance bond. After a thorough review of Bocatra, the learned judge 
adopted the second interpretation and stated the following:
“At no point did the court in Bocatra discuss the scope of this concept of 
unconscionability…I do not understand the court as having changed without a discussion 
of the basis for it. Given that the Court of Appeal had stated that the weight of authority 
                                                
19 [1999] 1 SLR 374.
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had suggested that fraud as the sole exception was well entrenched, I do not understand 
the court as having changed the law without a discussion of the basis for it.”20
After a review of the leading English cases cited in Bocatra, he concluded that none of the cases 
were decided on the basis of unconscionability and that he was unable to find the term 
unconscionability mentioned in any of the cases.
    Soon after Civilbuild was decided, unconscionability made a comeback in Min Thai Holdings 
Pte Ltd v Sunlabel Pte Ltd21. In Min Thai, the first defendant agreed to buy rice from the second 
defendant. The second defendant’s rice was supplied by the plaintiff from China. Under the 
contract, the plaintiff was to procure a performance guarantee in favour of the first defendant, 
payable upon default of delivery. Severe flooding took place in China causing the plaintiff to 
default on its delivery. The first defendant made a demand for payment under the performance 
bond even though the parties were at that point in the midst of discussing a solution. The plaintiff 
obtained an injunction from Rajendran J on the grounds that it would be unconscionable for the 
first defendant to enforce the performance guarantee. On appeal by the first defendant, Lai J
upheld the injunction. In his finding of unconscionability, he took into account the following 
matters:
1) There was still a dispute about whether there was a breach of contract for failure to ship. 
2) There was an issue as to whether the plaintiff’s performance of the contract was affected 
by force majeure.
3) As between the first defendant and the second defendant, there was a dispute as to the 
applicability of the ICC Force Majeure Conditions.
4) There was evidence that the plaintiff had attempted to find alternative sources, albeit of a 
lower grade, which admittedly the first defendant could reject.
                                                
20 Ibid, [33]-[35].
21 [1999] 2 SLR 368.
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He was of the opinion that the first defendant was perfectly entitled to make that call since there 
was an expiry date, but should have in all good conscience offered that the money remain in the 
bank pending the resolution of the disputes between the parties.22   
    The real leap in the law came in GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building Construction Pte Ltd.23 In 
this case, the appellant (GHL) engaged the first respondent (Unitrack) to be the main contractors 
in the construction of a five-storey boarding house. The contract sum for the project was 
S$5,781,400 which included a sum of S$3,820,000 for sub-contractors’ works. Pursuant to the 
contract, the Unitrack procured the issue of a performance bond from the second respondent 
(AFG Insurance Pte Ltd) for an amount equaling 10% of the contract sum. Unitrack kept the 
performance bond and did not deliver it to GHL. Subsequently, there was a written variation to 
the contract whereby it was agreed that the GHL would pay the sub-contractors directly and the 
contract sum would become S$1,961,400. A dispute then arose and GHL purported to call on the 
performance bond. The Unitrack obtained an interim injunction against GHL and the bank. On 
appeal to the High Court, Rubin J found that there was no evidence of fraud on the part of GHL
but affirmed the order on the basis that “the present endeavour by GHL to enforce a bond which 
it did not even bother to take possession of, was unjustifiable as well as unconscionable”. On 
further appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the application. The Court of Appeal explicitly 
held that in the absence of fraud, unconscionability alone could constitute a ground for restraining 
a beneficiary from enforcing his rights to call for payment under a performance bond.  It was held 
that the GHL’s conduct was unconscionable because 10% of the revised contract sum amounted 
to only $196,140 but the GHL was calling on the performance bond for the full amount of 
$578,140 which represented 30% of the revised contract sum. 
    LP Thean JA, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, noted that the term 
unconscionability was referred to in Bocatra on no less than three occasions and stated that: 
“The concept of unconscionability was adopted after deliberation and not inadvertently as 
a result of a slip; nor was it intended to be used synonymously or interchangeably with 
                                                
22 Ibid, [28]. As the writer comments later on in the article, this seems to take a rather broad view of what constitute 
unconscionability.
23[1999] 4 SLR 604.
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fraud. There is nothing in the judgment which can be said to indicate or suggest that the 
Court did not decide that unconscionability alone is not a separate ground as distinct from 
fraud.  We accept that to that extent Bocatra is a departure, and if we may respectfully say 
so, a conscious departure, from the English position.”24
The learned judge confirmed that Royal Design was decided on the ground of unconscionability 
although there was no express mention of the term unconscionability in that case. Kvaerner was 
confirmed as being decided partly on the ground of unconscionability and does not strictly 
comply with the fraud exception principle established in English cases.25 The decision in New 
Civilbuild was expressly disapproved for the reasons mentioned above but Raymond 
Construction and Min Thai were cited with approval. 
    In GHL, LP Thean JA also approved of Chartered Electronics Industries Pte Ltd v The 
Development Bank of Singapore26 although the case was not expressly referred to in Bocatra. In 
this case, the plaintiffs entered into a contract with overseas buyers for the supply of certain 
articles and, as security for the performance of the contract, the defendant bank at the instance of 
the plaintiffs issued a performance guarantee. A dispute subsequently arose. While the dispute 
was still in progress, the buyers called on the bond and the plaintiffs obtained ex parte two
interim injunctions against the defendant bank, restraining them from paying on the guarantee. In 
Chartered Electronics, there was no evidence that the buyers made complaints
about the delays in shipments or defects in the goods.27 Chan J stated that:
“In the circumstances, there was strong evidence that the demand for payment of 
US$407,040 under the performance guarantee was not made bona fide. There was no way 
that the buyers could have justified the demand for the amount since they had retained the 
second shipment valued at UD$759,740.16.”28
                                                
24 Ibid, [16].
25 GHL (n 23), [20].
26 [1999] 4 SLR 655. 
27 With the exception of the second consignment, even so, the complaints were vague.
28 Chartered Electronics Industries (n 26), [45].
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  Chan J concluded that the plaintiffs had more than satisfied the test of a strong case of fraud and 
upheld the injunctions. But later, the Court of Appeal in GHL took the view that the term fraud 
was used in Chartered Electronics in a somewhat broad sense and not strictly in the sense applied 
in English cases. “Fraud in the common law sense involves more than mere absence of bona fides 
in the claim. It implies an element of deceit on the part of the beneficiary, that is to say a case 
where the beneficiary presents a claim on the performance bond which he knows at that time to 
be invalid or false.”29 In effect, the Court of Appeal in GHL was saying that the decision in 
Chartered Electonics was not based on fraud but based on the ground of unconscionability. 
    The decision in GHL has an acute impact on the law in this area while at the same time 
clarifying the uncertain effect created by previous decisions of the Singaporean courts. 
6.3.2 Malaysia
At one point in Malaysia, the law appeared to have also caught up with the development of the 
concept of unconscionability. In Bains Harding (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant 
Bank Bhd30 , the plaintiff contracted with the defendants to carry out certain insulation and 
painting works as subcontractor to the defendants. Pursuant to the contract, two performance 
guarantees were issued by the plaintiff. The defendants subsequently terminated the contract 
pursuant to Art 20 of the contract which provided that the contractor had a right at any time, for 
any reason and at its absolute discretion to terminate the contract for convenience by notice in 
writing. It was not alleged by the defendants that the plaintiff was in default in its performance of 
the works. The plaintiff’s work was passed on to Meisi Corporation and the defendants demanded 
that the plaintiff pay its creditors (the lower-tier subcontractors), failing which the defendants 
would seek payment under the guarantees. The plaintiff argued that the defendants had 
terminated the contract because it had a financial connection with Meisei Corporation and that 
the guarantee was called on to pay off the lower-tier subcontractors so that Meisei Corporation 
could continue to utilise them to complete the works. 
                                                
29 GHL (n 23), [21]. GNK Contractors Ltd v Lloyds Bank (1985) 30 Build LR 48, 63 was cited as authority.
30 [1996] 1 MLJ 425.
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    Richard Talalla J granted an interlocutory injunction to the plaintiff to restrain the defendants 
from receiving payment under the guarantees on the basis that the defendants were “guilty of 
fraud, have acted in bad faith and in an unconscionable manner”.31 It may be that the granting of 
the injunction was based on the fraud exception despite the reference to unconscionability. 
Richard Talalla J perhaps used the terms ‘fraud’ and ‘unconscionable manner’ interchangeably, 
without according them different meanings, like Karthigesu JA in Bocatra. However, the case 
can be construed as not being decided on the ground of fraud but on the ground of 
unconscionable conduct.32 The fraud exception in relation to independent guarantees traditionally 
encompasses the situation where the beneficiary presents a claim which he knows at the time to 
be an invalid claim. In other words, where there is either a fraudulent presentation of documents 
or the request for payment is made fraudulently under circumstances when there is no right to 
payment. 33 However, in this case, Richard Talalla J found fraud on the part of the defendants on 
the basis that they terminated the contract so that the plaintiff’s work could be passed on to 
Meisei Corporation, which could then benefit from the profits remaining from the contract. In his 
finding of fraud, he was also influenced by the defendants’ refusal to tell the court whether one or 
more of the defendants had an interest in Meisei, their refusal to disclose details of the contract 
with Meisei and that no reasons were given for such refusal. This is not within the scope of the 
fraud exception as understood from previous cases.
    Another Malaysian case where unconscionability was expressly adopted as a ground for 
restraining payment is The Radio and General Trading Co Sdn Bhd v Wayss & Freytag34. The 
plaintiff had contracted with the defendant to perform certain sub-contract works on the KL 
Telecommunication Towers. In accordance with the terms of the contract, the plaintiff furnished 
a performance bond for 30% of the sub-contract sum in favour of the defendant. Subsequently 
disputes arose over the completion of works which led to the defendant making a demand for 
payment under the performance bond. The plaintiff sought an injunction restraining the defendant 
from calling on the performance bond. The plaintiff alleged that it had substantially completed 
                                                
31 Ibid, 443.
32  Adrian SP Wong (n 17) 160.
33 This is well established following Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International [1978] 1 Q.B. 
159.
34 [1998] 1 MLJ 346.
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the sub-contract works and that the unfinished portion was due to the defendant and their sub-
contractors failing to complete their work on time and the variations requested by the defendant. 
Therefore, it was argued that the defendant did not have a right to call on the bond.  
    Kalamanathan JC adopted the approach of looking at the facts relating to the call on the 
performance bond.  He found the call to be inequitable and was very much influenced by the fact 
that whilst the defendant had alleged that the works have not been completed, the plaintiff was 
able to produce a letter from the defendant to its architect giving notice that the works had been 
substantially completed and requiring them to issue a certificate of practical completion. Citing 
Bocatra as the authority that unconscionability is a ground for restraining payment, he found it 
unconscionable on the part of the defendant to call on the bond.  He further stated that, 
“In the circumstances and in line with the (then) Supreme Court decision in Esso 
Petroleum Malaysia Inc v Kago Petroleum Sdn Bhd35, I hold that while an injunction 
cannot be issued against a bondsman, the plaintiff could not be prevented from applying 
for an interlocutory injunction against the beneficiary of the bond.”36
Here, he is drawing a distinction between restraining a bank from paying and restraining the 
beneficiary from calling for payment. He is effectively saying that the unconscionable exception 
can only apply to injunctions restraining a beneficiary from calling on a bond. However, this 
conflicts the judgment of Karthigesu JA in Bocatra where it was expressly stated that the same 
principles apply for the two. 37
   
    Subsequently, the unconscionability exception was not adopted by other high courts of 
Malaysia. 38 The development was halted by the decision of the Court of Appeal in LEC 
Contractors (M) Sdn Bhd v Castle Inn Sdn Bhd39. In this case, the plaintiff had contracted with 
                                                
35 [1995] 1 MLJ 149, 157.
36 Radio and General Trading (n 34) 357.
37 [1995] 2 SLR 733, [34].
38 Transfeld Projects (M) Sdn Bhd v. Malaysian Airline System Bhd [1999] 428 MLJU 1; Murni Builders Sdn Bhd v. 
Legends Golf & Country Resort Bhd [1999] MLJU 441.
39 [2000] 3 MLJ 339.
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the first defendant to construct and complete a hotel and office development. Following the terms 
and conditions of the contract, the plaintiff procured a performance bond from the second 
defendant bank in favour of the first defendant. A dispute arose, prompting the plaintiff to 
demand arbitration proceedings. In the meantime, the plaintiff also took out a writ for a 
declaratory order and applied for an injunction to restrain the first defendant from demanding the 
RM4.8m from the second defendant under the performance bond. The trial judge refused to grant 
an injunction and the plaintiff appealed. The appeal was based in part upon the submission that 
the first defendant was guilty of fraud/unconscionable conduct because:
 The first defendant demanded payment under the bond when he was himself in breach
 The first defendant did not disclose to the second defendant the material fact that that the 
plaintiff was relieved from further performance of the contract following the termination 
of the contract.
 The first defendant had attempted to demand the payment of RM4.8m without going to 
arbitration or without adjudication by the courts of the disputes.
In the Court of Appeal, M Sidin JCA dismissed the submission on the following grounds:
“First of all we wish to point out that the authorities we have referred to above 
clearly indicated that in order to justify any injunction to stop payment there must be 
clear evidence of fraud on the part of the first defendant which comes to the 
knowledge of the second defendant. Bad faith or unconscionable conduct by itself is 
not fraud. The examples given by the authorities above are those where from the very 
beginning there was intention to defraud the bank such as where the seller from the 
beginning had the intention not to send the goods to the buyer. This is not the case 
here. In the present case, a genuine contract had been executed between the parties 
upon which the performance bond was given. From the record it is clear that works 
under the contract had commenced but then disputes between the parties arose and as 
a result of that the first defendant demanded payment under the performance 
bonds.”40
                                                
40 Ibid, 17.
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It should be pointed out that the Court of Appeal did not at any point consider the two previous 
authorities, Bains Harding and The Radio even though they had been cited.41 The dictum in LEC
obviously conflicts with that of the two previous cases but these decisions were not binding upon 
the Court of Appeal. The non-reference to the two previous authorities in the judgment may be 
explained by the fact that an approach of not referring to previous non-binding authorities, even 
when a decision has the effect of overruling previous decisions, is an acceptable judicial practice 
in Malaysia.42 With due respect, the judgment is disappointing in that it merely asserts the 
position that payment can be restrained only where there is evidence of fraud. Nowhere in the 
judgment was any explanation offered as to why unconscionability could not be a ground to 
restrain a call on a performance bond.  
6.3.3 Australia
In Australia, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA) exists to prevent anti-competitive conduct in 
business, and to provide for the protection of consumers from unfair commercial practices. The 
act gives some rights for private action with the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission being responsible for monitoring and enforcing activities under the Act. Part IV of 
the Act is comprehensive and far-reaching as it prohibits anti-competitive conduct of various 
kinds such as collusive agreements, misuse of market power, exclusive dealing and mergers that 
substantially lessen competition in a market. Despite various criticisms, the Act was amended in 
1992 to introduce a new Part IVA entitled unconscionable conduct. Unconscionable conduct is 
prohibited by the TPA in both commercial dealings (s. 51AA and s. 51AC) and in consumer
transactions (s. 51AB).
    Two important decisions have since emerged, applying the provisions in the Act to find 
unconscionability in commercial transactions. However, even before these decisions, 
unconscionability had actually been considered in relation to independent guarantee and 
documentary credit transactions. In Hortico (Australia) Pty Ltd v. Energy Equipment Co 
                                                
41  Private information.
42 Although such an approach is almost never taken by English judges.
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(Australia) Pty Ltd, Young J  expressed his view that “….in some cases …. the unconscionable 
conduct may be so gross as to lead to the exercise of the discretionary power.”43 In Inflatable Toy 
Company Pty Ltd v State Bank of NSW, he again noted that, “...it is still wise to keep open the 
possibility that unconscionable conduct may be an exception.”44
    In Olex Focus Pty Ltd v Skodaexport Co Ltd45, the plaintiff agreed to undertake certain works 
for the defendant (the head-contractor) on a pipeline that was being built in India. The defendant 
was required to pay the plaintiff certain advances. As security for the repayment of these 
advances by the plaintiff to the defendant, the plaintiffs provided unconditional bank guarantees 
known as mobilisation guarantees. The plaintiff also provided performance bonds by way of bank 
guarantees to the defendant to secure performance of their work. A dispute arose as to whether 
the work was properly done by the plaintiff despite certain delays. The defendant later threatened 
it would make a demand on the bank to pay amounts due under the guarantees that were provided 
unless the plaintiff reduced the outstanding amount for work done. The plaintiffs sought 
interlocutory injunctions to countermand the demands made, to restrain the defendant from 
making any further demand under any of the guarantees, and to restrain the bank from making 
any payment pursuant to any of the guarantees under:
a) the general law, claiming that the threats amounted to fraud
b) s. 51AA of TPA46, claiming unconscionable conduct 
    Batt J held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any injunction under the general law as they did 
not establish a clear case of fraud. As for the allegations of unconscionability under s. 51AA, he 
distinguished the performance bonds from the mobilisation guarantees in his analysis. He 
declined to grant an injunction in respect of the performance bonds on the ground of 
unconscionability within the meaning of s. 51AA. After considering the nature and function of 
performance bonds, he was of the opinion that the calling of a performance bond in order to exert 
                                                
43 (1985) 1 NSWLR 545, 554. 
44 (1994) 34 NSWLR 243, 251.
45 [1998] 3 VR 380.
46 Section 51AA of Trade Practices Act 1974 provides the following:
(1) A corporation must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is unconscionable within the meaning of 
the unwritten law, from time to time, of the States and Territories. 
(2) This section does not apply to conduct that is prohibited by section 51AB or 51AC.  
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commercial pressure on the account party so as to achieve an advantageous settlement of a 
dispute is not in itself unconscionable.47  
  
    But in the case of the mobilisation guarantees the position was different.  Ninety percent of the 
advances guaranteed had already been repaid. However, all the guarantees were called up at once 
even though the beneficiary’s interest would have been protected by a partial demand or by a full 
demand under one of the guarantees After examining the mobilisation advance guarantees, he 
stated that the “..defendant’s conduct based on its legal rights, or on its perception of its legal 
rights, so far as that conduct relates to the mobilisation or procurement advance guarantee is, 
according to ordinary human standards, quite against conscience.”48 By calling on more money 
than was needed to protect itself, the defendant was abusing its position in the context of the Act 
and therefore an injunction was warranted. He granted an injunction, but this was limited to an 
amount equaling the advances that had already been repaid. The beneficiary was free to call upon 
the bonds for the amounts that had not been repaid. In other words, the injunction was 
constrained to something like $5.2 million of the $6.2 million outstanding under the mobilisation 
procurement guarantees. On appeal, the Court of Appeal refused to grant an injunction in respect 
of the performance bonds.  Significantly, it was observed in this case that the effect of the 
legislation “is to work a substantial inroad into well-established common law autonomy of letters 
of credit and performance bonds and other bank guarantees”.49
    In Boral Formwork v Action Makers50, the defendant supplied scaffolding equipment to the 
plaintiff. Pursuant to the contract, the defendant was furnished with a standby letter of credit by 
the plaintiff. The equipment supplied was defective. The plaintiff wrote to the defendant’s 
receivers setting out details of the defects and stating their preference of option (b) in clause 
24.13, which permitted the plaintiffs to remedy the defects themselves and deduct the cost of 
doing so from the price. The receivers did not reply. The plaintiff performed remedial works and 
then sought an undertaking from the receivers that they would not exercise their rights under the
                                                
47 The judgments in Woodhall Ltd v Pipeline Authority(1979) 141 CLR 443 and Burleigh Forest Estate 
Management Pty Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 54 support this view.
48 Olex Focus (n 45) 404.
49 Olex Focus (n 45) 404.
50 [2003] NSWSC 713.
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credit. The receivers subsequently made a demand upon the bank under the credit for the full 
amount. The plaintiff sought to restrain the receivers from calling for payment and the issuer of 
the standby credit from paying out any amount in excess of the undisputed amount on the 
following grounds:
a) The agreement contained an implied negative stipulation to the effect that the beneficiary 
will not call upon the financier to meet its obligation if there is a bona fide dispute between 
the beneficiary and the applicant. This was found to be absent here.
b) The receivers acted unconscionably contrary to s. 51AA51 and s. 51AC52 of the TPA in 
demanding for payment.
   By failing to respond to the plaintiff’s correspondences, Austin J held that the defendants were 
estopped from denying that option (b) under clause 24.13 was selected. 53 The effect of the 
section was to bring into the statutory regime of the act the general equitable concepts of 
unconscionability. Therefore, the issue was whether the conduct in question was unconscionable 
within the meaning of the unwritten law of the New South Wales. Austin J observed that the 
principle of autonomy cannot override the statute.54 He considered the decision in Olex Focus,
but was of the opinion that although some of the considerations in Olex Focus were relevant, the 
plaintiff's claim to unconscionable conduct went beyond the matters considered in previous cases.
“This is not just a matter of calling upon the irrevocable instrument in order to apply pressure to 
settle a dispute. It is a case where, effectively, the dispute had been settled by virtue of the 
administrative receivers' acquiescence in Boral undertaking repairs after its letter……..and then 
later, notwithstanding that acquiescence, Action Makers made a call on the letter of credit as if all 
those circumstances had not occurred.”55 He decided that it would be appropriate to make 
declarations and orders under s. 51AA.
                                                
51 Section 51AA Trade Practices Act 1974 (n 46).
52 Section 51AC(1) of Trade Practices Act 1974  provides the following:
A corporation must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with:
(a) the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a corporation (other than a listed public company); or
(b) the acquisition or possible acquisition of goods or services from a corporation (other than a listed public 
company);
engage in conduct that is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable.
53 Boral Formwork (n 50) [57].
54 Boral Formwork (n 50) [74].
55 Boral Formwork (n 50) [82].
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Despite objections by the defendants, Austin J concluded that s.51AC applied. He concluded 
that since the dispute was effectively over and the disputed amount was no longer owed, it was 
unconscionable for the defendant’s receivers to use their rights under the standby credit by
certifying for payment of the whole amount. Since s 51AA(2) provides that s 51AA is not to be 
applied to conduct that is prohibited by s 51AC,  he granted relief under s 51AC.
The decisions in Olex Focus and Boral Formwork triggered an alarm for all parties involved 
in such commercial transactions in Australia. In particular, commentators are most concerned 
with the diminution of the autonomy principle which serves the purpose of maintaining the 
commercial utility of such instruments. 56 Despite these concerns, this development seems settled 
in Australia now, with the Federal Court of Australia confirming in two recent cases that 
unconscionable conduct constitutes a ground to restrain payment (although there was no finding 
of unconscionable conduct on the facts of these cases).57   
Interestingly, one of these cases relates to a documentary credit. In Orrcon Operations Pty Ltd 
v Capital Steel & Pipe Pty Ltd58, Orrcon opened a documentary credit in favour of Capital Steel 
which is to supply steel pipe to Orrcon, which would in turn supply them to the State of 
Queensland. Orrcon subsequently claimed that the goods delivered were defective because they 
did not comply with the specification.59 Orrcon sought for injunctions against various parties60
from making a call or making payment, claiming that Capital Steel was guilty of unconscionable 
conduct within s 51AA of the TPA on the basis that:
     “1. Capital Steel's knowing failure to deliver steel pipe that complied with the specification …; 
                                                
56Jeffrey J Browne, ‘The Fraud Exception To Standby Letters Of Credit In Australia: Does It Embrace Statutory  
Unconscionability?’ (1999) Bond L R 98; Healey D, ‘Unconscionable Conduct in Commercial Dealings’ (1993) 1 
TPLJ 169.
57 Clough Engineering Limited v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited [2008] FCAFC 136; Orrcon Operations 
Pty Ltd v Capital Steel & Pipe Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1319.
58 Orrcon (n 57).
59 It was alleged that the pipes were not compliant in two ways:
a. They did not have the reduced minimum specified mechanical properties because the yield strength of the 
pipe was consistently less than specified. 
b. The yield strength of the coils from which the pipes were manufactured were significantly variable through 
each coil.
60 In Orrcon, Capital Steel had assigned the proceeds of the credit to the advising bank.
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and
      2. Capital Steel making and seeking to rely on the first, second and third purported drawings 
down on the letter of credit; and
      3. Capital Steel doing those things in circumstances where it lacked the financial capacity to 
repay those drawings down.”61
Besanko J was prepared to accept that a seller who presents documents under a credit with a level 
of knowledge about the goods and whether they comply with the contract could constitute 
unconscionable conduct within s 51AA.62 However, he held that the level of Capital Steel’s 
knowledge which Orrcon may establish at trial is insufficient to establish unconscionable 
conduct.63 In relation to the third plea, Besanko J stated that it was not clear that it could be an 
element of unconscionable conduct under s 51AA. 64 Nevertheless, he held that in the 
circumstances of the case, “it would be odd if the financial position of Capital Steel was an 
element of unconscionable conduct” and that even if it was,” it cannot be sufficient by itself.”65
Hence, the application for interlocutory relief was dismissed.
6.4 The Scope of Unconscionability
Despite attempting to posit unconscionability as an additional ground, it is evident that the 
Malaysian, Singaporean and Australian cases so far have failed to provide a clear and detailed 
analysis of the meaning of unconscionability. Equity is a system of law serving to modify the 
rigor of common law, where the application of its rules would operate harshly in a particular case. 
Therefore unconscionability, as an equitable concept, will inevitably be somewhat vague. 
However, in the context of demand guarantees and documentary credits, the concept of 
unconscionability is surrounded with so much vagueness that it is very difficult for practitioners 
to predict the outcome of any unconscionability case with any certainty. In this section, the writer 
                                                
61 Orrcon (n 57), [51].
62 Orrcon (n 57), [70].
63 Orrcon (n 57), [87].
64 Orrcon (n 57), [91].
65 Ibid.
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investigates what has been set out as the parameters of unconscionability by the courts of 
Malaysia, Singapore and Australia. 
6.4.1 The scope of unconscionability in Singapore and Malaysia
In Raymond Constuction, Lai J attempted to define unconscionability as follows:
“The concept of unconscionability to me involves unfairness, as distinct from 
dishonesty or fraud, or conduct of a kind so reprehensible or lacking in good faith 
that a court of conscience would either restrain the party or refuse to assist the party. 
Mere breaches of contract by the party in question would not by themselves be 
unconscionable.66”
    However such a definition does not reduce the uncertainties in practice. What is more apposite 
is to deduce from the cases decided so far some guidance as to how and when the courts will 
apply unconscionability as an exception to the autonomy principle. Based on the decisions of the 
Singaporean and Malaysian courts, the following situations are predisposed to a finding that a 
call is unconscionable:
 Where the applicant’s non-performance of the contract was induced by the beneficiary’s 
very own actions, for example, in Royal Design where the cause of the non-performance 
was the beneficiary’s refusal to make the interim payments and in Raymond Construction
where the beneficiary had repeatedly obstructed with the work of the account party. 
 Where the beneficiary fails to fulfill his major obligation as stated in the contract. For 
example, in Kvaerner, where the beneficiary failed to open a letter of credit for the 
remainder of the purchase price as required under the contract.
 Where, related to the underlying contract, the beneficiary owes a substantial sum of 
money to the applicant.  For example, in Royal Design where the account party was 
entitled to the sale amount of the 3 ½ units of houses but this was only partially paid by 
the beneficiary.
                                                
66 Raymond Construction (n 18), [5].
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 Where there is a genuine dispute as to whether the beneficiary has fulfilled his obligations 
under the contract. For example, there was a real issue in Min Thai as to whether the 
breach of contract was precipitated by a natural disaster and the applicability of the force 
majeure provisions.
 Where there is evidence that the beneficiary has an unhealthy financial record and a 
reputation of not honouring his financial commitments like the beneficiary in Raymond 
Construction.  
 Where there is evidence that a call was made in order to obtain some other financial 
benefit. For example, the defendant in Bains Harding threatened to make a call on the 
performance bond unless the plaintiff paid the lower tier sub-contractors. There was 
evidence that this was done so that the sub-contractors could continue completing the 
works, and since defendant had a financial connection with the company which is to take 
over the plaintiff’s work, the defendant could benefit financially from the call.
 Where, having regard to the factual circumstances of the case, the applicant does not owe 
the beneficiary the full amount as claimed under the call, for example in GHL, where the 
performance bonds were procured for a percentage of the contract sum and the contract 
price was subsequently revised, but the beneficiary called on the bond for the unrevised 
contract sum. 
     The writer takes the view that Singaporean courts have adopted a very liberal approach in 
applying unconscionability broadly to restrain payment. Min Tai manifestly illustrates this. On 
the facts of Min Tai, there is nothing to suggest that it was unconscionable for the beneficiary to 
call on the bond except for the fact that there were outstanding issues that had to be resolved at a 
proper trial.  In my view, a finding that there is unconscionability on the part a beneficiary who 
calls a bond when there is still uncertainty as to whether there was a breach of contract is too 
radical a departure from the firmly rooted principles applicable to such transactions. Such a 
finding runs the risk of diminishing the usefulness of such payment instruments. 
The Singaporean courts will, it seems investigate any allegations indicating unfairness and bad 
faith on the part of the beneficiary. In particular, the analysis above indicates that the Singaporean 
courts will look into any significant non-performance by the beneficiary or whether the 
beneficiary was calling the bond for an ulterior motive. Not only have the Singaporean courts 
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examined the underlying contracts, they also appear to have extended the examination of the 
relationship between the parties beyond the underlying contract by taking into account extrinsic 
information such as the beneficiary’s financial record. 67 It is acceptable that the courts are 
involving themselves in disputes arising from the underlying contract as this is inevitable given 
the nature of the unconscionability exception. However, the writer is of the opinion that the 
Singaporean courts have gone too far in the factual considerations it has taken into account in 
applying the unconscionability exception.
6.4.2 The scope of unconscionability in Australia
In Australia, there is a continuing debate as to what is really implied by the unconscionablity 
provisions of the TPA since the Act does not provide for a definition of unconscionability. In 
Boral Formwork, Batt J relied on the analysis of the Full Federal Court in Hurley v McDonald's 
Australia Ltd68 where it was stated that, 
“For conduct to be regarded as unconscionable, serious misconduct or something 
clearly unfair or unreasonable, must be demonstrated…Whatever ‘unconscionable’ 
means in sections 51AB and 51AC, the term carries the meaning given by the 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, namely, actions showing no regard for 
conscience, or that are irreconcilable with what is right or reasonable…The various 
synonyms used in relation to the term ‘unconscionable’ import a pejorative moral 
judgment ...” 69
6.4.2.1 S.51AA
S.51AA of the TPA provides a puzzling reference to “conduct that is unconscionable within the 
meaning of unwritten law.” This raises the difficult question of what is unconscionable conduct 
according to the “unwritten law”. Professor Buckley offers two possible interpretations of s 
51AA.70 One way to interpret it is that s 51AA was intended to merely import into the TPA the 
                                                
67 Raymond Construction (n 18).
68 (2000) 22 ATPR 41-741.
69 Ibid at 40, 585.
70 Buckley R, ‘Unconscionability Amok, or Two Readily Distinguishable Cases?’ (1998) 26 ABLR 323, 324.
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equitable doctrine of unconscionable conduct and provide the broad range of remedies available 
under the Act. By this he refers to the narrowly defined equitable doctrine of unconscionable 
dealing which requires the following 71: 
 the weaker party was in a position of special disability; and
 the stronger party knew about (or should have known about) the disability; and
 the stronger party took unfair advantage of its position.
His second alternative is to interpret s. 51AA broadly so that unconscionability merely means 
“grossly unfair or extremely inequitable”. 
    The first interpretation appears to presume that only one specific cause of action could possibly 
be within the reach of s. 51AA.  However, it is possible that s. 51AA encompasses other conduct 
falling under specific equitable doctrines such as estoppel, undue influence, unilateral mistake or 
relief against forfeiture. Two cases yield support for this approach. In ACCC V CG Berbatis 
Holdings v Pty Ltd72, the High Court was not called upon to decide on this issue but Kirk J was of 
the view that s. 51AA can reach beyond the principle of unconscionable dealing. Agreeing with 
the comments of French J at first instance, he noted the following:
“…..the primary judge made three pertinent observations: first, that as a general 
proposition the object of equity's intervention is to prevent behaviour contrary to 
conscience, however, this does not mean that the prohibition in s 51AA encompasses all 
conduct that would attract the intervention of equity; secondly, that within the meaning of 
the ‘unwritten law’ the notion of unconscionable conduct has no ‘technical meaning’ and 
provides ‘a standard determined by judicial decision-making rather than a rule’; and 
thirdly that while the Explanatory Memorandum prepared in support of the clause in the 
Bill that became s 51AA of the Act specifically referred to the concept of unconscionable 
                                                
71 This doctrine was affirmed and clarified by the High  Court of Australia in Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362 
and Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
72 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] HCA 18.
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conduct explained in Blomley and Amadio, that ‘may turn out to have been an unduly 
narrow selection of case law’...”73
In ACCC v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd74, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia 
commented that, although the Explanatory Memorandum and the Second Reading Speech 
referred to the Blomley and Amadio cases, the terms of the section are not limited to the doctrine 
of unconscionable dealing:
“Although the section is confined by the parameters of the ‘unwritten law’, it is the 
unwritten law ‘from time to time’. Neither the Explanatory Memorandum nor the 
Second Reading Speech can be treated as imposing qualifications which are not 
found in the words of s. 51AA.”75
    However, having adopted a broader interpretation of the scope of s. 51AA, the court goes 
slightly backwards, affirming that establishing unconscionability requires more than mere 
unfairness: “On the other hand, equitable doctrine does not presently provide a remedy against 
conduct simply on the basis that it is unfair in the opinion of a judge. It cannot be applied to 
unconscionable conduct at large.”76   
6.4.2.2 S.51AC
Unlike s. 51AA, s. 51AC makes no reference to the unwritten law and merely refers to conduct 
that is “unconscionable”. One major difference between the two is that s. 51 AC provides a non-
exhaustive list of matters that may be considered by the courts in determining whether conduct is 
unconscionable within the section. 77
                                                
73 Ibid, [76].
74 ACCC v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 62.
75 Ibid, [50].
76 Ibid.
77 The list includes the relative bargaining strengths of the two parties; whether as a result of the stronger party’s 
conduct, the other was required to meet conditions not reasonably necessary to protect the stronger party’s legitimate 
interests; whether the target business could understand any related documentation that had been used; the use of any 
undue influence, pressure or unfair tactics by the stronger party;the amount for, and the circumstances under which, 
the target business could have bought/sold identical or equivalent goods or services from/to another supplier; 
comparative prices and terms for availability of goods and services elsewhere; the terms and circumstances in which 
the weaker party could have engaged in a similar transaction with another party; the extent to which the stronger 
222
    An examination of the legislative history and judicial decisions points to the conclusion that 
uconscionability has a broader meaning under s. 51AC than s. 51AA. Section 51AC was added to 
the TPA in 1998 following concerns that equity and the TPA did not adequately protect small 
businesses against unconscionable conduct.78 Thus, the whole purpose of introducing s. 51AC 
was to enhance the ability of small businesses to seek redress for unfair and exploitative conduct 
against them in their business transactions with larger businesses.  
    In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Simply No-Knead (Franchising) Pty 
Ltd, Sundberg J said:
“…in my view ‘unconscionable’ in s 51AC is not limited to the cases of equitable 
or unwritten law unconscionability the subject of s 51AA. The principal pointer to 
an enlarged notion of unconscionability in s 51AC lies in the factors to which sub-
s (3) permits the Court to have regard. Some of them describe conduct that goes 
beyond what would constitute unconscionability in equity. For example, factor (j) 
directs attention to the extent to which the supplier was willing to negotiate the 
terms and conditions of any contract for supply of the goods or services with the 
business consumer. Factor (g) relates to the requirements of any applicable industry 
code. Further, it is to be remembered that the list of factors in sub-s (3) is not 
exhaustive.”79
                                                                                                                                                             
party’s conduct was consistent with its conduct in similar transactions with other businesses; the requirements of any 
applicable industry code; the requirements of other any other industry code if the target business acted in the 
reasonable belief that the stronger party would comply with it;the extent to which the stronger party unreasonably 
failed to disclose any intended conduct that might affect the interests of the target business or any risks to the target 
business arising from that conduct which the stronger  party should have foreseen would not be apparent to the target 
business; the extent to which the stronger business was willing to negotiate the terms of any supply contract with the 
target busines; whether parties acted in good faith.
78  A number of reports highlighted the vulnerability to exploitation small businesses suffer at the hands of larger 
businesses eg. Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Mergers, 
Monopolies & Acquisitions: Adequacy of Existing Legislative Controls (1991); House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Parliament of Australia, Finding a Balance: Towards Fair Trading 
in Australia (1997) (‘Reid Report’).
79 ACCC  v Simply No-Knead (Franchising) Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1365 at 31. Accordingly, his Honour concluded (at 
para51) that the evidence disclosed “an overwhelming case of unreasonable, unfair, bullying and thuggish behaviour 
in relation to each franchisee that amounts to unconscionable conduct...”.
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In ACCC v 4WD Systems Pty Ltd80, Selway J also interpreted s.51AC widely. He was of the 
opinion that unconscionability is not limited to the meaning of the word at common law or at 
equity.81 These judicial interpretations of s.51AC have also received the concurrence of various 
commentators.82
     At first sight s.51AC appears to provide a means whereby the commercial certainty of 
payment instruments may be completely undermined. However, since none of the factors listed in 
the section are conclusive, and are not mandatory, it is submitted that s.51AC can be cautiously 
applied so that it does not encroach upon the established system of these payment instruments. In 
particular, it does not preclude the courts prioritising the principle of autonomy as the most 
important consideration when exercising their discretionary powers to grant an injunction under s. 
51AC. So far, the Australian courts have shown that they will adopt a well-balanced approach in 
applying s. 51AC to restrain payment and will only restrain payment in very exceptional 
circumstances. 
    Based on the decisions in Australian cases, the situation most predisposed to a finding that a 
call is unconscionable is where the beneficiary calls for the full amount of the guarantee but the 
applicant does not actually owe the beneficiary the full amount claimed, as in Olex Focus and
Boral Framework. One notable difference between Singaporean and Australian courts on the 
application of the concept unconscionability is in situations where the beneficiary calls on the 
instrument at a time where there is an existing dispute as to whether there was any breach of the 
underlying contract. In Min Thai, there was a genuine dispute between the parties as to the 
performance of the underlying contract but the injunction was upheld by the Singaporean High 
Court on the basis that the demand was unconscionable.83 In Minson Constructions Pty Ltd v 
Aquatec Maxon Pty Ltd84, there was a genuine dispute concerning responsibility for defects in the 
civil works carried out by the plaintiff. However, the Supreme Court of Victoria allowed the call 
                                                
80 ACCC v 4WD Systems Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 850.
81 Ibid, [183].
82 Joachim Dietrich, ‘The meaning of unconscionable conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1972’ (2001) 9 TPLJ 
141, 144; Nicole Dean, ‘ACCC v Berbatis Holdings’ (2003) 197 ALR 153, 164.
83 See page 204.
84[1999] VSC 17.
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on the performance guarantee, emphasising that the purpose of the guarantee was to provide 
security to the defendant so that a valid claim for damages would be secured.85
    At this point, one must not forget that a good proposition of the scope of unconscionability is 
incomplete without a consideration of its interaction with the fraud exception. The English courts 
had confined the fraud exception to merely common law fraud. Chapter 3 demonstrated that 
although the exception has been widely invoked in a number of cases, its narrow scope means 
that only in a small number of cases is the exception invoked successfully. It is important to bear 
in mind that a too narrow scope of unconscionability will render unconscionability useless as an 
exception to the autonomy principle.
However, it is submitted that the scope of unconscionability should only encompass situations 
where the call on the instrument is manifestly unfair to the beneficiary.  Using the words of the 
trial judge, Carr J in Samton, “...if there is a scale by which to measure unreasonable behaviour 
by one person towards another, unconscionable is towards the extreme end of that scale."86
Furthermore, in Clough Engineering Limited v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited, the 
Full Court asserted the following:
“Given the commercial purpose of such guarantees,…assuming the absence of fraud, 
there would seem to be very little, if any, scope for the application of equitable 
doctrines of unconscionable conduct to restrain the exercise by a party of its legal 
rights under such guarantees. There may be extreme cases which would merge into 
the area of bad faith exercises of the power…The wide purpose of the performance 
bank guarantees and their character as reflecting an allocation of risk and a provision 
of security to their holder militate against any argument as to disproportion in their 
exercise.87
I am inclined to agree with the approach of the Australian courts so far, which is not as 
expansive as the one adopted by the Singaporean courts.  Australian judges have provided 
                                                
85 Ibid, [23].
86 ACCC v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1725, [83].
87 FCAFC 136, [138].
225
a guiding yardstick to illustrate the scope of unconscionability but it does not in any way 
resolve the problem. If English law is to adopt unconscionability to change the law, it is 
very important that the judiciary clarify the boundaries of unconscionability in order to 
reduce unwanted litigation. After a consideration of a wide spectrum of possible scenarios, 
it is proposed that only the following situations should attract the ‘unconscionability’ 
exception:
 There is strong and undisputable evidence that there is a material breach of contract by the 
beneficiary. In practice, contracting parties often allege breaches of contract by each other 
when there are real and complex issues as to whether such allegations are true. A 
determination of these issues can only be resolved by a thorough assessment of the 
contract, the facts and the available evidence. Since the function of documentary credits is 
to guarantee payment of money on the presentation of the correct documents, 
beneficiaries should not be prevented from obtaining payment merely because of any
allegation of breach. 
 There is strong evidence to suggest that the beneficiary is calling the credit for an ulterior 
purpose which is to its own advantage.
 There is strong evidence that the amount called for under the credit is more than what the 
applicant owes to the beneficiary. For example, where the contract price is subsequently 
reduced by re-negotiation between the parties or where the courts resolve an existing 
dispute in favour of the applicant.
It is also submitted that the standard of proof to establish these allegations should be as high as 
that required to obtain injunctive relief under the fraud exception.88  
6.5 Similar position in England?
It is ironic that any notable development of the concept of unconscionability in payment 
instruments took place outside England because it was more than two decades ago when Eveleigh 
LJ first said in Potton Homes Ltd v Coleman Contractors Ltd. that, “… in principle, I do not 
                                                
88 See 3.3.3.
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think it is possible to say that in no circumstances whatsoever, apart from fraud, will the court 
restrain the buyer.”89
    Although as a general rule fraud is the only exception to the autonomy principle, a lack of 
good faith has for a long time provided the basis for restraining a beneficiary from calling on a 
bond or guarantee. In Elian and Rabbath v Matsas90, the cargo owners gave a guarantee to the 
shipowners in order to obtain a discharge of a lien over its goods that the shipowners were 
exercising in respect of demurrage. A further lien was imposed over the goods for a different 
purpose and a further sum had to be put up to discharge the second lien.  The shipowners then 
sought to enforce the guarantee in relation to the first demurrage claim but this was restrained by 
the Court of Appeal on application by the cargo owners. Danckwerts LJ stated the following:
“It seems to me that if the shipowners were entitled immediately after obtaining the 
undertaking to claim a fresh lien and use it for the purpose of the undertaking, it would 
amount at least to a breach of faith in regard to the arrangement between the parties. 
Whatever may be the final result of the case, it seems to me this is an instance where the 
court should interfere and prevent what might be an irretrievable injustice being done to 
the plaintiffs in the circumstances.”91
    In TTI Team Telecom International Limited, Axarte Limited v. Hutchison 3G UK Limited92, the 
parties entered into a contract whereby the plaintiff provided complex software system to the 
defendant. Pursuant to the agreement, an advance payment bond was procured by the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff’s work was delayed for a variety of disputed reasons. The defendant then terminated 
the sales contract and gave notice of its intention to draw on the total amount of the bond. The
plaintiff applied to the court for an injunction to prevent this from happening, contending that the 
call was not made in good faith, without a genuine intention to terminate or to call but with the 
ulterior motive to draw attention away from the fact that it had wanted a premature let out from 
the agreement and to reduce the scope of the software system to be supplied. Judge Thornton QC 
                                                
89 (1984) 28 BLR  19, 20.
90 [1966] 2 Ll R 495.
91 Ibid, 498.
92 [2003] 1 All E.R. 914.
227
decided that these assertions were mere speculation without any factual basis and therefore 
rejected the argument. 
    However, despite the actual decision, he appeared to have accepted the contention that a 
breach of faith could be the basis for the courts to intervene to restrain a beneficiary from calling 
a bond. At one stage, he even elaborated on this point:
“The basis for a contention of a breach of faith must be established by clear evidence even 
for the purposes of interim relief. A breach of faith can arise in such situations as: a 
failure by the beneficiary to provide an essential element of the underlying contract on 
which the bond depends; a misuse by the beneficiary of the guarantee by failing to act in 
accordance with the purpose for which it was given; a total failure of consideration in the 
underlying contract; a threatened call by the beneficiary for an unconscionable ulterior 
motive; or a lack of an honest or bona fide belief by the beneficiary that the circumstances, 
such as poor performance, against which a performance bond has been provided, actually 
exist.”93
    It remains to be seen if lack of good faith will be applied as a general rule by the English courts 
to restrain payment. In the light of this case, the possible addition of an unconscionability 
exception is less audacious than it initially appears to be. This is because the breach of faith 
exception, as instigated in TTI Team Telecom, requires the court to look into all the relevant facts 
of the case. Many factual situations may well fall under both exceptions, since both the 
unconscionability exception and the breach of faith exception take into consideration concepts of 
fairness, conscience and good faith in determining whether an injunction should be granted.94 The 
judgment in TTI Team Telecom reveals that the English position in this area of law is not such a 
far cry from that of Singapore, Malaysia and Australia as it appears to be.
                                                
93 Ibid, [46(3)].
94 M Bisley and J Mok, ‘Unconscionable demands under letters of credit, performance bonds and bank guarantees’ 
(2005) 16 JBFLP 197, 211.
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6.6 An unconscionability exception for documentary credits?
6.6.1 The advantages 
From the facts of the cases analysed so far, it is obvious that there exist situations where the call 
for payment under an independent guarantee is abusive but the beneficiary is within his legal 
right to do so.  There is always the possibility that a beneficiary will call on the instrument even 
though the applicant has fully performed his contractual obligations. The guarantee could be 
called on for tactical reasons, such as to avoid further contractual obligations, or to vary the terms 
of a contract that has turned out unfavourably. In cases where disputes exist, the call could very 
likely be determinative of a quick settlement of the dispute to the disadvantage of the applicant. 
Although the terms of the contract sometimes allow the applicant to proceed to arbitration or 
litigation in order to pursue any claims, the applicant might not be capable financially of enduring
the whole process of arbitration or litigation.
    Similarly, in relation to documentary credits, abusive and unfair claims for payment could exist. 
Common sense would indicate that there is a need to do justice to the parties before the court but the 
various constraints of the fraud exception very often make it impossible to obtain an order to restrain 
payment. It should be noted that the possibility of abusive claims in relation to documentary credits is
much more limited if compared to demand guarantees. This is because, in documentary credit
transactions, the advising bank bears the heavy responsibility of checking if the documents presented 
comply with the terms of the credit. However, this does not mean that documentary credits are not at all 
susceptible to abusive and unfair calls. There are examples of situations where a draw down by a 
beneficiary of a documentary credit could be regarded as unconscionable or unfair but the law affords no 
protection to the applicant or the banking world. 
   
    The first example is where a third party, a loading broker who is not acting as the seller’s agent, 
has changed the shipment date of a bill of lading in respect of perishable goods so as to make it 
comply with the credit and the seller becomes aware of this fact before the documents are 
presented to the bank but was not involved in the falsification of the shipment date. The seller 
then presents the document to the bank without mentioning the falsification. Following the 
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United City Merchants case, it is established that the fraud exception does not apply where the 
fraud is committed by a third party and the seller was unaware of the falsification before the 
document was presented. However, it is not clear whether the fraud exception can apply where a 
seller is not involved in the falsification of the document but becomes aware of the falsification 
before the document is presented to the bank, since the courts have not hitherto held that silence 
on the part of the beneficiary would suffice to invoke the fraud exception. Professor Bridge 
submits that under the fraud rule, the beneficiary would still be paid either because silence on the 
part the beneficiary is not fraudulent or because there has been no loss caused to the bank.95  
Although this scenario could fall under an unconscionability exception, the addition of an 
unconscionability exception is unnecessary because it would be possible for the courts to expand 
the fraud exception to encompass third party fraud 96 or to encompass a situation where the 
beneficiary presents, without any revelation, a document that has been falsified by another party 
when he is aware of this fact.
The second situation is where Company XYZ procures a documentary credit from Bank ABC 
for the purchase of goods from the seller. As payment for the credit, XYZ obtains a loan from 
Bank ABC, secured against XYZ’s manufacturing equipment. However, the owners of XYZ have 
defrauded Bank ABC by transferring the assets to another company and somehow this 
information comes to the attention of the beneficiary. The bank later does not receive repayment 
of the loan. In such a situation, if the beneficiary presents complying documents, is the bank 
bound to pay since applicant fraud has been held to be outside the scope of the fraud rule? 97
However, it is submitted that it is unacceptable for the fraud exception to be expanded to apply 
to the second situation because the fraud in such a case does not relate to the genuineness of the 
documents presented but rather relates to the application process of the credit. 98 An 
unconscionability exception would be more comprehensive as it is able to apply to most 
                                                
95 M. Bridge, International Sale of Goods Law and Practice (OUP, Oxford, 1999) 274. However, it is not always 
the case that such falsification will not affect the value of the goods. 
96 See Chapter 3. 
97 Comdata Network Inc v. First Interstate Bank (1993) 497 NW 2d 807.
98 Xiang Gao, The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study (1st edn Kluwer Law 
International, London 2003) 117-121.
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situations where an injustice had occurred. Unlike the fraud exception which is able to afford 
protection to the parties only in limited circumstances, an unconscionability exception has the 
flexibility to apply to more situations. Depending on the exact circumstances, it may be that in 
both of the hypothetical instances discussed, the conduct of the beneficiary may not be 
considered unconscionable by the courts. What is clear however is that, there is room for an 
unconscionability exception to be applied to documentary credits.  
In addition, if a claim for an injunction was successful on the grounds of fraud on the part of 
the beneficiary, the injunction granted will usually be for the whole amount of the bond. In other 
words, the approach is all or nothing. In granting an injunction to restrain payment under a 
documentary credit, there could be considerations which dictate that an injunction should only be 
granted for part of the amount that had been called and unconscionability is a flexible concept
which enables the courts to grant a partial injunction to achieve justice. In Eltraco International 
Pte Ltd v CGH Development Pte Ltd99, the applicant objected to a call for the full amount of 
$2,438,800 on the performance bonds. To ensure that the amount of the bond that was called on 
was not unconscionable, the court took into consideration the retention moneys held by the 
beneficiary, the amount of money owed to the applicant for some undisputed variation works and 
the amount claimed in the progress claim submitted by the applicant before coming to a decision 
that the beneficiary was only permitted to call on the bond for an amount of $600,000. Therefore, 
the court was able to restrain a call on that part of the performance bond which it would be 
unconscionable to call on while allowing a perfectly legitimate call on the other part of the bond.    
    Finally, adopting unconscionability as an additional ground for restraining payment would also 
yield practical advantages for the legal system. The courts are able to achieve justice in the 
shortest amount of time, thereby saving on legal cost and time which is of course beneficial to all 
parties involved.
                                                
99 [2000] 4 SLR 290.
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6.6.2 The disadvantages
The most cogent opposition to the arguments above is that an unconscionability exception will 
result in a significant increase in the number of injunctions granted. This leads to the further 
concern that the commercial utility of documentary credits will not be sustained. Documentary 
credits are not the cheapest method of payment but have attained their popularity because of the 
extra security and certainty it offers to sellers. With an additional exception to the autonomy 
principle, the instrument becomes less secure and certain.  Buyers, sellers and the banks involved 
will have to be a lot more cautious in their dealings with documentary credits and this could very 
much reduce the demand for this kind of instrument. In particular, banks would not be able to
execute their responsibilities with full confidence since they would not be able to make payment 
merely because the documents presented comply with the terms of the credit but might have to 
concern themselves with the facts of the underlying transaction if any allegations of 
unconscionability were to be made.
    On the other hand, arguably such concerns are exaggerated since the courts can always restrict 
the scope of any unconscionability exception and apply it only to cases where there is severe 
injustice. Although the writer was able to give examples of situation which illustrates that there is 
room for an unconscionability exception in documentary credits, these scenarios would be very 
rare in practice. Therefore, even if an unconscionability exception was recognised in relation to
documentary credits, the number of cases in which injunctions are granted based on such an 
exception will not be significant enough to reduce the standing of the instrument in the eyes of 
the commercial world.100   
   
    An unconscionability exception might entail the courts involving themselves in any issues or 
disputes arising from the underlying contract of sale. Most of the time, the disputes that arises 
from a documentary credit transaction which would allow for an intervention based on the 
unconscionability ground are complex and would take a huge amount of time to be resolved. Not 
only is such an investigation not appropriate at the interlocutory  stage, but the evidence 
                                                
100 In Singapore, there is lack of evidence to suggest that the unconscionability exception  had resulted in the 
demand guarantee losing its importance in the marketplace.
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necessary to resolve such disputes might require a full trial on the merits. Nelson Enonchong 
expressed a similar objection to an unconscionability exception for demand guarantees: “....the 
court will be required to look into the consequences of the breach to ascertain what loss if any the 
beneficiary has suffered or, where the beneficiary already holds some security, whether the cost 
of rectifying the breach exceeds the amount held by the beneficiary. Yet these are matters more 
properly dealt with in any dispute under the underlying contract.” 101
    One of the major benefits of using a documentary credit is that a beneficiary will still be in 
possession of his monies even in the event of any alleged breaches of the underlying contract. 
This is the long standing ‘cash in hand principle’ which means that a dissatisfied buyer is only 
able to recover any losses or damages for any breach of contract through arbitration or litigation 
later on.  Arguably, an applicant who has voluntarily agreed to payment by documentary credit, 
perhaps after seeking independent advice, takes the risk of such a transaction and should not be 
allowed to go back on his promise. Similar arguments have also been expressed in relation to 
performance bonds: “If the account party voluntarily undertook the risk of unconditional payment, 
why should the courts intervene and assist him to go back on his promise when circumstances 
become unfavourable to him and he decides to go against what he originally contracted with the 
guarantor to do?”102 An unconscionability exception would provide opportunities for parties who 
had voluntarily entered into contracts to set them aside and avoid their contractual obligations 
whenever it would be advantageous for them to do so. 
    Despite its advantages in principle, the vagueness of the concept of unconscionability makes it 
difficult to apply to documentary credits in practice. At the moment, each case turns on its own 
facts because of the lack of guidelines in using unconscionability as a ground for granting 
injunctions. This, in addition to the concern raised earlier about the courts basing their decisions 
on documentary evidence such as affidavits or witness statement at the pre-trial stage without the 
benefit of full consideration of the relevant evidence, makes the process very unpredictable.    
                                                
101 Nelson Enonchong, “The Problem of Abusive Calls on Demand Guarantees" [2007] LMCLQ 83, 105. 
102 Adrian Wong (n 17) 185.
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6.7 Comparison of documentary credits and independent guarantees
This section considers the question of whether documentary credits and independent guarantees 
should be treated in the same way by law. A conclusion that both instruments are different will 
support the argument that unconscionability as an exception to the autonomy principle should not 
be made applicable to documentary credits.  The answer to this question requires an analysis of 
the characteristics of each instrument and the respective principles underlying their operation. 
    In the eyes of English law, the two are closely analogous. The well-established principle of
autonomy does not only apply to documentary credits but to independent guarantees as well. An 
independent guarantee, like a documentary credit, is a separate transaction in that a bank’s 
obligations to pay under the guarantee is unaffected by the underlying contract on which the 
guarantee is based. Similarly, the fraud exception is equally applicable to these two different 
forms of transactions.
“…..performance guarantee stands on a similar footing to a letter of credit. A bank which 
gives a performance guarantee must honour that guarantee according to its terms. It is not 
concerned in the least with the relations between the supplier and the customer; nor with 
the question whether the supplier has performed his contractual obligation or not; nor with 
the question whether the supplier is in default or not. The bank must pay according to its 
guarantee on demand, if so stipulated, without proof or conditions. The only exception is 
when there is a clear fraud of which the bank has notice.”103
    The purpose of both instruments is to ensure that the beneficiary will have a readily realisable 
security. As Professor RM Goode puts it, “Demand guarantees share with documentary credits 
the characteristic of being abstract payment undertakings, that is, they are promises of payment 
which are considered binding upon communication to the beneficiary without the need for 
acceptance, consideration, reliance, or solemnity of form …”104 The collorary of this is the 
established “cash-in-hand” principle. Both types of payment instruments are in most respects 
                                                
103 Edward Owen v Barclays Bank International [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 166, 171 per Denning LJ.
104 Professor RM Goode, “The New I.C.C Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees” LMCLQ [1992] 190, 192.
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regarded as being as good as cash because the beneficiary is able to receive promptly 
compensation for breach of contract without going through the tedious process of litigation, 
although his right to sue for further damages in excess of the amount of the credit/guarantee is 
unaffected.  However, where the paid amount exceeds any loss suffered by the beneficiary, the 
excess amount may be recovered by the applicant in subsequent litigation. 
    The two types of instruments are further assimilated by the fact that independent guarantee 
cases are often cited in documentary credits cases on issues of autonomy and fraud and vice versa.  
This is particularly true in relation to performance bonds. For example, Edward Owen 
Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd, Intraco Ltd v Notis Shipping Corpn, The 
Bhonja Trader, Bolivinter Oil SA v Chase Manhattan Bank and Turkiye Is Bankasi As v Bank of 
China are performance bond cases which have all been cited in documentary credit cases.  In fact, 
in most practitioner textbooks and academic discussions, the cases relating to these two forms of 
transaction are often discussed within the same framework.
    However, there exists the question as to whether independent guarantees are really similar to 
documentary credits, as perceived in English law. Despite their apparent similarities, the two 
instruments fundamentally serve different commercial purposes. The documentary credit is a 
means for providing payment of the price of goods. It truly facilitates international trading and 
comes into play whenever the goods are to be delivered. Payment is wholly dependent on the 
documents tendered by the seller and therefore documents play a significant role in the operation 
of the system. The documentary credit does not guarantee the performance of the underlying 
contract - the performance of the underlying contract has no bearing on the bank’s obligation to 
pay on the credit. 
    On the other hand, an independent guarantee does not serve as a mechanism for discharging 
payment of the price of goods or other performance. It protects a beneficiary from non-
performance and financial risks should the seller/contractor default on the underlying contract. 
Unlike a documentary credit, an independent guarantee only comes into play when a beneficiary 
alleges breach of contract on the part of the applicant. It serves as a form of deterrent, 
discouraging the seller/contractor from defaulting on the contract and provides a form of 
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liquidated damages by way of compensation if the deterrent fails to prevent a breach of contract.
Therefore, an independent guarantee is somewhat linked to the underlying contract.
Writing on letters of credit and performance bonds, C Debattista argues that the fundamental 
principles underlying the two instruments do not operate identically.105  The decisions in letters of 
credit cases indicate that a heavy standard of proof is required for the fraud exception to apply.
However, there are judicial suggestions that such a restrictive approach is not necessary in 
performance bonds. In United Trading Corporation SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd, a case concerning 
performance bonds, Ackner L.J. stated the following:
“…We would find it an unsatisfactory position if, having established an important 
exception to what had previously been thought an absolute rule, the Courts in practice 
were to adopt so restrictive an approach to the evidence required as to prevent themselves 
from intervening.  Were this to be the case, impressive and high-sounding phrases such as 
"fraud unravels all" would become meaningless.”106
Not only do there exist objections to the restrictive approach of the fraud exception, a further 
criticism is that the fraud exception, which has been rigorously applied to performance bonds, is 
difficult to operate and serves no meaningful purpose in relation to performance bonds. 107                                                                                                                               
This is because most performance bonds do not require the presentation of documents. The 
beneficiary can make a demand for payment without having to prove that the applicant has 
defaulted in performance of the underlying contract. However, if one takes the view that the fraud 
exception also encompasses fraud in the underlying transaction108, then this criticism has very 
much less force.
    In addition, the application of the principle of strict compliance in letters of credit and 
performance bonds is different. In Siporex Trade S.A. v. Banque Indosuez, Hirst J stated that in a 
letter of credit, the bank is dealing with the very documents themselves, and is obliged to 
                                                
105 C Debattista, “Performance Bonds and Letters of Credit: A Cracked Mirror Image”  [1997] JBL 289.
106 [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 554, 561.
107 Debattista (n 105) 304.
108 See 3.3.1.
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compare with meticulous care those tendered with those described in the mandate, whereas in 
performance bonds the bank is dealing with no more than a statement in the form of a declaration 
to the effect that a certain event has occurred.109
    Contrary to Hirst J’s comments, there exists a different judicial opinion, suggesting that that 
the principle of strict compliance should be applied to performance bonds transactions. In I.E. 
Contractors Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank Plc. and Rafidain Bank, Leggatt J was of the opinion that the 
closeness of the analogy between the letters of credit and performance bonds is dependent on the 
actual requirements of the bond. 110 Therefore, he regarded Hirst J’s comments about the 
differences between the two as resulting from the wording of the particular bond which he had to 
consider. In this case, Leggat J adopted a very strict approach:
“First, it (the court) must construe the performance bond itself, in order to see what the 
beneficiary has to do for the purpose of making a valid demand under it; and secondly, it 
must construe the call and any associated document, in order to see whether the 
beneficiary has done that which for the purpose of making a valid demand is required of 
him.”111
The advantage of such a rigorous application of the principle of strict compliance is that sellers
are better protected against the possibility of unfair calls. 
6.8 Conclusion
The chapter has discussed the emerging trend of using the concept of unconscionability to 
restrain payment under independent guarantees. It is evident from the discussion that in Australia 
and Singapore, the trend is solidly developing whereas in Malaysia the trend is not followed 
habitually. This paper has also shown that English common law is not totally isolated from this 
development where independent guarantees are concerned.              
                                                
109 [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 146, 159.
110 [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 205, 207.
111 Ibid, 208.
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    The writer appreciates the effort of the relevant jurisdictions for bringing on the new 
development in this area of law. This radical development was obviously brought about at a time 
when such payment instruments are afflicted with problems of unfair and abusive calls. However, 
even the unconscionability exception as applied to independent guarantees in these jurisdictions 
is in need of much refinement.  
It is observed that independent guarantees and documentary credits share certain similarities to 
a great extent. However, there is one significant difference - the documents against which these 
instruments are payable are fundamentally different. The inherent risk created by the lack of 
documents or the nature of the documents required under independent guarantees is precisely the 
reason why an unconscionability exception was instilled in the first place. In relation to 
documentary credits, the risk of unfair call is much lower. Furthermore, if the submission in 
Chapter 4 that the fraud exception should be extended is accepted by English courts, this would 
reduce the usefulness of an unconscionability ground to withhold payment. 
The analysis has also demonstrated that there is room for an unconscionability exception to be 
applied to documentary credits. However the writer is of the opinion that the disadvantages of 
positing an unconscionability exception outweigh the advantages. Such an exception would in 
effect expose those involved in documentary credit transactions to wide ranging possibilities of 
delay in payment while disputes concerning unconscionable calls are resolved. Although the 
fraud exception has so far not undermined the importance of these instruments, an ill-defined 
unconscionability exception, might have the potential to do so. Even if the unconscionablity 
exception was more clearly defined, its application to particular facts would not be 
straightforward and it would take time for a clear set of principles to emerge. If adopted as an 
exception by English courts, the initial stages of the development would be a very difficult period 
because of the uncertainty involved.  Therefore, on balance, the writer is of the opinion that it 
would be safer for English law to take a conservative stand on this matter and not adopt an 
unconscionability exception where documentary credits are concerned.
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CHAPTER 7
NEGATIVE STIPULATIONS IN THE UNDERLYING 
CONTRACT
7.1 Introduction
Occasionally, one may find that the terms of the underlying contract connected to a 
documentary credit contain provisions which restrict the circumstances under which a 
beneficiary is to be paid. This chapter examines the question of whether in such 
circumstances, these provisions may be relied on to withhold payment under the credit. In 
other words, will these provisions be enforced? The discussion which follows contains 
analysis of Australian and English cases, since it is in Australian and English courts where 
negative stipulations in the underlying contract have been vigorously argued as a basis to 
withhold payment.  
7.2 Australia
Australian courts have shown that they are willing to enforce these provisions in cases 
involving independent guarantees. The first indication of this was in Wood Hall Ltd v Pipeline 
Authority1, where Stephen J. in the High Court of Australia stated obiter that a beneficiary 
may not be entitled to payment if the provisions in an underlying contract qualify the right to 
call on the undertaking contained in a performance guarantee.2 Subsequently, in some first 
instance decisions, Australian courts have granted injunctions to restrain payment under 
performance bonds/performance guarantees on this basis.3 Most recently, in Clough 
Engineering Limited v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited4, the Full Court of the 
                                                            
1 (1979) 141 CLR 443.
2 Ibid, 459.
3 Pearson Bridge (NSW) Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales Wales (1982) 1 ACLR 81; Barclay 
Mowlem Construction Ltd v Simon Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 451; Reed Construction 
Services Pty Ltd v Kheng Seng (Australia) Pty Ltd (1998) 15 BCL 158.
4 [2008] FCAFC 136.
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Federal Court of Australia considered the right of a beneficiary (employer of a builder) to call 
upon performance guarantees provided by a builder of a construction contract. The applicant, 
Clough, argued that the underlying contract contained an express negative stipulation, which 
is that the beneficiary would not call on the performance guarantees unless there was an actual 
breach of the contract, as distinguished from events "bona fide believed" to be breaches.
Clough argued that since there was a genuine dispute, an injunction should be granted to
restrain the beneficiary from demanding payment and the banks from making payment under 
the guarantees. The Federal Court of Australia accepted that stipulations in the underlying 
contract could constitute a ground to restrict the rights of a beneficiary but preferred to refer 
to it as an “over-riding rule” rather than an exception.5 It is not clear what is meant by the use 
of the phrase “over-riding rule”. However, because clause 3.3.1 of the construction contract
required Clough to open an "unconditional and irrevocable" guarantee and the term 
"notwithstanding any disputes pending" existed in the guarantees,6 the Federal Court of 
Australia held that that the commercial purpose of the contract was to allocate the risk to 
Clough, who should be out of pocket notwithstanding that a genuine dispute exists. Hence, 
injunctive relief was refused despite the existence of disputes over breaches of contract.7 In 
this case, it was emphasised that “…[C]lear words will be required to support a construction 
which inhibits a beneficiary from calling on a performance guarantee where a breach is 
alleged in good faith, ie, non-fraudulently”8. It follows from this that any claim about an 
implied negative stipulation which qualifies the entitlement of a beneficiary to call on a 
guarantee will most likely be rejected by the courts.9
                                                            
5Ibid, [77].
6 In the construction of the contract, the Court said it also needed to consider the provisions of the performance 
guarantees.
7Nevertheless, the Court found that Clough was in breach of its obligations under the contract by failing to 
deliver the certificates of insurance and failing to renew the performance guarantees.
8[2008] FCAFC 136, [83].
9 Deutsche Ruckversicherung v Walbrook Insurance [1994] CLC 415; Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v 
Varnsdorf Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 812; Boral Formwork v Action Makers [2003] NSWSC 713; Orrcon Operations
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7.3 England
In England, there is some acknowledgment that the existence of a term restricting the 
circumstances in which a letter of credit could be drawn down could be a basis of upon which 
payment could be withheld. In Sirius International Insurance Co Ltd v FAI General 
Insurance Ltd10, Agnew, a Lloyd’s syndicate, wished to be reinsured by FAI. Because Agnew 
was concerned about the solvency of FAI, Sirius agreed to reinsure Agnew subject to an
agreement that FAI would reimburse Sirius if Agnew called on Sirius to pay. As security for 
the agreement between Sirius and FAI, a letter of credit was opened in favour of Sirius. In a 
separate side letter, there was a negative covenant term that Sirius would not pay a claim by 
Agnew nor draw on the letter of credit without FAI's consent. Agnew subsequently made a 
claim under the reinsurance contract but FAI disputed the claim. Sirius commenced 
arbitration proceedings on behalf of Agnew against FAI, claiming to be entitled to payment 
from FAI, which necessarily involved the determination of whether Sirius was liable to meet 
Agnew’s claim. Later on, provisional liquidators of FAI were appointed which had the effect 
of automatically staying the arbitration proceedings. Sirius applied to lift the stay but the 
parties reached a compromise by a Tomlin Order, in which FAI admitted its liability to 
reimburse Agnew. Sirius then called upon the letter of credit, the proceeds of which were 
placed in an escrow account pursuant to the Tomlin Order. A preliminary issue then came 
before the court as to whether Sirius was entitled to the balance of the account. The issue was 
whether the condition of the side letter was satisfied. Sirius argued that:
1) The condition of the side letter had been satisfied by FAI’s acknowledgment of 
indebtedness to Sirius in the Tomlin Order. 
2) Even if the condition in the side letter was not satisfied, it was entitled to the proceeds of 
the letter of credit because the letter of credit was autonomous of any underlying agreement 
between Sirius and FAI. 
    At first instance, Jacob J decided that the condition in the side letter had been satisfied. As 
to the second argument, he stated that if the condition in the side letter was not satisfied, 
Sirius could be prevented from calling the letter of credit even though the conditions were not 
terms of the letter of credit itself. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that Sirius was not 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Pty Ltd v Capital Steel & Pipe Pty Limited [2007] FCA 1319; See also N Enonchong, “The Problem of Abusive 
Calls on Demand Guarantees" [2007] LMCLQ 83, 92.
10 [2004] UKHL 54.
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entitled to the proceeds of the credit on both grounds. On the first issue, it was held that the 
condition in the side letter was not met because the acknowledgment in the Tomlin Order did 
not amount to FAI agreeing that Sirius should pay Agnew.  On the second issue, the Court of 
Appeal reached the same conclusion as Jacob J. Despite affirming the autonomous nature of 
the letter of credit, May LJ stated that “There is no authority extending this autonomy for the 
benefit of the beneficiary of a letter of credit so as to entitle him as against the seller to draw 
the letter of credit when he is expressly not entitled to do so.”11 Although not at issue, May LJ 
indicated that, had it been necessary to do so, he would have granted an injunction to restrain 
Sirius from drawing down on the credit. The House of Lords decided that Sirius was entitled 
to the proceeds of the credit by adopting a commercial approach in the construction of the 
Tomlin Order. The House of Lords did not resolve any issues regarding the effect of the 
autonomy principle on the express contractual restrictions between the parties.
    Hence, the question as to whether under English law, a negative stipulation can be enforced 
so that payment under a credit can be withheld remains unclear, although there is authority 
supporting this in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sirius. Even the authority of the 
Court of Appeal on this point remains debatable considering that May LJ had emphasised on 
the unique feature of the case in his judgment:
“…Here the relevant underlying agreement is, not the commercial transaction that 
the letter of credit was intended to support, as in the typical case the contract of 
sale or in the present case the retrocession treaties, but a related agreement 
regulating as between FAI and Sirius terms on which the letter of the credit would 
be established. The terms included express contractual restrictions on the 
circumstances in which Sirius would be entitled to draw on the letter of credit. To 
that extent the letter of credit was less than the equivalent of cash and Sirius' 
security was correspondingly restricted…”12
It is not clear whether the ruling of the Court of Appeal on this matter is limited to the unique 
facts of the case or whether this exception to the autonomy principle would extend to a
negative stipulation in an underlying contract which is supported by a documentary credit. It 
                                                            
11 [2003] 1 C.L.C. 1124, [26].
12 Ibid, [27].
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is submitted here that this exception should only be applied to cases similar to Sirius.13 In the 
case of negative stipulations which exist in an underlying contract of which the credit 
supports, the autonomy principle should prevail. 
7.4 Commentary
One should consider the difficulties which would confront a paying bank if the law was to 
treat an express stipulation in the underlying contract as an exception to the principle of 
autonomy. Where a beneficiary presents documents which are compliant the bank is obliged 
to make payment. But, if the applicant then informs the bank that it should not pay, alleging 
breaches of these express stipulations in the underlying contract, this puts the bank in a 
dilemma. Just like the other exceptions to the autonomy principle, the applicant should 
establish to the bank, to a high standard of proof, that the conditions in these agreed terms had 
not been satisfied. However, as one commentator writing on demand guarantees highlights,
there is a lot of uncertainty involved; firstly, in determining the existence of conditions which 
restrict the entitlement of the beneficiary to monies under a guarantee, and secondly in 
determining if the conditions are satisfied.14 On the first issue, much will depend on the 
method of interpretation used to construe the particular contract, a matter which has triggered
a lot of litigation in the past. The uncertainty involves puts the bank in doubt as to whether to 
pay. Practically, the bank may need to conduct its own investigations (although it is not under
a duty to do so) and even seek legal advice in order to form a correct judgment as to whether 
the applicant has established the allegation to a high standard of proof. If the bank withholds
payment under the credit but it turns out that the evidence is insufficient, the commercial 
reputation of the bank will be affected.
    It is also argued that withholding payment on the grounds of express stipulations in the 
underlying contract will be a step too far. The common intention of both the seller and buyer 
to elect the use of a documentary credit is mainly due to the advantage it offers as being as 
good as cash. In the other exceptions to the autonomy principle considered in this thesis, there 
is greater unfairness involved and stronger policy reasons which justify an inroad to the 
                                                            
13 In Daewoo Engineering & Construction Co Ltd v The Titular Roman Catholic Archibishop of Kuala Lumpur
[2004] 7 MLJ 136, the High Court of Malaysia granted an interlocutory injunction to withhold payment under a 
performance guarantee on the basis of conditions which existed in the form of a letter from the applicant to the 
beneficiary. This case was decided before Sirius and does not provide any clarification on this issue. 
14 N Enonchong (n 9) 95.
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autonomy principle. However, in the case of express stipulations in the underlying contract, 
these can be avoided by the parties. In fact, if the law enforces these stipulations to the 
detriment of the autonomy principle, it will further encourage the insertion of these negative
stipulations, which should really be discouraged. Otherwise, the number of injunctions 
granted will increase and the usefulness of the documentary credit will decline. Especially 
since documentary credits are typically used to support payment under a sale of goods, such 
an exception would defeat the whole purpose of the documentary credit in such transactions. 
In Orrcon Operations Pty Ltd v Capital Steel & Pipe Pty Limited 15, the provisions in the
underlying contract of sale was argued as a ground to refuse payment under a documentary
credit. This argument was not successful in this case, although the Federal Court of Australia 
did not dispel that this exception could be applicable to contracts of sale. It is submitted that a 
negative stipulation exception in relation to documentary credits which support contracts of 
sale should be rejected. 
7.5 Conclusion
There are considerable problems if negative stipulations of this kind are enforced in 
documentary credit transactions. Enforcement of these stipulations will effectively establish a 
further exception to the autonomy principle. Even if the scope of this exception can be 
confined strictly as in the case of the fraud exception, the practical consequences of 
encouraging the insertion of these terms could, in the long term affect the commercial 
viability of the documentary credit. Furthermore, this conclusion of not recommending a 
“negative stipulation exception” is consistent with the conclusion in Chapter 6 which rejects 
an unconscionability exception, since one may consider it unconscionable to call for payment 
in circumstances where there was a breach of the negative stipulations of the underlying 
contract. Under English law, the remnant of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Sirius still 
exists. Hence, it is urged that English courts clarify this issue when the first opportunity arises 
and re-affirm the autonomy principle. Given that no principles of justice are involved here, it 
is clear that the interest of certainty should prevail.
                                                            
15 [2007] FCA 1319.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, the writer provided an overview of the operation and function of 
the documentary credit. The chapter revealed the importance of the instrument in overcoming 
the risks involved in cross border trading transactions. The many types of documentary 
credits were discussed by reference to their characteristics and purpose. The choice of the 
correct type of credit is dependent on the specific circumstances of the case; it is important to 
choose the correct type of credit so as to ensure a seamless transaction and to obtain the best 
possible benefit from the instrument. It has also been shown that many complicated legal 
relationships arises from a documentary credit transaction, some of which do not fit into 
traditional concepts of a contract under the English common law. From the discussion in this 
chapter, it is evident that the principle of autonomy and the principle of strict compliance 
underpin the operation of the documentary credit, ensuring its success and attractiveness as 
an instrument of payment. However, by safeguarding the certainty of payment under a credit, 
these two fundamental principles also create unsatisfactory situations where some parties are 
able to benefit unfairly from the documentary credit system. As a result of this unfairness and 
abuse, the law has had to compromise these principles, by recognising that payment under a 
documentary credit can be withheld in certain circumstances. The focus of this thesis has 
been to examine the circumstances which provide a basis for withholding payment under a 
documentary credit. Throughout the analysis in this study it has been shown that some of 
these grounds for withholding payment constitute exceptions to the autonomy principle, 
whilst some others do not. 
It is undisputed that the tender of non-compliant documents will provide a ground for 
refusing payment as this follows directly from the principle of strict compliance. Chapter 2 
investigated the most common type of discrepancies which provide a ground for refusing
payment and made recommendations for reform of the law where necessary.  Although the 
principle of strict compliance is the guiding principle in the standard of compliance, the 
analysis of the relevant court decisions and the provisions of the UCP revealed that “strict 
compliance” has a different meaning in different types of documents. On this issue, the 
statement of Professor Schmitthoff that “This branch of law is too multiform to admit 
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generalisation” is most cogent.1 Many problems may arise as a result of an overly strict or 
overly lenient application of the principle of strict compliance. Although the UCP 600 is not 
perfect, this study made the finding that the new UCP strikes a good balance between
preserving the benefit of certainty and maintaining the interest of fairness. The relaxation of 
the rules of compliance and the additional options for which banks may deal with discrepant 
documents under UCP 600 may succeed in reducing the rejection rates of tendered 
documents. Nevertheless, despite the immense effort to achieve uniformity in this area, UCP
600 does not provide for every type of discrepancy which may arise in practice and some of 
its provisions are also exposed to uncertainty. It is certainly the case that discrepant 
documents cannot be eliminated but it most certainly can be reduced to a great extent if all 
sellers adopt practical measures such as understanding the law on documentary compliance 
and implementing appropriate training and strategy to handle documents within the many 
departments in their organisations so that common discrepancies can be prevented prior to the 
shipping of the goods.
Because fraudulent activities have dire consequences on international trading and affect 
the success of the documentary credit as a financial instrument, the law has for a long time 
established that, in limited circumstances, fraud could provide a valid ground to prevent 
payment under a credit. Chapter 3 examined the fraud rule, an exception to the autonomy 
principle which was created to prevent unscrupulous fraudsters from benefiting from the 
system. This study discovered that in England the fraud exception can only be applied to 
withhold payment under a credit in extremely limited circumstances due to the many 
requirements imposed on a party who wishes to rely on the exception.  Whilst it is recognised 
that there is a need to preserve the integrity of the system and maintain the certainty of 
payment, the way in which the law restricts the fraud exception is so excessive to the extent 
of defeating the objective of the exception. It is recommended that the fraud exception be 
relaxed but only in the following manner, as suggested throughout Chapter 3:
a) The ambit of the fraud exception should include both fraud in the documents and 
fraud in the underlying transaction. As Sztejn shows, the determination of whether 
there are fraudulent documents is intertwined with the question of whether there is 
                                                            
1 Clive M. Schmitthoff, "Discrepancy of Documents in Letters of Credit Transactions" [1987] J.B.L 94, 110.
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fraud in the underlying transaction. Nevertheless, there is some indication that English 
law is moving in this direction.
b) In considering whether to grant an injunction to refuse payment under the fraud 
exception, the balance of convenience test as expounded in American Cyanamid v 
Ethicon Ltd should not be applied.  It has been argued that this test lacks certainty and 
imposes an unnecessary hurdle since the applicants are already burdened with the 
requirement of proving fraud to an extremely high standard. Further, this argument is 
consistent with the ex turpi causa non oritur action maxim, which forms the 
conceptual basis of the fraud exception. 
c) The fraud exception to the autonomy principle should encompass fraud perpetrated 
by a third party. Due to the practical difficulties of establishing a beneficiary’s 
involvement in a fraud, a loophole will continue to exist in the law which allows 
fraudsters to continue obtaining monetary gains from the use of the instrument if this 
proposal is not adopted. It has also been demonstrated that forged documents do not 
actually conform to the terms and conditions of the credit, supporting further the idea 
that forged documents should constitute a ground to refuse payment under a credit. 
d) If recommendation c) is not adopted, it is submitted that the requirement of 
knowledge should at least be relaxed by the adoption of the concept of constructive 
knowledge. This submission, which is in line with the position adopted in America, 
also stems from the difficulties of proving subjective knowledge on the part of a
beneficiary. 
Chapter 4 explored the question of whether documentary nullity constitutes a ground for 
refusing payment under a documentary credit. The analysis of the relevant English cases 
revealed that English law does not at present recognise documentary nullity as a defence to 
payment. It was recommended that documentary nullity be accepted as a separate ground to 
withhold payment under a credit and should not as be treated as an extension of the fraud 
exception.  Many arguments were presented for this proposition in this chapter - the non-
compliance of null documents; the difference between the status of the beneficiary and a 
holder in due course; the protection of the financial position of banks; the prevention of fraud 
and the fairness in imposing the risk on the beneficiary.  The writer takes the view that 
documentary nullity does not constitute an exception to the autonomy principle since
presentation of a null document is presentation of an incomplete tender with the beneficiary 
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having no right to payment because of a failure to comply with the terms and conditions of a 
credit. Although various approaches have been adopted by different judges and commentators
in the determination of whether a document is null, it is acknowledged that it is not possible 
to define clearly what constitutes a null document other than that it is generally a document 
which is devoid of legal force. It was also highlighted that it is a common misconception to 
regard forgery as an essential ingredient of a null documents - the analysis in this chapter 
demonstrated that fraud, forgery and nullity are distinct concepts which may overlap.
In Chapter 5, the writer considered whether illegality provides a valid ground to withhold 
payment under a documentary credit.  On this issue, it has been shown that it is important to 
distinguish between the following two instances:
a) The documentary credit is illegal 
b) The underlying contract which a documentary credit supports is illegal
Withholding payment in a) is not a contentious issue since it is well established in the general 
law of contract that a contract which is illegal is void or unenforceable. However, whether 
payment can be refused in b) is open to debate. The refusal of payment on the basis of b) will 
constitute an exception to the autonomy principle since the documentary credit itself is not 
directly illegal and is traditionally seen as a separate contract from the underlying contract. 
From the discussion in this chapter, it is revealed that, unlike other jurisdictions, English law
is slowly recognising an illegality exception, although the exception is in need of further 
refinement. Based on the relevant English cases, it has been suggested that the scope of the 
illegality exception be limited by the following requirements: 
a) Knowledge of the beneficiary of the illegality: Just like the treatment of illegal 
contracts under the general law of contract, this thesis drew a distinction between 
contracts which are illegal at the time of formation and contracts which are illegal as 
performed.  In the former, it was submitted that knowledge of the beneficiary is not a 
requirement for an illegality exception to succeed. In the latter, it was submitted that 
knowledge of the beneficiary is a pre-requisite to attract the illegality exception. 
b) Serious illegal conduct: It was acknowledged that there are a few methodologies 
which could be adopted to distinguish between an illegality which is sufficiently 
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serious and one which is not serious enough to constitute a ground to withhold 
payment. However, this thesis did not advocate any of these possible means because 
it was concluded that it is in the interest of justice to maintain some flexibility in the 
determination of this matter. There are, however, a few considerations, such as the 
subjective intention of the beneficiary, the potential or actual consequences of the 
illegality and the extent of transgression which may be taken into account in the 
determination of this issue.
c) Close relationship between the contract and conduct: It has been shown that this 
requirement strikes at the heart of an illegality exception because a documentary
credit can only be tainted by an illegality in the underlying contract if the illegality in 
the underlying contract is sufficiently linked to the credit. It was suggested that the 
manner for establishing this is to focus on the function served by the credit in relation 
to the alleged illegality in the underlying contract.  
As for the issue of determining which is the applicable law to establish illegality in the 
absence of an express choice of law, it is submitted that the applicable law should be the law
of the place where payment is to be made under the credit. This principle, if applied to all the 
contractual relationships arising from a documentary credit transaction, would provide a 
consistent solution to an issue of law which is complicated and confusing. 
Chapter 6 examined cases in some common law jurisdictions where payment was refused 
under independent guarantees on the grounds of unconscionability. The aim was to assess 
whether this recent development should be adopted in relation to documentary credits. It has 
been highlighted that independent guarantees such as performance bonds and demand 
guarantees perform a different function from the documentary credit, but share many 
characteristics and have the same fundamental principles underlying the operation of these 
instruments. The documentary credit is primarily used to finance international trade but has 
been used in a variety of ways in practice.  Due to the varied circumstances in which the 
documentary credit may be put to use, and the complexities of its operation, there is certainly 
scope for an unconscionability exception to be applied to the documentary credit. The 
flexibility of the unconscionability concept means that any injustice or gap left by the fraud 
exception may be corrected.  However, it was concluded that the adoption of an 
unconscionability exception should not be recommended. It is nearly impossible to delineate 
the ambit of an unconscionability exception with sufficient certainty – this presents a problem 
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in an area where certainty of outcome is regarded as a crucial objective. This significant 
weakening of the autonomy principle could also create cash flow problems to beneficiaries.
Since unconscionable conduct is not as threatening to international trading as a fraudulent or 
illegal conduct, it does not provide as strong a rationale as fraudulent or illegal conduct to 
overcome the competing interest of certainty.
In Chapter 7, the writer investigates whether payment under a documentary credit may be 
affected by negative stipulations in the underlying contract which limit the right to call for 
payment. The discussion revealed that Australian courts have already recognised this as an 
exception to the autonomy principle, but the position on this issue remains unsettled under 
English law despite an indication of judicial willingness to accept this exception. It was not 
recommended in this thesis that breach of negative stipulation be recognised as an additional 
exception to the autonomy principle. Unlike the other grounds which provide a basis for 
withholding payment, accepting a “breach of negative stipulation exception” is different 
because it effectively allows parties advertently to derogate from the principle of autonomy.
This exception does in fact overlap with the unconscionability exception and just like the 
unconscionability exception, the arguments in favour of recognising this as an exception do 
not carry with them the same force as those which exist in nullity, fraud and illegality.  
It should be emphasised that the various grounds which were advocated in this thesis to 
provide a basis to withhold payment will not impose any extra burden on a paying bank.  
English law imposes a very high level of proof of fraud in all stages of proceedings where the 
fraud exception is argued. This is laudable and hence, as with the fraud exception, a bank is 
only under a duty to refuse payment where it is in possession of extremely strong facts which 
establish illegality or nullity at the time of payment. However, a bank is not under a duty to 
obtain evidence or investigate for illegality or nullity. 
Finally, there are some unresolved complex issues related to the operation of the 
documentary credit which are not within the scope of this thesis. The following issues are 
suggested for future research:
a) What are the actual effects of the new provisions of UCP 600? The new rules only 
came into force on July 1, 2007 but the writer would like to conduct an empirical 
research on this issue in future to investigate the overall success of the new rules. 
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b) Could arbitration be an efficient means to resolve issues and disputes relating to 
payment under a credit? Currently, an arbitral regime is not incorporated under the 
UCP. This issue is important because arbitration, in the bigger picture, could 
potentially play a pivotal role in enhancing the reliability of the documentary credit 
and ensuring its longetivity in international trading transactions. 
c) What are the effects of exclusion clauses which expressly restrict the effect of forgery, 
fraud or illegality? The effect of these clauses on the right to payment may differ in 
respect of different parties such as beneficiaries, assignees and transferees. 
d) Is there a cause of action under the principle in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & 
Partners Ltd 2 for a party involved in a documentary transaction who suffers financial 
loss following payment under a documentary credit?
e) What are the typical characteristics of securities provided by an applicant of a credit? 
The corollary to this is the question of how much importance is placed by a bank on 
the security provided by an applicant in practice.
These issues were identified throughout this study because they share a common feature with 
the subject matter of this thesis which is that further clarification of these issues may provide 
important insights into understanding the rights and obligations of the various parties in 
relation to payment.
                                                            
2 [1964] AC 465.
 251
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Articles 
 
 
Ademun-Odeke, “Double Invoicing in International Trade; The Fraud and Nullity exceptions 
in Letters of Credit – Are the America Accord and the UCP 500 Crooks Charters?” (2006) 18 
Denning L.J. 115. 
 
Adodo, E., “Conformity of Presentation Documents and a Rejection Notice in Letters of 
Credit Litigation: A Tale of Two Doctrines” (2006) 36 HKLJ 309. 
 
Adodo, E., “Non-documentary requirements in letters of credit transactions: what is the 
bank's obligation today?” [2008] JBL 103. 
 
Arban, E., “The Doctrine of Strict Compliance in the Italian Legal System” (2005) 23 
Ariz.J.Int'l & Comp.L. 77. 
 
Barnes, J., “The UCP in court "Illegality" as excusing dishonour of L/C obligations”  
<http://www.iccbooks.com/Home/UCPCourtIllegality.aspx> accessed 11 June 2009. 
 
Barnett, M., and Isaacs, M., “International trade finance - letters of credit, UCP 600 and 
examination of documents” [2007] J.I.B.L.R 660.    
 
Baxt, R., “Unconscionable Conduct Under the Trade Practices Act” (1997) 71 ALJ 432. 
 
Baxt, R., and Mahemoff, J., “Unconscionable Conduct under the Trade Practices Act — An 
Unfair Response by the Government: A Preliminary View” (1998) 26 ABLR 5. 
 
Beatson, J., “Repudiation of Illegal Purpose as a Ground for Restitution” (1975) 91 LQR 313. 
 
Bennett, H.N.,  “Documentary Credits: A Reasonable Time for What?” [1992] LMCLQ 169. 
 
Bennett, H.N., “Performance Bonds and the Principle of Autonomy” [1994] JBL 574. 
 
Bennett, H.N., “Stern Doctrine and Commercial Common Sense in the Law of Documentary 
Credits” [1999] LMCLQ 507. 
 
Bennett, H.N., “Unclear or Ambiguous Instructions in the World of Documentary Credits” 
[2001] LMCLQ 23. 
 
Bergami, R., “UCP 600: Letter of Credit Rules Revised” 
<http://www.melbournecentre.com.au/Finsia_MCFS/2007/Roberto_Bergami_final.pdf>acess
ed 8 March 2009. 
 
Bisley, M., and Mok, J., “Unconscionable demands under letters of credit, performance 
bonds and bank guarantees” (2005) 16 JBFLP 197. 
 
 
 252
Brown, L., “The Impact of Section 51AC Of The Trade Practices Act 1974 (CTH) on 
Commercial Certainty” [2004] MULR 589. 
 
Browne, J.J., “The Fraud Exception to Standby Letters of Credit in Australia: Does it 
embrace Statutory Unconscionability?” (1999) 11 Bond LR 98. 
 
Bryan, M., “Unjust Enrichment and Unconscionability in Australia” in  J.W. Neyers, M. 
Mcinnes and S. Pitel (eds) Understanding Unjust Enrichment (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2004). 
 
Buckley, R., “Illegal Transactions: Chaos Or Discretion” (2000) 20 LS 155. 
 
Buckley, R., “Illegality in Contract and Conceptual Reasoning” (1983) 12 Anglo-American 
LR 280. 
 
Buckley, R., “Unconscionability Amok, or Two Readily Distinguishable Cases?” (1998) 26 
ABLR 323. 
 
Byrne, J.E., “Negotiation in Letter of Credit Practice and Law: The Evolution of the 
Doctrine” (2007) 42 Tex. Int'l L.J. 561. 
 
Chan, F.W., “Documentary Compliance under UCP: A fault finding mission or a mere 
guessing exercise?” Law Lectures for Practitioners 1999 
<http://sunzi1.lib.hku.hk/hkjo/view/14/1400252.pdf>accessed 12 December 2008. 
 
Chew, W., “Strict Compliance in Letters of Credit: The Banker's Protection or Bane?” (1990) 
2 SAcLJ 70. 
 
Chin and Wong, “Autonomy- A nullity Exception at Last?” [2004] LMCLQ 14. 
 
Chuah, J., “Documentary and illegality in the underlying transaction” (2003) 9 JIML 518. 
 
Chuah, J., “Documentary Credit-principle of autonomy-derogation” (2003) 9 JIML 215. 
 
Chuah, J., “UCP 600 new challenges and issues” (2007) 13 JIML 73. 
 
Clough, D., “Trends in the Law of Unconscionability” (1999) 18 ABR 34. 
 
Coleman, M., “Performance Guarantees” [1990] LMCLQ 223. 
 
Collyer, G., “The Origins of the UCP 600 Revision”, (2006) Coastline Solutions 
<http://www.coastlinesolutions.com/news0.htm>accessed 6th March 2007.  
 
Coutsoudis, B.,“Letters of credit and the Fraud Exception :A Comparative Analysis of the 
Laws of the United States of America, England and South Africa” 
<http://www.lawonline.co.za/IntTradeLaw/letcredit.htm> accessed 1 August 2009. 
 
Davies, P.S., "The Illegality Defence and Public Policy" (2009) 125 LQR 556. 
 
Dean, N., “ACCC v Berbatis Holdings” (2003) 197 ALR 153. 
 253
 
Debattista, C., “Performance Bonds and Letters of Credit: A Cracked Mirror Image” [1997] 
JBL 289. 
 
Debattista, C., “The new UCP 600: changes to the tender of the seller's shipping documents 
under letters of credit” [2007] JBL 329. 
 
Dixon, W.M., “As good as cash?: The diminution of the autonomy principle” (2004) 32 
ABLR 391. 
 
Dolan, J.F., “Analyzing Bank Drafted Standby Letter of Credit Rules: The International 
Standby Practice (ISP98)” [2000] 45 Wayne L. Rev. 1865. 
 
Dolan, J.F., “Tethering the Fraud Inquiry in Letter of Credit Law” (2006) 21 Banking & Fin. 
L. Rev 479. 
 
Dolan, J.F., “The UN Convention on International Independent Undertakings: Do States with 
Mature Letter of Credit Regimes Need It?” (1997) 13 Banking & Fin L.Rev.1. 
 
Downes, P., “UCP 600: not so strict compliance” (2007) 22 B.J.I.B. & F.L. 196. 
 
Ellinger, E. P., “The UCP-500: Considering a New Revision” [2004] LMCLQ 30. 
 
Ellinger, E.P., “Fraud in documentary credit transactions” [1981] JBL 258. 
 
Enonchong, N., “Illegality: The Fading Flame of Public Policy” (1994) 14 OJLS 295. 
 
Enonchong, N., “The Problem of Abusive Calls on Demand Guarantees” [2007] LMCLQ 83. 
 
Enonchong, N.,“The Autonomy Principle of Letters of Credit: An Illegality Exception?” 
[2006] LMCLQ 404. 
 
Fellinger, G.A., “Letters of Credit: The Autonomy Principle and the Fraud Exception” (1990) 
1 JBFLP 4. 
 
Finlay, A., “Unconscionable Conduct and the Business Plaintiff: Has Australia Gone Too 
Far?” (1999) 28 A.A.L.R. 470. 
 
Furmston, M.P., “The Analysis of Illegal Contracts” (1966) 16 U. Toronto L.J. 267. 
 
Gao, X., “The Fraud Rule in Law of Letters of Credit in the P.R.C” (2007) 41 Int'l Law 1067. 
 
Gao, X., and Buckley, R.P., “A Comparative Analysis of the Standard of Fraud Required 
Under the Fraud Rule in Letter of Credit Law” (2003) 13 Duke J. of Comp. & Int'l L. 293. 
 
Gino dal Pont, “The Varying Shades of “Unconscionable” Conduct — Same Term, Different 
Meaning” (2000) 19 ABR 135. 
 
Goode, R.M., “The New I.C.C Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees” [1992] LMCLQ 190. 
 
 254
Goode, R.M., “Reflections on Letters of Credit -1” [1980] JBL 291. 
 
Hare, C., "Not so Black and White: the Limits of the Autonomy Principle" (2004) 63 CLJ 
288. 
 
Harfield, H., “Enjoining letter of credit transactions” (1978) 95 Banking L.J. 596. 
 
Healey, D., “Unconscionable Conduct in Commercial Dealings” (1993) 1 TPLJ 169. 
 
Holdsworth, “The Origins and Early History of Negotiable Instruments (II)” (1915) 31 LQR 
173. 
 
Hoong, A.L.F., “Injunctions and Performance Bonds- A Return To English Orthodoxy” 
(1995) SJLS 682. 
 
Horowitz, D., “Banco Santander and the UCP 600” [2008] JBL 508. 
 
Kozolchyk, B.,“The Immunization of Fraudulently Procured Letter of Credit Acceptances: 
All Services Exportacao, Importacao Comercio, S.A. v. Banco Bamerindus Do Brazil, S.A. 
and First Commercial v. Gotham Originals” (1992) 58 Brook. L. Rev. 369.  
 
Law Commission, “Illegal Transactions: The Effect of Illegality on Contracts and Trusts” 
(Consultation Paper No 154) 1999. 
 
Lawson, M., “Performance Bonds- Irrevocable Obligations” [1987] JBL 259. 
 
Leacock, S.J., "Fraud in international transaction: Enjoining payment of letters of credit in 
international transaction" (1984) 17 Vanderbilt J Transnat’l L 855. 
 
Leacock, S.J., “Fraud in the International Transaction: Enjoining Payment of Letters of Credit 
in International Transactions” (1984) 17 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 885. 
 
Lee, A., “Injuncting Calls on Performance Bonds: Reconstructing Unconscionability” (2003) 
15 SAcLJ 30. 
 
Lee, R. J., "Strict Compliance and the Fraud Exception: Balancing the Interests of Mercantile 
Traders in the Modern Law of Documentary Credits" (2008) 7 MqJlBLaw 137. 
 
Levit, J.K., "Bottom-Up Lawmaking Through a Pluralist Lens: The ICC Banking 
Commission and the Transnational Regulation of Letters of Credit" (2008) 57 Emory L.J. 
1147.  
 
Loh, Q.S.C., and Wu, T.H., “Injunctions Restraining Calls On Performance Bonds-Is Fraud 
the Only Ground in Singapore?” [2000] LMCLQ 348. 
 
Mann,R.J., “The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions” (2000) 98 Mich. L. Rev. 
2494.  
 
McLaughlin, G.T., “Standby Letters of Credit and Penalty Clauses: An Unexpected Synergy” 
(1982) 43 Ohio St. L.J. 1.  
 255
 
McLaughlin, G.T.,“Letters of Credit and Illegal Contracts: The Limits of the Independence 
Principle” (1989) 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1197. 
 
Merkin, R., “Restitution by Withdrawal from Executory Illegal Contracts” (1981) 97 LQR 
420. 
 
Monteiro, F., “Documentary Credits: the Autonomy Principle and the Fraud Exception - A 
Comparative analysis of common law approaches and suggestions for New Zealand” (2007) 
13 AULR 144. 
 
Mooney, J.L., and Blodgett, M.S., “Letters of Credit in the Global Economy: Implications for 
International Trade” (1995) 4 Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation 175. 
 
Morris, R., “Discrepancies: Has UCP 500 Wrought Any Improvement?” Hong Kong Lawyer 
(Dec 1998) <http://sunzi1.lib.hku.hk/hkjo/view/15/1502320.pdf.> accessed 13 Jan 2008. 
 
Morse, C.G.J., “Letters of credit and the Rome Convention” [1994] LMCLQ 560. 
 
Moses, M.L., “Controlling the Letter of Credit Transaction” The New Jersey State Bar 
Association <http://www.connellfoley.com/articles/moses1.html> accessed 2 February 2009. 
 
Mugasha, A., “Enjoining the Beneficiary's Claim on a Letter of Credit or Bank Guarantee” 
[2004] JBL 515. 
 
Neo, D., “A Nullity Exception” [2004] SJLS 46. 
 
Note, “Fraud in the Transaction: Enjoining Letters of Credit During the Iranian Revolution” 
(1980) 93 Harv.L.Rev. 992. 
 
Parson, R., “UCP 600 - a new lease of life for documentary credits? Part 1” 2007 Jan F. & 
C.L. 1. 
 
Parson, R., “UCP 600 - a new lease of life for documentary credits? Part 2” 2007 Feb F. & 
C.L. 1. 
 
Sappideen, R, “International commercial letters of credit: Balancing the rights of buyers and 
sellers in insolvency” [2006] JBL 133. 
 
Schmitthoff, C.M., "Discrepancy of Documents in Letters of Credit Transactions" [1987] 
JBL 94. 
 
Singh, L., “Caveat Emptor: Are Decisions More Favourable to the Seller on Matters Relating 
to Letters of Credit?” (2006) 2 NJCL  <http://www.njcl.fi/2_2006/article2.pdf> accessed 10th 
July 2007. 
 
Smith, G.W., “Irrevocable Letters of Credit and Third Party Fraud: The American  
Accord” (1983) 24 Va J Int'l L 55. 
 
 256
Stoufflet, J., “Fraud in Documenting Credit, Letter of Credit and Demand Guaranty” (2001) 
106 Dick. L. Rev. 21.  
 
Stowe, H., “The Unruly Horse Has Bolted: Tinsley v Milligan” (1994) 57 MLR 441. 
 
Symons E.L., “Letters of Credit: Fraud, Good Faith and the Basis for Injunctive Relief” 
(1980) 54 T.L.R 338. 
 
Takahashi, K., “The Introduction of Article 12(b) in the UCP 600: Was It Really a Step 
Forward?” [2009] J.I.B.L.R. 285. 
 
Taneja, P., “UCP 600: A Document Restoring the Credibility of LCs” (2007) 109 Business 
Credit 56. 
 
Teoh, P.O.T, “Letters of Credit: A Conflict of Laws Perspective” (1990) 2 SAcLJ 51. 
 
Treitel, G.H., “Mistake in Contract” (1988) 104 LQR 501. 
 
Tucker, P., “Too Much Concern Too Soon? Rationalising the Elements of Section 51AC of 
the Trade Practices Act” (2001) 17 JCL 120. 
 
Ulph, J., “The UCP 600: documentary credits in the 21st century” [2007] JBL 355. 
 
Walkling, K., “Can you bank on your guarantee?” (1990) 5 J.I.B.L. 345.   
 
Wedderburn, K., “Collateral Contracts” [1959] CLJ 58. 
 
Whitaker, R.D, “Letters of Credit and Electronic Commerce” (1995) 31 Idaho L. Rev. 699. 
 
Williams, M., “Documentary Credits and Fraud: English and Chinese Law Compared” 
[2004] JBL 155.  
 
Wong, A.S.P., “Restraining a Call on a Performance Bond: Should Fraud or 
Unconscionability be the New Orthodoxy?” (2000) 12 SAcLJ 132.  
 
 
Books 
 
 
Aldrich, G.H., The Jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: An Analysis of 
the Decisions of the Tribunal (OUP, USA 1996). 
 
Atiyah, P.S., An Introduction to the Law of Contract (6th edn OUP ,Oxford 2006). 
 
Beatson, J.,  Anson's Law of Contract (28th edn OUP, Oxford 2002). 
 
Bertrams, R., Bank Guarantees in International Trade (3rd edn ICC Publication, Paris; New 
York 2004). 
 
 257
Blair, W.,  “Commentary on Documents and Contractual Congruence in International Trade” 
in S Worthington (ed), Commercial Law and Commercial Practice (Hart Publishing, London 
2003). 
 
Bridge, M., “Documents and Contractual Congruence in International Trade” in S 
Worthington (ed), Commercial Law and Commercial Practice (Hart Publishing, London 
2003). 
 
Bridge, M., International Sale of Goods Law and Practice (OUP, Oxford 1999). 
 
Brindle, M., and Cox, R., Law of Bank Payments (3rd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2004).  
 
Buckley, R. A.,  Illegality and public policy (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2002). 
 
Byrne, J., and Taylor, D., ICC Guide to the eUCP (ICC Publication, Paris 2002).  
 
Byrne, J.E., and Byrnes, C.S.,  2008 Annual Survey of Letter of Credit Law & Practice 
(Institute of International Banking Law & Practice, Montgomery Village, Md 2008). 
 
Byrne, J.E., and Taylor, D., ICC Guide to the eUCP (ICC Publication No. 639, Paris 2002).  
 
Byrne, J.E., The Comparison of UCP600 & UCP500The Institute of International Banking 
Law & Practice, MD USA 2007). 
 
Cane, P., and Stapleton, J., (eds), Essays for Patrick Atiyah (Clarendon, Oxford 1991). 
 
Castel and Sarna, Letters of Credit: The Law and Current Practice (3rd edn Sweet & 
Maxwell, Toronto 1989). 
 
Castel, J.G., and others, The Canadian Law and Practice of International Trade (2nd edn, E. 
Montgomery, Toronto 1997). 
 
Charles, D.B., ICC Guide to Documentary Credit Operations (ICC Publications No. 515, 
Paris 1994). 
 
Chuah, J., Law of International Trade (4th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2009). 
 
Commentary on UCP 600-Article-by-Article Analysis by the UCP 600 Drafting Group (ICC, 
Paris  2007). 
 
Dicey, A. V., and others, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the conflict of laws (14th edn Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 2006). 
 
Ellinger, E.P., Documentary Letters of Credit – A Comparative Study (University of 
Singapore Press, Singapore 1970). 
 
Ellinger, P., and Neo, D., The Law And Practice Of Documentary Letters Of Credit (Hart, 
Oxford 2010). 
 
 258
Enonchong N., Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2006). 
 
Enonchong, N., Illegal Transactions (Lloyd’s of London Press, London 1998). 
 
Everett, A., and McCracken, S.,  Everett & McCracken′s Banking and Financial Institutions 
Law (7th edn Thomson Reuters, Sydney 2009).  
 
Fentiman, R., Foreign law in English courts : pleading, proof, and choice of law, (OUP, 
Oxford 1998). 
 
Fung, K.T.,  Leading Court Cases on Letters of Credit (ICC Publication, Paris 2004).  
 
Furmston, M., Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston's Law of Contract (15th edn OUP, Oxford 
2006). 
 
Gao, X.,The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study (1st edn 
Kluwer Law International, London 2003). 
 
Goode, R.M.,Commercial Law ( 3rd edn LexisNexis, London 2004). 
 
Gozlan, A. Y., International letters of credit : resolving conflict of law disputes (2nd edn 
Hague, London 1999). 
 
Guest, A.G., and others, Benjamin's Sale of Goods (7th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 
2008). 
 
Hedley, W., and Hedley, R., Bills of Exchange and Bankers’ Documentary Credits (4th edn 
LLP, London 2001). 
 
Jack, R., Documentary credits: the law and practice of documentary credits including 
standby credits and demand guarantees (4th edn Tottel, Haywards Heath 2009). 
 
Jennings, M.M., Business: Its Legal, Ethical And Global Environment  (7th edn Thomson, 
USA 2005). 
 
Katz, R., Indights into UCP 600: collected articles from DCI 2003 to 2008 (ICC, Paris 2008).  
Kee, H.P., and Chen H.M., Current Problems of International Trade Financing (2nd edn 
Butterworths, Singapore 1990). 
 
King, R., Gutteridge and Megrah's Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits (8th edn Europa 
Publications, London, New York 2001). 
 
Klein, C., Letter of Credit Law Developments (Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago 2006). 
 
Kozolchyk, B., Commercial Letters of Credit in the Americas- A Comparative Study of 
Contemporary Commercial Transactions (Matthew Bende, New York 1966). 
 
Kurkela, M., Letters of credit and bank guarantees under international trade law (2nd edn 
OUP, New York 2008). 
 259
 
McCullogh, B.C., Letters of Credit (Matthew Bender, New York 1989). 
 
Mugasha, A., The Law of Letters of Credit and Bank Guarantees (The Federation Press, 
Sydney 2003). 
 
Murray, C., Holloway, D., and Timson-Hunt, D., Schmitthoff's Export Trade: The Law and 
Practice of International Trade (11th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007). 
 
Oelofse, A. N., The Law of Documentary Letters of Credit in Comparative Perspective 
(Interlegal, Pretoria 1997). 
 
Osborne, C., Civil Litigation (OUP, Oxford 2006). 
 
Poh, C. C., Law of Pledges, Guarantees and Letters of Credit, (5th edn LexisNexis, 
Singapore 2003). 
 
Pollock, F., Pollock's Principles of Contract  (13th  edn Stevens & Sons, London 1950). 
 
Purvis, R.N., and Darvas, R., The law and practice of commercial letters of credit, shipping 
documents and termination of disputes in international trade (Butterworths, Sydney 1975). 
 
Schütze, R. A., and Fontane, G., Documentary credit law throughout the world: annotated 
legislation from more than 35 countries (ICC Publication, Paris 2001). 
 
Sealy, L. S., & Hooley, R. J. A., Commercial Law: Text, Cases and Materials (4th edn OUP, 
Oxford 2009). 
 
SITPRO Ltd, Report on the Use of Export Letters of Credit 2001-2002 (SITPRO Ltd, London 
2003). 
 
Todd, P., Bills of Lading and Bankers Documentary Credits (3rd edn LLP, London 1998). 
 
Treitel, G.H., and Peel, E., Treitel on the Law of Contract (12th edn Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 2007). 
 
Warne, D., and Elliott, N., Banking Litigation (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005). 
 
White, J., and Summers, R., Uniform Commercial Code (5th edn West Group, St. Paul, 
Minnesota 2000). 
 
 
Theses 
 
 
Corne, C.W., “Rethinking the Law of Letters of Credit” (PhD thesis, University of Sydney  
2003).  
 
Goksu, A., “A comparative analysis of the rules pertaining to compliance of documents under 
commercial and standby credits” (PhD thesis, University of East Anglia 2004). 
 260
 
Kelly-Louw, M., “Selective legal aspects of bank demand guarantees" (PhD thesis, 
University of South Africa 2008). 
 
Khademan, M., “Documentary Letters of Credit and Related Rules under International Trade 
Law: A case for action” (LLM thesis, University of Glasgow1996). 
 
 
